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THE APOCALYPSE ARCHIVE: AMERICAN LITERATURE AND THE NUCLEAR 
BOMB 
Bradley J. Fest, PhD 
University of Pittsburgh, 2013 
 
This dissertation looks at global nuclear war as a trope that can be traced throughout twentieth 
century American literature. I argue that despite the non-event of nuclear exchange during the 
Cold War, the nuclear referent continues to shape American literary expression. Since the early 
1990s the nuclear referent has dispersed into a multiplicity of disaster scenarios, producing a 
“second nuclear age.” If the atomic bomb once introduced the hypothesis “of a total and 
remainderless destruction of the archive,” today literature’s staged anticipation of catastrophe has 
become inseparable from the realities of global risk. Consequently, to understand the relationship 
between the archive of twentieth and twenty-first century disaster literature and the world risk 
society, my dissertation revitalizes nuclear criticism by emphasizing the link between the 
development of nuclear weaponry and communication technologies. 
I read a group of writers for whom nuclear war functions more as a structural principle 
than as a narrative event. William Carlos Williams’s Spring and All (1923) is a significant 
precursor of a nuclear imagination distinct from a more general apocalyptic imagination. By 
imagining the destruction and reappearance of terrestrial life, Williams’s poem captures the 
recursive character of the nuclear imagination. I then address the relationship between the 
nuclear imagination, narrative, and the writing of history in the novels of Thomas Pynchon, and 
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how his asymptotic engagement with nuclear war attempts to transform postmodernity’s sense of 
an ending. David Foster Wallace’s subsequent response in Infinite Jest (1996) to US 
metafiction’s apocalyptic atmosphere is transitional between the first and second nuclear ages, 
reconfiguring the archive from a target of destruction into a system capable of producing 
emergent disaster through accumulation. My dissertation thus draws together technologies of 
destruction and preservation, and shows them to be inseparable in twentieth and twenty-first 
century US literature. 
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 1.0 MUTUALLY ASSURED DECONSTRUCTION: NUCLEAR CRITICISM AND 
AMERICAN APOCALYPTICS 
 
“I like to read about mass destruction and suffering. I spend a lot of time reading stuff 
that concerns thermonuclear war and things that pertain to it. Horrible diseases, fires 
raging in the inner cities, crop failures, genetic chaos, temperatures soaring and 
dropping, panic, looting, suicides, scorched bodies, arms torn off, millions of dead. That 
kind of thing.” 
 —Don DeLillo, End Zone1 
 
The fact that the September 11 attacks were the stuff of popular fantasies long before they 
actually took place provides yet another case of the twisted logic of dreams: it is easy to 
account for the fact that poor people around the world dream about becoming 
Americans—so what do the well-to-do Americans, immobilized in their well-being, dream 
about? About a global catastrophe that would shatter their lives—why? 
 —Slavoj Žižek, Welcome to the Desert of the Real!2 
 
Someone once said that it is easier to imagine the end of the world than to imagine the 
end of capitalism. We can now revise that and witness the attempt to imagine capitalism 
by way of imagining the end of the world. 
—Fredric Jameson, “Future City”3 
 
1 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION: STAGING THE REALITY OF CONTEMPORARY GLOBAL 
RISK 
This dissertation is the result of a fascination and an anxiety: a fascination with eschatological 
images and discourse, with narratives of disaster, ruin, and crisis; and an anxiety—or perhaps 
more accurately, a palpable if inchoate sense of embarrassment—about this fascination, about 
the fact that, like the protagonist of Don DeLillo’s End Zone (1972), “I like to read about mass 
destruction and suffering.” Why?  
If the events of the last decade or so are any indication, I am surely not alone in my 
fascination(s) (nor, I imagine, in my anxieties). One would have to be either heroically 
impervious to global realities or else some extraterrestrial from a cosmically distant utopia to not 
in some way be captured by or implicated in this or that contemporary invocation, formulation, 
or instantiation of “crisis.” From the proliferation of increasingly realistic spectacles of 
destruction in cinema and other media, to the irrefutably disastrous effects of observable climate 
change, the multiplying projections of global risk, the clamoring barrage of news describing yet 
another instance of human violence, the follies of United States foreign policy, the rapacious 
effects of a global capitalism that seems to be less and less the result of human agency, and more 
and more like the emergent manifestations of some nonhuman entity over which we have little 
control, etc., etc.—if, as some have noted, information is the very air we breathe in the digital 
age, disaster is the cosmic background radiation, invisibly infiltrating every fiber of our being. 
As Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek has recently put it after the 2008 financial crisis: “If this 
sounds apocalyptic, one can only retort that we live in apocalyptic times.”4  
2 
But is this apocalyptic invocation not a bit much? Is not such talk hyperbolic in a fashion 
similar to how a particularly heavy winter storm now gets quickly labeled “snowmageddon” or 
“snowpocalypse” by reactionary and fear-mongering news networks bent upon increasing their 
ratings?5 Have we not left behind the grand narratives of the Cold War, specifically the 
apocalyptic fantasy of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD)? Have not the hands of the 
doomsday clock moved a little further away from midnight, even in light of such disturbing 
recent developments as North Korea’s third nuclear test since 2006 or the meteor strike over 
Chelyabinsk, Russia?6 Even with the increasing awareness of such portentous events granted by 
today’s global communication networks, is it not in some way anachronistic to continue 
projecting such global doom? Should not fascination with and anxiety about massive destruction 
belong to a previous age, an age often defined by the possibility of an immediate nuclear 
eschaton, rather than the today’s slow burn of ecological crisis? These and many others are 
precisely the questions, asked in light of the persistence of eschatological and thanoptic fantasies 
of all kinds, which motivate what follows. 
 If this dissertation emerges from a fascination with and an anxiety about discursive 
formulations and textual instantiations of disaster, and specifically projections of nuclear 
disaster, it is simultaneously grounded in an acknowledgment of the power of such discourses 
and texts to shape reality (and of course vice versa). Indeed, as I hope to develop in this chapter 
and throughout this dissertation, drawing a clear line of separation between “discourse” or “text,” 
on the one hand, and “reality,” on the other, seems to me, at least at this late and exhausted date, 
largely beside the point. Despite the constellation of poets, novelists, critics, theorists, and 
philosophers I draw upon,7 and how a number of these writers predominantly worked during a 
period of postmodernity that was very concerned with the relationship between signs and what, if 
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anything, they signified (to absurdly oversimplify the issue), my project of revisiting and 
revivifying the practice of nuclear criticism does not seek to rehearse or revisit the kinds of 
debates that caused so much bad blood and ink to be spilled between poststructuralism and its 
diverse opponents regarding the textuality of the text, the discursive construction of reality, or 
the virtuality of the real, etc.  
Granted, our present moment may be lacking in the kind of rhetorical provocations that 
marked the most extreme salvos in these debates. Jean Baudrillard’s infamous claim that 
provides the title for his essay, “The Gulf War Did Not Take Place” (1991),8 for example, would 
(perhaps) necessitate such equivalent responses as Christopher Norris’s if it were made today:  
“[t]hat this is all sheer nonsense—a postmodern update on well-worn sophistical themes—should 
be obvious to anyone not wholly given over to the vagaries of current intellectual fashion.”9 But 
the ubiquity and proliferation of screens (all types of screens) at the present time—a moment that 
art historian and critic Terry Smith has productively called “contemporaneity”10—is making 
Baudrillard begin to appear not wrong or incendiary or naïve, as he once did for many, but quaint 
and perhaps even a bit precious.11 No longer does it seem novel or radical to stress the simulated 
virtuality of contemporary life. Rather, such descriptions seem to be merely accurate. 
This is not, however, to suggest that we are now living in some Matrix-like simulation,12 
nor am I proffering some uncomplicated misreading of Jacques Derrida’s famous quip about 
there being nothing outside of the text.13 Rather, one of the big claims I want to make is about 
precisely the relationship between disaster and the real. Following the thinking of German 
sociologist Ulrich Beck and drawing upon his concept of the “world risk society,” in 
contemporaneity the complexity of global risk is in many ways a result of how we imagined risk 
during the first nuclear age.14 The risks we now face often emerge from or occur because of 
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networks built, so the story goes, to combat risk, to preserve communication in the case of 
thermonuclear war.15 And today these networks have transformed into what is increasingly 
looking like a nonhuman entity or force, or if nothing else, an emergent phenomena. If we are to 
understand Beck’s term “reflexivity of uncertainty”16 (and his related notion of “reflexive 
modernity”), this latter point makes it clear the kinds of reflexivity produced by risk projection. 
Risk, like irony, is reflexive and soon reaches what Paul de Man once called “the dimensions of 
the absolute.”17 In the case of the projection of thermonuclear war, risk is also recursive. 
Imagining a nuclear eschaton, I think no one would disagree, played a significant role in 
preventing it from happening. And the non-event has produced, in the second nuclear age, a quite 
different set of risks, many of which continue to be inflected by the nuclear. The textual and 
aesthetic reflexivity and recursivity that so many have defined as aspects of postmodernism, 
something that David Foster Wallace dwelled on at length in his essay, “E Unibus Pluram: 
Television and U.S. Fiction” (1993), cannot be divorced from the reflexivity of risk. 
In this and other ways, Beck’s thinking bears considerably upon my reading of William 
Carlos Williams’s Spring and All (1923), and the work of Thomas Pynchon and Wallace. For 
Beck: “The distinction between risk and cultural perception of risk is becoming blurred [. . .] the 
staged anticipation of disasters and catastrophes obliges us to take preventive action.”18 
Revising and expanding his earlier definition of risk society in his recent work World at Risk 
(2009), he further argues that  
global risk is the staging of the reality [Realitätsinszenierung] of global risk. [. . .] 
‘Staging here is not intended in the colloquial sense of the deliberate falsification of 
reality by exaggerating “unreal” risks. The distinction between risk as anticipated 
catastrophe and the actual catastrophe forces us instead to take the role of staging 
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seriously. For only by imagining and staging world risk does the future catastrophe 
become present—often with the goal of averting it by influencing present decisions. Then 
the diagnosis of risk would be “a self-refuting prophecy”—a prime example being the 
debate on climate change which is supposed to prevent change.19 
The implications of Beck’s notions for reading literature, particularly contemporary literature, 
have begun to be pursued in a number of productive and interesting ways.20 But I think the 
implications of Beck’s thinking reveal, at a very fundamental level, one of the real and important 
ethical roles that literature does in fact play at the present time. Namely, how we imagine the 
world to be, and even more importantly, how we want the world not to be matters. Our ability to 
tell stories, and particularly our ability to tell stories about risk, stories that often prevent 
catastrophes, means that “Believed anticipation of catastrophe is transforming the concept of 
society in the twenty-first century.”21 And if the way we anticipate catastrophe is by telling 
stories, understanding those stories is of the utmost importance in the twenty-first century. 
 Certain stories about risk do in fact end. Often staged risks end in catastrophe, a term 
Beck distinguishes from risk.22 But other endings are (thankfully) less definite, and thus less 
clear. The projection of MAD, the primary way that the US State Department and US citizens 
staged the reality of global risk during the Cold War, has clearly transformed beyond recognition 
in the last two decades. But its legacies remain in a variety of ways. As Donald E. Pease argues 
so forcefully in The New American Exceptionalism (2009), the staging of the reality of global 
thermonuclear annihilation supported a state fantasy. “The fantasy that permitted U.S. citizens to 
achieve their national identity through the disavowal of U.S. imperialism was American 
exceptionalism.” 23 Consequently, the ideological and political stakes of staging global risk 
involve more than simply some bureaucratic, technocratic dream (or nightmare) of “managing” 
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risk (though obviously risk assessment and disaster management are visibly “booming” sectors 
of the US economy24). This dissertation begins from the understanding that the history of risk 
projection in the US has fundamentally shaped the ideological and political terrain of the postwar 
era through the discourse of American exceptionalism, and that the US national fantasy of global 
catastrophe continues to find diverse kinds of expression today. As Pease argues about American 
exceptionalism and the national fantasy of MAD: 
American exceptionalism was imagined as the primary means of warding off not merely 
an enemy ideology but a scene of catastrophic violence that could include the entire 
planet within its sphere of destruction. Defined as heresy none of whose tenets could 
become representable within the categorizations of the enemy’s symbolic order, 
American exceptionalism positioned U.S. citizens who took up this fantasy within the 
fantasmatic space of catastrophic destruction. When they hallucinated themselves as 
positioned there, this sublime fantasy enabled U.S. citizens to enjoy the attainment of 
their exceptional American identity through this awe-inspiring image of its possible total 
loss.25 
With the Cold War this national fantasy ended. As Pease goes on to demonstrate in his work, the 
nuclear de-escalation that followed the Cold War has transformed US national fantasy in a 
number of ways. The fantasmatic projection of nuclear devastation did not occur. Today, then, it 
is this non-event that has transformed the stories we tell about risk, and these stories are 
producing new national fantasies and new global risks. 
 This dissertation is an attempt, however, to tell a different kind of story, about different 
kinds of stories. I have largely eschewed looking at texts that represent nuclear disaster explicitly 
(perhaps as a way of distancing myself from both fascination and anxiety). Rather, it is the non-
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event of nuclear war that largely interests me here, and particularly how eschatological fantasy 
and the nuclear imagination transform from the first to the second nuclear ages. The texts I 
discuss are not “apocalyptic” in the way a plethora of postwar American texts have been; I 
(mostly) do not discuss texts in which nuclear warfare is (clearly) represented, nor do I discuss 
texts that unambiguously present “realistic” disasters. Instead, I concern myself primarily here 
with more “experimental” texts—poems, novels, novellas, and short stories—that, though clearly 
emerging from what I call a nuclear imagination, attempt in many ways to subvert or transform 
the projection of MAD and its totalizing effects. If, as Pease argues, MAD is a fantasy, then the 
projections of nuclear destruction and post-apocalyptic survival tales that appeared during the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries serve to both affirm and deny the historical realities of 
nuclear warfare and the US bombing of Hiroshima at the conclusion to the Second World War in 
insidious ways. Regarding MAD and Hiroshima, Pease writes: 
the nuclear anxiety originating from Hiroshima was to be understood as if retrospectively 
crucial to the dismantling of the cold war mentality it had engendered. As the actual 
historical enactment of the “spectacular annihilation,” the cold war at once affirmed yet 
denied, Hiroshima acquired the U.S. public’s spontaneous consent for the containment 
ideology of the cold war epoch and a vivid justification for the policy of nuclear 
deterrence. As a historic national spectacle, Hiroshima turned the entire U.S. social 
symbolic system into the afterimage of a collectively anticipated primal scene, a self-
divided (rather than self-present) instant, that always had not yet taken place (hence 
always anticipated) but had nevertheless always already happened (in the lived 
experience of anticipated disaster).26 
8 
 
The group of writers I have gathered together here—William Carlos Williams, Thomas 
Pynchon, David Foster Wallace, and others—attempt to resist eschatological fantasy in different 
ways, and thereby problematize the relationship between Hiroshima, the present, and the future. 
Each, in his own particular manner, is aware of how projecting global nuclear annihilation serves 
to both affirm and deny the past, to both prop up dominant ideologies, and obscure the political 
realities of the present. Consequently, this dissertation attempts not only to describe different 
kinds of histories in order to inform our present formulations of global risk, it also reemphasizes 
the vital role that the literary imagination can play in understanding contemporaneity (despite 
claims to the contrary). In order to map this nuclear present, to describe a modernist pre-World 
War II nuclear imagination, and to describe the important transformations in the literary and 
nuclear imaginations between what I will persist in calling the first and second nuclear ages, I 
have returned to the project of nuclear criticism, particularly Jacques Derrida’s seminal essay, 
“No Apocalypse, Not Now: Full Speed Ahead (Seven Missiles, Seven Missives)” (1984), in 
order to introduce what I think is a vitally important term in the continuing discussion and 
development of the nuclear imagination, risk projection, national fantasy, and the serious 
reconsiderations of nuclear criticism occurring right now after a long period of dormancy. That 
term is archive. As I demonstrate through my reading of Pynchon and Wallace, it has now 
become impossible, if it in fact ever was, to separate information technology from nuclear 
technology, both in the imaginary and in reality. As Derrida so notoriously theorized that what 
nuclear war threatened was the archive, beyond anything else, today the archive has itself 
become a threat. What I call the hyperarchival impulse of contemporaneity, the urge to 
archivally preserve everything, regardless of content, and the tendency for information to 
accumulate without clearly defined goals and purposes grounding that accumulation27—the 
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hyperarchival impulse is both on display in Pynchon and Wallace, and is simultaneously being 
heavily critiqued and problematized in each writer’s work.28 If today many are seeking terms to 
locate what is “beyond” postmodernism, what might constitute the “new,” we should be wary of 
how closely such projects can be implicated in the hyperarchival urge of the present. If during 
the first nuclear age the archive was fantasized as a site of destruction, during the second nuclear 
age its limitless accumulation now defines a different, though quite similar horizon of 
eschatological fantasy and global risk. By returning to the important question of the nuclear as it 
transforms in the second nuclear age, my reading of Pynchon and Wallace will demonstrate 
some of the important pathways for understanding global risk in the digital age that we would do 
well to understand as one of the enduring legacies of experimental postmodern American 
literature. 
 
1.2 “THE TWISTED LOGIC OF DREAMS”: THE HYPERREAL, THE REAL, AND 
9.11.01 
 
That the fatal fragmentation of society might some day end is, for the cultural critic, a 
fatal destiny. He would rather that everything end than that mankind put an end to 
reification. 
—Theodor W. Adorno, “Cultural Criticism and Society”29 
 
It is probably unavoidable to begin talking about fantasy and disaster, risk and projection, 
catastrophe and narrative at this point in time, especially framed by the terms of American 
exceptionalism, without talking about the events of 11 September 2001. But I hesitate to do so 
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for two reasons. First, it disturbingly seems both cliché and self-serving in ways that make me 
uncomfortable. Just as apocalyptic prophecy has been used in the service of hegemonic power 
for thousands of years, the attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center (WTC) that 
largely inaugurated my adulthood have been used to justify an uncountable number of atrocious 
activities, both at the level of the state and at the level of the individual. So I worry that any 
discussion of 9.11.01 will implicate my intervention in similar ways.30 Second, as many would 
largely agree, US literary production explicitly engaged with 9.11.01 has been sorely wanting.31 
Novels like Don DeLillo’s Falling Man (2007), Jonathan Safran Foer’s Extremely Loud and 
Incredibly Close (2006), and Jonathan Franzen’s Freedom (2010) (to name only a few), with 
their emphasis on domesticity and the individual, their clear participation in an Amerocentrism, 
and their view on history and the present that largely ignores the conditions of global capitalism 
in the twenty-first century—make the American literary response to 9.11.01 seem both myopic 
and unimaginative. Though obviously there are valuable aspects to each of these novels, as well 
as other important moments in the growing corpus of US 9.11.01 literature—something like 
Amy Waldman’s The Submission (2011), though wanting in other ways, seems like an important 
reframing of the event(s)—it will probably take the passage of a more significant amount of time 
before the historicity of 9.11.01 can be channeled productively in US literature.32  
Despite my hesitation, however, it would seem shortsighted not to immediately address 
an event that has been a kind of “testing ground” for postmodern theories of the image that 
dominated so much of the critical and theoretical discussion during the 1980s and 1990s, and for 
thinking about the contemporary spectacle of disaster. So rather than discuss the events or their 
literary response, and as a way of framing what is at stake in my nuclear critical approach, I will 
turn toward Slavoj Žižek and Jean Baudrillard’s response to 9.11.01. I also turn toward these 
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thinkers as it provides me with a way of talking about American apocalypticism in more 
historical terms, and it introduces the need to talk about narrative eschatology more generally. If 
the reimagining of nuclear criticism is to be productive, Žižek and Baudrillard are excellent 
“testing grounds” of my own, particularly with regard to the primary debates surrounding nuclear 
criticism, which I will address at further length in the third and fourth sections of this chapter. If 
the fantasy of annihilation has shaped so much of the nuclear imagination, then Žižek and 
Baudrillard offer poignant moments to press against that will inform my understanding of the 
nuclear imagination and my reading of the nuclear referent throughout the dissertation. 
 
On the one year anniversary of the attacks on the WTC, notable radical publishing house Verso 
published three books.33 Slim rectangles clearly meant to resemble the austere towers of the 
WTC, each book contains portions of the same image on its cover: a highly stylized, heavily 
processed photograph of people running from the collapsing towers. The cover of each book 
successively “zooms in” on the amorphous mass of smoke where the towers used to be, so that, 
through successively looking at all three, by the time one comes to the “close-up” of the gap 
created by the towers’ destruction, it is difficult to discern what we are seeing from a piece of 
abstract expressionism.34 These books—penned by some of the most visible and controversial 
intellectuals of the late-twentieth century: Paul Virilio, Baudrillard, and Žižek—considered 
initially as aesthetic objects, participate in the very spectacle of disaster that they critically 
theorize between their covers. The shape of the books and the images portrayed on their covers 
unabashedly inscribe these objects as already collapsing, as already involved in the process of 
their own destruction and the repetition, in finer and finer granularity, of the attacks. Their 
“writing of the disaster”35 houses that disaster in a structure that simultaneously reproduces that 
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disaster while announcing its anniversary. That this takes place from a position on the left should 
not distract us from the fragility of the towers being reproduced with the fragile word, with 
writing. And the fact that there are three of these books rather than two reveals a need for 
archival accumulation, a logorrhea that, faced with disaster, must keep writing in excess of the 
disaster itself. 
 Žižek makes much the same point in Welcome to the Desert of the Real! (2002): “Of 
course, the point is not to play a pseudo-postmodern game of reducing the WTC collapse to just 
another media spectacle, reading it as a catastrophe version of the snuff-porno movies; the 
question we should have asked ourselves as we stared at the TV screens on September 11 is 
simply: Where have we already seen the same thing over and over again?”36 His purpose in 
asking this question is to highlight a common response to the attacks: “it looked like a movie.” 
Such images of destruction had already become so visible, so common, that for Žižek 9.11.01 
was merely the irruption into reality of the virtual regime of catastrophic images. To repeat the 
epigraph to this chapter from above: “The fact that the September 11 attacks were the stuff of 
popular fantasies long before they actually took place provides yet another case of the twisted 
logic of dreams: it is easy to account for the fact that poor people around the world dream about 
becoming Americans—so what do well-to-do Americans, immobilized in their well-being, 
dream about? About a global catastrophe that would shatter their lives—why?” In his patented 
Lacanian psychoanalytic mode, the images which repeated again and again, on that morning and 
since, were simply the realization of a supposed cultural-wide fantasy of desiring this type of 
spectacular disaster. It was already contained in writing itself, and its fulfillment in reality was 
merely a by-product of this imaginative regime. Curiously, disaster here cannot help but produce 
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excess in Žižek’s own prose. In attempting to analyze the disaster, he inevitably participates in 
the very writing of the disaster he is analyzing. 
 Jean Baudrillard also cannot help participating in this operation in The Spirit of Terrorism 
(2002) as he develops his thinking along similar, if slightly different lines: “The fact that we 
have dreamt of this event, that everyone without exception has dreamt of it—because no one can 
avoid dreaming of the destruction of any power that has become hegemonic to this degree—is 
unacceptable to the Western moral conscience. Yet it is a fact, and one which can indeed be 
measured by the emotive violence of all that has been said and written in the effort to dispel it.”37 
Clearly Baudrillard is rhetorically over-generalizing here, for surely the destruction of the WTC 
was not the destruction of Western hegemonic power, nor could one say that “everyone” surely 
dreamed of this event. The gusto and flourish of his prose, however, clearly indicates that, for 
him, the writing of the disaster, the writing produced in the face of disaster, is an attempt to 
destroy the fact that the disaster itself was already written, that it was the towers’ “symbolic 
collapse that brought about their physical collapse, not the other way around.”38 And in his 
provocative style, he even goes so far as to imagine that “we might even be said to have before 
us the absolute event, the ‘mother’ of all events, the pure event uniting within itself all the events 
that have never taken place.”39 
 Žižek and Baudrillard’s characteristically provocative rhetoric (and to a much lesser 
extent Virilio’s) is essentially apocalyptic, a discourse of revelation and veils being ripped 
asunder. This discourse, however, has been effectively reversed if not qualitatively changed from 
traditional apocalyptic utterances. Rather than some veil of māyā covering over “real” reality—
“truth” being that which the Apocalypse penetrates or unveils—what we have is an event which 
reveals the virtuality that reality itself covers over.40 What is notable about this discourse, 
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however, is not simply how it mirrors the reversals both authors are so well-known for and 
which they employ so effectively,41 but also how it at first appears to reassess the age-old 
problem of eschatological imagination and prophecy. 
 Traditionally, the failure of the apocalyptic moment to occur, that it was “soon but not 
yet,” has assured the slow but steady primacy of something like the “reality-principle” with 
regard to apocalyptic discourse. One could imagine, predict, and prophesy the end to one’s 
heart’s content, at bottom assured that it would not occur. Consequently, eschatological 
formulations have often been effectively read with regard to their real consequences, referents, 
and goals. John of Patmos’s Apocalypse can and should be read as a political tract denouncing 
the Roman Empire. Norman Cohn has emphasized the anarchic and politically revolutionary 
aspects of medieval apocalypticism.42 And even something as benign as Alan Weisman’s recent 
The World Without Us (2007) only imagines the disappearance of humanity to emphasize the 
complex relationship humans have with their physical environment—i.e. that we are not only 
destroying the Earth; vast parts of its eco-system depend upon our presence. (And indeed, if we 
were to disappear the planet would ultimately be “fine,” with the exception of a thin layer of 
plastic in the geologic record.43) 
 In the American tradition, the relationship between real-world rhetorical goals and the 
apocalyptic imagination finds its most clear articulation in what Sacvan Bercovitch, drawing 
upon Perry Miller, has designated the “American jeremiad.”44 For Bercovitch, the Puritan 
“errand into the wilderness” required an accompanying rhetoric of producing perpetual crisis. 
(Today we can see such rhetoric in the economics of Milton Friedman.) To unite the disparate 
peoples of New England, the jeremiad served to define a community and to provide an 
eschatological destiny for the individuals of that community. Faced with the fires of damnation 
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and the soon-at-hand Last Judgment (a judgment all the more assured because these jeremiads 
were based on the perceived election or chosen nature of the people they were addressed to), the 
“new chosen people, city on a hill, promised land, destined progress, New Eden, American 
Jerusalem,”45 etc.—these things could only be realized within the purview of an eschatological 
destiny, a destiny which required a rhetoric of eternal doom in order to facilitate a fantasy about 
a communal future. 
The American Puritan [. . .] entails a ritual that obviates the traditional distinctions 
between preparation for salvation and social conformity—a carefully regulated process in 
which the fear for one’s soul is a function of historical process, moral discipline a means 
simultaneously to personal and social success, and success a matter of constant anxiety 
about the venture into the future [. . .] and it implies a form of community without 
geographical boundaries, since the wilderness is by definition unbounded, the terra 
profana ‘out there’ yet to be conquered, step by inevitable step, by the advancing armies 
of Christ.46 
 The efficacy of the American jeremiad can be seen in the way it eventually secularized this type 
of rhetoric in and around the American Revolution, how  
in virtually every area of life, the jeremiad became the official ritual form of continuing 
revolution.  Mediating between religion and ideology, the jeremiad gave contract the 
sanctity of covenant, free enterprise the halo of grace, progress the assurance of the 
chiliad, and nationalism the grandeur of typology. In short, it wed self-interest to social 
perfection, and conferred on both the unique blessings of American destiny.47   
For Bercovitch, apocalyptic rhetoric, unconsciously or not, can be most clearly understood in the 
reality-effects it produced. The “event,” instantiation, or actual occurrence of the disaster, of the 
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apocalyptic moment, has little-to-no bearing on its reality. The imminence of such an event 
supplies all its rhetorical weight. That it is “soon but not yet” produces a reality of perpetual 
crisis and anxiety never to be eschatologically consummated.   
Consequently, we can find in traditional apocalyptic discourse and representation, in 
which the jeremiad clearly falls, a perpetual caesura between the virtual and the real; in fact, the 
very structure of the apocalyptic imagination depends upon its never-being-realized. The 
apocalypse provides teleological thrust, eschatological meaning, and communal destiny for a 
world caught in what literary critic Frank Kermode, drawing upon Sir Philip Sidney’s Apology 
for Poetry (1595), would locate as the “middest.”48 This structure is paramount to the 
apocalyptic imagination, for its actual realization would truly be a revelation, it would shatter the 
illusion of reality—whether produced by this imagination or not—and reveal the “truth.”  
The significance of Baudrillard and Žižek’s reversal of traditional apocalyptic structures 
in their 9.11.01 books, however, is in danger of being overstated here. For Baudrillard in 
particular, the attack on the WTC actually constitutes an apocalyptic-type event, “the absolute 
event, the ‘mother’ of all events, the pure event uniting within itself all the events that have never 
taken place.” The horizon of this reversal is that it is the actual occurrence of the event which 
reveals the reality of the virtual, rather than the event revealing the virtuality of reality. But it is 
only this actual occurrence of the event that permits this reversal. It is not clear if this actually 
constitutes a significant departure, a difference in kind rather than simply degree, from 
traditional apocalyptic discourse: 
In contrast to the nineteenth century of utopian or ‘scientific’ projects and ideals, plans 
for the future, the twentieth century aimed at delivering the thing itself—at directly 
realizing the longed-for New Order. The ultimate and defining moment of the twentieth 
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century was the direct experience of the Real as opposed to everyday social reality—the 
Real in its extreme violence as the price to be paid for peeling off the deceptive layers of 
reality.49 
For Žižek here as elsewhere, the Real is that horrible void that must be and is covered over by 
“reality,” by our construction of reality. To experience the Real is traumatic. What is revealed is 
not “truth” or reality as such, then, but the fictional nature of our experience. This “fiction” does 
not mask some more “real” reality, but rather is produced by the very lack of any transcendent 
truth or meaning. The “truth” is that there is no truth, only the nothing. The fictions we construct 
about the world are produced from an inability to confront the void. 
 In recent years, Žižek’s apocalypticism has become more pronounced. In both First as 
Tragedy, Then as Farce (2009) and Living in the End Times (2010), he has undergone what I 
would call an “apocalyptic turn.” This turn is recognizable in Žižek’s representation and 
discussion of disaster. In the intervening years between his thinking in Welcome to the Desert of 
the Real!, which was largely grounded by what Alain Badiou calls the twentieth century’s 
“passion for the real,”50 and 2008, Žižek’s despair about our inability to imagine the end of 
capitalism has introduced a thoroughgoing apocalypticism into his thinking, a sense of disaster 
that also desperately imagines and accepts as inevitable “a global catastrophe that would shatter 
[our] lives.” 
 His solution has been a simple and attractive. In nearly every one of his books since Iraq: 
The Borrowed Kettle (2004) he concludes by invoking a “Bartlebian politics.” From a Bartlebian 
stance, he thinks that for the intellectual (and others) the only proper political act available within 
the culture of late capitalism is the stance of Herman Melville’s Bartleby.51 Largely following a 
passage of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s Empire (2000),52 he argues that we should 
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approach the world uttering “I would prefer not to. . . .”53 In his analysis of the failure to 
properly react to the financial crisis in First as Tragedy, Then as Farce, he writes: “Perhaps the 
solution resides in an eschatological apocalypticism which does not involve the fantasy of the 
symbolic Last Judgment in which all past accounts will be settled; . . . the task is ‘merely’ to stop 
the train of history which, left to its own course, leads to a precipice.”54 And later: “We have to 
accept that, at the level of possibilities, our future is doomed, that the catastrophe will take place, 
that it is our destiny—and then, against the background of this acceptance, mobilize ourselves to 
perform the act which will change destiny itself and insert a new possibility into the past.”55 This 
sentiment, that we need to assume the apocalypse (without revelation) is inevitable, that, in light 
of the realities of contemporary global capitalism, an apocalypse might indeed be necessary, has 
also recently been echoed by Evan Calder Williams: “What we need, then, is an apocalypse”56 
and then to restart “with a world after the fact of its collapse, an endless series of world 
collapses. . . . Constructing anew from leftovers”—an ethico-aesthetic mode he calls “salvage 
punk.”57 
 Though I must admit that both Žižek and Williams’s invocation of a necessary 
apocalypse shares a rhetorical and affective resonance with my own thinking on the subject, and 
that I very much appreciate their often masterful critique of contemporaneity and its unique 
apocalyptic texts, in attempting to define a new relationship to history and capitalism, a mode of 
thinking capable of accounting for and confronting the increasingly complex realities of late 
capitalist existence, each thinker not only fails to acknowledge that his apocalyptic and messianic 
mode is thoroughly traditional (and somewhat antiquated)—along the lines of Norman Cohn’s 
analysis of Christian millenarianism in the Middle Ages—but makes the mistake of equating 
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ecological catastrophe, which has become one of the dominant projections of the apocalyptic 
imagination since the end of the Cold War, with the instantaneity of global nuclear war. 
Recall the recent films of Roland Emmerich, perhaps especially The Day After Tomorrow 
(2004) and 2012 (2009). In each film Emmerich misconstrues current acknowledged realities 
about climate change, even the possibility of sudden climate change, with instantaneous climate 
change. Though narrativizing ecological disaster probably necessitates a more-or-less sudden 
environmental event or catastrophe to make proper narrative sense, to provide the moment of 
narrative crisis that Kermode, drawing upon Aristotle, calls peripeteia58—something Kim 
Stanley Robinson explores in his Science in the Capital Trilogy (2004-2007) and Red Mars 
Trilogy (1993-1996)—Emmerich’s films are thoroughly structured by something that I will 
argue continues to be nuclear. Projecting an ecological disaster in the Anthropocene that 
instantaneously transforms and destroys human civilization is a narrative device that does not 
correspond to the realities of climate change, but shares a more clear genealogy with MAD. The 
national fantasy of instantaneous manmade destruction has not disappeared in Emmerich’s films. 
In something like Independence Day (1996) the fantasmatic national spectacle is on display. In 
other words, to imagine that an apocalypse is what the world “needs,” or that it is even possible, 
is a formulation still thoroughly grounded in a traditional apocalyptic imagination. That 
Emmerich is a German creating these eco-jeremiads is only a further testament to the 
transnational power of apocalyptic spectacle. 
This is not to suggest that Žižek or Williams are participating in or reproducing an 
exceptional national narrative, indeed, they are doing quite the opposite, but they are very much 
delivering jeremiads. Perhaps in contemporaneity such jeremiads are exactly what we need to 
hear, and the successes (and failures) of revolutionary politics during the last decade does testify 
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to the power of the event. For each writer, however, the disaster is still very much to come. 
Critics like James Berger in After the End: Representations of Post-Apocalypse (1999), and Lee 
Quinby in Anti-Apocalypse: Exercises in Genealogical Criticism (1994) have provided some 
excellent readings of what might be called an anti-eschatological strain of American fiction. 
Berger’s reading of the twentieth century as defined by narratives of post-apocalypse and 
aftermath seem particularly important to keep in mind. As does Quinby’s Foucauldian reading of 
how apocalyptic rhetoric can serve hegemonic power structures. But the persistence of 
eschatological desire, whether from the perspective of state fantasy or from the radical left, 
should give us pause.  
Žižek and Baudrillard’s books on 9.11.01 mark both a shift and a continuation of the 
persistence of apocalyptic formulations. This continuing persistence, if I may be so bold, can be 
located quite simply in the attempt to find a relationship between formulations of the apocalypse 
and reality as such. These attempts have a long history of failure and revision, but this in no way 
has lessened the persistence of presenting a relationship between the end and historical reality, 
for as Frank Kermode argues: 
the great majority of interpretations of Apocalypse assume that the End is pretty near. 
Consequently the historical reality is always having to be revised; time discredits it. And 
this is important. Apocalypse can be disconfirmed without being discredited. This is part 
of its extraordinary resilience. It can also absorb changing interests, rival apocalypses, 
such as the Sibylline writings. It is patient of change and of historiographical 
sophistications. It allows itself to be diffused, blended with other varieties of fiction [. . .] 
and yet it can survive in very naïve forms.59 
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For Kermode, apocalyptic fictions, representations, and images do not depend upon any sort of 
real instantiation. They are too resilient, for no matter how much reality may frustrate the 
apocalyptic imagination, it is infinitely pliable and malleable with regard to reality—it does not 
depend upon reality as such for its realization. 
 And yet today it seems like it is reality itself that is pliable. Our sense of the real 
continues to be fundamentally shaped and transformed by apocalyptic fantasy, a fantasy that 
though it has lost the capacity for revelation, reflexively produces and responds to risk. The 
pliability of the apocalypse, of narrative to make sense out of all the incoherent and frustrating 
ways reality disconfirms beginnings and endings, has merged with Baudrillard’s “hyperreal.” 
Such a statement is not to suggest that the reality of disaster is textual or simulated. Quite the 
opposite. The epigraph from Fredric Jameson that begins this chapter, his revision of his famous 
statement that it is easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism, seems 
especially relevant here: “Someone once said that it is easier to imagine the end of the world than 
to imagine the end of capitalism. We can now revise that and witness the attempt to imagine 
capitalism by way of imagining the end of the world.” Today, in a world where the 
manufacturing of perpetual crisis serves the endless re-articulation of late capitalist modes and 
structures, it seems no longer possible or productive to continue the critique of the image vis-à-
vis the disaster from the very position of (desiring) crisis, caesura, and peripeteia. Imagining the 
disaster produces more images, which produces more disaster, which produces more images, ad 
infinitum. Jameson’s point, both originally and in his revision, is not, contra Žižek and Williams, 
that we need some “mother” of all events that would shatter the stranglehold of late multinational 
capitalism. Rather, it is a continuing call to imagine something different, to not imagine the end 
of the world, to not participate in the rhetoric and discourse of crisis as the only mode through to 
22 
 
some more humane way of living. If risk and catastrophe are fundamentally defined by how we 
imagine and project risk, then it no longer seems critically or theoretically productive to 
reproduce apocalyptic discourse so freely, so hyperbolically, so willingly. What we “need” is not 
some apocalypse. What we need is to imagine time and space, the conditions of the network 
society, and our relationship to the historical archive and the archive to come in different ways—
to tell a different narrative. William Carlos Williams’s early experimental prose-poetry is a 
testament to this need. As is Thomas Pynchon’s massive work of historical fiction inflected by 
his resistance to what I call the optical society. And David Foster Wallace is explicit in his desire 
to move past the apocalypticism of postmodern American metafiction. The continuing power of 
these writers, whose influence does not seem to be waning,60 for me is directly tied to their 
efforts to imagine different stories, to imagine narrative itself, differently. The necessity to heed 
this effort, the necessity to imagine a way of being in world that is anti-eschatological informs 
the work of this dissertation. And it is my contention that revisiting and revivifying the practice 
of nuclear criticism to confront the challenges of the control society provides one path toward no 
apocalypse, not now. 
 
1.3 NUCLEAR ANACHRONISM(S) AFTER THE COLD WAR: THE LEGACIES OF 
DERRIDA’S “NO APOCALYPSE, NOT NOW” 
 
Everything is being blown away; 
 A little horse trots up with a letter in its mouth, which is read with eagerness 
 As we gallop into the flame. 
  —John Ashbery, “A Last World”61 
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 In the midst of the debt crisis that dominated the news cycle during the summer of 2011, Joseph 
Cirincione published a short piece in The Atlantic, “How to Shave a Bundle off the Deficit: 
Spend Less on Nukes.” In this (un)timely article, Cirincione points out that  
the government is set to spend almost $700 billion on nuclear weapons over the next 10 
years, roughly as much as it spent on the war in Iraq over the [previous] decade. Most of 
the money will be spent without any clear guidance on how many weapons we need and 
for what purpose. Procurement is racing ahead of policy. . . . As Forbes recently noted, 
“Barack Obama is likely to spend more money on the U.S. nuclear arsenal than any U.S. 
president since Ronald Reagan.”62 
Current president of The Ploughshares Fund, a prominent anti-nuclear foundation, Cirincione 
suggests that the US desperately needs a “nuclear road map”—a strategy for contemporary 
nuclear realities rather than “weapons to fight last century’s conflict” 63—before spending any 
more money on nuclear technology. And it appears that Cirincione’s efforts have been effective 
in drawing legislative attention to this issue, as in October 2011 Cirincione reported in The 
Atlantic that Massachusetts Representative, Democrat Edward J. Markey, sent a letter to the 
budgetary Super Committee, signed by 65 members of Congress, calling for $200 billion in cuts 
from the nuclear weapons budget over the next ten years.64 
As my purpose here is to seriously reconsider, in a contemporary context, what once went 
under the heading of nuclear criticism, it is significant to note that Markey’s letter begins by 
emphasizing that “the Berlin Wall fell. The Soviet Union crumbled. The Cold War ended. Yet 20 
years later, we continue to spend over $50 billion a year on the U.S. nuclear arsenal. This makes 
no sense [. . .]. We are robbing the future to pay for the unneeded weapons of the past.”65 For 
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weapons that were only used aggressively when atomic technology was still new, the “unneeded 
weapons of the past” largely functioned during the twentieth century as an arsenal of futurity, as 
the “to come,” a speculative event that a great outpouring of military and cultural production 
attempted to imagine. But here Markey seems to indicate that nuclear weapons are as militarily 
archaic as, say, trench warfare. Somehow the nuclear capacity of the US itself has become a relic 
of the past. Consequently, the pervasive national fantasy of global catastrophe and MAD has 
somehow moved into a position of historicity, an event that, though it did not occur, has been 
transformed into a document in what might be called a nonexistent “apocalypse archive.” (That 
the US is set to spend the same amount on its nuclear arsenal that it spent in Iraq is a further 
testament to the untimely anachronistic realities of nuclear weapons.) In a similar fashion, one 
might be tempted to classify nuclear criticism—which was practiced between 1984 and 1993, 
and more-or-less vanished with the end of the Cold War—as similarly anachronistic and 
outdated, a mode of cultural engagement whose occasion has passed. Yet I would like to argue 
that precisely the opposite is the case at the moment; and it may very well be the “untimely” 
nature of nuclear criticism—in the sense that Nietzsche gives the word66—that makes it 
appropriate to reconsider.  
 Jacques Derrida in the early 1980s delivered two papers on explicitly apocalyptic topics. 
The first, “On a Newly Arisen Apocalyptic Tone in Philosophy” (1984),67 undertook to analyze 
philosophy in terms of apocalyptic discourse. The second, “No Apocalypse, Not Now: Full 
Speed Ahead (Seven Missiles, Seven Missives)” (1984),68 outlined a multivalent, rigorous, and 
malleable nuclear criticism for literary studies. Indeed, depending upon how seriously we might 
take him, we might read these essays as Derrida proposing nothing less than an overhaul of the 
disciplinary boundaries of literature and philosophy themselves. Though his statements tend 
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toward the hyperbolic and ironic, as they associate all literature with the nuclear issue, their 
claims should be confronted today: “thus one cannot be satisfied with saying that, in order to be 
serious and interesting today, a literature and a literary criticism must refer to the nuclear issue, 
must even be obsessed by it. To be sure, this should be said, and it is true. But I believe that, at 
least indirectly, literature has always done this. It has always belonged to the nuclear epoch, 
even if it does not talk ‘seriously’ about it.”69 For any reader of Derrida, the declarative tone of 
this statement cannot be ignored, especially for a writer whose style is so often characterized by 
its deferrals, ellipses, circles, half-statements, and contradictions. Furthermore, he even goes so 
far as to off-handedly remark near the end of “No Apocalypse” that, with regard to “the topic of 
this name, ‘nuclear criticism,’ one can predict that soon after this colloquium, programs and 
departments in universities may be created under this title, just as one did well, even with all the 
ambiguity it entailed, to create programs or departments of ‘women’s studies’ or ‘black studies’ 
and more recently of ‘peace studies.’”70 Assuredly, no programs or departments of “nuclear 
criticism” have arisen, and even the term has fallen into almost complete disuse in the past 
fifteen years or so,71 but for a while in the waning days of the Cold War, some scholars were 
quite invested in pursuing a project of nuclear criticism. 
 In April of 1984, a colloquium on the topic of nuclear criticism was held at Cornell 
University. Major papers from this conference, including “No Apocalypse,” were then published 
that summer in a special edition of Diacritics.72 The editor of this issue of Diacritics, Richard 
Klein, defined nuclear criticism in his introduction: “by Nuclear Criticism is meant something 
positive and something unavowed, a new topic and an explication of what is already everywhere 
being done.”73 Though this is a fantastically vague definition, and allowed the papers collected in 
Diacritics along with his own proposed subjects for investigation to define exactly what was 
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meant by nuclear criticism,74 the initial gesture to propose the term arose because literary studies 
and literary theory in general had been too silent with regard to nuclear issues, a silence that 
could not continue because of the “important contribution” that literary and critical theory could 
make “to the public discussion of nuclear issues.”75 Furthermore, the proposal for a nuclear 
criticism arose “out of reading a certain amount of recent criticism and critical theory and feeling 
that without exception it recounts an allegory of nuclear survival”; and that the one could show 
“how the terms of the current nuclear discussion are being shaped by literary or critical 
assumptions whose implications are often, perhaps systematically, ignored.” 76 In other words, 
literary theory was especially capable of dealing with nuclear issues, both in the public sphere 
and within the academy, and its general silence should be rectified. Though this issue of 
Diacritics included some significant contributions—among them Frances Ferguson’s “The 
Nuclear Sublime” on the unthinkable or unrepresentable nature of nuclear war, and Derrick De 
Kerckhove’s “On Nuclear Communication,” which tied the nuclear and the atomic firmly to the 
history of the phonetic alphabet—Derrida’s “No Apocalypse” has received the bulk of attention 
and controversy when it comes to the issue of nuclear criticism. 
 Much of this attention has focused on Derrida’s claim that literary theorists are especially 
competent to confront the nuclear issue because it is  
fabulously textual, through and through. Nuclear weaponry depends, more than any 
weaponry in the past, it seems, upon structures of information and communication, of 
language, including unvocalizable language, of codes and graphic decoding. But the 
phenomenon is fabulously textual also to the extent that, for the moment, nuclear war has 
not taken place: one can only talk and write about it.77   
27 
 
This claim, clear as it is (despite the “it seems”) angered some scholars, even some working 
within the field of nuclear criticism, because it appears to eschew absolutely any reality for 
nuclear war, that its possibility or probability, its actual instantiation in the world would be 
merely textual (or virtual). This reaction to Derrida has mostly been around his earlier, 
controversial claim that “there is nothing outside the text,” that even a nuclear war can only be 
confronted as a text, that it is not “real” in his thinking. Though he clarifies why this is, both 
above, and when he says “nuclear war has no precedent.  It has never occurred, itself; it is a non-
event,” that what permits such a statement, for the moment, is that nuclear war has not occurred, 
none of this has prevented people from denouncing Derrida’s nuclear criticism. 
 In the Winter 1990 issue of Papers on Language & Literature, the only other special 
issue of a journal wholly devoted to the issue of nuclear criticism, William J. Scheick writes in 
his editorial introduction to both the journal itself and the concept of nuclear criticism, that 
“nuclear criticism aims to transform the poststructuralist distant and abstract emphasis on the 
indeterminacy of the meaning of any thought or word to an immediate and relevant emphasis on 
the determinacy of at least one meaning: the utter reality of predictable death, of the total 
extinction of all life, in terms of the nuclear referent.”78 For Scheick, drawing upon J. Fisher 
Solomon and others,79 the reality of nuclear war can be located in the fact that it is logically 
predictable and probable.80 Consequently, to confine thinking about nuclear war to the merely 
literary is irresponsible and wrong. For Scheick, nuclear criticism is primarily an ethical 
criticism, perhaps the most ethical criticism, as it revolves around “the one ultimate concern that 
has always mattered to humanity throughout history: the preservation of life.”81 Ethics for 
Scheick boils down to the preservation of the species, and the reality of the possibility of the 
species’ extinction becomes the reality of his ethical imperative. “The nuclear referent is the 
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‘most real’ of empirical potentialities; situationally verifiable, it ‘really’ threatens the extinction 
of life.”82 The “goal” or task of nuclear criticism, the foundation of its ethical stance, is to 
prevent this reality, this “‘most real’ of empirical potentialities.”83 This is a very different nuclear 
criticism from the one outlined by Derrida, yet his text is still the foundation for this ethical 
nuclear criticism. Consequently, during the “heyday” of nuclear criticism, we can discern a clear 
split between an “ethical nuclear criticism” and a “deconstructive nuclear criticism.” 
 When Scheick and Solomon insist on the reality of the nuclear, on a nuclear criticism 
whose horizon is the prevention of total nuclear war, and they thereby misread “No Apocalypse.” 
Both read Derrida as if he is denying nuclear war’s real possibility, that it would merely be a 
“text” to read. But I find that Derrida’s text, his “denial” of the reality of nuclear war, comes 
from simply the position that it has not happened yet. For Solomon, the empirical reality of a 
nuclear war is based on its possibility, and, since it is possible, it is real. Derrida does not in any 
way deny that the actual, real, empirical instantiation of nuclear war is a possibility: “the nuclear 
age gives us to think this aporia of speed starting from the limit of absolute acceleration at which 
the temporalities called subjective and objective, phenomenological and intraworldly, authentic 
and inauthentic, and so on, would end up merging in the uniqueness of an ultimate event, of a 
final collision or collusion.”84 This ultimate event, this final collision, however, “is obviously the 
possibility of an irreversible destruction, leaving no traces, of the juridico-literary archive and 
therefore of the basis of literature and criticism. Not necessarily the destruction of humanity, of 
the human habitat, or even of other discourses (arts or sciences), or even indeed of poetry or the 
epic.”85 For Derrida, this destruction of the archive is a very real possibility, and it is this that 
nuclear war would bring about. One can imagine fragments of humanity going on after a nuclear 
war; oral-poetry, non-literary memory, the “real referent external to the archive itself” may 
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continue existing, but what would be destroyed in reality would be our textual, literary, and 
archival relationship to reality, to history. The reality that Scheick and Solomon want to prevent, 
the annihilation of humanity, is this annihilation, the reality of it. Both draw their lines at the 
possibility of this reality, but do not investigate what exactly this reality would be, and that is 
Derrida’s point. No one is competent enough to understand this future possibility because it is so 
radical that it functions as wholly other. It is the special incompetence of literature and literary 
theory, its ability to imagine, “its facility with texts, all kinds of texts,”86 which make this wholly 
other future reality and possibility the privileged domain of literature. Consequently, “Derrida’s 
scare quotes around ‘real’ in ‘direct and realistic description of a “real” nuclear catastrophe’ 
mark the impossibility of ever attaining a direct, unmediated, nonrepresentational ‘real’ 
experience of nuclear war; a subject in that position would no longer be a subject.”87 For all of 
Scheick and Solomon’s emphasis on the empirical reality of the possibility of nuclear war, they 
ignore the fact that, for Derrida, there can be no empirical experience of total nuclear war, only 
its possibility. Derrida’s text, rather than trying to eschew or obfuscate the reality of the 
possibility of nuclear war, merely places literature in a privileged position to talk about it for, at 
the moment, that is its only reality: it only “exists” as discourse, its possibility, especially in 
Scheick and Solomon’s thinking, can only be expressed discursively. (One may easily propose 
here the hypothesis that it is the very type of project that Scheick and Solomon are engaged in 
that “prove” Derrida right. To get at the empirical reality of nuclear war, they must talk about it. 
He is ultimately not saying anything more radical than this.88) 
 To understand the full impact of Derrida’s thinking, and to assess the large implications 
of his conceptions of literature with regard to the nuclear, it is necessary, having cleared away 
some of the prismatic controversies of post-Derridean nuclear criticism, to quote him at length; 
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and it is a passage I feel deserves such lengthy quotation. Furthermore, I feel that this section of 
“No Apocalypse, Not Now” deserves significantly more attention than it has heretofore received 
from nuclear criticism and literary studies: 
The hypothesis we are considering here is that of a total and remainderless destruction of 
the archive. This destruction would take place for the first time, and it would lack any 
common proportion with, for example, the burning of a library, even that of Alexandria, 
which occasioned so many written accounts and nourished so many literatures. The 
hypothesis of this total destruction watches over deconstruction, it guides its footsteps, 
allowing one to recognize, in the light, so to speak, of that hypothesis or phantasm, the 
characteristic structures and historicity of the discourses, strategies, texts, or institutions 
to be deconstructed. This is why deconstruction, at least what is being advanced today 
under that name, belongs to the nuclear age. And to the age of literature. If “literature” is 
the name we give to the body of texts whose existence, possibility, and significance are 
the most radically threatened, for the first and last time, by the nuclear catastrophe, this 
gives one to think the essence of literature, its radical precariousness and the radical form 
of its historicity; but by the same token, through literature, what gives itself to thinking is 
the totality of that which, like literature and henceforth in it, is exposed to the same 
threat, constituted by the same structure of historical fictionality, producing and then 
harboring its own referent. We may thus assert that the historicity of literature is 
thoroughly contemporaneous with, or rather structurally indissociable from, something 
like the nuclear epoch (by nuclear “epoch,” I also mean something like the epochē 
suspending judgment before the absolute decision). The nuclear age is not an epoch, it is 
the absolute epochē; it is not absolute knowledge and the end of history, it is the epoch of 
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absolute knowledge.  Literature belongs to this nuclear epoch, that of the crisis and of 
nuclear criticism, at least if we mean by this the historical and ahistorical horizon of an 
absolute self-destructibility without apocalypse, without revelation of its own truth, 
without absolute knowledge. 
This statement is not abstract.89 
What I want to emphasize here, among many other things, is that this is indeed not an abstract 
statement; it is the specific materiality of literature, the very real and constant threat of the 
material disappearance, dissolution, and destruction of literature, of the archive, that bounds one 
end of Derrida’s horizon. The other end of this horizon, however, is equally important: that 
literature itself as material contains within and through it the totality of this destruction; 
literature is everywhere engaged with thinking through its essence, it “gives itself to think” its 
own destruction, its writing of the disaster. These statements are not abstract nor are they merely 
dialectical word-games in which two opposite things are reversed and turned on their head until 
they become indistinguishable from one another. Rather, through emphasizing the very 
materiality of literature itself, Derrida has offered a model in which “all literature is apocalyptic” 
not merely tropologically, structurally, or archetypally, but materially first and foremost. To 
think through this materiality requires a dialectical vision of the archive’s destruction, on the one 
hand, and the destruction always already contained in the archive on the other. What occurs 
through this radical materialism is nothing less than a mode of approaching literature in general, 
and apocalyptic literature specifically, that is not dependent upon the incommensurability 
between “reality” and the imagination. The very aporia I have concerned myself with here as a 
fundamental impasse to thinking through and about the apocalypse with regard to literature—the 
persistence of the apocalyptic imagination, the continual and eternal attempts to find a 
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relationship between the fantasmatic image and the reality of an event—can be effectively 
resolved here because both a “real” Apocalypse and an imagined one are subsumed into the 
category and material of literature itself. What has largely not been explored with regard to 
readings of “No Apocalypse, Not Now,” nuclear criticism, and apocalyptic studies in general is 
this implication: Derrida’s work here has the ability to reconfigure how one goes about thinking 
and writing about apocalyptic literature by effectively demonstrating that one need have no 
recourse to anything beyond its material instantiation and the mode it thinks through materiality 
for the stakes of its various projects to be given to thought, and it reconceives the important role 
the study of apocalyptic literature may serve beyond understanding representations of a 
collective thanatos.   
Nuclear literature forces one to confront the very fragility of texts-themselves and makes 
possible the critical perspective that eschatological anxiety is fundamentally an anxiety regarding 
the (continued) existence of texts. The persistence of the apocalyptic imagination both in the 
past, present, and future, understood in relationship to the nuclear referent, hence becomes an 
index of how the imagination structures its inscription while being fully aware of the possible 
disappearance of that inscription. Simply put, what this allows for the critic is an ability to study 
texts, apocalyptic or otherwise, that finds a more fundamental anxiety over disaster in textual 
production itself than simply the apocalyptic nature of narrative. When Kermode and others 
categorize all literature as apocalyptic, they do so because it is the inevitable narrativity of books, 
that they begin and end, which is eschatological. This critical perspective, however, does not go 
far enough in that it glosses over the fundamental fact that the material instantiation of the book 
itself may very well have an end, that its status as object is not eternal and unchanging, but 
contingent and ephemeral. Any textual production then must be confronted with questions of 
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how it articulates this contingency, the eschaton it grounds itself upon; and understanding, even 
partially, how this occurs is tantamount to any reading practice whatsoever. At no point in the 
past, even with the burning of the Library of Alexandria, is it as clear what precisely is at stake in 
such a critical perspective, in that, for all the gestures digitization, the Internet, and current 
archival practices make toward something like “the infinite book” or the “total archive,” in all 
these textual practices decay, loss, dissolution, and disappearance operate fundamentally. This, 
of course, has been true since the appearance of the written word. What has been so curious 
about the near-total disappearance of nuclear criticism from scholarly discourse, until very 
recently, is that its practice is perhaps better suited now (than in the 1990s) to the problems 
facing a scholar working in the digital age, as it places critical questions of the very material 
which is the object of that scholarship first and foremost. In short, nuclear criticism offers the 
possibility of a mode of criticism capable of handling current and future textual practices upon a 
solid critical ground. The abgrund which has for so long been characteristic of all kinds of 
apocalypticism finds in nuclear criticism something substantial upon which to build. 
Derrida’s nuclear criticism also has significant implications for many of the problems that 
have faced studies of apocalyptic literature in general in that it potentially redraws the very 
boundaries of what may be meant by “apocalyptic.” By locating literature itself as situated within 
a nuclear epoch, the old myth of apocalyptic revelation and eschatological truth, of a finally 
achieved total knowledge, can then be understood as revealing the other material horizon of the 
archive. The persistence of the deferral and re-articulation of apocalypsis or revelation, the fact 
that so many apocalyptic narratives are post-apocalyptic (in which no revelation has occurred), 
the fact that we experience the world from a position in the “middest,” and even the mode in 
which the archive is organizing itself in “reality,” all point to this other horizon, which Derrida 
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outlines in his short essay on Blanchot’s take on Mallarmé’s “Un coup de dés jamais n'abolira le 
hasard” (1897), in “The Book to Come” (1959). If, on the one hand, the nuclear epoch makes us 
consider the “total and remainderless destruction of the archive,” then, on the other hand there is 
also “a constant reinvestment in the book project, in the book of the world or the world book, in 
the absolute book (this is also why [. . .] the end of the book [i]s interminable or endless.)” 90 (Or 
in other words, if one fantasmatic limit of the archive may be figured in something like Nathaniel 
Hawthorne’s “Earth’s Holocaust” [1844], Jorge Luis Borges marks the other fantasmatic limit in 
“The Library of Babel” [1941] or “The Book of Sand” [1975].) The desire for this total book, 
this archive not as destroyed without remainder but rather as archive which grants revelation,  
re-creates the temptation that is figured by the World Wide Web as the ubiquitous Book 
finally reconstituted, the book of God, the great book of Nature, or the World Book 
finally achieved in its onto-theological dream, even though what it does is to repeat the 
end of the book as to-come. 
 These are the two fantasmatic limits of the book to come, two extreme, final, 
eschatic figures of the end of the book, the end as death, or the end as telos or 
achievement. We must take seriously these two fantasies; what’s more they are what 
makes [sic] writing and reading happen. They remain as irreducible as the two big ideas 
of the book, of the book both as the unit of a material support in the world, and as the 
unity of a work or unit of discourse (a book in the book). But we should also perhaps 
wake up to the necessity that goes along with these fantasies.91 
Though Derrida wrote the above thirteen years after “No Apocalypse, Not Now,” it should be 
clear that “The Book to Come” operates as a kind of companion piece that completes his 
theorization of the apocalyptic horizons of literature. Much of the confusion around the concept 
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of the Apocalypse, especially since the advent of the nuclear bomb, has resulted because the term 
“Apocalypse” has been blurred—i.e. is it destruction or revelation? What would a nuclear 
Apocalypse reveal, if anything? Consequently, if the nuclear epoch is the epochē of absolute 
knowledge, of the impossibility, despite the persistence of the fantasy, of an absolute, total 
archive, nuclear criticism and the study of apocalyptic literature must take into account that, not 
only does the fantasy of disaster, catastrophe, destruction, and dissolution ground the materiality 
of its endeavors, but so do excess, accumulation, and hyperarchivization; the very exponential 
increase of the archive, of modes of literature, of apocalyptic representations themselves are just 
as much an aspect of the nuclear epoch as are visions of destruction. This over-accumulation and 
will-toward-totality are the obverse parallactic horizon of nuclear criticism, something that 
previous “nuclear criticisms” have not theorized. 
  During the second nuclear age pursuing nuclear criticism permits and provides, among 
many other things, a manner of dealing with apocalyptic literature (and literature in general) that 
not only potentially resolves the millennia-old aporia between reality and the apocalyptic 
imagination, but also provides a sturdy and robust material foundation from which to read all 
kinds of texts, apocalyptic or otherwise. Along these lines, much has been made of Derrida’s 
statement that “in truth I believe that the nuclear epoch is dealt with more ‘seriously’ in the 
writings of Mallarmé, of Kafka, or Joyce, for example, than in present-day novels that would 
describe a ‘true’ nuclear catastrophe directly and in a ‘realistic’ fashion.”92 Rather than reading 
this statement as an “apparent abyss between the ‘popular’ and the ‘serious,’”93 as privileging 
Literature (with a capital L) to confront nuclear issues over what had up until that point appeared 
to be the privileged site of nuclear narratives—science or speculative Fiction (SF)—I would like 
to point out that the real effect of Derrida’s claim is to highlight texts that one would not think of 
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as belonging to the nuclear epoch at all, if for no other reason than none of these authors lived to 
see the explosion of an atomic bomb. In other words, we will surely have recourse to texts 
dealing explicitly with a nuclear catastrophe, they cannot be avoided nor should they be excluded 
as some have suggested Derrida is implying,94 but also that, if we follow Derrida in asserting that 
all literature belongs to the nuclear epoch, many things that might not readily suggest themselves 
because of their apparent distance will then resonate within a project of nuclear criticism.95  
This dissertation will pursue the resonances between the nuclear imagination, nuclear 
representation, optical physics, information technology, and different modes of emergence from 
the modern to the postmodern, and it will attempt to firmly ground itself in the materiality of 
literature as much as possible. To ground the history of what might be called the “long nuclear 
twentieth century,” I will now turn toward the nuclear imagination as it began to be articulated 
before the First World War. 
 
1.4 NUCLEAR DYNAMOS: HENRY ADAMS AND H.G. WELLS 
 
But bombs educate vigorously, and even wireless telegraphy or air-ships might require 
the reconstruction of society. 
 —Henry Adams, The Education of Henry Adams96 
 
If we are curious about Derrida’s invocation of Stéphane Mallarmé, Franz Kafka, and James 
Joyce as being potentially rich grounds to turn a project of nuclear criticism toward, it seems that 
the late writings of Henry Adams would also be quite appropriate to turn to in order to trace the 
development of the nuclear referent prior to the Second World War. The Education of Henry 
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Adams (1918) provides perhaps one the most prophetic, disturbing, and convincing accounts of 
how the massive technological changes that were taking place around the turn of the nineteenth 
century would transform the world. And it is difficult to read Adams’s thinking toward the end 
of the volume without noting what in retrospect seems difficult to read as anything less than a 
kind of nuclear prescience, and as an awareness about the exponential rate of technological 
change that would quickly outpace human cognition and control.97 For instance, consider the 
following: 
So long as the rates of progress held good, these bombs would double in force and 
number every ten years. [. . .] The railways alone approached the carnage of war; 
automobiles and fire-arms ravaged society, until an earthquake became almost a nervous 
relaxation. An immense volume of force had detached itself from the unknown universe 
of energy, while still vaster reservoirs, supposed to be infinite, steadily revealed 
themselves, attracting mankind with more compulsive course than all the Pontic Seas or 
Gods or Gold that ever existed and feeling still less the retiring ebb.98 
Adams’s awareness about the relationship between “progress” and the increasing capacity for 
violence made possible by the technological mastery of the world is an awareness that has 
haunted nearly every significant thinker during the twentieth century. We can read in Adams the 
seeds of Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944). 
Heidegger’s “The Question Concerning Technology” (1954) appears to necessarily follow from 
Adams thinking. And the entire oeuvre of Pynchon never escapes Adams’s orbit, which I discuss 
at much further length in Chapter 3.  
Adams’s biggest breakthrough was his exposure to the idea of “force,” and how the 
dynamo—his famous symbol of modernity—harnesses that force. Samuel Pierpont Langley first 
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introduced Adams hid concept of force at the 1900 Paris Exhibition Universelle. This caused 
Adams to realize, upon viewing one of the dynamos that had been set up for the exhibition that  
X-rays had played no part whatever in man’s consciousness, and the atom itself had 
figured only as a fiction of thought. In these seven years [between the Chicago World’s 
Fair of 1893 and 1900] man has translated himself into a new universe which had no 
common scale of measurement with the old. He had entered a supersensual world, in 
which he could measure nothing except by chance collisions of movements imperceptible 
to his senses, perhaps imperceptible to his instruments, but perceptible to each other, and 
so to some known ray at the end of the scale. Langley seemed prepared for anything, 
even for an indeterminable number of universes interfused,—physics stark mad in 
metaphysics.99 
In 1945 that force exploded into the world and no longer did one need a symbol for it in the 
abstract dynamo, one need only open up the newspaper or, a few years later, take a trip to Las 
Vegas, where one could stand atop a hotel and watch bombs go off in the desert. And perhaps 
what is most striking about Adams is, that for all the destructive and chaotic creation stories, for 
all the apocalyptic prophecies which have dotted history’s landscape, all the postlapsarian tales 
and portents of doom, no one has been more accurate about what will allow the end of the world 
to enter reality, to make it possible, to make it “human.” The Education of Henry Adams may 
very well mark the caesura between an eschatology marked by faith and one defined along 
scientific lines. For Adams, the “dynamo became a symbol of infinity [. . .] a moral force, much 
as the early Christians felt the Cross.”100 The infinite, inexhaustible nature of this force, and the 
acceleration of humanity’s ability to harness it, would mean that “bombs would double in force 
and number every ten years.”101 Consequently, science now flirted with the same apocalyptic 
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abyss in seeking to understand and harness infinite force as religion had done for millennia.102 
The dynamo had replaced the Cross as a symbol for the infinite and for the unrepresentable. 
“The rays that Langley disowned as well as those which he fathered were occult, supersensual, 
irrational; they were a revelation of mysterious energy like that of the Cross; they were what, in 
terms of mediæval science, were called immediate modes of the divine substance.”103 But the 
specific resistance of the nuclear referent to a narrative in which it merely replaces religious 
modes of understanding would appear to belie such an account of whatever it is about the nuclear 
that has restructured the world, spatially and temporally, in Adams’ words, “into a new 
universe.” And indeed, he himself would accede this, as the shift from the Cross to the dynamo 
as symbols of force in human life represents the shift from cultural unity to multiplicity. If the 
Apocalypse was previously understood in terms of the unity represented by the Cross, the new 
force of the dynamo (and consequently the nuclear bomb) would teach something quite different 
about the end of the world. 
It is just such a vision of modernity, the lessons of being educated by the dynamo, and the 
needs to address the exponential rate of technological change that grounds the first text which 
dealt explicitly with global nuclear war: H.G. Wells’ incredibly prescient A World Set Free 
(1914).104 In what is now clearly recognizable as a surprising description of the world after 
atomic war, Wells imagines a shattered world that would dominate the nuclear imagination of 
the twentieth century and beyond: “most of the capital cities were burning; millions of people 
had already perished, and over great areas government was at an end. Humanity had been 
compared by one contemporary writer to a sleeper who handles matches in his sleep and wakes 
to find himself in flames.”105 Imagining atomic war for Wells, however, does not occasion him 
to give a completely bleak view of such an apocalyptic scenario, as he does with the entropic, 
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heat-death of the universe in The Time Machine (1895) or how Nevil Shute’s later On the Beach 
(1957) imagined the result of a global nuclear war as the utter annihilation of humanity. Rather 
the aftermath of Wells’s global nuclear conflagration is a utopian field of possibility. The major 
problem presented in the novel is not that atomic war destroys the world, but rather that the 
world was well on its way toward catastrophe without nuclear weapons: “civilization was very 
near disaster when the atomic bombs came banging into it, that if there had been no Holsten [the 
inventor of the bombs] and no induced radio-activity, the world would have—smashed—much 
as it did [. . .]. The whole system was rushing toward bankruptcy. And they were spending every 
year vaster and vaster amounts of power and energy upon military preparations, and continually 
expanding the debt of industry to capital.”106 The catastrophe of atomic war in Wells’s novel 
causes humanity to reorganize itself along scientific lines into an “Empire of the World,”107 
which ushers in an unprecedented era of peace, prosperity, and human possibility (i.e., a “world 
set free” by atomic weapons). The main character of the last section of A World Set Free, 
Karenin (a clear allusion to Leo Tolstoy), nearing the end of his life, sums up the utopian nature 
of the world nearly one hundred years after the atomic war: “Life is beginning and nothing else 
but beginning. It begins everlastingly [. . .]. This Modern State of ours, which would have been a 
Utopian marvel a hundred years ago, is already the commonplace of life. But as I sit here and 
dream of the possibilities in the mind of man that now gather to a head beneath the shelter of its 
peace, these great mountains here seem but little things. . . .”108 For Wells the catastrophe of 
atomic war apocalyptically and comedically ushers in, if not a religiously defined New 
Jerusalem, then a scientific utopia, one only made possible by confronting the most extreme 
horrors and possibilities of the emerging science of the early-twentieth century directly.   
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In terms of a theory of comedy, Wells’s novel functions in what Northrop Frye would 
call an ironic mode in his Anatomy of Criticism  (1957), and it would be safe to argue that this 
mode would come to dominate narratives of nuclear apocalypses in the twentieth and twenty-
first centuries. For Frye, “in ironic comedy we begin to see that art has also a lower limit in 
actual life. This is the condition of savagery, the world in which comedy consists of inflicting 
pain on a helpless victim, and tragedy in enduring it. Ironic comedy brings us the figure of the 
scapegoat ritual and the nightmare dream, the human symbol that concentrates our fears and 
hates. We pass the boundary of art when this symbol becomes existential.”109 Though Frye is 
primarily engaged here with individual human figures, I cannot help but to map directly upon 
Wells’s bomb an expanded notion of this scapegoat ritual and nightmare dream.110 For the 
victims Wells and most subsequent writers imagine are helpless and (often) “blameless” (i.e., 
who possibly is powerful enough to prevent a nuclear bomb from inflicting pain?). The nuclear 
bomb functions as a referential scapegoat or pharmakos.111 Its mere existence transposes it into a 
symbol of human hubris, evil, and pointless violence, of a profoundly corrupt and unjust 
society112; it becomes an existential symbol clearly passing the boundaries of art. 
Simultaneously, however, the nuclear bomb may be said to be “innocent”; it is not capable of 
action, and whatever destruction it may provoke, someone or something else is to blame. 
Furthermore, nuclear irony has the tendency to become comic in its very repetitive banality, as 
scapegoating the mere fact of nuclear weapons verges on rhetorically delivering only the 
message that they are “bad” and to be avoided at all costs—a nightmare beyond all others. Not 
only does Wells’s novel inaugurate a comedic mode in which the nuclear narrative is fulfilled in 
an ultimately positive manner, but it does so through ironic treatment of its subject matter. 
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This is not, however, to ignore that apocalyptic literature often functions as tragedy, and 
nuclear narratives do as well, but rather, as it would come to serve as a baseline text and 
archetype for much of the nuclear imagination which would succeed it, The World Set Free, in 
textually privileging comedy as a mode of approaching a nuclear eschaton, creates an altogether 
different temporal space defined by the bomb than previous apocalyptic literature. In his chapter 
on the apocalyptic nature of Shakespeare’s tragedies, Kermode writes: “In tragedy the cry of woe 
does not end succession; the great crises and ends of human life do not stop time.”113 The tragic 
aspect of the Shakespearean Apocalypse is a result of the awareness that though Othello may 
have a “tock” (or a narrative end), Shakespeare “will not pretend that the clock does not go 
forward”; time will move forward ceaselessly and mercilessly, and the localized tragic 
Apocalypse is made all the more tragic by its insignificance in the grand temporal order of 
things. This is not the case in Wells, for though time goes forward after the atomic wars (in a 
sense), they were so shattering as to effectively change the parameters of humans’ very 
relationship to time: they stopped the human temporal order of being in the “middest” and 
inaugurated a utopian temporality, one which is ceaselessly moving forward toward humanity’s 
perfection. Furthermore, this is a temporal space unbounded by the Augustinian aporias of time 
as it removes the concept of “origin” from the distant past and firmly locates it in the present, as 
noted above. The future as well is equally transposed upon the present. As Karenin lies dying in 
the last few pages, he imagines that “very soon now, old Sun, I shall launch myself at you, and I 
shall reach you and I shall put my foot on your spotted face, and tug you about by your fiery 
locks [. . .]. Yes—long ago, long ago before I had stripped off a few thousand generations, dust 
now and forgotten, I was a hairy savage and I pointed my hand at you and—clearly I remember 
it!—I saw you in a net. Have you forgotten that, old Sun?”114 This is a teleological and 
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temporally liminal projection of human progress if there ever was one, as it obviously ascribes 
upon the whole of human history a utopian project of completely harnessing the forces of the 
physical universe. Atomic war was merely a misstep, the grand endeavor of splitting the atom an 
inevitable outcome of Promethean striving. As opposed to the tragic apocalypse, total and global 
nuclear war if it does not wholly stop the clock, at least makes it pause and turn off in another 
direction for Wells, or, as Augustine attempted to do, it houses the past and future within the 
present. And this perhaps represents his most significant early contribution to nuclear literature: 
that nuclear war is so huge, so unimaginable, so real even if ultimately unrepresentable, that it is 
capable, at least as it is presented to the imagination, of redefining temporal experience itself. It 
is the mother of all peripeteia, and if it still participates in the teleological traditions of 
apocalypse as revelation and fulfillment, it must do so upon wholly secular, material, and 
scientific lines—time itself, after the bomb, can only be understood in and through the very 
matter of what made it possible in the present. Said another way, Wells effectively takes us from 
the world of divine comedy to nuclear comedy. The legacies of Wells’s nuclear irony, then, are 
still being felt today, perhaps most visibly in the work of Pynchon and Wallace. 
But there is a further, more sinister and disturbing irony at the heart of Wells’s novel, and 
it is one which must strike one as significant if, as I have been trying to emphasize, there is an 
intimate relationship between the nuclear imagination and the projection of global risk. Indeed, 
Wells may himself be held to some account in imagining nuclear weapons for their actual, 
material appearance. In his recent book on nuclear weapons after the Cold War, The Seventh 
Decade (2007), Jonathan Schell emphasizes the virtual inevitability of the invention of the 
nuclear bomb. Long before the U.S. dropped the bomb on Hiroshima—itself understood as an 
inevitability since no one, not even Harry Truman, decided to use it (i.e. from its inception it was 
44 
 
always assumed that it would be used)115—the bomb figured prominently in the imagination of 
scientists and statesmen as a thought, and it is a thought that may be traced directly to Wells’s 
imaginative door. In histories of the nuclear bomb this story has become apocryphal, particularly 
in the important account given by Richard Rhodes in The Making of the Atomic Bomb (1986), 
but for my purposes it very much bears repeating: 
In truth, the sources of the bomb’s momentum were rooted in the structure of the modern 
scientific enterprise. In the beginning, the bomb was a thought. More specifically, it was 
a thought in the mind of the Hungarian scientist Leo Szilard, who, while crossing a street 
in London one day in 1933, came to believe that a nuclear chain reaction was possible, 
and that, if it were so, the very survival of human life would be in jeopardy. The thought 
was the marriage of a scientific experiment (James Chadwick’s discovery of the neutron 
in 1932) and a work of science fiction (H.G. Wells’ futuristic novel of 1914, The World 
Set Free, in which he foresaw atomic war). A few years later, Szilard obtained patents on 
some of the processes involved in chain reactions and deeded them to the British 
Admiralty, which, he hoped, would keep them secret from the war-bound world. It was 
history’s first attempt at nuclear nonproliferation, and it of course failed.116 
The genealogy of nuclear warfare is clear here. Wells provides the necessary imaginative work 
to bring nuclear bombs into being. And though Szilard and Wells are of course admirable in that 
each attempted to prevent the reality of nuclear war, it cannot be denied that in imagining nuclear 
war’s possibility textually, Wells paved the way for its reality. The darkly comedic failing of 
Wells and Szilard to prevent the horror both so clearly imagined is ironic in the extreme. Like the 
imaginative momentum of the inevitability of the bomb, of the momentum of technological 
change that Adams’s felt so strongly, nuclear “irony possesses an inherent tendency to gain 
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momentum and not to stop until it has run its full course; from the small and apparently 
innocuous exposure of a small self-deception it soon reaches the dimensions of the absolute.”117 
Though this quotation comes from Paul de Man speaking more generally of literary irony, his 
words resonate deeply with the irony at the heart of the nuclear imagination: that the bombing of 
Hiroshima was always already a repetitive catastrophe; it was a direct result of a more-or-less 
innocuous cautionary tale which, looked upon in retrospect, “reaches the dimensions of the 
absolute.” 
 Though this is surely not to lay much (if any) of the blame for our current nuclear 
predicament at the feet of a novel of speculative fiction written nearly one hundred years ago that 
was mostly engaged with the coming European conflict (let alone another one twenty-five years 
in the future), it is to suggest that not only was the nuclear referent already functioning quite 
profoundly before even the empirical possibility of the nuclear bomb became a reality, but that 
imaginative narrativization of catastrophe into a formula of perpetual crisis, as seen in the gross 
proliferation of this type of narrative in the fields of both history and nuclear literature, has deep 
affinities with materiality in-and-of-itself. To view the bomb as an inevitable outcome of the 
scientific regime of the early-twentieth century is surely not incorrect, but this should not 
subsequently blind us to the imagination’s implication in this inevitability. Following the 
revitalization of nuclear criticism I am proposing, if what nuclear war threatens is the total 
destruction of the archive, this destruction is always already contained in the archive itself. 
Consequently, if American history narrativizes itself catastrophically, it is to the archive of the 
imaginative construction of catastrophe and crisis that we must turn to understand the reality of 
the proliferation and repetition of disaster. 
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1.5 NUKE THE MOON: DECLASSIFYING THE LONG NUCLEAR TWENTIETH 
CENTURY 
 
Is it our fault if the networks are simultaneously real, like nature, narrated, like discourse, 
and collective, like society? 
  —Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern118 
 
A recent bit of information has been declassified that is so ridiculous it has to be true: “the 
United States planned to blow up the moon with a nuclear bomb in the 1950s as a display of the 
country’s strength during the Cold War space race.”119  
If nothing else, such a story reveals two things. First, it is incredible the things that we did 
not know about the Cold War until relatively recently. This is crazy. Blowing up the moon. This 
is even crazier than MAD.120 Who knows what kinds of effects that much radiation in space 
would have, let alone the effects upon the moon’s gravitational pull—and all this just to play a 
game of intimidation? So second, I think I can suggest that this idea basically defines the nuclear 
imagination, in all of its absurdity, horror, and irony. Not only can we imagine it, I think the 
image above will testify that this is also in fact a very old twentieth century imaginary. In one of 
the most iconic images of early cinema, an image that initiated the rocket dreams of the twentieth 
century, we were nuking the moon. That the U.S. Defense Department went so far as to set the 
plans in motion for its possibility made this was part of, what . . . “risk projection”? This is the 
kind of Dr. Strangelove-type irony that I will continually return to throughout what follows.  
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 Figure 1: A Trip to the Moon (dir. George Méliès, 1902). 
 
This dissertation is divided into roughly four different sections of unequal length and 
emphasis. My engagement with the work of David Foster Wallace is the most extensive and 
most assiduously researched. With his death in 2008, I had the opportunity when I began writing 
in 2010 to actually read everything. Everything he had published, every critical essay, book, and 
the important book reviews. Nearly all the interviews. Even the juvenilia and miscellany. Of 
course I would have preferred that he had kept living and writing, but I had the opportunity to 
begin from a position of archival totality when I started writing about him, a rare position to be 
in indeed. So I was perhaps a bit more encyclopedic than necessary. This section has since been 
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revised into two different articles. The section discussing Infinite Jest (1996) has been 
significantly shortened and polished in its published version. But I would like to include here the 
original draft, which was nearly twice as long, because I think it stands as a testament to a 
particular moment during which this dissertation originally took shape. It also stands as a 
testament to a moment before Wallace’s legacy started to be more clearly defined. Since I wrote 
this section, Wallace’s posthumous novel, The Pale King (2011), a finalist for the Pulitzer Prize 
(in a year which none was granted), has appeared. A volume of his uncollected essays, Both 
Flesh and Not (2012) and two volumes of interviews have been published. Columbia University 
Press has published his undergraduate philosophy thesis, Fate Time and Language: An Essay on 
Free Will (2011). He is largely understood to be the basis of two characters in his 
contemporaries’ novels, Richard Katz in Franzen’s Freedom and Leonard Bankhead in Jeffery 
Eugenides’s The Marriage Plot (2011). Franzen has written a weird self-serving “elegy” for 
Wallace.121 And D.T. Max has released a somewhat disappointing biography: Every Love Story 
is a Ghost Story: A Life of David Foster Wallace (2012). With the benefit of more material, 
however, I do not believe that I would significantly revise what I have to say about Wallace. 
If anything, discussing The Pale King would provide an even more appropriate 
conclusion than my current discussion of his short story, “Datum Centurio,” as evidence of what 
I call “hyperarchival realism.” The Pale King refines Wallace’s sense of the archive, particularly 
at the level of the institution and the state. The boredom he tries to achieve both through his 
prose and his characters is a direct result of a procedural engagement with the data in the 
archive. The IRS, hyperarchivalists par excellence, represent the potential for archival 
emergence in a different direction than the Entertainment in Infinite Jest (1996). Rather than 
something so entertaining one can’t look away, The Pale King presents something so boring that 
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to continue looking requires Zen-like patience and attention. It is not the spectacle of archival 
emergence that is threatening here. It is the senseless lack of emergence in archival processes’ 
banal proceduralism. To continue to be engaged, then, transforms from apocalyptically 
threatening to a heroic impossibility. I must be happy, however, to leave such further work and 
thinking to the future, particularly further discussion about procedure with regard to mega-texts. 
In Chapter 4, “The Inverted Nuke in the Garden: David Foster Wallace’s Archival 
Apocalypse,” my discussion about Wallace’s career primarily revolves around his early 
conception of postmodern metafiction’s project as eschatological. Recursively doubling and 
tripling back upon the nuclear imagination, particularly of the Pynchonian sort, Wallace 
explicitly attempts to achieve an anti-eschatological aesthetic, a sense of narrative without the 
national fantasy of MAD. His refusal to ever truly “end” any of his novels is only the most 
obvious example of this project. More important was how Wallace engaged with a sense of 
textuality, an engagement that transformed from The Broom of the System (1987), to “Westward 
the Course of Empire Takes its Way” (1989), to Infinite Jest. In the latter novel, his identification 
of aesthetic self-reference and eschatology achieves a striking expression of twentieth century 
anxieties in his construction of the Entertainment. Here, the nuclear bomb aimed at the archive in 
Pynchon’s Gravity’s Rainbow (1973) becomes an archive aimed at the world. That today this 
representation of contemporaneity seems all the more accurate, as we all stare at our screens, is 
only one of the many testaments to Wallace’s continuing power. 
Chapter 2, “By the Bomb’s Late Light: Prefiguring the Nuclear Imagination,” continues 
the work of my brief discussion of Henry Adams, H.G. Wells, and Leo Szilard by tracing certain 
nuclear strands through pre-Cold War American literature. Some of these threads are pulled 
through some obvious places—J. Robert Oppenheimer and Gertrude Stein’s aphoristic 
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comments on the Bomb—and some are less obvious. My reading of Walt Whitman’s “Song of 
Myself” (1855) is probably the most idiosyncratic in the entire dissertation, but as it positions my 
reading of American literature on principally machinic grounds, it seems an appropriate starting 
point, particularly for the discussion that follows. Ending with a considered and careful reading 
of Williams’s Spring and All, I describe, demonstrate, and sketch some of the stakes of the 
nuclear imagination, which I distinguish from an apocalyptic, romantic imagination. 
“Crystallizing Nuclear Temporality: Thomas Pynchon and Archival History,” the third 
chapter, intensively traces the nuclear referent in Pynchon’s work. Reading his primary project 
as a critique of what I call the optical society, of how modernity and postmodernity have shared 
in the similar project of physically capturing light, I discuss time, narrative, information 
technology, and nuclear warfare in his novels. I have sections devoted to Mason & Dixon (1997) 
and Against the Day (2006). I discuss Gravity’s Rainbow (1973) in a number of ways. And 
Inherent Vice (2009) receives considerable attention around the intersections between the origins 
of the Internet and the US Department of Defense. Pynchon’s oeuvre is perhaps the densest body 
of American literature published in the last fifty years, particularly if one considers, as I do, his 
novels as one massive historical fiction. Consequently, though my reading of him depends upon 
paying attention to highly selective moments, and indeed, to do much else would require a few 
more pages than I have at my disposal, I hope that I have created at least a convincing narrative 
about how to understand his body of work. Of course, if anyone could benefit from further 
nuclear critical forays, it would be Pynchon, whose career imposingly straddles both the first and 
second nuclear ages. 
The organization of this dissertation roughly corresponds to the various conclusions I 
have come to about American literary production of the long nuclear twentieth century. During 
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the first nuclear age Adams’s symbol for modernity—the dynamo—was capable of capturing the 
bomb within its tropological force. Today, twenty years into the second nuclear age, the 
dominant (metaphorical) structure of the control society—the distributed network—encourages 
us to read the nuclear in terms of network phenomena. Each individual section of this 
dissertation could and probably should be read as self-contained, individual dynamos. Strung 
together, however, I hope they create a distributed network of competing and complementary 
forces, outlining a constellation that points toward the different narratives necessary for 
imagining alternatives to eschatological discourse. My coda is a true coda: it repeats some of the 
motifs of the dissertation while changing and sending them in new directions. The most self-
contained section of the dissertation, I hope it also points toward new ways forward not only for 
nuclear criticism, but for thinking about hyperarchivalism and mega-texts. 
It has been both a joy and a horror exorcising my fascinations and anxieties. If anything, 
thinking about mega-death day in and day out for three years has left me sick to death of the 
apocalypse. If by the end the reader chooses also to be sick to death of the apocalypse, then I can 
only say that I have achieved my goals. Certain threads have inevitably been left dangling, and 
certain other trajectories deserve to be revisited and taken up, but this is how it is in a world that 
does not end. That said, I hope I have demonstrated throughout the power of the imagination, 
and the power of nonhuman forces to both shape and be shaped by the human. As our 
ontological horizon looks to be increasingly defined by informatics and algorithms, 
understanding hyperarchival relations to crisis will become increasingly paramount. The need to 
continually renew a sense of the world not dependent upon crisis, a view that may very well 
depend upon the kind of attention Wallace outlined in his 2005 Kenyon Commencement 
Address, is a difficult task indeed. Hopefully, however, it will not be as hard as reminding 
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ourselves, “this is water. This is water.”122 Now let’s wave our cowboy hats as we gallop into the 
flame. 
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 2.0 BY THE BOMB’S LATE LIGHT: PREFIGURING THE NUCLEAR IMAGINATION 
 
 The unfettered clouds and region of the Heavens, 
 Tumult and peace, the darkness and the light— 
 Were all like the workings of one mind, the features 
 Of the same face, blossoms upon one tree; 
 Characters of the great Apocalypse, 
 The types and symbols of Eternity, 
 Of first, and last, and midst, and without end. 
  —William Wordsworth, The Prelude123 
 
Man finds himself on the earth whether he likes it or not, with nowhere else to go. 
  —William Carlos Williams, “An Essay on Leaves of Grass”124 
 
2.1 SKETCHING A NUCLEAR POETICS 
 
One of the big claims I want to make in this dissertation involves arguing that the nuclear 
imagination is distinct from something like a more general apocalyptic imagination, and one of 
my tasks in this chapter will be to emphasize its divergence from religious eschatologies, and, 
most importantly, to sketch the unique features of what I will often for shorthand simply call the 
nuclear. I legitimately fear, however, blurring the distinction between the two imaginaries. For 
one thing, the sheer size of the Judeo-Christian apocalyptic corpus means that a thorough 
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engagement with this tradition is well beyond the scope and ambition of the current study.125 
Further, I do not want to belabor this distinction too much, for I feel that, treated rigorously, one 
may very well find little difference between certain kinds of religious and secular visions of the 
end—whether one wants to represent them as revelations of eternity or as bold projections of 
global risk126—for the simple reason that both eschatologies speculate about a future that cannot 
be known beforehand. And ultimately, I do not find this a problem: it should not surprise us that 
there may be similarities between different manifestations of the imagination, particularly of the 
speculative kind. Since it is the imagination that is the overarching subject of inquiry in this 
chapter, there will be certain inevitable consistencies between two different forms of literary 
expression historically engaged with the horizon of humanity and the ends of the human127 (even 
if these two imaginaries fundamentally disagree about the meaning of these ends). 
But as I suggest in Chapter 1, I am less interested in the more traditional (and 
supernatural) eschatological boundaries of the imagination in this dissertation. So if I choose to 
quickly gloss over an apocalyptic owing more to St. John of Patmos and St. Augustine than to 
Henry Adams, H.G. Wells, and Leo Szilard, part of this is because I feel that many of the 
similarities and differences between the natural and supernatural in various twentieth century 
apocalyptics have been admirably explored in a number of valuable monographs and 
collections.128 The other part is that I feel like my understanding of the nuclear imagination is, 
both here and in subsequent chapters, unique, and that my explorations of the postmodern 
imaginaries of Thomas Pynchon and David Foster Wallace address, demonstrate, and enact 
many of the differences between the nuclear imagination and the Christian apocalyptic.129 
Principal among these is my understanding of the nuclear imagination as the capacity to 
historically project a materially embodied, temporally limited, human-“controlled” force capable 
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of extinguishing the species without any sort of “revelation.”130 (One is tempted to call such a 
perspective a “natural naturalism,” or less awkwardly, simply naturalism or materialism.) 
Further, it is quite important that this understanding makes little distinction between fantasy and 
reality. In doing so, my nuclear critical perspective attempts, if not to eliminate, then to at least 
propose a (temporary) work-around of the debates that took place during the first decade of 
nuclear criticism, the arguments between what I call in Chapter 1 “deconstructive nuclear 
criticism” and “ethical nuclear criticism.” As I argue there, my mode of nuclear criticism 
conceives of the nuclear as something that has influenced a significant body of literature, and as 
something that has produced and emerged from a significant body of literature. Consequently, 
even a cursory glance at the proliferation of disaster fantasies and apocalyptic texts during the 
nuclear age(s) gives the nuclear critic access to a historical subjectivity introduced by humans’ 
eschatological agency unavailable to previous scholars. Though whether this “postmodern 
subject” understands her own projection into the future as historical, or is a subject who, in 
Fredric Jameson’s terms, has experienced “a consequent weakening of historicity,”131 is up for 
debate, either subject position understands that the capability of producing an eschaton through 
the nuclear is the result of human agency rather than divine (and inaccessible) judgment. This 
nuclear critical perspective also understands the power of a textually constructed, archival 
proliferation of disaster fantasy to shape that very history. Therefore, I read the nuclear as both 
an emergent literary trope, an idea that undeniably influences the activities of peoples and 
nations, and, simultaneously, something catastrophically material and real. Because of this, and 
because we can now begin to definitively see the persistence of the nuclear in the present, even 
as the nuclear imagination of the Cold War and the first nuclear age becomes more distant, we 
can begin to sketch a number of the increasingly complex relationships the nuclear imagination 
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has to a variety of global activities that may very well have little to do with an eschatological 
limit beyond which the human cannot go. 
At its simplest, however, the predominant mode by which the nuclear imagination found 
expression, during the twentieth century and beyond, was through narrative. Temporally, the 
nuclear inhabits the curious position of being both stubbornly “to come” and in the past, putting 
it always already in a slippery narrative situation.132 There are a number of larger outcomes that 
result from the nuclear bomb’s temporal situation (many of which I suggest that Pynchon 
addresses in his fiction). Perhaps most importantly in the American sphere, in the wake of 
Hiroshima and well beyond, US cultural production has often avoided or failed to do what 
Sigmund Freud calls the “work of mourning” 133 through the speculative narrative fantasy of 
Mutually Assured Destruction. (This failure continues to be visible in the contemporary post-
apocalyptic survival spectacle of Hollywood cinema and American television, for instance.) 
MAD, however, is simply one very clear example of how narrative often fails to respond to the 
nuclear event. Such responses and subsequent failures should not surprise us, and as we move in 
many ways past this particular nuclear narrative into other less monolithic disaster narratives, the 
difficulty of grasping the nuclear, let alone representing it, may indeed reveal that something like 
narration may be required to approach it. Among many other narratives, the tales of nuclear 
crisis the State tells itself, and the various institutions built to wage and prevent thermonuclear 
war, can be understood as narrative-inflected responses to the nuclear sublime.134 The nuclear 
bomb, with all its resistance to mimesis, becomes scalable within the spatial and temporal limits 
of narrative. And these limits have very real effects in the political and material realms of human 
activity. 
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 But to suggest that narrative exhausts, or even represents the ground of the nuclear 
imagination is not only to profoundly underestimate its impact on ideological and cultural 
formations, but does a disservice to the possibilities of the imagination itself. Further, this is to 
suggest that it is often inappropriate, and perhaps at times even wrong to privilege narrative with 
regard to the nuclear imaginary. Rather than acknowledging what Derrida calls “the uniqueness 
of nuclear war, its being-for-the-first-time-and-perhaps-for-the-last-time, its absolute 
inventiveness,”135 there is a quite understandable tendency, in twentieth century fiction and 
elsewhere, that understands both MAD and more localized uses of nuclear weapons through 
oftentimes quite ancient narratological structures and archetypes. 
 My goal in this chapter, consequently, is twofold. First, I would like to argue that what I 
call the nuclear imagination, after emerging in Adams’s dynamo, finds expression during a 
variety of moments of the early twentieth century. There are of course a great many paths down 
which to pursue such expression. To fully work out the ways in which the nuclear imagination 
might be said to have articulated itself between Adams and Hiroshima would require a study of 
its own. So though I have chosen to limit my inquiry of American modernism and its articulation 
of the nuclear imagination to the poetry of William Carlos Williams, in particular his 
experimental book Spring and All (1923), I find in him a particularly significant moment in 
which questions of the imagination, materiality, and eschatology in US poetry are posed. My 
reading of Williams demonstrates what is at stake for me in locating the nuclear prior to the 
Second World War, but also demonstrates the flexibility of a nuclear critical approach, and, I 
hope, the ways in which poetry is able to access important aspects of the nuclear imagination that 
do not depend upon the bomb’s historical facticity alone. As so many of the narrative approaches 
to the bomb depend upon this facticity—i.e., the various narratives produced by the bomb’s 
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historicity and MAD’s “to come”—Spring and All presents a way of approaching a nuclear 
imagination not limited to the epoch of the Cold War alone, and provides many of the terms for 
my reading of the nuclear as it passes into the second nuclear age. Further, reading Williams’s 
work as nuclear in particular ways not only permits my subsequent reading of Pynchon and 
Wallace, but allows me to trace a longer genealogy for the nuclear imagination in my reading of 
Walt Whitman as a particularly important precursor to Williams. This is not necessarily to 
suggest that Whitman can responsibly be called “nuclear,” but it is to suggest that Williams’s 
nuclear imagination did not somehow spring fully formed into the world, and that a Deleuzian 
reading of Whitman through the early thought of Manuel De Landa makes Williams’s distinct 
achievement much clearer. 
Second, it is one of the contentions of this chapter that the difference between a lyric and 
narrative impulse is considerable when it comes to how texts throughout the twentieth century 
have gone about representing nuclear bombs and addressing the nuclear condition(s) of 
modernity. Indeed, it would be an understatement to say that there are a great number of 
American poets who make available distinct formulations of the nuclear that are simply 
inaccessible to narrative. The dominance of the novel and of narrative film during the twentieth 
century as cultural forms, not least in being sites where (often spectacular) massive destruction 
was represented in highly visible ways, has oftentimes obscured US poetry’s contribution to, 
emergence from, and complicity with the nuclear. Further, as Daniel Grausam has nicely 
demonstrated, US postmodern metafiction’s concern with problematizing narrative may very 
well be best understood in terms of narratological problems introduced by the bomb.136 So I feel 
that to adequately address questions about postmodern metafiction, it is necessary to first 
address, if even briefly, the poetics of the nuclear. Not only are both Pynchon and Wallace’s 
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attention to language too refined to ignore their lyric impulse, but their refusal to represent 
nuclear war is more in line with certain developments in postmodern poetry than it is with wider 
trends in US fiction during the Cold War. Principal among these is how, as Bruce Comens points 
out about Louis Zukofsky’s poetry—particularly his long poem “A” (1978)—postmodern poetry 
often “adamantly refuses rhetorics of totalization, of apocalyptic breakthroughs.”137 Narrative, 
with its moments of crisis and peripeteia, and its subsequent resolution (or lack thereof), often 
depends for its sense-making upon just such apocalyptic breakthroughs and totalization. So in 
short, one cannot adequately understand the nuclear imagination if one restricts themselves 
exclusively to narrative, even such complex novels as those written by Pynchon and Wallace. To 
locate what is distinct about the nuclear in its ability to articulate a number of imaginaries, 
narrative and otherwise, the persistence of its sublimely attractive destructiveness, and the 
fluidity with which it is translatable in quite different historical situations, requires looking at a 
form capable of doing types of literary work unavailable to narrative alone. 
Consequently, this chapter will approach the nuclear imagination in a fashion that abjures 
strict chronological organization in order to unpack and highlight the aspects of the nuclear 
imagination that distinguish it from other imaginaries and to sketch aspects of its “absolute 
inventiveness” (that will be more fully developed in Chapters 3 and 4). Beginning with a brief 
detour through two initial reactions to the bomb in the mid-1940s—the quite different though 
strangely complementary reflections by J. Robert Oppenheimer and Gertrude Stein—the second 
section will then turn to a sustained reading of Walt Whitman that owes much to Manuel De 
Landa’s reading of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s notion of the “machinic phylum.” My 
initial turn toward “Song of Myself” (1855) has a number of motivations that will hopefully 
become clear as the chapter progresses. Primary among these, however, is how complementary 
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D.H. Lawrence’s seminal reconsideration of Whitman in his Studies in Classic American 
Literature is to Williams’s poetics in Spring and All (both books of course initially published in 
1923). Williams, along with countless others, has long been understood as an inheritor of 
Whitman’s poetic project, and the convergence of Lawrence and Williams’s thinking in 1923 can 
be traced not only to the literary excitement bred in the immediate wake T.S. Eliot’s The Waste 
Land (1922) and James Joyce’s Ulysses (1922), but to the continuing impact and relevance of 
Whitman’s voice. The third section of this chapter will then turn toward a reading of Spring and 
All that attempts to articulate and define the nuclear imagination in distinction to other 
imaginaries, particularly the romantic imagination. My discussion of Williams views Spring and 
All as a paradigmatic expression of the nuclear imagination, and though obviously there are any 
number of other places one might go to trace the emergence of a nuclear poetics, Spring and All 
is so thorough in its articulation of Williams’s unique conception of the imagination that one is 
left wanting little else for defining the nuclear imagination. 
 
2.2 MAPPING THE NUCLEAR PRESENT: J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER AND 
GERTRUDE STEIN 
 
One of the immediate challenges of attempting to locate a nuclear imagination prior to the 
atomic detonations at Alamogordo, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki is contending with the feeling, both 
among the scientists responsible for the bomb and in the world at large, that atomic weaponry 
introduced something ontologically unique and novel into history, that there is an “absolute 
inventiveness” the potential for nuclear war gives to thought unavailable prior to 1945. In his 
admirable study of the literary texts that influenced (as well as the literary texts produced by) the 
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scientists involved with the Manhattan Project at Los Alamos, however, John Canady points out 
that “the Los Alamites138 shared with [Albert] Einstein [. . .] a sense that the advent of atomic 
weapons introduced a radical change in the conditions of human social existence. Yet these same 
scientists maintained an equally strong belief in the continuity and benevolence of the scientific 
tradition that had produced these bombs.”139 The atomic bomb did not come out of nowhere. It 
clearly emerges from a long tradition of Enlightenment thought, the radical advances in physics 
during the early twentieth century, and the complex political and historical realities of the 
Second World War. This genealogy often makes the bomb’s appearance seem all but inevitable 
from certain perspectives on the history of modern Western Europe.140 Given these basic factors, 
it is difficult to look back upon that history and see the onset of nuclear technology as radical 
break or rupture with history, as something that is truly and radically new. 
 Nonetheless, from the very inception of atomic weapons, most view them as something 
new. As Canady notes about the bomb’s “father”: “like many of his colleagues, [J.] Robert 
Oppenheimer turned to metaphors of a new world to describe his complex response to the 
successful detonation of the first atomic bomb in the Jornada del Muerto desert.” 141 
Significantly, Oppenheimer, who had the most direct knowledge of the bomb, both as a scientist 
and as the director of the Manhattan Project, when recalling his experience of the Trinity test, 
wrote in 1946: 
When it went off, in the New Mexico dawn, that first atomic bomb, we thought of Alfred 
Nobel, of his hope, his vain hope, that dynamite would put an end to wars. We thought of 
the legend of Prometheus, of that deep sense of guilt in man’s new powers, that reflects 
his recognition of evil, and his long knowledge of it. We knew that it was a new world, 
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but even more we knew that novelty itself was a very old thing in human life, that all our 
ways are rooted in it.142 
Later, in one of the more famous statements made about atomic weaponry, Oppenheimer further 
interpreted his initial experience in the New Mexico desert: 
We waited until the blast had passed, walked out of the shelter and then it was extremely 
solemn. We knew the world would not be the same. A few people laughed, a few people 
cried. Most people were silent. I remembered the line from the Hindu scripture, the 
Bhagavad-Gita: Vishnu is trying to persuade the Prince that he should do his duty and to 
impress him he takes on his multi-armed form and says, “Now I am become Death, the 
destroyer of worlds.” I suppose we all thought that, one way or another.143 
There is a striking encounter in Oppenheimer’s words between representations of the nuclear as 
something radically new, and as something traditional, archetypal, and mythical. Oppenheimer’s 
comparison between a relatively ancient figure of eschatological destruction, and his own 
responsibility for the first explosion of an atomic bomb is revealing: faced with the sheer reality 
of the bomb, he immediately extrapolates the logic of nuclear weapons taken to their utmost 
limit, imposing an ancient narratological and mythical interpretation of the Trinity test rather 
than having recourse to a discourse which is not only capable of explaining this initial experience 
of the nuclear, but which has, quite simply, produced it as well: namely, atomic physics. As 
Canady puts it, “Oppenheimer’s naming of the test ‘Trinity,’ [. . .] asserts that the bomb’s 
‘meaning’ should be as important to its scientific observers as its destructive power. [. . .] By 
situating their ‘immediate’ reactions in this way, the Los Alamites’ use of religious literature 
took advantage of their ability to remove themselves from potentially debilitating awareness of 
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the physical ‘terror’ of their work into a more abstract consideration of its metaphysical 
terrors.”144 
The Los Alamites’ reading and interpretation of the bomb demonstrate some of the ways 
in which previous eschatological imaginaries can be insufficient for understanding it. Rather than 
grasp that the nuclear introduces something ontologically unique into history, for Oppenheimer 
and many others, it is merely the physical manifestation of one the oldest tropes: the embodiment 
and deification of death. In Oppenheimer’s vision, as in most nuclear narratives, the bomb 
quickly becomes a metaphor for something else, because of or even despite its radical materiality 
and novelty. Indeed, its radical newness for Oppenheimer can only be understood in the sense 
that “novelty itself was a very old thing in human life.” Whatever it is that is essentially “new” 
for Oppenheimer can only be understood through the strange turn of claiming that novelty is 
itself not unique, that the emergence of the new frequently occurs, repetitively, throughout 
history, thereby immediately deemphasizing the radicality of the bomb. The bomb, rather than 
something Oppenheimer could very well understand through the very scientific discourse that 
brought it about, something that, though with firm roots in a linear progression of scientific 
discovery and experimentation, still marks a break with the world of Newtonian mechanics and 
the emergence into reality of an unprecedented destructive power, cannot be permitted to be 
“new” at all. To ascribe it such novelty would require taking full responsibility for its very real 
effects and the massive death it would shortly cause, something that Oppenheimer either refuses 
or is unable to do (at least in the moments quoted above). By interpreting the bomb as the 
manifestation of the supernatural and thus the very ancient, Oppenheimer’s words obscure the 
bomb’s emergent facticity and historicity. 
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Something similar occurs in Gertrude Stein’s famous resistance to the novelty of the 
bomb. When asked what she “thought of the atomic bomb” in 1946, Stein said that she “had not 
been able to take any interest in it,” writing: 
What is the use, if [atomic bombs] are really as destructive as all that there is nothing left 
and if there is nothing there nobody to be interested and nothing to be interested about. If 
they are not as destructive as all that then they are just little more or less destructive than 
other things and that means that in spite of all destruction there are always lots left on this 
earth to be interested or to be willing and the thing that destroys is just one of the things 
that concerns the people inventing it or the people starting it off, but really nobody else 
can do anything about it so you have to just live along like always, so you see the atomic 
(bomb) is not at all interesting, not any more interesting than any other machine, and 
machines are only interesting in being invented or in what they do, so why be 
interested.145 
For Stein, there is not anything unique or novel about the atomic bomb at all. Rather than find 
some appropriate preexisting interpretive frame to understand the bomb, thereby turning it into a 
trope for this or that, inscribing some metaphysical and abstract meaning to its brute reality, 
making it manifest some ancient figure of death and destruction, Stein resists ascribing a 
distinctly literary meaning to it at all, resists making it into a metaphor for anything. Rather, the 
bomb for her is primarily yet another example of technology, not any more or less interesting 
than other machines. Since what this machine “does” is destroy things—and after things are 
destroyed they cannot be “interesting”—the machinic nature of the bomb for Stein is no different 
than any other technology. The only reason it is even on her radar has little to do with what it 
actually is, and much more to do with how much people are talking about it. The clamor about 
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the bomb continues less because it is frightening, than because “[e]verybody gets so much 
information all day long that they lose their common sense. They listen so much that they forget 
to be natural.”146 
 Stein’s position is understandable in many ways. If the bomb really is destructive enough 
to destroy all life on earth, then there is nothing to talk about. Faced with this finite horizon of 
extinction, there is nothing to say in the nihilistic face of such massive destruction. On the other 
hand, if the bomb is merely more destructive than other things, but not eschatological, it is as 
ultimately uninteresting as all the other technologies humans have produced to kill and destroy. 
The bomb only has power, in Stein’s formulation, because of how much people are talking about 
it, how much information is let loose into the world about it. The bomb produces an excess of 
language, an overflowing of information and meaning which covers over the fact that the bomb’s 
dumb reality cannot be given meaning, it cannot be incorporated into a human scale and thereby 
made “interesting,” by being discussed. 
 Both Oppenheimer and Stein’s attempts to understand the bomb reveal that, however it 
be understood, there is something strangely linguistic about certain encounters with the machinic 
harnessing of (atomic) material force.147 Its sheer fact is not interesting to Stein (despite the fact 
that what it “does,” is destroy matter itself). The reason we are under the delusion that it is 
interesting is because of how much people are listening to talk about it. The excess of 
information, even in mid-century, produces the delusion that the bomb is an interesting subject. 
It cannot be interesting in-itself, but only through what people say about it (and then it still is not 
interesting). Likewise, when Oppenheimer bestows upon the bomb eschatological properties, it is 
actually his own agency he is attempting to understand, his own (new) role as a god-scientist 
whose capabilities now involve potentially destroying the world. Between Oppenheimer’s 
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understanding of the bomb as a repetition of the new, and thus as a repetition of ancient 
archetypal and literary structures, and Stein’s emphasizing its banality and its inability to be 
“interesting” (as if that were the imperative of such a weapon—that it be interesting), there is a 
certain failure of the imagination that reveals the failure of traditional literary structures through 
which the bomb could be comprehended. Oppenheimer’s complex (and confusing) array of 
literary and scientific markers—the Bhagavad Gita, the legend of Prometheus, Nobel’s hope for 
dynamite’s prevention of further wars—signals his inability to place the Trinity test in history. 
Likewise, Stein’s refusal to find something “interesting” in the bomb refuses to acknowledge the 
reality of its use and to incorporate the bomb into the important work that literature does. In not 
even mentioning the horrors of Hiroshima or Nagasaki, even in acknowledging that the bomb is 
yet another manifestation of human violence, Stein in her aphorism on the bomb fails to 
understand its historical impact and the importance (or “interestingness”) of its existence as very 
real human technology with profound effects upon human realities. 
 Stein and Oppenheimer’s attempts to understand the impact and meaning (or lack 
thereof) of the bomb, then, though seemingly quite opposite—it is nothing interesting for Stein, 
it is the harnessing of god-like power for Oppenheimer—display some of the mimetic challenges 
in the face of the bomb’s materiality. Either it is supernatural, or human, all too human; either it 
is radically new or an uninteresting repetition; either it is Promethean or banal; either it is ancient 
and mythological, or modern, machinic, and technological. For the scientist, it is literary. For the 
writer of Tender Buttons (1914) who was deeply interested in a kind of expressive 
phenomenology of objects, of the richness of the everyday encounter with materiality, the bomb 
cannot support a literary encounter due to its mechanicity (in the way, say, the food-object of 
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roast beef can support being “tender and changing and external and central and surrounded and 
singular and simple, ”148 etc.). 
 Here, then, I think we are provided an inroad into what is distinct about the nuclear. Both 
Stein and Oppenheimer hesitate to understand the nuclear from within their own particular 
discursive “expertise.” Oppenheimer declines to report his initial understanding of the Trinity 
test within the discourse of atomic physics that produced it, and Stein declines to understand the 
bomb hermeneutically or tropologically. On the one hand, the bomb is overburdened with 
meaning, and on the other, it has none. Oppenheimer gives “meaning” to a scientific experiment 
that he should, traditionally, maintain a disinterested, objective distance from, and Stein 
emphasizes the lack of any meaning in this phenomenon whatsoever, meaning she traditionally 
was able to bestow on any number of things in her previous writing. These discursive reversals 
serve to highlight that the nuclear threatens the very structures that make certain unique 
discourses possible in the first place. If the very discourse of science that was used to produce the 
bomb is eschewed in favor of an anachronistic mythological explanation, then it is clear that the 
nuclear transforms (and destroys) the very discursive basis necessary to understand it, from 
either a literary or scientific perspective. Consequently, this is why Derrida was able to say that 
the uniqueness of nuclear war, its  
absolute inventiveness give us to think, even if it remains a decoy, a belief, a 
phantasmatic projection, is obviously the possibility of an irreversible destruction, 
leaving no traces, of the juridico-literary archive and therefore of the basis of literature 
and criticism. Not necessarily the destruction of humanity, of the human habitat, or even 
other discourses (arts or sciences), or even indeed of poetry or the epic; these latter might 
reconstitute their living process and their archive, at least to the extent that the structure 
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of this archive (that of nonliterary memory) structurally implies reference to a real 
referent external to the archive itself.149 
One of the (many) ways I think that we can still responsibly invoke and understand Derrida’s 
thinking in “No Apocalypse, Not Now,” is to understand the failure of discourse, and thus of the 
imagination, to contend with the bomb’s immediate reality. If, on the one hand, Stein’s previous 
ability to make what remains an important literary achievement in Tender Buttons through an 
archival encounter with the everyday and the banal fails in the face of the nuclear—that the 
nuclear cannot even be as interesting as, say, furniture—and on the other, Oppenheimer fumbles 
in discursive traditions in which he does not have scholarly expertise in order to explain 
something he must understand (atomic physics), then even shortly after the bomb’s initial 
deployments we can already see certain ways in which the (literary and scientific) archive begins 
to fray in the face of the nuclear. In short, the archives in which Stein and Oppenheimer reside 
and have expertise fail to provide sufficient understanding for both the bomb’s novelty and its 
historicity. What the bomb has destroyed for Stein and Oppenheimer is their archive, the basis 
for not only literature and criticism, but for science as a disinterested and objective empirical 
investigation of reality. Consequently, if we are to frame the bomb as both something radically 
new and as something with a complex historical genealogy, I believe we are encouraged to look 
elsewhere than the immediate wake of the Second World War to find whatever is distinct about 
the nuclear imagination. If the horizon of the bomb’s threat is a destruction of the archive, we 
must not so quickly abandon the archive to that destructive fire. 
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2.3 APOCALYPSE 1.0: WALT WHITMAN AND THE MACHINIC PHYLUM 
 
The examples of J. Robert Oppenheimer and Gertrude Stein’s initial encounters with the reality 
of nuclear weapons make clear some of the challenges of locating something that is a distinctly 
nuclear imagination by demonstrating how quickly the bomb can be fit within preexisting 
models of understanding, even if these models still strangely acknowledge the bomb as 
something novel. The recourse to literary archetypes and the vague gesture toward a history of 
technology display many of the slippages between the material and the metaphorical, the 
technological and the literary (to say nothing about how frequently and easily the bomb has been 
mapped upon Christian apocalyptic traditions) when the bomb is presented as an object of 
contemplation. In the manner that Stein approaches the bomb, for instance, it seems to be simply 
yet another technological invention in an epoch filled with new machines. (In other words, yes 
the bomb is radical, but so are tanks, machine guns, airplanes, the telephone, radar, etc.) Further, 
from our own (unavoidably) contemporary perspective on American history (particularly in the 
wake of 11 September 2001), the nuclear events of the Second World War, no matter how utterly 
horrific, are increasingly difficult to understand as a radical rupture in history for the simple 
reason that the current narratives told about the twentieth century (and other historical narratives 
of periods well before then) involve invoking any number of crises and ruptures, and speculation 
about the immediate and far future involve increasingly diverse imagined crises as well.150 
Locating whatever it is that is unique to the nuclear as it manifests in history is then even more 
challenging because it seems impossible to construct any narrative of history or global futurity 
that is not in some sense always already catastrophic. What I mean by catastrophic here is that, 
without much effort, one can recall a litany of events that when invoked in their commonplace 
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sense become narrativized as breaking with the past, catastrophically changing the parameters of 
history. The oft-commented upon lack of a collectively deep sense of a historical and archival 
past for those living in the United States has, among many other factors, made a cruel irony out 
of Karl Marx’s famous refinement of G.W.F. Hegel’s dictum: “that all facts and personages of 
great importance in world history occur, as it were, twice. He forgot to add: the first time as 
tragedy, the second as farce.”151 The defining events of US history appear to thrust historical 
narratives firmly into new epochs, to be peripeteia: breaks, turns, moments of profound change, 
fissures, caesuras, and crises without repetition, farcical or otherwise. The irony is that it is the 
very repetition of catastrophe itself that begins to define these narratives. If there is farce to be 
found in American peripeteia, it is in the comedy that results from the real and imagined state(s) 
of perpetual crisis, not as a second or third iteration, but as a state of being. From this 
perspective, saying that the nuclear is unique in history becomes impossible because of the very 
ways in which most understandings of history are unavoidably narrative and organize time 
through tales of (perpetual) crisis.152 
For this reason I am compelled to imagine, in the manner that Manuel De Landa does in 
his War in the Age of Intelligent Machines (1991), a future robotic historian attempting to 
understand these narratives of perpetual crisis and catastrophe in a physical world so clearly 
devoid of eschatological fulfillment, a historian that I imagine would place particular emphasis 
on the emergence of nuclear technologies of the mid-twentieth century, and the information 
technologies of the late-twentieth century. Though De Landa draws upon the notion of a robotic 
historian attempting to understand its own origins in order to describe the steadily exponential 
emergence of technologies of warfare operating at higher and higher levels of self-organization 
and awareness (the appearance and wide use of military drones being one of the most obvious 
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recent examples), the genealogical affinity that imagining such a historian might have with 
regard to questions of the nuclear and archival accumulation (or destruction) as a result of its 
own textual instantiation should be evident. De Landa describes how such a historian would 
function: 
If we disregard for a moment the fact that robotic intelligence will probably not follow 
the anthropomorphic line of development prepared for it by science fiction, we may 
without much difficulty imagine a future generation of killer robots dedicated to 
understanding their historical origins. We may even imagine specialized “robot 
historians” committed to tracing the various technological lineages that gave rise to their 
species. And we could further imagine that such a robot historian would write a different 
kind of history than would its human counterpart. While a human historian might try to 
understand the way people assembled clockworks, motors and other physical 
contraptions, a robot historian would likely place stronger emphasis on the way these 
machines affected human evolution. The robot would stress the fact that when 
clockworks once represented the dominant technology on the planet, people imagined the 
world around them as a similar system of cogs and wheels.153 
De Landa’s formulation of this robotic historian is interesting in how such a historian would 
mark changes in humanity’s imaginative construction of the world as affecting human evolution 
itself. Though this historian would still inevitably account for the nuclear in a narrative mode, the 
simple existence of nuclear and information technologies for such a historian would be physical 
markers of imaginative evolution, higher levels of organization within an imagination 
inextricably tied to our sense of the physical world, rather than yet another instantiation of 
supernatural eschatology. The exponential increase in the imagination of catastrophic scenarios 
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involving either of these technologies for such a historian —and of course, both these 
technologies are highly involved with one another—would represent an increasing material 
organization of the imagination, both in its products and effects. The eschatological perspective 
of nuclear annihilation, though obviously finding a rich genealogy in the apocalyptic imagination 
of the past, is fundamentally distinct from prior eschatologies because of the relationship 
between technological change and imaginative expression. And perhaps most significantly, De 
Landa’s thinking in no way deemphasizes the role of the imagination in human existence—his 
thinking is careful not to instrumentalize or reify the imagination (nor is it necessarily 
progressivist, as order emerging from chaos does not occur in a linear fashion). In itself, the 
imagination provides access to our very materiality and vice versa. If it does so through 
projecting a perpetual state of crisis upon our ontic experience of the world, this robot historian 
could not very well ignore this development, and would find that the nuclear must both emerge 
from and influence the imagination simultaneously. 
 Central to De Landa’s conception of why imagining such a robotic historian is 
appropriate to understanding military technologies is the notion that inorganic matter is capable 
of ordering itself into higher levels of organization, what is also often called “emergence”: 
The self-organizing processes studied by the science of “order out of chaos” (or “chaos,” 
for short) have indeed changed the way scientists view inorganic matter. While at one 
time only biological phenomena were considered to be relevant for a study of evolution, 
now inert matter has been found to be capable of generating structures that may be 
subjected to natural selection. It is as if we had discovered a form of “non-organic life.” 
With this in mind, I have borrowed from the philosopher Gilles Deleuze the concept of 
the “machinic phylum,” the term he coined to refer to the overall set of self-organizing 
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processes in the universe. These include all processes in which a group of previously 
disconnected elements suddenly reaches a critical point at which they begin to 
“cooperate” to form a higher level entity.154 
Representations of both archival destruction and accumulation are intimately tied to the concept 
of self-organization into higher levels of order that the concept of the machinic phylum gives one 
to understand during the nuclear age. As the machinic phylum does not privilege the organic 
over the inorganic, it subsequently matters very little to draw a distinction between the physical 
reality these products of the imagination refer to and their physical instantiation in archival 
processes. In other words, how a text represents archival accumulation or destruction is 
intimately tied to its own material existence as a mode of organizing the imagination and 
presenting it materially in something always already involved in its dissolution and 
accumulation. The logic of the archive is inherent in material processes themselves, as the 
archive is at least theoretically capable of organizing itself into higher levels of order. 
Consequently, if one has in mind even some of the material totality that links the literary 
imagination and nuclear technology, one can then indeed locate something particular and unique 
to the nuclear: both its instantiation in weaponry and its expression in literature are emergent 
properties of the machinic phylum. This permits a bracketing of the problems of narrative with 
regard to the nuclear for it allows that both Oppenheimer and Stein are correct: the nuclear is 
nothing new, its radical newness is old, it fits within ancient mythical archetypes, etc. It also 
allows that they are more or less (completely) wrong: the nuclear imagination is an emergent 
singularity in modernity that arrives through the properties and operations of the machinic 
phylum, processes that have a relationship to the past but emerge out of the chaos of that past in 
radical and unforeseen ways that cannot be accounted for simply by a strict linear description of 
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that past (i.e. emergence can never be “predicted”), thereby making it unnecessary to make a 
strong distinction between organic and inorganic vitality, between what is said about the bomb 
and what the bomb is (or how it comes about).155 Finally, this makes it all the more necessary to 
look at the ways in which the nuclear manifests in ways that are not primarily narrative, 
moments where the nuclear imagination emerges at particular points that are incapable of being 
explained by crisis and rupture, and this is precisely what poetry and the lyric impulse provide: a 
perspective on the nuclear imagination capable of finding its genealogical traces and 
prefigurations in moments one would not normally consider to be nuclear at all. 
Consequently, tracing the development in American literature of the relationship between 
the machinic phylum and the imagination provides an appropriate starting point and foundation 
for such an immense and general subject as “American literature and the nuclear bomb.” The 
study of American literature has for quite a while now emphasized the catastrophic nature of 
America’s literary past; and in one of the first major studies of that literature, D.H. Lawrence, 
stressing how modern American literature has come to a verge, wrote that the initial American 
came to its shores “largely to get away—the most simple of motives. To get away. Away from 
what? In the long run, away from themselves. Away from everything. That’s why most people 
have come to America, and still do come. To get away from everything they are and have 
been.”156 Lawrence suggests that, in the figure of Walt Whitman, this urge to get away reached 
its conclusion in the urge to even get away from being human and because of that, Whitman 
became mechanical, machinic, whose verge, I would like to suggest, can be seen in twentieth 
century engagements with the poet that are emergently nuclear. 
Many view Whitman as the poet Emerson desired and foretold in his essay “The Poet” 
(1844), the first voice to construct a song of the nation, finally and fully being able to inaugurate 
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a literature appropriate to the nation’s errand into the wilderness. What has not been suggested, 
at least to my knowledge, is that what Emerson truly desired of this “poet to come,” this 
“liberating god,”157 was a poet of the machinic phylum itself, a poet able to experience and 
articulate the vast horizon how organic and inorganic matter might organize itself meaningfully. 
When he says, “we have yet had no genius in America,”158 what he really means is that there has 
not yet been a literary expression capable of capturing the geography and landscape of the US, of 
the very materiality of its contours, as “America is a poem in our eyes; its ample geography 
dazzles the imagination, and it will not wait long for metres.”159 It cannot wait long for these 
meters, and indeed, Emerson appears to be suggesting that the landscape itself 
parthenogenetically produces poetry, that it will inevitably articulate itself into song through the 
mere fact that humans reside within it. Poetry (or order) will emerge out of the landscape (or 
chaos): “What drops of all the sea of our science are baled up! and what accident it is that these 
are exposed, when so many secrets sleep in nature! Hence the necessity of speech and song; 
hence these throbs and heart-beatings in the orator, at the door of the assembly, to the end 
namely that thought may be ejaculated as Logos, as Word.”160 The immensity of the material 
order of nature necessitates poetry, not a quiet and romantic contemplation of nature, but a poet 
able to conduct the immense forces, power, and secrets residing in nature into language. And for 
Emerson, it is indeed the privileged aspect of the poet (or the human) to channel, to conduct this 
power. “Stand there, balked and dumb, stuttering and stammering, hissed and hooted, stand and 
strive, until at last rage draw out of thee that dream-power which every night shows thee is thine 
own; a power transcending all limit and privacy, and by virtue of which a man is the conductor 
of the whole river of electricity.”161 In calling upon this future poet in such a manner, it should be 
clear that for Emerson he was to function as a kind of machinic conduit between the force(s) of 
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nature and the written word, as an electric generator absorbing (dumbly) all the chaos of nature 
before it could pattern that chaos, raging and dreaming, breaking the bonds of its own finite 
subjectivity, to finally channel these forces into form. This understanding gives a solid historical 
and formal foundation to a specifically nuclear critical take on American literature that the 
commonplace narrative of this literature does not provide in order to argue that Whitman is the 
first poet of the nuclear epoch (even if we can only say that today—i.e., it would be absurd to 
suggest that anyone thought this in Whitman’s lifetime).  
Such a conception of Whitman emerges as early as 1923, when Lawrence in the 
concluding chapter of his Studies in Classic American Literature wrote of Whitman that he “was 
really too superhuman. The danger of the superman is that he is mechanical.”162 Whitman now is 
often popularly viewed as a kind of jolly father to American environmentalism. To call him 
mechanical would appear to ignore the deep-seated sense of ecology of a poet who spent a 
lifetime engaged in the observation and celebration of the relationships and interconnections 
between natural forces. In a Deleuzian sense, he was a poet of the rhizome, a poet of the 
fragmentary and multiple, of the innumerable connections between diverse nodes, whose 
conception of nature was as incisively narrow as it was expansive.163 This description, however, 
should not blind us to what Lawrence so clearly sees: that we should perhaps take Whitman at 
his word when he says, “The young mechanic is closest to me . . . . he knows me pretty well.”164 
When his lines overflow, compiling immense lists in their repeating cadence of accumulation 
and gathering, they become machines observing the phenomenal world while experiencing an 
almost anxious frenzy to report upon and merge with it. For Lawrence, who hears in this cadence 
the rhythms of the railroad and an approaching modernity, Whitman’s mechanization is a result 
of the complete ascension of matter over the immaterial, of the triumph of the body in American 
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literature now that “the ship of the soul is sunk.”165 “The Pequod sinks with all her souls, but 
their bodies rise again. . . . Corpses.”166 All that remains to the imagination after Herman 
Melville’s Moby-Dick (1851) in Lawrence’s metaphorical construction of American Literature 
are bodies and matter. Whitman’s “Amorous Love,” attempting to incorporate, celebrate, and 
merge with the entire material world, is thus ultimately a mechanical expression. “The difference 
between life and matter,” Lawrence writes, “is that life, living things, living creatures, have the 
instinct of turning away from some matter.”167 Whitman cannot turn away from any matter, and 
consequently becomes wholly material and machinic in the process. As “matter gravitates 
because it is helpless and mechanical,”168 so too does he helplessly and without discernment 
gravitate toward matter, wholly absorbed as he is in an experience of materiality. 
That the record of this experience privileges the visual and the visionary should not 
surprise us, for, like so many other visionary poets, Whitman confronts the reader-as-mechanic. 
In “Song of Myself” (1855) he sees and finds that “There is no stoppage, and never can be 
stoppage; [. . .] See ever so far . . . . there is limitless space outside of that, / Count ever so much . 
. . . there is limitless time around that.”169 This immense vision, which attempts to take in 
material reality as a whole and to merge with it, fully aware that this is ultimately impossible 
(and its poetic expression no less so), is no less empirical and sensual in its operation. Infinity 
here is posited as an appropriate horizon for sensual experience and his poetic expression hence 
becomes the attempt to transcribe and archive this experience without end. 
At first glance, Whitman’s vision appears to constitute a significant break with the 
visionary tradition of the past, for the material world here is not a play of appearances covering 
over the truth which can only be “seen through a glass darkly,”170 nor an emanation masking the 
unity of a Plotinian One.171 The multiplicity of sensual experience contains within itself its own 
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transcendent and impossibly infinite truth, and as such, needs no immaterial foundation upon 
which to ground a visionary poetics. In this regard, his poetry evokes certain of the visionary 
elements found in William Blake, a poet who himself posed a significant break with the 
visionary tradition. Like Blake, Whitman absolutely privileges the body’s sensual experience and 
believes that one need not posit a rift between the body and the soul to access eternity. In Blake’s 
most famous eschatological vision 
the whole creation will be consumed and appear infinite. and holy whereas it now 
appears finite and corrupt.  
 This will come to pass by an improvement of sensual enjoyment. 
 But first the notion that man has a body distinct from his soul, is to be expunged. . 
. . 
 If the doors of perception were cleansed every thing would appear to man as it is: 
infinite.172 
Unlike Blake, however, the primacy of the body and empirical experience for Whitman does not 
depend upon a vision of the destruction of a fallen nature and its replacement by a New 
Jerusalem. Whitman’s break with the visionary tradition comes through making nature itself a 
medium of revelation rather than a medium whose destruction is revelatory. The materiality of 
nature affords access to the infinite in sensual perception itself. Like Blake, Whitman can “see a 
World in a Grain of Sand / And Heaven in a Wild Flower / Hold infinity in the palm of your 
hand / And Eternity in an hour,”173 but because this nature for Whitman is all there is, that it 
cannot be destroyed nor, if it could, would it reveal anything other than simply its mute and 
dumb and vital reality, he effectively creates what appears to be a non-eschatological vision. This 
is quite far from the Blakean Apocalypse according to Northrop Frye: “Vision is the end of 
79 
 
religion, and the destruction of the physical universe is the clearing of our own eyesight. Art, 
because it affords a systematic training in this kind of vision, is the medium through which 
religion is revealed. . . . And if all art is visionary, it must be apocalyptic and revelatory too: the 
artist does not wait to die before he lives in the spiritual world into which John [of Patmos] was 
caught up.”174 In holding unflaggingly to a robust, malleable, and fluid sense of materiality, 
Whitman expunges religion from his visionary poetics, and consequently inaugurates an 
aesthetic apocalypticism at once mechanical and repetitive, all-the-while retaining a sense of 
revelation in that he celebrates being caught up in the midst of nature as an observer. In short, we 
can find in Whitman a non-religious apocalypse, a sense of an ending without anything beyond 
that end (except more life and repetition), which is an essential step in the emergence of the 
nuclear imagination, something that will be even more fully articulated in Williams. 
Perhaps most importantly, Whitman’s vision is twofold; it is as catastrophic as it is 
celebratory. In its celebration of change and its foundation upon the transmutation of matter into 
life, it crystallizes a teleology of mechanical organization, life articulating itself again and again 
simply from the chaos of its own inherent generative capacity, concluding in the very dissolution 
of that force of articulation in death (that results in more life). For Lawrence this machinic poet 
was not only representative of a mechanical superhumanity, but also “a very great poet, of the 
end of life. A very great post-mortem poet, of the transitions of the soul as it loses its integrity. 
The poet of the soul’s last shout and shriek on the confines of death. Après moi le déluge [after 
me the Flood].”175 Whitman as post-mortem poet is a result of his mechanization. The open road 
does indeed have a destination, and it is just as infinite, palpable, and material as any other 
destination for “The smallest sprout shows there is really no death, / And if ever there was it led 
forward life, and does not wait at the end to arrest it, / And ceas’d the moment life appear’d.”176 
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The open road’s destination is death, but since life for Whitman is a process without end, it 
constantly re-expresses itself by participating in a tautology: life’s direction (through death) goes 
toward the production of more life. What oozes out of Whitman can be seen, quite simply, as a 
poet’s material confrontation with death, and that experience is simultaneously and paradoxically 
a vision of an infinitely verdant nature. When Whitman, among his many ramblings, sees upon 
“entering by the suburbs some vast and ruined city . . . . the blocks and fallen architecture more 
than all the living cities of the globe,”177 these lines should be understood both as great portents 
of doom as well as relatively insignificant insights, appearing as they do quite unobtrusively 
amongst a host of other landscape features. This multiplication of ruins appears between a 
history “approaching some great battlefield in which we are soon to be engaged” and an 
absolutely free sense of sexual generation: “I am a free companion . . . . I bivouac by invading 
watchfires, // I turn the bridegroom out of bed and stay with the bride myself, / And tighten her 
all night to my thighs and lips.”178 These ruins should be understood as elements of a generative 
material reality, of the machinic phylum itself, even as they approach an innumerable and 
abyssal multiplication in the slow dissolving march of history as it conducts its conversation 
amongst the ruins. 
Whitman understands his role as witness and transcriber of the infinite landscape and 
roads that he “tread[s] day and night.”179 In attempting to capture the cosmic immensity of 
reality, he can leave behind nothing but an innumerable multitude of ruins, of text which cannot 
help but approach its own dissolution while rapaciously seizing the opportunity to multiply. 
Whitman’s project, of attempting to merge his very self with the material world, understands that 
the limit of such an engagement is nothing less than the death of that self. Correspondingly, his 
formal attempt to produce a poetics adequate to sing this self, desiring a structure capable of 
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expressing the infinite nature of time and space as it is presented to the imagination, causes his 
textual machinery to constantly confront the finitude of its inscription, its own status as always 
already ruined. The anxious textual proliferation and accumulation of Whitman’s text, the 
overflowing, hyperarchival urge, is the mark of his implicit awareness of its finitude. 
Confronting this finitude causes him to write, to repetitively and encyclopedically write, in an 
attempt to absorb what he sees and maintain the scope of his vision. His poetry must absorb180 to 
participate in eternity. Within the machinic scope of death the poems’ absorptive urge produces 
an archive, an archive understood as always partial, contingent, selective, fragmentary, and 
ruined. As the imagination strides the open road, it attempts to capture and textually house all it 
sees. 
 To return again to Lawrence, he equates being mechanical with being superhuman. It is 
easy to see today why this might be the case. The post-apocalyptic tales in which a cyborg or 
machine carries the messianic burden are numerous, but to see this functioning in Whitman 
nearly twenty-eight years before Zarathustra announces his Übermensch181 is to catch a glimpse 
of an unmistakable teleological futurity for the human. Whether we see the genealogy of this 
superman resting upon a “human, all too human” sense of morality, or upon the rupture which 
was experienced by the European upon entering the verge of the “New World,” perhaps matters 
little in the end. In Whitman we are greeted by the superhuman as a kind of robotic historian 
sitting in the present at the end of the open road, beyond which lies futurity itself. 
Ahead of Whitman, nothing. Ahead of all poets, pioneering into the wilderness of 
unopened life, Whitman. Beyond him, none. His wide, strange camp at the end of the 
great high-road. And lots of new little poets camping on Whitman’s camping ground 
now. But none going really beyond. Because Whitman’s camp is at the end of the road, 
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on the edge of a great precipice. Over the precipice, blue distances and the blue hollow of 
the future. But there is no way down. It is a dead end.182 
For Lawrence, Whitman’s superhumanity is essentially liminal, it defines the horizon of vision 
given to the poet’s machinic imagination. In ascribing such a limit, Lawrence implicitly suggests 
something about the machinic imagination itself here, something that his death in 1930 prevented 
him from seeing directly, though there are inklings of it in Apocalypse (one of the last things he 
wrote before he died). Bemoaning the loss of cosmic vision granted to earlier Christian and 
pagan traditions, most notably articulated for him in John of Patmos’s Apocalypse, he argues that 
for this cosmic worship the Protestants “substituted the non-vital universe of forces and 
mechanistic order, everything else became abstraction, and the long slow death of the human 
being set in. This slow death produced science and machinery, but both are death products.”183 In 
his chapter on Whitman in Studies of Classic American Literature, though made fairly explicit, 
the relationship between Whitman as post-mortem poet and his mechanicity largely remains 
merely suggested or open by the end.  
Whitman’s position at the end of the open road stops before an oceanic and horizonless 
abyss, an abyss of nuclear horror beyond which this imagination could not go. In equating the 
exponential march of science and machinery with death, Lawrence, through reading Whitman, 
clearly understands that even a superhumanity would be forced to contemplate its total 
annihilation if the logic of Whitman’s imagination and engagement with the machinic phylum 
was carried to its inevitable end. For even this most mechanically superhuman of poets could not 
cross the unrepresentable, unimaginable gap of the nuclear. Though traces of the nuclear may be 
apparent in his work itself, more than anything else, the most clear nuclear trace lies in the fact 
that the material text itself is always already threatened by the very vision it attempts to project. 
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In attempting to see temporal and spatial infinity, the finitude of his text, of his superhuman 
project, confronts a central and unsurpassable paradox. Whitman has “heard what the talkers 
were talking, the talk of the beginning and the end, / But [he] do[es] not talk of the beginning or 
the end.”184 He cannot talk of the beginning or the end, quite simply, because his vision does not 
permit him to do so. He can absorb, record, write, massively accumulate, encyclopedically list—
in short, he can attempt to archive material reality itself, but this archive’s limit and contingency 
in the face of the nuclear referent everywhere marks Whitman’s relationship to the future. The 
futurity of the nuclear, that it is always “to come,” is the end of the open road, a space where 
American literature itself camps along with Whitman and where William Carlos Williams 
arrives. 
 
2.4 APOCALYPSE ON REPEAT: WILLIAM CARLOS WILLIAMS’S SPRING AND 
ALL AND THE NUCLEAR IMAGINATION 
 
 O Russia! Russians! come with me into 
 my dream and let us be lovers, 
 connoisseurs, idlers—Come with me 
 in the spirit of Walt Whitman’s earliest 
 poem, let us loaf at our ease—a moment 
 at the edge of destruction. 
  —William Carlos Williams, “Russia”185 
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The IMAGINATION then I consider either as primary, or secondary. The primary 
IMAGINATION I hold to be the living Power and prime Agent of all human Perception, 
and as a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM. 
The secondary I consider as an echo of the former, co-existing with the conscious will, 
yet still as identical with the primary in the kind of its agency, and differing only in 
degree, and in the mode of its operation. It dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to re-
create; or where this process is rendered impossible, yet still at all events it struggles to 
idealize and to unify. It is essentially vital, even as all objects (as objects) are essentially 
fixed and dead. 
 —Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Biographia Literaria186 
 
In effect, difference ceases to be reflexive and recovers an effectively real concept only to 
the extent that it designates catastrophes: either breaks of continuity in the series of 
resemblances or impassable fissures between the analogical structures. It ceases to be 
reflexive only in order to become catastrophic. No doubt it cannot be the one without the 
other. But does not difference as catastrophe precisely bear witness to an irreducible 
ground which continues to act under the apparent equilibrium of organic representation? 
 —Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition187 
 
In the preface to a volume of William Carlos Williams’s collected poetry published in 1934, 
Wallace Stevens claims that “[t]here are so many things to say about him. The first is that he is a 
romantic poet. This will horrify him. Yet the proof is everywhere.”188 A few years later, in a 
short review of a subsequent volume of collected poetry, poet and critic Yvor Winters states that 
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“Williams, in his view of life and of poetry, is an uncompromising romantic. He believes in the 
surrender to feeling and to instinct as the only way to wisdom and art.”189 Stevens and Winters, 
however, mean two different things by calling Williams a romantic. For Stevens, Williams’s 
romanticism resides in his rejection of “the accepted sense of things. In that, most of all, his 
romantic temperament appears. But it is not enough to reject: what matters is the reason for 
rejection. The reason is that Williams has a romantic of his own.”190 Winters takes a different 
approach by emphasizing Williams’s famous phrase, “no ideas but in things”191: “His poetry 
therefore concentrates on the concrete; the only ideas which it occasionally expresses are those 
which I have outlined, and since the ideas are bad, the poetry is best when Dr. Williams follows 
his favorite formula and eschews ideas altogether.”192 Williams’s romanticism manifests itself, if 
we take both Winters and Stevens at their word, as simultaneously a rejection of and a surrender 
to things. For Stevens, his romanticism resides in his iconoclasm; for Winters, “the romantic 
principles which have governed Dr. Williams’[s] work have limited his scope.”193 Between 
Stevens and Winters’s assessment, we might slightly bastardize their statements and say that his 
“romanticism” simultaneously displays a deconstructive and phenomenological impulse, a desire 
to break apart and reconstruct the objects of his poetic contemplation, while limiting his poetic 
scope through surrendering to the materiality of things. 
 Of course, with such a wide definition of Williams’s “romanticism,” a poet that at this 
late date we would have an understandably difficult time calling “romantic” without considerable 
qualification, it perhaps behooves me to offer a different definition of romanticism than either 
Stevens or Winters provide. For Stevens goes on to make the strange assertion that Williams’s 
romanticism is a result of the fact that “[a]ll poets are, to some extent, romantic poets. Thus, the 
poet who least supposes himself to be so is often altogether so.”194 Though Stevens is ultimately 
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intent on making a fairly interesting and germane point about Williams—that he is a “realist 
struggling to escape from the serpents of the unreal”195—the large breadth and scope of how his 
understanding of the term “romantic” here might be applied to Dr. Williams’s work threatens to 
make the term meaningless. For this reason, I turn to M.H. Abrams’s seminal study of 
romanticism, Natural Supernaturalism (1971), not only because Abrams’s book provides many 
of the terms about the relationship between apocalyptic structures and the imagination in the 
discussion that will follow, but also because he provides a historical definition of romanticism: 
“The Romantic enterprise was an attempt to sustain inherited cultural order against what to many 
writers seemed the imminence of chaos; and the resolve to give up what one was convinced one 
had to give up of the dogmatic understructure of Christianity, yet to save what one could save of 
its experiential relevance and values, may surely be viewed by the disinterested historian as a 
display of integrity and courage.”196 
Though there are any number of ways one might qualify or revise Abrams’s formulation 
of romanticism, it begins to make clear some of the problems in calling Williams a “romantic.” 
His thorough and lifelong rejection of Christianity and the supernatural can clearly be seen not in 
a resolve “to save what one could of [Christianity’s] experiential relevance,” but in his famous 
demand to “Say it! No ideas but in things.”197 In his own words, and much like Walt Whitman, 
Williams wanted to conceive of the experimental work he was doing in Kora in Hell: 
Improvisations (1920) and afterward as breaking with the past by creating a new and particularly 
American idiom that attempts to inhabit the unimpeachable materiality of the present, and to 
look toward imaginative forms capable of carrying forward this approach into the future. 
Remembering the appearance of T.S. Eliot’s “The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock” (1915) 
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when he was at work on the “Prologue” to Kora in Hell,198 Williams later recalled in a 
conversation that, 
I had the violent feeling that [T.S.] Eliot had betrayed what I believed in. He was looking 
backward; I was looking forward. He was a conformist, with wit, learning which I did not 
possess. He knew French, Latin, Arabic, god knows what. I was interested in that. But I 
felt he had rejected America and I refused to be rejected and so my reaction was violent. I 
realized the responsibility I must accept. I knew he would influence all subsequent 
American poets and take them out of my sphere. I had envisaged a new form of poetic 
composition, a form for the future. It was a shock to me that he was so tremendously 
successful; my contemporaries flocked to him—away from what I wanted. It forced me 
to be successful.199 
In contradistinction to Stevens’s assessment of Williams as romantic because of his rejection of 
“the accepted sense of things,” Williams’s violent reaction to “Prufrock” occurs because of what 
he views as Eliot’s rejection of America and the present in favor of (a conservative view of) the 
European past. Though this is obviously not to suggest that the presence of the tradition does not 
appear in Williams’s own work—Kora in Hell takes its title from Greek mythology, he 
immediately mentions after his words above that he “was proud to be associated with the writers 
of the past,”200 and, as Kenneth Burke puts it, “Williams knows Walt Whitman’s smile down to 
the last wrinkle”201—it makes it very difficult to call Williams “romantic” if we (even 
tentatively) accept Abrams’s definition of romanticism202 (to say nothing of the conflict between 
Stevens and Winters’s discussion of his romanticism). 
 I begin my discussion of Williams around the difficulties of assessing his romantic 
tendencies not because I think it really matters whether we call him romantic or not, and surely 
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one can find elements of romanticism in many of the notable modernists, but rather because this 
term immediately draws me into a discussion of how his untimely poetic project regards the past, 
present, and future in a manner that begins by acknowledging the difficulty of locating Williams 
in literary history, a difficulty that even his contemporaries had, as evidenced by the conflicting 
accounts of his “romanticism” from Winters and Stevens. Further, Williams is a poet with a 
number of poetic genealogies that clearly revolve in a romantic orbit, of which I would like to 
focus on two.  
First among these is the enduring influence of Whitman on Williams’s work and 
thinking. Other than Hart Crane, for whom Whitman served as “Panis Angelicus”203 or 
“heavenly bread” throughout The Bridge (1930) and elsewhere, Williams is one of the most 
visible modern inheritors of Whitman’s distinctly American project. As Williams wrote in 1950:  
Whitman—not gone— 
not at the end of his rope 
—that’s jewel weed out there not lamb’s quarters 
 
Let’s say we’ve a little unraveled 
the end of the rope 
and go on from there. Walt, Ben 
See you again Some day204 
Even well after the early experimental works of Kora and Hell, Spring and All (1923), and The 
Great American Novel (1923), Whitman’s voice had still not reached the end of its open road 
and was “not gone”; he was still very much present for Williams, and the project begun in “Song 
of Myself” could be carried forward by unraveling “the end of the rope.” And I probably do not 
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need to belabor Whitman’s influence overmuch, as whether in Williams’s own words or in those 
of his critics, the impact Whitman has on Williams’s career has long been evident.205 (Nor is this 
the venue to pursue Whitman’s own “romanticism,” a poet who, especially later in life, had a 
very complicated and oftentimes obscure relationship to the supernatural.) The coincidence of 
Lawrence publishing his Studies in Classic American Literature in the same year that Spring and 
All appeared, the self-avowed machinic quality of his poetry—“There’s nothing sentimental 
about a machine, and: A poem is a small (or large) machine made of words”206—and the 
endeavor to make poetry speak in the language of everyday life makes Whitman a clear 
precursor in many ways, but most evidently in terms of Williams’s own inability to talk about a 
beginning or end. 
 Second, one of the most enduring pursuits of Williams’s long career was his continual 
refinement of his understanding of that quite romantic concern: the imagination. As he asks 
himself in Spring and All, “To whom then am I addressed?” his answer is clear: “To the 
imagination.”207 This overarching concern with the imagination, both as generative and as an 
addressee of his art gives Williams his romantic coloring, especially in terms of the explicitly 
apocalyptic manner in which he inaugurates his engagement with the imagination in Spring and 
All. As Abrams writes about the romantic transformation of the apocalypse: 
To put the matter with the sharpness of drastic simplification: faith in an apocalypse by 
revelation had been replaced by faith in an apocalypse by revolution, and this now gave 
way to faith in an apocalypse by imagination or cognition. In the ruling two-term frame 
of Romantic thought, the mind of man confronts the old heaven and earth and possesses 
within itself the power, if it will but recognize and avail itself of the power, to transform 
them into a new heaven and a new earth, by means of a total revolution of consciousness. 
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This, as we know, is the high Romantic argument, and it is no accident that it took shape 
during the age of revolutions.208 
It is tempting to suggest that Williams has a similar “high romantic argument” in his 
experimental work from the early 1920s, in which his sense of the imagination, at least as it is 
articulated in Spring and All, wants to transform the world. What transpires in Spring and All, 
however, is something that I would like to argue is a formation of the imagination that, though it 
takes place in clearly apocalyptic terms, represents a significant departure from the romantic 
notion of the imagination, even if it is in many ways obviously indebted to that sense of the 
imagination. Distinguishing Williams’s notion of the imagination from the romantic, apocalyptic 
imagination is paramount for my thinking throughout this dissertation, and Williams’s 
articulation of the imagination in Spring and All best captures what I mean by nuclear 
imagination. 
Williams begins Spring and All’s curious mix of hyperbolic (theoretical) prose and 
contrastingly understated poetry by revising and inverting Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s notion of 
the primary and secondary imagination from his Biographia Literaria (1817) that provides the 
epigraph for this section of Chapter 2. Rather than consider the imagination as the human 
manifestation of the divine act of creation, the “repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of 
creation in the infinite I AM,” Williams removes the romantic sense of eternity and the infinite, 
and limits his scope to a highly rigorous sense of the imagination as something intent upon 
understanding a contingent present—“this moment is the only thing in which I am at all 
interested.”209 He writes: “And if when I pompously announce that I am addressed—To the 
imagination—you believe that I thus divorce myself from life and so defeat my own end, I reply: 
To refine, to clarify, to intensify that eternal moment in which we alone live there is but a single 
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force—the imagination. This is its book. I myself invite you to read and to see.”210 Though he 
retains Coleridge’s romantic sense of the imagination as a “living Power” here, calling it a 
“force” places it more firmly in Adams’s distinctly materialist understanding of force in The 
Education. The “eternal moment,” the ungraspable now, the reality and materiality of conscious 
existence is for Williams the subject of the imagination’s activity, and it is an activity firmly 
grounded in the organic rather than the supernatural, the ontic rather than the eternal.  
Like the Whitman who begins “Song of Myself” with the invocation that “every atom 
belonging to me as good belongs to you,”211 Williams also makes clear to say that “Whenever I 
say ‘I’ I mean also ‘you.’ And so, together, we shall begin.”212 For Williams, the invitation “to 
read and to see” his book of the imagination is fundamentally dialogical, an understanding of the 
imagination that arises not through the channeling of some supernatural Other, nor as an 
expression or manifestation of the poet’s transcendental self or his genius, but through a 
conversation in which self and other become blurred and, in a clearly Whitmanian image, 
become “locked in a fraternal embrace, the classic caress of author and reader.”213 Williams’s 
language and sense of the imagination begin by having, in the words of Mikhail Bakhtin, “a 
potential dialogue [. . .] embedded in them, one as yet unfolded, a concentrated dialogue of two 
voices, two world views, two languages,”214 from which the myth of a unitary, originary, 
singular voice—the “I AM” of the transcendental logos—is foreclosed by a dialogical poetics of 
heterglossia and multivocity. In this, Williams’s poetics, by addressing the imagination, but also 
“you”—who is also “I”—acknowledges an imagination that is multiple and fundamentally 
social. (As J. Hillis Miller notes, for Williams “[a] private language is no language, for the 
essence of language is its use as a means of communication.”215) 
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Further, Williams’s sense of the imagination as it is formulated in Spring and All is not 
initially generative or creative, as in Coleridge’s formulation, but rather emerges from 
phenomenological encounter. The imagination refines, clarifies, and intensifies reality. In this, 
Williams shares with “the Romantic poet [his dependence] on his mind as it engages with the 
world in the act of perceiving,”216 but rather than denigrate the “‘bodily,’ ‘physical,’ ‘vegetable,’ 
‘corporeal,’ or ‘outward eye,’ which results in a slavery of the mind to merely material objects, a 
spiritual sleep of death and a sensual death-in-life,” 217 for Williams the bodily and corporeal 
perception of the world is, as it is for Whitman, not only sufficient, but the very thing the 
imagination strives after— no ideas but in things. Rather than the Romantic opposition to the 
gross material reality of things in favor of “the liberated, creative, and resurrective mode of sight 
[. . .] by means of [. . . ] ‘the imagination’” that achieves “freshness of sensation, ‘moments’ of 
illumination, and visual transvaluations,”218 Williams sees this “redemptive” goal of the 
imagination as mere fantasy. He says this more-or-less emphatically: “nearly all writing, up to 
the present, if not all art [. . .] has always been a search for ‘the beautiful illusion.’ Very well. I 
am not in search of ‘the beautiful illusion.’”219 Rather, responding to an invented critic who 
considers Williams’s poetry “antipoetry. It is the annihilation of life upon which [he] is bent,” 
Williams mock-seriously takes up an antipoetic imaginary intent on annihilation far beyond the 
scope of simply accomplishing the “death of poetry” that the “moderns!” are intent upon.220  
To begin the work of the imagination, and to begin addressing the imagination, Williams 
begins with a vastly expanded version of Coleridge’s notion of the secondary imagination that 
“dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to re-create; or where this process is rendered 
impossible, yet still at all events it struggles to idealize and to unify. It is essentially vital, even as 
all objects (as objects) are essentially fixed and dead.” Williams, however, is not content to 
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merely dissolve, diffuse, and dissipate the objects of his poetic contemplation in order to re-
create and reconstruct them through a vital process working upon objects essentially fixed and 
dead (objects that for Williams are never fixed and dead). He goes much, much further here, to 
the point where the secondary imagination, the imagination that Coleridge calls different in 
degree rather than kind from the primary imagination, is bounded only by the limits of what it is 
capable of destroying. If the primary imagination for Coleridge is the “living Power and prime 
Agent,” in the opening of Spring and All the prime agent of the imagination is its destructive 
capacities, and the power of the imagination rests upon its ability to annihilate all life on earth. 
Spring and All is striking in the scope of its destruction and the depth of its irony. For 
Williams, the power of the imagination in the opening pages of this curious little book resides in 
nothing less than its capacity to project absolute destruction brought about through a distinctly 
(and strangely) national project. Further, he introduces this apocalyptic scope by implicating the 
kind of gross sentiment often associated with more pedestrian versions of romanticism that 
would argue for a harmonious accord between the human, the cosmic, and the national: “imagine 
the New World [. . .] in all its prismatic colorings, its counterpart in our souls—our souls that are 
great pianos whose strings, of honey and of steel, the divisions of the rainbow set twanging, 
loosing on the air great novels of adventure!”221 Rather than pausing for even a moment on the 
harmonious vibrations between the supernatural (“our souls”), aesthetic, and material spheres, 
vibrations both of sound and of light that result in “great novels of adventure,” he invites us to 
imagine a very different sort of New World in the very next sentence that cannot but resonate 
with the destructive horrors of the Great War recently concluded: “Imagine the monster project 
of the moment: Tomorrow we the people of the United State are going to Europe armed to kill 
every man, woman, and child in the area west of the Carpathian Mountains (also east) sparing 
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none.”222 The lack of commentary or transition between an overwrought sentimentality and 
American bloodlust intent on genocidal destruction can hardly be called “romantic” here. Any of 
the more reassuring capacities for the imagination to create a “beautiful illusion,” or provide 
aesthetic meaning, or to transform a “discrete, dead, and alien milieu into a human, integral, and 
companionable milieu in which man finds himself thoroughly at home,”223 are not even paused 
over—not even to say that these modes or expressions of the imagination are insufficient—
before we are urged to “Kill! kill! the English, the Irish, the French, the Germans, the Italians 
and the rest: friends or enemies, it makes no difference, kill them all.”224 
The sheer hyperbole of Williams’s discourse over the following pages makes it difficult 
to take him seriously as actually providing what he initially promised: that Spring and All is the 
imagination’s book, and that we are receiving—even filtered through his art—some sort of 
“theory” of the imagination. But he simultaneously is refusing to offer some reassuring 
alternative to this sense of the imagination at this point. The power of the imagination resides 
precisely in its ability to invent newer and newer modes of destruction, to the point that even 
love—either in the sense of eros or caritas—is merely in the service of destructive horror: 
“Because we love them—all. That is the secret: a new sort of murder.”225 Williams is doing more 
here than simply condemning the invocation of Christian eschatology as the revelation of God’s 
love as absurd, that we need to imagine the destruction of the world to access love; he is 
foreclosing the apocalyptic as a means toward the (loving) redemption of history altogether. As 
Bruce Comens so nicely puts it: 
Williams imagines the apocalypse not in order to hasten an actual apocalypse, but to 
disrupt and so free us from apocalyptic, or strategic, patterns of thought and culture—
those patterns that had already led to World War I and that, with continued technological 
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progress, could clearly lead to an actual, man-made apocalypse, a “self-inflicted 
holocaust.” Already in the 1920s, Williams sensed that he was living in a world where 
such an end could come all too true.226 
For Williams the imagination is not a means to the divine or supernatural, nor is it primarily 
creative in the opening pages of Spring and All. Rather, we enter into a realm in which the 
imagination is still an operative term, a force, a human capacity, a vessel for literary production. 
Its ability to create or generate any meaning, and humanity’s capacity to destroy itself through 
the imagination have nearly subsumed Coleridge’s primary, generative, creative imagination. A 
space redeemed by this imagination has fallen away. 
 Consequently, Williams’s articulation of the imagination is positively Pynchonian in the 
recursivity of its irony at this point of the book. It achieves whatever it can achieve by inversion, 
destruction, dissolution, violence, parody, sarcasm, hyperbole. There is no stable ground upon 
which it rests, but rather works as an abyssal force, arising from nowhere other than a destructive 
(rather than procreative) urge. 
The imagination, intoxicated by prohibitions, rises to drunken heights to destroy the 
world. Let it rage, let it kill. The imagination is supreme. To it all our works forever, from 
the remotest past to the farthest future, have been, are and will be dedicated. To it alone 
we show our wit by having raised in its honor as monument not the least pebble. To it 
now we come to dedicate our secret project: The annihilation of every human creature on 
the face of the earth. This is something never before attempted. None to remain; nothing 
but the lower vertebrates, the mollusks, the insects and plants. Then at last will the world 
be made anew. Houses crumble to ruin, cities disappear giving place to mounds of soil 
blown thither by the winds, small bushes and grass give way to trees which grow old and 
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are succeeded by other trees for countless generations. A marvelous serenity broken only 
by bird and wild beast calls reigns over the entire sphere. Order and peace abound.227 
What is to be done with such complete destruction? Why such a genocidal “secret project”? Such 
entropic dissolution? And the quasi-reassuring sense that “order and peace abound”? 
There are a few different yet complimentary ways of reading Williams’s thanoptic urge 
here, all of which I think are not only accurate, but if my goals here are to demonstrate that 
Spring and All captures an emergent nuclear imagination and to provide as complex a definition 
of my understanding of this (nuclear) imagination as possible, it is necessary to consider these 
different interpretations of Williams’s destructive imagination concurrently.  
The first reading of this imagination drunk on its own potential for destruction would 
suggest that here is Williams’s most vitriolic critique of modernity (as Comens does). It is 
impossible to look at the world of 1923 and not see that the most visible and powerful recent 
manifestations of the human imagination were not poems—even following the heady (literary) 
year of 1922—but rather tanks, airplanes, bombs, machine guns, mustard gas, etc. (Manuel De 
Landa’s robotic historian would surely concur with this statement.) In this way, Williams is quite 
clear in his parodic anti-apocalypse. The project of the imagination is mechanical annihilation 
without revelation or meaning. Any assessment of the imagination that follows in Spring and All 
must be understood as secondary to this potential for humanity to destroy itself through its 
(supposed) technological mastery over the material world.228  
Further, suggesting that this looks like a particularly nuclear sense of the imagination, a 
sense quite concomitant with the Cold War fantasy of Mutually Assured Destruction should be 
clear. At its most simple, if I am suggesting that Williams articulates and engages with a nuclear 
imagination, this reading must emphasize how the fantasy of MAD is prefigured here, even to go 
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so far as to implicitly suggest that it is only something Williams and ourselves can imagine; this 
sense of species destruction cannot be experienced, “it has existence only by means of what is 
said of it and only where it is talked about. Some might call it a fable, then, a pure invention [. . 
.]. Who can swear that our unconscious is not expecting this? Dreaming of it? Desiring it?”229 
Long before such destruction becomes possible, Williams is consciously dreaming it, 
consciously talking about it, consciously writing it, consciously imagining it (in a fashion that 
may very well be unprecedented). He is fully participating in the nuclear national fantasy of 
MAD over twenty years before Hiroshima. He is prefiguring the Cold War by imagining Russia 
as a particular object of the genocidal US “project of the moment”: “For the Russians we shall 
build a bridge from edge to edge of the Atlantic [. . .]. The bridge is to be blown up when all of 
Russia is upon it.”230 And he imagines this species-wide destruction, unlike H.G. Wells in A 
World Set Free, without referencing a specific technology for how one would accomplish this 
horrifying vision. He also does not need recourse to thermodynamics and a theory of entropy. He 
only needs the imagination in its modern project of the moment to see: “Now, in the imagination, 
all flesh, all human flesh has been dead upon the earth for ten million, billion years.”231 And 
ultimately, it is because “[t]he imagination uses the phraseology of science. It attacks, stirs, 
animates, is radio-active in all that can be touched by action.”232 
To persist along with Winters or Stevens (or indeed many others) in tracing Williams’s 
poetic genealogy from romanticism in light of what is an imaginary clearly participating in a 
sense of eschatology that (in retrospect) is thoroughly and almost shockingly nuclear, is to 
mistake Williams’s “resistance” and his “surrender” to things, to objects, with what is, in certain 
distinct ways, a new imaginary—“quietly and without fanfare, a revolution in human 
sensibility.”233 Williams owes a great deal to the romantics and to Coleridge’s notion of the 
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imagination, to the point that we might read his mock-gratitude—“Thank you, I know well what 
I am plagiarizing”234—as a nod toward the romantic. And I further think that without firmly 
grounding my discussion in at least some history of how poets have understood the imagination 
and the persistence of apocalyptic structures through which it is articulated not only in 
supernatural eschatologies, but in eschatologies that display what Abrams following Carlyle calls 
“natural supernaturalism,” would do a great disservice to Williams’s own complex sense of an 
ending.235 But the horrifying scope of his vision in which no redemption whatsoever is offered, 
appears to me not only distinctly modern—and without modernism’s held-out hope that 
aesthetics still might redeem mankind (without supernaturalism)—but as J. Hillis Miller claims 
in his influential reading of Williams “as a post-metaphysical ‘poet of reality,’ indeed as 
someone who actually broke through into an original sense of immanence,”236 Williams’s 
“‘resignation to existence, a despair’ [. . .] puts him beyond romanticism.”237 Nor do I want to 
simply conflate this despair with a modern sense of alienation, nor some kind of Angst, nor 
existential crisis, nor mere ennui. Williams’s despair in Spring and All manifests as the 
imagination’s realization and fulfillment of the finitude of the species, not the individual subject, 
the transcendental genius contemplating his dissolution and death, the fragility of human 
institutions, etc. Surely Williams does not originate such a despair over human finitude in this 
kind of cosmic sense,238 but his emphasis on the human, all too human power of the imagination 
to bring such destruction about, in the wake of the nuclear age and the waning of the Cold War, 
must be looked back upon at this late date as a vital and uncanny early expression of the nuclear 
imagination and its attendant fantasy of MAD. If there is something new in Williams’s 
imaginary, it is precisely this: a deep sense of the imagination with none of its traditionally 
redemptive and positive powers; and to risk oversimplification, Williams’s imagination in the 
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opening of Spring and All is different from Coleridge’s primary imagination in kind rather than 
just degree. This is not an imagination grounded in some past archetype like Oppenheimer’s 
Hindu-vision, nor is it “uninteresting” in the sense that Stein understands the bomb (it is almost 
too interesting, and will shortly be generative as well). Williams’s imagination is emergent, new, 
destructive, powerful, horrific, and radioactive; it is, quite simply, nuclear. 
A second way of reading Williams’s supremely destructive imagination would suggest 
that what follows in Spring and All truly is the imagination’s book, and that he must first clear 
the ground of our preconceived ideas about the immateriality of the imagination—or Coleridge’s 
supernatural primary imagination and its redemptive powers—before he may consider that “the 
imagination is an actual force comparable to electricity or steam, it is not a plaything but a power 
that has been used from the first to raise the understanding of—it is, not necessary to resort to 
mysticism [. . .]. The value of the imagination to the writer consists in its ability to make words. 
Its unique power is to give created forms reality, actual existence.”239 Williams’s destructive 
fantasy that opens Spring and All, in this second sense, works by emphasizing the materiality and 
reality of the imagination through its ability to destroy. That is, since it is not only able to 
destroy, but we can imagine an immense US national project bent upon the eradication of the 
species, we must acknowledge that the imagination is real, all-too-real—a rhetorical move that 
subsequent history surely justifies Williams for making here. The reading of this moment of 
species-annihilation as serving to emphasize the materiality and reality of the imagination as a 
force is also vital for my understanding of the nuclear imagination for a number of reasons, but 
principally among them the fact that nuclear destruction is not “like” something else, it is not 
metaphorical—“There is not life in the stuff because it tries to be ‘like’ life”240—it is real, even 
if it is only real through “what is said of it and only where it is talked about.” The emphasis on 
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the materiality of the imagination, and simultaneously the imagination’s effect on the material 
must be emphasized here, for it offers nuclear criticism a significant, albeit unintentional initial 
salvo into whether the nuclear is “fabulously textual” or whether it is altogether too real. Here, 
even at this early date, it is always already both. If Williams’s sense of the imagination is to 
resonate in any way as Spring and All progresses, it must be read as a material force, and as 
something thoroughly textual and literary. 
A third reading of the imagination’s destruction of the world in the opening pages of 
Spring and All must emphasize Williams’s irony. My two previous readings of this moment have 
taken Williams quite seriously indeed, but obviously his thanoptic hyperbole is meant to be read 
humorously. If, as his imagined critic suggests, his poetry is “anti-poetry,” and he is bent upon 
“the annihilation of life,” then Williams is more than willing to oblige and satisfy the opinion of 
such a critic. “Okay,” he seems to be saying, “if my poetry is so bent upon the destruction of life, 
at least I will make it explicitly, violently, and extremely so.” Even at its most genocidal, 
however, when love becomes “a new sort of murder,” Williams remains playful with his 
imaginary destruction, murdering only so that “We [can] make leberwurst of them. 
Bratwurst.”241 Further, his humor here does not limit itself to simply small jokes about food, but 
sets its sights on the Christian apocalyptic itself through a digestive and gustatory irony that is, at 
least to my knowledge, without equal: 
This final and self inflicted holocaust has been all for love, for sweetest love, that 
together the human race, yellow, black, brown, red and white, agglutinated into one 
enormous soul may be gratified with the sight and retire to the heaven of heavens content 
to rest on its laurels. There, soul of souls, watching its own horrid unity, it boils and 
digests within itself the tissues of the great Being of Eternity that we shall then have 
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become. With what magnificent explosions and odors will not the day be accomplished 
as we, the Great One among all creatures, shall go about contemplating our self-
prohibited desires as we promenade them before the inward review of our bowels—et 
cetera, et cetera, et cetera . . .242 
It is difficult to gauge precisely how seriously to take Williams here, if at all. He is obviously 
quite emphatic and serious about his critique of a certain notion of the Christian afterlife, as here 
it is a ludicrous “agglutination” of humans—even if this amassing appears egalitarian or 
“democratic” (or even “Whitmanian”)—into “one enormous soul,” a heavenly melting pot that 
“boils and digests . . . the great Being of Eternity.” He could not be less celestial or heavenly 
though, as he is clearly describing a kind of divine flatulence of “magnificent explosions and 
odors” that accompanies this vision of the afterlife, a congealed soul with nothing left to do but 
review its own bowels. And with the repetition of “et cetera,” Williams implies that this soul has 
nothing to do for the rest of eternity but engage in a kind of endless scatological navel-gazing. 
What, with the deep seriousness of his eschatological vision birthed from an experience of the 
horrors of modernity, and the essential ground clearing it enacts in order to arrive at an 
articulation of his unique sense of the imagination, are we to do with such unholy and 
scatological irony? 
 I think the point to stress here is actually quite simple, and it is one that will bear out as 
the dissertation continues to confront irony in its subsequent chapters. Basically, Williams’s 
irony here is recursive—it continually upsets any stable meaning, reversing and turning in on 
itself in a vicious circle. On the one hand, we are encouraged to take Williams’s critique and 
disdain for Christian eschatology very seriously. We are also encouraged to take seriously 
Williams’s response to his contemporary critics that in articulating his imagination, he does 
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arrive at a sense of poetry capable of producing such poems as “By the Road to the Contagious 
Hospital” and “The Red Wheel Barrow,” among the many other fine poems in the book. And of 
course I think we are also encouraged to take the eschatological section of Spring and All 
seriously in the ways I have endeavored to above—as an important articulation of Williams’s 
sense of the imagination and as an imaginary firmly grounded in the material and real. But as the 
ground of this imaginary is here abyssal, and it works through destruction and dissolution, 
through extermination and eradication, it must also be fundamentally ironic. To engage with the 
kind of imagination Williams is constructing and enacting, one cannot escape irony, and not only 
can one not escape it, irony in such an imaginary is recursive and relentless in its ability to 
deconstruct any stable ground upon which to build anything.243 And indeed, for an imaginary 
that posits the extinction of the species at one horizon of its possibility, such irony is unavoidable 
if a text revolves within a nuclear sphere. This has caused Comens to say that Williams 
“struggled through much of his career to become a post-apocalyptic poet,”244 but I think this is 
wrong. The prevalence of post-apocalyptic American literature in the postwar era speaks more to 
the recursivity of the nuclear imagination—it imagines destruction repeatedly, over and over 
again, never satisfying itself with any limit to its ability to turn the world on its head in whatever 
way it can—than it speaks to some way out of apocalyptic structures and projections. Williams, 
through embracing this destructive, recursive, ironic, nuclear imagination abandons an 
eschatology that could in any way be positive, even as something to be gone “beyond,” to be 
gotten “post-” (please excuse the pun). In this way, Williams is neither an apocalyptic nor a post-
apocalyptic poet, but a thoroughly nuclear one. For Comens, Williams resides on the boundary 
between modernism and postmodernism, between a poetics of strategy and a poetics of tactics, 
falling onto either side in a number of ways. And indeed, his career itself is quite neatly divided 
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by the Second World War. But if we for a brief moment dispense with such an untimely reading 
of Williams, the capacity of Spring and All to be simultaneously deeply serious and deeply ironic 
signals the fullness of his achievement in articulating an imagination commensurate with the first 
nuclear age. 
 The final reading I will offer of Williams’s eschatological projection turns on what it is 
capable of generating, returning us not to a version of Coleridge’s primary imagination, but to a 
version of the imagination in which it is neither principally mimetic nor principally expressive, 
but is “a force, an electricity or a medium, a place.”245 After having “the imagination flying 
above the wreck of ten thousand million souls,”246 the earth depopulated for “ten million, billion 
years,” with as little fanfare and foreshadowing as the initial destruction received, bursting all at 
once out of “the monster project of the moment” Williams exclaims that 
It is spring! but miracle of miracles a miraculous miracle has gradually taken place during 
these seemingly wasted eons. Through the orderly sequences of unmentionable time 
EVOLUTION HAS REPEATED ITSELF FROM THE BEGINNING. 
 Good God! 
 Every step once taken in the first advance of the human race, from the amoeba to 
the highest type of intelligence, has been duplicated, every step exactly paralleling the 
one that preceded in the dead ages gone by. A perfect plagiarism results. Everything is 
and is new. Only the imagination is undeceived.247 
There are a number of things that are unsurprising about this “miraculous miracle” of a total 
repetition of earthly life. First, the persistent and exuberant invocation of spring throughout 
Williams’s work should prepare us here and elsewhere for the generative power he usually 
ascribes to organic life in its infinite capacity to return, rejuvenate, and regenerate. (For example, 
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the first lines of Sour Grapes [1921], the collection of poems that appeared just prior to Spring 
and All, are: “Here it is spring again / and I still a young man!”248) Second, Williams has a 
notion of time here that shares much with Friedrich Nietzsche’s notion of the eternal return, as 
well as other romantic theories of historical development in which history is repetitive and 
cyclical.249 Third, there is a clear echo of particular moments in “Song of Myself” here, 
particularly the moment when Whitman declares: “There is no stoppage, and never can be 
stoppage; / If I and you and the worlds and all beneath or upon their surface, and all the palpable 
life, were this moment reduced back to a pallid float, it would not avail in the long run, / We 
should surely bring up again where we now stand, / And as surely go much farther, and then 
farther and farther.”250 If anything, this moment in Williams is actually less ecstatic than 
Whitman’s declaration that even if everything disappeared on the earth, it would return just as it 
was, for Whitman goes on to make the horizon of his poetic vision recede into infinity: “A few 
quadrillions of eras, a few octillions of cubic leagues, do not hazard the span, or make it 
impatient, / They are but parts . . . . any thing is but a part. // See ever so far . . . . there is 
limitless space outside that, / Count ever so much . . . . there is limitless time around that.”251 
Fourth, even with the clear antecedent of Whitman, Williams maintains the irony he has 
established over the previous pages through his repetition of the “miraculous” nature of this 
organic repetition. But as we are encouraged to simultaneously take his eschatological imaginary 
quite seriously, so too can we read this “miraculous miracle” sincerely, for given Williams’s 
sense of materiality, life itself must be considered a miracle, so the repetition of evolution after 
the self-inflicted holocaust must be miraculous as well. As Gilles Deleuze notes in Difference 
and Repetition (1968): “If repetition is possible, it is due to miracle rather than to law,” further 
adding that “repetition belongs to humor and irony; it is by nature transgression or exception.”252 
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Lastly, Williams here is very much in a space that follows from my above reading of Whitman. 
Evolution repeating from the beginning, occurring through no other force than the “orderly 
sequence of unmentionable time” is a clear formulation of material emergence, even if 
Williams’s thinking predates cybernetic and physical theories of emergence by a few decades. 
This moment shows Williams fully inhabiting and engaging with the machinic phylum. And 
though each of the above points is worthwhile to pursue for a number of different reasons, as this 
section concludes I will focus on these final two Deleuzian points as they regard Williams’s 
notion of the imagination as it gets further articulated in Spring and All. 
 Williams’s consideration of the imagination turns on this moment of cosmic, 
evolutionary, planetary repetition, a repetition that, in laying the groundwork for the appearance 
of the much more understated and subtle poetry of Spring and All ripping free of his initially 
eschatologically hyperbolic prose, must be also read as difference. There are a number of layers 
of repetition here, each subtly different from the last. Though probably impossible to find an 
“original” layer of repetition amongst the intricate meshwork of the book, one of the first 
repetitions that suggests itself is how Whitman’s mechanicity and his repetitive line quickly gets 
repeated in Williams’s invocation of Whitman’s concept of cosmic repetition as quoted above. 
Repeating this, Williams’s invokes evolution—a concept Whitman would not have had access to 
in 1855, four years before the publication of Charles Darwin’s The Origin of the Species 
(1859)—as the driving force of this repetition, evolution of course being in itself the production 
of difference through repetition. Further, this evolutionary repetition occurs through no outside 
forces intervening; in the manner Williams frames it, it is an emergent phenomenon, a 
consequence of the organization of matter into higher levels of order, a phenomenon of the 
machinic phylum. Following this, Williams emphasizes that even though “a perfect plagiarism” 
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results from this repetition—invoking a textual or literary repetition as well—there is still 
something not only different in this second emergence of the human, but new: “In fact now, for 
the first time, everything IS new.”253 And it is through this repetition that Williams grants access 
not only to the present, but to the future: “in that colossal surge toward the finite and the capable 
life has now arrived for the second time at that exact moment when in the ages past the 
destruction of the species Homo sapiens occurred.”254 By imagining the repetition of human 
history right up until the nuclear moment he previously imagined eradicating that very history, 
Williams opens up a sense of temporality that does not talk about the beginning or the end, not 
because it cannot transgress a nuclear limit, like Whitman, but because it has already 
incorporated a fully nuclear eschatology into its sense of reality. And at the upper limit of the 
proliferating repetitions here, we have Williams’s refined sense of mimesis: “Now at last the 
process of miraculous verisimilitude, that great copying which evolution has followed, repeating 
move for move every move that it made in the past—is approaching the end. [. . .] Suddenly it is 
at an end. THE WORLD IS NEW.”255 Thus ends the five odd pages of prose that opens Spring 
and All, after which the book begins in earnest with its first poem, “On the Road to the 
Contagious Hospital,” which repeats the movement of the initial prose section from wasteland to 
spring dawning, though in a highly condensed, less fantastic form. 
 Not only can we see Williams anticipating the post-apocalyptic narratives of the 
twentieth century in which civilization restarts after some catastrophe—indeed there is a sense of 
the human here that very much resembles, for example, Walter M. Miller Jr.’s A Canticle for 
Leibowitz (1959) and its construction of a similarly cyclical post-nuclear history—but after this 
moment he is then able to subtly and complexly formulate his notion of the imagination over the 
next fifty pages of prose mixed and interspersed with poetry. To begin the aesthetic work of 
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poetic composition Spring and All enacts total destruction and material repetition to introduce 
what for Williams is the new: a position from which, “[n]ow indeed men look about in 
amazement at each other with a full realization of the meaning of ‘art.’”256 Williams is careful to 
point out that in this repetition of evolution from the beginning, “the imagination is undeceived.” 
The imagination, in his conception, has unique access to the he “meaning” of art. Art’s power 
and realism does not lie in its representation or repetition of nature. Rather, “[t]he only realism in 
art is of the imagination. It is only thus that the work escapes plagiarism after nature and 
becomes creation”; and “the only world of reality that men know: the world of the 
imagination.”257 
 In the world of Spring and All the imagination is a force. And if the world the 
imagination creates is reality itself, then the idea that is in things, in our very experience of 
materiality, is a fundamentally vital idea. As Williams so powerfully writes, the 
Imagination is not to avoid reality, nor is it description nor an evocation of objects or 
situations, it is to say that poetry does not tamper with the world but moves it—It affirms 
reality most powerfully and therefore, since reality needs no personal support but exists 
free from human action, as proven by science in the indestructibility of matter and of 
force, it creates a new object, a play, a dance which is not a mirror up to nature.258 
For Williams the imagination is not mimetic, or not simply mimetic. It is a material force. It is 
vibrant, organic, and radio-active. It is scientific and geological. It is tapped into early atomic 
physics, before the atom was split; it is electric. And it works through irony. These aspects of the 
imagination most powerfully distinguish Williams from Coleridge specifically and from 
romanticism more generally. Even if clearly still revolving in a romantic orbit, the perspective on 
species finitude that he provides, the removal of the transcendental logos, the political horizon of 
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its historical expression and its possibilities, utopian and otherwise— the combination of these 
descriptions of his imagination, even if we allow him this apologia: “whatever of dull you find 
among my work, put it down to criticism, not to poetry”259—provides a significant departure 
from earlier imaginaries.  
Williams concludes Spring and All by emphasizing the liberating powers of the 
imagination, that the imagination’s goal should be to “free the world of fact from the impositions 
of ‘art’ [. . .] and to liberate the man to act in whatever direction his disposition leads.”260 And 
this closing gesture does not necessarily smuggle redemption back into Williams’s notion of the 
imagination, because for the later Williams, one of the directions this disposition leads to circles 
back around to the beginning of Spring and All, to destruction and violence, to the bomb. There 
are a number of moments where Williams explicitly discusses the bomb in his later poetry, 
writing in “Catastrophic Birth” (1944) of “the death dealing / chemistry [that] cannot be long 
held back,”261 in “The Old House” (1948) of Hiroshima and the “aftermath of ‘the bomb,’” 262 
and in Book Four of Paterson (1963) of the discovery of uranium and “hydrogen / the flame, 
helium the / pregnant ash.”263 But it is in one of Williams’s most famous later poems, 
“Asphodel, that Greeny Flower” (1955), where he is the clearest about the bomb’s relationship to 
poetry and the imagination in the midst of the Cold War:  
The poem 
  if it reflects the seas 
   reflects only 
its dance 
  upon that profound depth 
   where 
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it seems to triumph. 
  The bomb puts an end 
   to all that. 
I am reminded 
  that the bomb 
   also 
is a flower 
  dedicated 
   howbeit 
to our destruction.264 
Written over thirty years after Spring and All, “Asphodel” profoundly resonates with Williams’s 
earlier nuclear imagination. Whatever mimetic power the poem may have had, reflecting itself 
reflecting itself in a triumph of the imagination, this is destroyed by the bomb. This does not run 
counter to William’s formulation of the materiality and the reality of the imagination, however, 
for “If a man die / it is because death / has first / possessed his imagination.”265 Similarly, the 
bomb is not opposed to the imagination, even if it puts an end to the work of the poem. Its sheer 
reality is a result of the kind of imagination Williams’s began Spring and All with; if the 
destruction of the human has possessed Williams’s imagination, then the eschatological horizon 
of the species is a result of the ability to imagine that very horizon. The end of the world, even if 
it is a product of the imagination, is real. “Only the imagination is real! / I have declared it / time 
without end.”266 More than anything else, the eschatological horizon of the nuclear here is not 
mere fantasy or the repetition of a previous apocalyptic imaginary. And it is precisely this very 
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real horizon that the imagination has access to that reveals the necessity to continue the work of 
the imagination. 
 Williams is clear in “Asphodel” that the bomb is opposed to the liberating powers of the 
imagination, even as it manifests the imagination’s destructive powers: “All suppressions [. . .] 
are confessions / that the bomb / has entered our lives / to destroy us.”267 The image of the 
exploding warhead has replaced religious idols, and now the bomb is something “to prostrate 
ourselves / before.”268 It is also, however, something whose “childlike / insistence” “we are sick 
to death / of,”269 something dumbly repeating its destructive urge. The Christian apocalypse has 
retreated into the background, and now men “believe rather / in the bomb / and shall die by / the 
bomb.”270 Despite this overwhelming tenor of doom, however, Williams holds out hope against 
the reality of the bomb’s power over modernity, and he is quite clear how to go about avoiding 
nuclear destruction: “But love and the imagination / are of a piece, / swift as the light / to avoid 
destruction.”271 
 “Asphodel, that Greeny Flower” ends by noting that “It is all / a celebration of the light,” 
and that “Asphodel / has no odor / save to the imagination / but it too / celebrates the light.”272 
And in this Williams understandably retreats from the radicality of the nuclear imagination’s 
horror. Yes, the bomb is a product of the imagination. And the mega-death that it introduces is a 
product of the imagination. But the way out, toward a celebration of “light,” is also the 
imagination’s province. The end of “Asphodel” is Williams at his most romantic, retaining the 
trope of revelation or illumination, of light as a redemptive power closely associated with love. If 
he cannot go all the way toward the radicality of Pynchon’s deeply ironic engagement with the 
bomb and with light, if Williams cannot yet see the project of modernity as capturing the very 
light he holds out as redemptive, then this only serves to re-emphasize that whatever reality is 
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produced both prior to and in the wake of the bomb can only be brought about by the 
imagination, by the nuclear imagination. To see that light itself can be turned toward the process 
of “all suppressions, / from the witchcraft trials at Salem / to the latest / book burnings,”273 is part 
and parcel with the nuclear imagination, and if history and the future are not to be foreclosed in 
the very eschatological fire Williams is able to see as early as 1923, then the work of literature, 
the very necessary work of the imagination, must continue interrogating the horizon of the 
nuclear in order to make the opening pages of Spring and All remain real only on the page. And 
among many other things, the enduring legacy of Williams’s imagination is that the projection of 
the future, how we imagine the world to be in the future, continues to shape how that future is 
articulated in the present. If we can sit here in the wake of the Cold War on a planet that is not 
irradiated, it is because one of the principal effects of the nuclear imagination during the 
twentieth century has been its lack of actualization, its non-event. And if nothing else, this is the 
nuclear imagination’s enduring reality, and it is a reality that we owe in part to William Carlos 
Williams. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
112 
 
 3.0 CRYSTALLIZING NUCLEAR TEMPORALITY: THOMAS PYNCHON AND 
ARCHIVAL HISTORY 
 
Everything gets lumped together into uniform distancelessness. How? Is not this merging 
of everything into the distanceless more unearthly than everything bursting apart? 
Man stares at what the explosion of the atom bomb could bring with it. He does 
not see that the atom bomb and its explosion are the mere final emission of what has long 
since taken place, has already happened. Not to mention the single hydrogen bomb, 
whose triggering, thought through to its utmost potential, might be enough to snuff out all 
life on earth. What is this helpless anxiety waiting for, if the terrible has already 
happened? 
  —Martin Heidegger, “The Thing”274 
 
 “There is no outside of Nature.” 
  —Vicki Kirby, Quantum Anthropologies275 
 
If Sloth can be defined as the pretense, in the tradition of American settlement and 
spoliation, that time is one more nonfinite resource, there to be exploited forever, then we 
may for now at least have found the illusion, the effect, of controlling, reversing, slowing, 
speeding and repeating time—even imagining we can escape it. 
 —Thomas Pynchon, “The Deadly Sins/Sloth; Nearer, My Couch, to Thee”276 
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3.1 “SLOW LEARNER” 
 
One of the most explicit discussions of eschatology in the work of Thomas Pynchon occurs not 
in his fiction, where events that might be called apocalyptic are often ambiguous, opaque, or 
asymptotically deferred, but in the introduction to the collection of his early short stories, Slow 
Learner (1984). Displaying a rare willingness to discuss his (youthful) authorial intentions and 
provide commentary upon his work,277 Pynchon situates his short story, “Entropy” (1960), 
between the poles of cybernetics and thermodynamics. For a perspective revolving in a nuclear 
critical orbit, it is crucial to make note of the following statement278: 
I happened to read Norbert Wiener’s The Human Use of Human Beings [. . .] at about the 
same time as The Education of Henry Adams, and the “theme” of [“Entropy”] is mostly 
derivative of what these two men had to say. A pose I found congenial in those days—
fairly common, I hope, among pre-adults—was that of somber glee at any idea of mass 
destruction or decline. The modern political thriller genre, in fact, has been known to 
cash in on such visions of death made large-scale or glamorous. Given my undergraduate 
mood, Adams’s sense of power out of control, coupled with Wiener’s spectacle of 
universal heat-death and mathematical stillness, seemed just the ticket. But the distance 
and grandiosity of this led me to short-change the humans in the story.279 
Though the “theme” of entropy is persistent throughout Pynchon’s work, making significant 
reappearances in V. (1961), The Crying of Lot 49 (1966), and Gravity’s Rainbow (1973), and it 
has received considerable attention by Pynchon’s critics,280 it is the invocation of Adams and 
Wiener that should be highlighted here, specifically their influence on Pynchon’s sense of an 
ending. As early as “Entropy,” Pynchon’s fictional worlds exists within an eschatological space 
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defined by Adams and Wiener, and one could easily argue that this remains the case all the way 
up to his most recent novel, Inherent Vice (2009). Pynchon’s narrative projections continually 
reside within a horizon defined by information and matter, cybernetics and thermodynamics, 
communication and physics, the archive and The Bomb. 
 It is equally important to note Pynchon’s own judgment of his youthful apocalypticism. 
His “somber glee at any idea of mass destruction or decline” is characterized as “pre-adult” and 
“undergraduate”; his “reading at the time also included many Victorians, allowing World War I 
in [his] imagination to assume the shape of that attractive nuisance so dear to adolescent minds, 
the apocalyptic showdown.”281 Slow Learner, as its title suggests, collects what Pynchon thinks 
of as juvenilia and early exercises in narrative form. The apocalypse, if one does not read these 
statements as overly modest assessments of his early work, is not an appropriate subject for a 
“mature” writer, a writer who has already written Gravity’s Rainbow, a book, according to one 
critic, “that is both one of the great historical novels of our time and arguably the most important 
literary text since Ulysses.”282 It is easy enough to read Gravity’s Rainbow as an apocalyptic 
novel obsessed with twentieth century disasters, the escalation of the arms race during the 1960s, 
the dissolution of America during what Carl Freedman recently has called the “age of Nixon,”283 
and a novel haunted by the mass-death of World War II while anxiously anticipating the Cold 
War and future catastrophe. Whatever one might say about Gravity’s Rainbow and the rest of his 
“mature” work, however, for Pynchon the apocalypse qua apocalypse should be relegated to the 
writing of youth, the honing of one’s art, an adolescent obsession to be grown out of. Reading 
Pynchon requires formulating an understanding of his sense of narrative that is different, perhaps 
more mature, than the apocalypse the apprentice writer’s mind finds readily congenial. Such a 
narrative model should be understood as a more complex engagement with the structures Adams 
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and Wiener provide, something still bounded by and understood through the science of 
cybernetics and thermodynamics, but not over-simplifying that science for the readymade ending 
of “Entropy,” where the entire universe becomes a uniform 37 degrees Fahrenheit.284  
 In the introduction to Slow Learner, Pynchon provides a ground for how to understand 
such a narrative maturation and complication as he shifts his emphasis, almost imperceptibly, 
from the gleefully somber adolescent apocalyptic imagination, to the overwhelming anxiety 
created by nuclear weapons’ sheer existence. 
I don’t mean to make light of this. Our common nightmare The Bomb is in [“Entropy”] 
too. It was bad enough in ’59 and is much worse now, as the level of danger has 
continued to grow. There was never anything subliminal about it, then or now. Except for 
that succession of the criminally insane who have enjoyed power since 1945, including 
the power to do something about it, most of the rest of us poor sheep have always been 
stuck with simple, standard fear. I think we have all tried to deal with this slow escalation 
of our helplessness and terror in the few ways open to us, from not thinking about it to 
going crazy from it. Somewhere on this spectrum of impotence is writing fiction about 
it—occasionally, as here, offset to a more colorful time and place.285 
Here Pynchon frames “The Bomb”286 differently than the apocalypse, though the differentiation 
might seem slight at first. Even though he notes that The Bomb is in “Entropy” just as much as 
the “somber apocalypse” that emerged out of his reading of Adams and Wiener, The Bomb is in 
the story too; it is there along with, though it is something different than, his adolescent 
apocalypticism. The difference can be understood in the manner he stresses The Bomb’s reality. 
Its physical presence in the world defines “our helplessness and terror,” as opposed to the 
apocalyptic, which is merely one way of interpreting events of the past (or future), an 
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interpretive structure to be fitted onto whatever might suggest itself to the youthful writer’s 
mind. Writing and thinking the apocalypse is hermeneutic, a mode of interpreting history, 
allowing World War I to become an apocalypse of the Victorian mode, whereas The Bomb 
cannot be interpreted, even by those with the capacity to “use” it. The Bomb is a more “mature” 
object of thought because it does not lend itself to familiar and readily suggested temporal and 
narrative forms; its terror overwhelms the mind, any mind, no matter how mature. Writing this 
introduction in 1984, his writing and thinking may have outgrown the apocalypse as a narrative 
mode, but the threat of The Bomb, the anxiety it produces, its sheer mute, dumb reality—i.e. 
there was never anything subliminal about it—means we all have to “deal with it,” no matter 
how “mature” we may be. 
Further, his mode of address here shifts dramatically, going from a youthful, solipsistic 
obsession with apocalypse, to noting the very real collective global terror inspired by The Bomb. 
This is one of the few moments in the introduction to Slow Learner where Pynchon uses the first 
person plural rather than the first person singular. He is not addressing himself or his work at this 
moment—ostensibly the appropriate subjects for an author’s introduction—but rather signals that 
his mature writing might be understood as an utterance of a first person plural, a communal we. 
The apocalypse is an interpretive structure a somewhat narcissistic individual (his own youthful 
self) imposes upon the world. The Bomb, on the other hand, not only is too real for an individual 
to understand, thereby deserving capitalization, but must be impotently confronted by “the rest of 
us poor sheep.” There is nothing to do for what Pynchon in Gravity’s Rainbow calls the 
“preterit.” The criminally insane have all the power over The Bomb. Capital “They” are going to 
destroy us, and there is nothing we can do. We can’t even imagine it, let alone interpret its 
meaning. (Or else, it is the only thing we can imagine, the only thing we are called upon to 
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interpret.) Even worse off is the fiction writer whose job it may very well be to attempt to 
imagine The Bomb. The writer is tasked by the collective “we” Pynchon invokes and places 
himself among to attempt to describe just how its (or Their) target is us; and yet this writer’s 
impotence can be situated along an axis, palpable enough to mapped and coded. Despite all this, 
writing as a mode of coping with the impotence the “rest of us” feel in the face of the nuclear 
destruction has not caused Pynchon unambiguously to represent The Bomb nor the final logic of 
its global deployment. 
 Rather, the nuclear event appears in Pynchon as an asymptote that can never be reached, 
a point beyond which we cannot go, while simultaneously a limit that structures all events within 
its parabolic arc. In Gravity’s Rainbow the Rocket’s final approach to the Orpheus Theater in 
Los Angeles, where the reader has presumably been viewing the entirety of the narrative up until 
the final pages, is perhaps American literary postmodernism’s most representative nuclear 
image287: “And it is just here, just at this dark and silent frame, that the pointed tip of the Rocket, 
falling nearly a mile per second, absolutely and forever without sound, reaches its last 
unmeasurable gap above the roof of the old theatre, the last delta-t.”288 The Rocket (capitalized 
like “The Bomb”) emerges when the screen goes dark, ceasing to represent anything, and the 
audience is simply left to wait for the film to be repaired and resumed. The Rocket, however, 
does not explode. It hangs suspended in the infinitely miniscule gap of its asymptotic approach, 
forever approaching in its meaningless trajectory, silent in its eternal deferment of exploding, an 
Achilles to the theater’s tortoise. The appeal of Pynchon’s striking image can be located within 
the impossibility of experiencing the explosion: to have heard the rocket’s approach means one 
has survived, left to impotently speak in the aftermath; to have not heard its approach is to be 
buried by the disaster.289 “He won’t hear the thing come in. It travels faster than the speed of 
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sound. The first news you get of it is the blast. Then, if you’re still around, you hear the sound of 
it coming in.”290 Gravity’s Rainbow, as has been extensively commented upon,291 exists both in 
the aftermath of the explosion—“A screaming comes across the sky,”292 the novel’s famous first 
sentence, can be heard because the rocket has already fallen—and in anticipation of a final 
explosion which will make mimesis and hermeneutics meaningless activities: extinction cannot 
be written about, let alone made meaningful after the fact. The Rocket has both fallen and exists 
in a new dispensation that cannot be compared to previous explosions: “It has happened before, 
but there is nothing to compare it to now.”293 In these asymptotic reversals, Pynchon effectively 
displaces the commonplace, cliché apocalypse of his own adolescent imagination, and thereby 
sutures the past, present, and future to some event that either did, may, or will never occur, 
inscribing the nuclear referent upon the temporalities and narratives of his larger historical 
project. Tyrone Slothrop’s journey through the Zone in Gravity’s Rainbow begins always already 
in the wake of his own anticipation of this event that has already occurred but cannot happen. He 
is American literature’s nuclear (rather than the apocalyptic) character par excellence. He is not 
waiting for the telos of history, for its completion, for the “to come” of the apocalypse, but rather 
is a figure who exists in the ruins and aftermath of a shattered history without purpose, 
desperately awaiting another explosion that cannot come, or if it does come, cannot be 
experienced, and if experienced, would be incomparable to any previous event. 
Pynchon’s nuclear worlds, however, are not the bleak post-apocalyptic wastelands of, for 
example, Samuel Becket’s Endgame (1958) or Cormac McCarthy’s The Road (2006); nor do his 
worlds after “Entropy” approach H.G. Wells’s time traveler perched on the edge of time itself, 
witnessing the entropic decline of the planet and universal heat-death.294 Pynchon’s worlds are 
consistently full of striking fantasy and color. His narratives, rather than sites approaching static 
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inertia, are spatio-temporal constructs where matter vibrates in vitally complex ways, often 
rupturing or displacing the very fabric of space-time itself.295 His worlds are dynamic, allowing, 
for example, the Chums of Chance in Against the Day (2006) to travel through the center of a 
hollow Earth, to a parallel though different Earth on the other side of the sun, and to other 
dimensions entirely. Such transgressions of space-time move Pynchon’s eschatology from the 
apocalyptic to the nuclear, from the entropic to the emergent, from the young individual writer 
trying to cope with and represent the world, to a palpable species-level existential dread being 
impotently faced by writing the fantastic, the vital, and the weird.  
Pynchon’s fantastic nuclear spaces are not simply the simulation and simulacra of 
disaster and the Bomb, nor does he ignore the realities of the historical nuclear past within these 
landscapes. Peter Schwenger, in his compelling nuclear critical study, Letter Bomb (1993), 
convincingly argues that The Bomb predominantly functions in Gravity’s Rainbow as Pynchon’s 
engagement with the United States’ decision to deploy atomic weaponry at the conclusion of 
World War II. This is not simply the case because atomic bombs are dropped on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki during the chronology of the novel’s narrative, but “of all the horrors of Hiroshima, 
that which distinguishes it from every comparable horror is that it is not finished. I am speaking 
of the deferred action of the bomb not on the bodies of its victims but on the minds of all those 
who live in the world that it dominates.”296 In other words, though The Rocket (The Bomb) 
hurtles toward the theater in Los Angeles and the horrors that are not finished are still 
asymptotically in the future, the fact of the matter is, The Bomb has already exploded at 
Hiroshima and its traumatic effects continue to dominate minds in the present. Any imaginative, 
narrative engagement with the nuclear Bomb in Pynchon’s present must necessarily take place in 
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Hiroshima’s aftermath, even as it anticipates further destruction. (This recursive loop is a 
familiar structure in the nuclear imagination as I have sketched it thus far.)  
  When one steps back from the recursively (and obviously) nuclear Gravity’s Rainbow 
and considers Pynchon’s work as a whole, though it becomes more difficult to definitively locate 
the nuclear referent in his other novels, the synchronic temporality of his fiction—in its tendency 
to elide familiar formulations of eros and thanatos, of genesis and ending—functions in a 
similarly nuclear fashion. This recursive narrative form is distinct in Pynchon’s fiction. I will 
argue that it is The Bomb itself he bends forward and backward through history to create his 
non-linear temporality. Further, this narrative trajectory, this bending, as it swerves erratically 
through different historical modernisms (and postmodernisms), can be primarily understood 
through Pynchon’s engagement with that mysterious entity light. Constantly revolving among 
the major scientific fields of the twentieth century—cybernetics, thermodynamics, and quantum 
physics, among others—Pynchon’s world(s) are constructed as crystals of relativity capable of 
warping the space-time of history itself. To access The Bomb writing, or the writing of The 
Bomb, the missing, occluded, and ungraspable component of Pynchon’s history, namely light, 
illuminates the archival accumulation and destruction of The Bomb’s (retroactive) insertion into 
history.  
The Rocket falls at the end of Gravity’s Rainbow on a room in darkness. We begin the 
novel: “But it’s night. He’s afraid of the way the glass will fall—soon—it will be a spectacle: the 
fall of a crystal palace. But coming down in total blackout, without one glint of light, only great 
invisible crashing.”297 Awaiting a spectacle, an image of crystal falling that can only be heard in 
the absolute darkness as an “invisible crashing,” the novel begins and ends in the same space. 
This is the space of nuclear singularity, gravity having affected light to the point that even the 
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light from a nuclear explosion cannot escape the Black Hole of its own historical trajectory and 
logic. The title of Gravity’s Rainbow can be read as the impossibility of escaping Earth’s gravity 
and the novel’s action should be mapped along such a parabola; and of course, if extreme 
enough, gravity is a force capable of capturing light itself. Thus, one might suggest that an 
“illuminated” understanding of The Bomb is prevented from within the darkness of its own 
history, and consequently, a subject in Gravity’s Rainbow has no other position in relationship to 
The Bomb than this anxious awaiting in the darkness of a “to come” that cannot arrive. What 
falls back to earth in Gravity’s Rainbow is not merely The Rocket. The rainbow itself—a 
parabola that is also a spectrum of light—is swallowed up by The Bomb. Consequently, to 
understand the Bomb, one must step outside of its historical, eschatological trajectory defined by 
the narrative and historical structure of Gravity’s Rainbow and late-twentieth century anxieties. 
To do this, Pynchon projects nuclear moments luminously into the historical past in his other 
novels, accessing points when one can step out of the asymptotic darkness of Gravity’s 
Rainbow’s nuclear singularity, and thereby imagines a deep kind of multiplicitous history for the 
Bomb a Nietzsche of “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life” (1874) might have 
well appreciated. 
Pynchon’s nuclear imagination, by exploring  how light functions throughout his 
narratives, thus articulates itself in general as a rewriting of history, and in particular, as a 
reconsideration of the nuclear referent in history. This rewriting (or more accurately, this 
revising) does not function to change history. It does not create an “alternate” history, nor simply 
explore historical possibilities that never occurred, as in Philip K. Dick’s The Man in the High 
Castle (1962), Philip Roth’s The Plot Against America (2004), or Kim Stanley Robinson’s The 
Years of Rice and Salt (2002). Rather, Pynchon’s historical project presents a plurality of 
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possibilities, some realized, others abandoned or refracted. In doing so he constantly emphasizes 
the act of writing history. His historical imagination is defined by the need to write the secret 
histories that are occluded by “reality.” This often takes the form of unveiling “conspiracies,” 
outing clandestine societies, and unlocking hidden archives. Though always acknowledged as 
impossible to reveal—i.e. there is no apocalypse per se, no revelation proper—the forces of 
history, in Pynchon’s terms, can best be captured by updating Adams’s symbol of the dynamo. 
The forces at work in the physical world: time, gravity, light, quantum mechanics, entropy, 
chaos, etc., represent this occluded history, the history that gets ignored by anthropocentric and 
anthropomorphic eschatological narratives. Of course this is not to say that Pynchon ignores the 
human. Far from it, as the thousands of characters in his fiction attest to the complexity of the 
human as a category in his work. As subjects and objects of history, Pynchon’s characters map a 
complex network of relationships, both to other humans and to the material world. Sometimes 
this latter relationship is expressed through direct alteration of the world through some sort of 
violent act—the V2 bombs falling, for instance—but just as often it is presented as a slippage in 
and around the material world, a break from one particular instantiation of actually-lived-reality 
to another. All this tends to take place during a “new kind of time,”298 and this new kind of 
temporality can best be described by the different ways light bends through space and, 
ultimately, through the archive. Over the course of his oeuvre, from Mason & Dixon (1997), 
largely set in the eighteenth century, to the 1980s of Vineland (1990), Pynchon’s historical and 
archival timeline occurs as a nuclear drama of light, a narrative that unsettlingly explores both 
modernity’s reifying project of capturing light, and possible modes of resistance available to the 
postmodern subject of the twenty-first century optical society. 
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3.2 ATOMIC MIMESIS: THE BOMB AND GRAVITY’S RAINBOW 
 
One significant aspect of Pynchon that must be confronted for any discussion of his relationship 
to The Bomb is the simple fact, mentioned above, that nowhere does he unambiguously represent 
an atomic explosion or anything resembling global nuclear war. Though there are many 
speculative aspects to Pynchon’s work, and his various affinities with science fiction cannot be 
ignored, his commitment to exploring history, a history in which global nuclear war has not 
taken place, necessitates eschewing certain kinds of futurity for his projected worlds. Though 
that futurity should always be understood as one that might not take place, the dominant 
narrative mode of twentieth century nuclear fiction—projecting disaster into some moment in the 
future—significantly, does not occur in Pynchon. 
 This is not to ignore, however, how the historical event of The Bomb dropped on 
Hiroshima functions in Gravity’s Rainbow. Near the end of the novel, in the final moment that 
one can call Slothrop a distinct individual, the final scene before he becomes “[s]cattered all over 
the Zone,”299 he catches a glimpse of a headline: 
In one of those streets, in the morning fog, plastered over two slippery cobblestones, is a 
scrap of newspaper headline, with a wirephoto of a giant white cock, dangling in the sky 
straight downward out of a white pubic bush. The letters 
    MB DRO 
      ROSHI 
appear above with the logo of some occupation newspaper, a grinning glamour girl riding 
astraddle the cannon of a tank, steel penis with slotted serpent head, 3rd Armored treads 
’n’ triangle on a sweater rippling across her tits. The white image has the same 
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coherence, the hey-lookit-me smugness, as the Cross does. It is not only a sudden white 
genital onset in the sky—it is also, perhaps, a Tree . . . .300 
In all of Pynchon’s work, this is the most explicitly nuclear moment. It reports the historical 
event of Hiroshima, provides an image of the explosion, and it is Gravity’s Rainbow’s 
“protagonist” who encounters this fragment of newspaper. The complexity of this point in the 
novel cannot be overstated, and to understand how the nuclear referent functions in Pynchon’s 
work in a larger sense, it deserves sustained attention.  
First and foremost, the inability for language and text to capture the event is underscored 
by the fragmentation of the famous, though fabricated, headline, “ATOM BOMB DROPPED 
ON HIROSHIMA,” into “MB DRO / ROSHI.” In attempting to represent the historical actuality 
of the event, only destroyed text, text erased by the wet, foggy streets, is possible. When reported 
in such a fashion, Hiroshima becomes a site of fragmentation, misrepresentation, and misreading. 
The ability to capture this (or any) event is implicated in a process of archival decay as 
documents fray and fragment in their futile attempts at atomic mimesis. Slothrop has some 
connection to the historical event, but it is (at least) twice removed. As in so many other places in 
the novel, the characters in Gravity’s Rainbow have a marginal relationship to “official history” 
at best. Steven Weisenburger makes clear in his companion to the novel that Pynchon 
painstakingly mined The Times of London, The New York Times, and other sources to provide 
tiny details to make the chronology of the novel correspond with the actual events of history,301 
details that add considerable texture to the historical moments Gravity’s Rainbow inhabits, but 
these details are usually tangential to the more “familiar” historical events of World War II. 
Slothrop, wandering the various streets of postwar German towns at this point in the novel—
Stralsund, Greifswald, Rostock—has not heard news of The Bomb being dropped on 6 August 
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1945, but rather first hears of Hiroshima in what must be days afterward through a text whose 
very authority is doubtful. He is on the margins of history here, only able to read an already 
fragmenting and disappearing history, unable to encounter the nuclear thing itself, an event that 
is already situated in an ambiguous past. 
 To further complicate the newspaper fragment’s relationship to Hiroshima, this 
document, unlike Pynchon’s use of actual articles from The Times, cannot be said to really even 
exist except as an imaginative construction. For instance, the headline from the front page of The 
New York Times on 7 August 1945, reads: “First Atomic Bomb Dropped on Japan; Missile is 
Equal to 20,000 tons of TNT; Truman Warns Foes of a ‘Rain of Ruin,’”302 with no photograph 
whatsoever of the mushroom cloud. Only five days later did The New York Times publish 
photographs of the explosions at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and they were buried on page 28.303 
There is a temporal and historical conflation in the newspaper fragment from Gravity’s Rainbow 
that combines reporting the event and the presentation of its iconic image, an elision further 
complicated by the many significant events between these two moments of documentation.304 
This image of a monumental nuclear history, for the narrative purposes of Gravity’s Rainbow, 
gets temporally distorted and refracted, the image imposed upon a headline in a text that never 
(could have) existed. Pynchon’s temporal manipulation of text and image, of the moment of 
historical reportage and the release of the photographs, should be emphasized here, for this 
manipulation serves to undermine the authority and authenticity of the image as it is described in 
the novel as well.  
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 Figure 2: Atomic Bombing of Hiroshima, 6 August 1945. 
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Throughout the subsection of Gravity’s Rainbow, “Streets,” in which Slothrop finds the 
newspaper fragment in the morning, nothing is very clear. Slothrop is unsure of his actual 
physical location, whether it is Stralsund, Greifswald, or Rostock, as the physical aspects of each 
city blend into one another. This causes him to imagine, before the bomb is even mentioned, that 
his inability to place himself—that everything looks the same as somewhere else—is because 
“[p]erhaps there is a new bomb that can destroy only the insides of structures.”305 The slippage 
of location, the blending of buildings into one another, creates a relativistic space defined by 
architecture without interiority. Slothrop’s projection of homogeneous urban space, defined by 
interchangeable exteriors, transforms the Zone into a veritable film set, with its empty façades 
and smooth exterior surfaces covering a lack of interiority. This “new bomb,” which is also The 
Bomb whose image he is about to encounter, turns his world into pure Hollywood spectacle, 
only the interchangeable urban façades are necessary for the evocation of realistic space. 
Slothrop is firmly in the world of the fantasmatic and the filmic, a world of pure appearances, a 
space dominated by the ability to manipulate images, a space that is already produced by The 
Bomb that exploded at some relatively indeterminate time in the recent past. It is only within 
such Pynchonian space that Slothrop can encounter the newspaper reporting the attack on 
Hiroshima. 
Further veiling and distorting the particulars of his surroundings, the entire scene, 
wherever it might be, is ensconced in fog: “Strips of insulation hang up in the morning fog, after 
a night of moon brightening and darkening as if by itself, because the blowing fog was so 
smooth, so hard to see.”306 Looking at the picture does not decrease the fogginess of the setting: 
“Slothrop sits on the curbstone watching it, and the letters, and girl with steel cock waving hi 
fellas, as the fog whitens into morning, and figures with carts, or dogs, or bicycles go by in 
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brown-gray outlines, wheezing, greeting briefly in fog-flattened voices, passing. He doesn’t 
remember sitting on the curb for so long staring at the picture. But he did.”307 Fog veils 
everything Slothrop sees, the newspaper, his setting, and the people surrounding him. Thus it 
would be wrong to read Hiroshima’s presence in Gravity’s Rainbow as a revelation, an 
“apocalypse.” The explosion has not torn away the veil and revealed some underlying truth, but 
the opposite: it has served to further veil the very reality Slothrop inhabits, foreclosing the 
possibility of apocalyptic revelation. The fog is also produced by The Bomb and is analogous to 
the white smoke rising from its explosion, and even the fog itself is difficult to discern (somehow 
drifting, in an elision of space, from Japan to northern Germany). 
Consequently, the image that Slothrop sees, the “wirephoto of a giant white cock” is a 
representation of the nuclear that we would do well to question, both through its inability to 
provide revelation and as always already thoroughly mediated. The image is seen through several 
glasses darkly, a mechanical reproduction of the mechanical destruction of matter. Nuclear 
fission is only conveyed in Pynchonian space by a heavily mediated image. In a McLuhanesque 
fashion, the medium here really is the message.308 If each successive media technology’s 
“message,” its subject matter or content, is a previous technology, then Pynchon forces us to 
consider that matter itself is now a media technology, something to be manipulated, changed, 
destroyed, and created (fusion and fission), all in order to convey a spectacle, to communicate 
something (mass-death), to extend human senses all the way down to the molecular and atomic. 
The nuclear medium’s expression, the destruction of matter itself, can only be perceived at a vast 
distance, through multiple layers of text and manipulated images in a physical space that is 
already thoroughly filmic and mediated.  
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But the mushroom cloud rising into the sky is not an image that has, through its 
reproduction, lost what Walter Benjamin famously called an “aura” in “The Work of Art in the 
Age of Mechanical Reproduction” (1936). For a consideration of the “nuclear object,” we would 
do well to recall that Benjamin does not limit himself to exclusively considering the aura of 
aesthetic objects, but notes the aura in natural objects as well:  
We define the aura of [natural objects] as the unique phenomenon of a distance, however 
close it may be. If, while resting on a summer afternoon, you follow with your eyes a 
mountain range on the horizon or a branch which casts its shadow over you, you 
experience the aura of those mountains, of that branch. This image makes it easy to 
comprehend the contemporary decay of the aura. . . . Namely, the desire of contemporary 
masses to bring things ‘closer’ spatially and humanly, which is just as ardent as their bent 
toward the uniqueness of every reality by accepting its reproduction.309 
In constructing an image of a nuclear object as he does, Pynchon forecloses any possibility of an 
“aura,” whether it be aesthetic or “natural,” and affirms the epigraph from Heidegger that begins 
this chapter, where he says of the atomic bomb that it is only the grossest example of the 
“merging of everything into the distanceless [that is] more unearthly than everything bursting 
apart.” To perceive an “aura” in an “authentic” object requires some amount of distance. The 
nuclear object is essentially the atom, matter itself, and its fusion (or fission) presumably brings 
human senses into direct contact with the object. And yet, for Heidegger, “despite the conquest 
of distances the nearness of things remains absent.”310 Neither Slotrhop nor the audience of 
Gravity’s Rainbow is nearer the “nuclear Thing” than the pilot of the Enola Gay, the camera 
operator of The Necessary Evil, Bernard Waldman, who took the photograph of Hiroshima, nor 
anyone else who remains in the wake of the blast (let alone the scientists who worked on the 
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Manhattan Project). The only experience of the nuclear object in-and-of-itself is to be destroyed 
by its realization and emergence—its explosion. Whatever is “authentic” about the nuclear can 
only be experienced in annihilation; to encounter the nuclear-itself is to be destroyed. The 
withering of the aura Benjamin perceives in the age of mechanical reproduction has been 
completed in Pynchon’s postmodernism, the aura of any object whatsoever having completely 
disappeared, and necessarily so, for to continue to encounter an aura in Pynchonian space is 
destructive. Matter itself, the “natural” object, loses any possibility for authenticity in Pynchon’s 
nuclear image, and we are consequently forced to reconsider “nature” as a category of possible 
experience or encounter. 
 Consequently, Slothrop’s discovery of the nuclear image cannot really be said to be an 
encounter with an object at all, let alone the nuclear object. There is nothing to see, no “reality” 
of the nuclear that the phenomenal world is somehow veiling. There is only the veil, and this is at 
the heart of Pynchon’s rejection of the apocalyptic as a structure for his narrative in favor of the 
nuclear. Discussing something slightly different, but still apropos for my purposes, Slavoj Žižek 
notes that 
[i]f, behind the phenomenal veil, there is nothing, it is through the mediation of this 
“nothing” that the subject constitutes himself in the very act of his misrecognition. The 
illusion that there is something hidden behind the curtain is thus a reflexive one: what is 
hidden behind the appearance is the possibility of this very illusion—behind the curtain is 
the fact that the subject thinks something must be behind it.311 
Slothrop’s entire subjectivity until this point in the novel has been constructed by his paranoia, 
his fear that there is a “They” behind the curtain of his experience, manipulating, controlling, and 
constructing him. His experience of phenomenal reality is a misrecognition that always verges on 
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“the discovery that everything is connected, everything in Creation, a secondary illumination—
not yet blindingly One, but at least connected, and perhaps a route In.”312 And even if, to a large 
extent, Slothrop’s paranoia is appropriate—for there often really is someone or something out to 
get him—this does not lessen the fact that his subjectivity is constructed through his 
misrecognition of how things are connected and what their connections might mean. His first 
“reading” or interpretation of the nuclear image as sexualized and phallic cannot then be said to 
represent the underlying “truth” of Pynchon’s nuclear image then: that the nuclear is essentially 
an outgrowth of a phallogocentric, masculine, patriarchal, war-mongering culture. But this is also 
not to suggest that there is anything except this reading available to Slothrop. His misrecognition, 
his interpretation is always a “secondary illumination” with no originary, singular unity having 
produced this image except Slothrop’s hermeneutic activity that assumes there must be 
something behind it.  
The image of The Bomb may be a simulacrum, but as the simulacra is the only thing we 
or Slothrop are given to understand, then the sexuality of this image deserves to be taken quite 
seriously even if the only truth of the image is its illusion. Further, the sexual metaphors here are 
more complex and compelling than they might first appear. When Pynchon writes about Masonic 
conspiracies earlier in the novel, he notes that “we must also never forget famous Missouri 
Mason Harry Truman: sitting by virtue of death in office, this very August 1945, with his 
control-finger poised right on Miss Enola Gay’s clit, making ready to tickle 100,000 little yellow 
folks into what will come down as a fine vapor-deposit of fat-cracklings wrinkled into the fused 
rubble of their city on the Inland Sea. . . .”313 Here we glimpse that the nuclear is more than 
simply a phallus, as it unites Freud’s eros and thanatos through Pynchon’s characterization of 
the nuclear as both phallic and clitoral. The “button” or catalyst is feminine and orgasmic; the 
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event is masculine (but also, of course, vice versa). The nuclear is capable of being perceived as 
male or female, and this is precisely what Slothrop sees: both a maternal genesis and 
eschatological phallus in the rising smoke. As should be clear, even a brief perusal of the 
opening of Gravity’s Rainbow forces one to confront the overly-phallic in Pynchon’s exhaustive 
accounting of Pirate Prentice’s famous Banana Breakfasts. And one cannot fail to note the 
phallic nature of the Rocket, specifically in the final scenes when the Schwarzgerät is wrapped 
around Gottfried like the Cassock in Melville’s Moby-Dick (1851). But it should also be stressed 
that the 00000 Rocket containing the Gottfried “payload” is a womb capable of containing or 
giving birth to a nuclear subject. This and further layers of sexual imagery prevent a reading of 
the nuclear here as a purely masculine or feminine event. Not only are these images queered, 
they also contain their opposite. And so we must ask what sexual act is being performed, and 
what it produces, if anything at all.  
“At the instant it happened, the pale Virgin was rising in the east, head, shoulders, 
breasts, 17° 36’ down to her maidenhead at the horizon. A few doomed Japanese knew of her as 
some Western deity to be sacrificed. The sun was in Leo. The fireburst came roaring and 
sovereign . . . .”314 The phallus is both penetrating the ground, creating its own penetration out of 
its birth or explosion, while simultaneously contained in and birthed from the womb of Virgo. 
The victims are tickled, arriving at orgasmic destruction. But it is also a rising Cross and the 
world tree Yggdrasil. As Slothrop performs his reading of the image, it becomes capable of 
representing Adams’s Virgin and Dynamo simultaneously. We are moving in the realm of the 
thoroughly, if confusingly archetypal, and clearly, as Harold Bloom would have it, “Pynchon’s 
despair of his own Gnostic Kabbalah.”315 The sexualization of the nuclear image quickly 
threatens to become anything and everything. Slothrop’s encounter with this image creates 
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accumulating and potentially infinite interpretations, and these proliferating interpretations 
threaten to engulf any reading. This operation is Pynchonian irony at its best, and ultimately a 
site of interpretive breakdown. 
Contra Žižek, for whom “it is through the mediation of this ‘nothing’ that the subject 
constitutes himself in the very act of his misrecognition,” when Slothrop is confronted with the 
picture of Hiroshima, spending an unconsciously long amount of time staring at the image, this is 
not a moment of subjective formation but rather the opposite. He cannot look away. And then he 
is scattered across the Zone, multiplied and transformed into a rhizomatic and nomadic network. 
His inability to cease interpreting the nuclear image causes his dispersal. Confronted with the 
accumulation of references—sexual, historical, textual, and mimetic—the images refuse to 
coalesce into an apocalyptic interpretation of history, a confirmation of his paranoia, nor much 
else. There is an accumulation of data, a swelling of textuality at this moment that cannot be 
comprehended. The threat to a subject like Slothrop, and thus the preterit and the schlemihl as 
well, is textual; the very condition of the nuclear subject then is less that the subject is threatened 
by the void, or that illusions keep one from a transcendental or apocalyptic truth, than that the 
interpretations one is forced to arrive at out of an encounter with the nuclear—a nuclear that can 
also, consequently, be found anywhere—create a subject threatened and dissolved by textual 
accumulation, by the inability to stop interpreting an effluvium of text.316 
In this fashion Pynchon suggests that for the post-nuclear subject, a subject that is always 
already scattered, dispersed over a network of conflicting images proliferating from the trauma 
of Hiroshima, history is radiant. Events as singular as Hiroshima and Nagasaki flirt with infinite 
regress—a kind of historic Casimir effect of nuclear representation, as they spill over into the 
eighteenth, nineteenth, and twenty-first centuries. The radiation emitted from the fragment of 
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newspaper Slothrop finds on the ground explodes backwards and forwards through Pynchon’s 
historical novels in luminous moments of nuclear narrativity. But, like the parabola light defines 
in relationship to a singularity, Pynchon’s atomic light cannot escape the black of hole of (its 
own) history. 
 
3.3 NUCLEAR LUMINOSITY: THE FABULOUS METAHISTORICAL TEXTUALITY 
OF MASON & DIXON 
 
“As if . . . there were no single Destiny [. ..] but rather a choice among a great many 
possible ones, their number steadily diminishing each time a Choice be made, till at last 
‘reduc’d,’ to the events that do happen to us, as we pass among ’em, thro’ Time 
unredeemable,— much as a Lens, indeed, may receive all the Light from some vast 
celestial Field of View, and reduce it to a single Point.” 
  —Thomas Pynchon, Mason & Dixon317 
 
To begin to explore Pynchon’s luminous history, I would like to turn to a novel that, at first 
glance, one would hardly accuse of being nuclear in any way. Framed in Philadelphia during 
Christmastide of 1786 on the eve of the Constitutional Congress, Mason & Dixon spins a 
fantastic yarn, told by a Reverend Cherrycoke, about Charles Mason and Jeremiah Dixon 
surveying their historically significant border. Drawing us further from the present, Pynchon 
employs a number of stylistic and grammatical aspects of late eighteenth century English prose 
throughout the narrative that produces a texture of periodicity while consistently removing us 
from a coherent sense of history through the novel’s frequent anachronistic and ahistorical 
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references. (E.g., five pages in, Pynchon makes a reference to Bill Clinton that a contemporary 
reader would find difficult to miss.318) As sprawling and encyclopedic as Gravity’s Rainbow, 
Mason & Dixon, as one recent critic notes, “rewrites the American romance to foreground the 
anti-heroic realities of the historic record, complicating in the process the naïve heroism of 
patriotic historical narratives.”319 An at times brutal critique of American origin myths, slavery, 
European imperialism, and the Enlightenment (among other things), Mason & Dixon is also 
particularly luminous. 
 The novel is everywhere saturated by invocations of light. Over the course of the novel 
the astronomers Mason and Dixon survey the famous line that would geographically separate 
Delaware and Pennsylvania from Maryland and Virginia. In doing so, I would like to argue that 
they inscribe a hermeneutics of light upon the novel’s relationship to history. Marking what 
would eventually be slave states from free states, their interpretation of light, of reading the 
heavens to draw an imaginary line upon the earth (also marking the boundary of the state), not 
only evokes the American Civil War, but, in the greater sense of Pynchon’s oeuvre, a “terrible 
simple nearness to the Night of the ‘Black Hole,’ some Zero-Point of history.”320 The violence of 
history is thus traced throughout Mason & Dixon along geometries of light. And as there is a 
significant difference between how the astronomers of the novel understood their principle 
object, and how modern physics understands light, Pynchon’s most obvious project in the 
novel—a complex critique of the Enlightenment—grounds itself in the break Einstein’s notion of 
relativity makes with Newtonian mechanics.321 (That there are other effects of this break in the 
novel upon notions of space, time, history, and matter should also be evident.) 
 Unlike Gravity’s Rainbow, however, Mason & Dixon is much less concerned with the 
event of history. Rather, its narrative is pieced together in a complex web of fidelities and 
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infidelities to the historical record. Throughout, Pynchon’s imagination and prose display a kind 
of archival violence, a merciless project of weaving together debris from the ash bin of history 
into a fascinating and, at times, incoherent pastiche of events. The eschatological limit of such an 
archivally violent narrative is not the asymptote of Gravity’s Rainbow, however, but how the 
00000 Rocket, in a certain paradoxical sense, had in fact reached its destination: “Snow balls 
have flown their Arcs, starr’d the Sides of Outbuildings.”322  
 This first of line of the novel is a complex image that immediately signals the end of the 
Cold War, Gravity’s Rainbow,323 and a complex hermeneutics of an illuminated, non-
teleological history. The Bomb falling at the end of Gravity’s Rainbow is revealed, in the wake 
of the Cold War, as nothing more than a snowball that has already flown its arc. The nuclear 
missiles threatening MAD become harmless projectiles thrown at a family gathering 
immediately following Christmas.324 The potential for a “hot” war, in Pynchon’s 1990s, has 
frozen in the wake of the Cold War. The novel then reads this initial explosion, this non-event, in 
recursive patterns as a Zero-Point, a narrative asymptote that was never reached, but nevertheless 
as something that radiates in both the star-pattern the snowball makes upon impact, and the 
deeper fractal structures of the snowflakes themselves. Further, this non-event is temporally 
convoluted. The snowballs have flown their arcs; they have been launched and landed in the past, 
before the establishment of the United States as a nation. Thermonuclear war, then, is presented 
as both something that did not happen (the Bombs were really just snowballs) and something 
always already present in American history (they land before the Constitutional Congress of 
1787). As such, Pynchon immediately invites us to read the crystals of his textual snowflakes 
how his astronomer/astrologers read the stars. As Mason comments at one point, “‘Surely, at the 
end of the day, we serve no master but Him that regulates the movements of the Heav’ns, which 
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taken together form a cryptick Message.’”325 For Mason, deeply embedded in a world of 
Newtonian mechanics (which, of course, is constantly breaking down), history is something that 
can be read, and the stars are reality’s cryptic, convoluted text. The stars created by the 
snowballs (or the [unexploded] Bombs) rewrite American history itself. To interpret the cryptic 
message of the (non-)explosion of the bombs, of the stars, is to engage with a recursive 
hermeneutics of material reality as it is observed in various phenomena of light. 
 Further, it is important that the surface these snowballs have exploded upon is an 
“Outbuilding.” Mason & Dixon concerns itself with history as it is crashes against the 
outbuilding—history as shithouse. Cousin Ethelmer, whose conception of history is quite close 
to that of the narrator Cherrycoke, describes the formation and aims of writing this history: 
“Who claims Truth, Truth abandons. History is hir’d, or coerc’d, only in Interests that 
must ever prove base. She is too innocent, to be left within the reach of anyone in 
Power,— who need but touch her, and all her Credit is in the instant vanish’d, as if it had 
never been. She needs rather to be tended lovingly and honorably by fabulists and 
counterfeiters, Ballad-Mongers and Cranks of ev’ry Radius, Masters of Disguise to 
provide her the Costume, Toilette, and Bearing, and Speech nimble enough to keep her 
beyond the Desires, or even the Curiosity, of Government.”326 
Ethelmer, and by proxy Cherrycoke and Pynchon himself, has a sense of history here quite 
similar to Walter Benjamin’s famous “Theses on the Philosophy of History” (1940). History is 
written by the victors in the service of “Power” and “Government,” and Cherrycoke’s task as 
narrator is “to brush history against the grain.”327 Rather than claiming his account of Mason and 
Dixon’s adventures is the “Truth,” to keep history beyond the interests of power, it must be 
fabulistic and counterfeit: “‘Twasn’t Gibbon’s sort of History [. . .] that I meant,— rather, Jack 
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Mandeville, Captain John Smith, even to Baron Munchausen of our own day.”328 Consequently, 
rather than relate a heroic tale of Mason and Dixon that would lend ideological support to the 
emerging nation, Cherrycoke concerns himself with the waste and detritus of history, the 
marginal, forgotten, and hidden histories deposited in the outbuildings of time. That the 
scatological history of Mason & Dixon is largely fabricated artifice is of little concern, for to 
read the history of the non-event of the Bomb, to understand how it radiates into the past 
represented in Pynchon’s novel, is not to understand it in terms of those in power, but, as 
Pynchon says in the introduction to Slow Learner, to approach it from the position of the rest of 
“us,” from the position of preterition.329 
 The presence (or rather, absence) of The Bomb in Mason & Dixon is further complicated 
by the novel’s sense of, and the preterit’s relationship to, historical time. Supposedly written in 
Cherrycoke’s (fictional) book Christ and History, the epigraph to chapter 35, in which the above 
conversation takes place, evokes Pynchon’s sense of his historical novel’s temporality: 
“Facts are but the Play-things of lawyers,— Tops and Hoops, forever a-spin. . . Alas, the 
Historian may indulge no such idle Rotating. History is not Chronology, for that is left to 
Lawyers,— nor is it Remembrance, for Remembrance belongs to the People. History can 
as little pretend to the Veracity of the one, as claim the Power of the other,— her 
Practitioners, to survive, must soon learn the arts of the quidnunc, spy, and Taproom 
Wit,— that there may ever continue more than one life-line back into a Past we risk, each 
day, losing our forebears in forever,— not a Chain of single Links, for one broken Link 
could lose us All,— rather a great disorderly Tangle of Lines, long and short, weak and 
strong, vanishing into the Mnemonick Deep, with only their Destination in common.”330 
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History for Pynchon is not collective memory nor a mere chronology of events, but a tangle of 
interweaving lines, a disordered network of threads that depends upon gossip, secrecy, 
conspiracy, and (drunken) humor to be written. The preservation of “us all” depends upon 
projecting this tangle of history. Rather than the monolithic narrative of the State interpellating 
its citizens through an imaginative geographic or eschatological boundary—the “arbitrary” 
borders of the nation and the national fantasy of global nuclear war—the task of Cherrycoke’s 
historian, and consequently Pynchon as a novelist, is to spin facts into not merely a yarn, but a 
quilt. Not a calendar, but a fabulist landscape playing with the historical record.331 
The history of the Bomb for the post-Cold War Pynchon, then, does not evoke a clear line 
of progression from the Enlightenment to the present, from Newton to 1945, but rather 
constitutes a tangled web of interconnecting threads that must be continually, imaginatively, and 
inventively rewoven if the past is not to disappear entirely. That there is an echo of Derrida’s 
“hypothesis [. . .] of a total and remainderless destruction of the archive,”332 should also be 
emphasized. In Cherrycoke’s account, if we view history as a single chain, a break in this chain 
threatens to “lose us All.” The Bomb here is simultaneously the break that would interrupt the 
chain, destroying the archive and “us All,” as well as these lines’ common destination, a 
destination that is both MAD and a present in which that event did not occur. Consequently, The 
Bomb’s threat to history and the archive should be understood within the fullness of its non-
event in the present of a post-Cold War United States and how this non-event is retroactively 
rewritten in Pynchon’s fabulous reimagining of American history. 
Though there are a few episodes that one might read as apocalyptic, or else as nuclear 
allegories333—and indeed, given the Puritan tenor of the novel’s setting, there are a few different 
eschatological threads Pynchon weaves throughout—the simple fact remains that, beyond the 
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first line of the novel, locating the nuclear referent in Mason & Dixon is a tangled business. For 
the non-event of thermonuclear war results in a doubling of the nuclear referent’s anachronism: it 
is neither “appropriate” for a historical novel set in the eighteenth century, nor does it evoke the 
sense of terror it evoked for the Pynchon of Slow Learner’s introduction in the 1990s US cultural 
imagination. In other words, I am not arguing that Mason & Dixon is “about” the nuclear bomb, 
nor even, necessarily, is it “about” the end of the Cold War. Rather, because of both its setting in 
a pre-national past, and its deeply complex use of light, Mason & Dixon forces us to reread the 
tangled threads of its own complex historiography as seriously engaging with the nuclear epoch 
in a manner similar to how Derrida (curiously) suggests certain pre-nuclear modernists might be 
read as dealing “seriously” with the nuclear referent: “[L]iterature has always belonged to the 
nuclear epoch, even if it does not talk ‘seriously’ about it. And in truth I believe that the nuclear 
epoch is dealt with more ‘seriously’ in the writings of Mallarmé, of Kafka, or Joyce, for 
example, than in present-day novels that would describe a ‘true’ nuclear catastrophe directly and 
in a ‘realistic’ fashion.” 334  
For all the suggestive moments of Derrida’s essay, “No Apocalypse, Not Now,” the claim 
that a writer like Joyce, who died in 1941, deals more “seriously” with the nuclear epoch than 
post-1945 novels, has received surprisingly little attention. This may partly be due to how the 
two major threads of nuclear criticism read Derrida’s provocative claim that global nuclear war 
is “a phenomenon whose essential feature is that it is fabulously textual, through and through.”335 
On the one hand, the more deconstructionist nuclear critics, though fully sympathetic with the 
fabulous textuality of nuclear war, largely focused their attention on post-1945 literature. On the 
other, for the nuclear critics more concerned with the ethical “reality” of a potential global 
nuclear war, who rejected, in varying degrees, the fabulous textuality of nuclear war, such a 
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statement about Mallarmé, Kafka, or Joyce would be as patently absurd as, one might imagine, 
reading the fabulous nuclear textuality of Mason & Dixon. 
In his insightful reading of what he calls the “staged symptoms of a pretraumatic nuclear 
syndrome,” however, Paul K. Saint-Amour “take[s] up Derrida’s claim that pre-1945 literature 
might ‘seriously’ address the nuclear condition.” 336 Beginning with a discussion of the residents 
of Hiroshima’s sense of bukimi prior to the Bomb being dropped,337 Saint-Amour then goes on to 
read Joyce’s Ulysses (1922) as a particularly illuminating pre-nuclear text: “In the advance guard 
of Cold War eschatology, Ulysses’s anticipation of a past, along with the spectral status of its 
characters with respect to the archive, limns the epistemological suspension, the uncanny dread, 
the hysteron proteron of the nuclear condition.”338 Though I can do little but add to Saint-
Amour’s convincing reading of Ulysses, traumatic earliness, and the nuclear uncanny here, for 
the purpose of treating Mason & Dixon as a text that deals ‘seriously’ with the (post-)nuclear 
epoch, I will also briefly turn to Ulysses. 
Near the end of the “Cyclops” chapter, Joyce inflates a fairly minor moment of 
violence—when the citizen throws a tin box at the departing Leopold Bloom, and misses—into 
an event with repercussions that are, as The New Bloomsday Book puts it, “prophetically, in the 
megaton range.”339 The resulting explosion deserves lengthy quotation: 
The catastrophe was terrific and instantaneous in its effect. The observatory of Dunsink 
registered in all eleven shocks, all of the fifth grade of Mercalli’s scale, and there is no 
record extant of a similar seismic disturbance in our island since the earthquake of 1534, 
the year of the rebellion of Silken Thomas. The epicentre appears to have been that part 
of the metropolis which constitutes the Inn’s Quay ward and parish of Saint Michan 
covering a surface of fortyone acres, two roods and one square pole or perch. All the 
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lordly residences in the vicinity of the palace of justice were demolished and that noble 
edifice itself, in which at the time of the catastrophe important legal debates were in 
progress, is literally a mass of ruins beneath which it is to be feared all the occupants 
have been buried alive. From the reports of eyewitnesses it transpires that the seismic 
waves were accompanied by a violent atmospheric perturbation of cyclonic character. An 
article of headgear since ascertained to belong to the much respected clerk of the crown 
and peace Mr George Fottrell and a silk umbrella with a gold handle with the engraved 
initials, coat of arms and house number of the erudite and worshipful chairman of quarter 
sessions sir Frederick Falkiner, recorder of Dublin, have been discovered by search 
parties in remote parts of the island, respectively, the former on the third basaltic ridge of 
the giant’s causeway, and the latter embedded to the extent of one foot three inches in the 
sandy beach of Holeopen bay near the old head of Kinsale. Other eyewitnesses depose 
that they observed an incandescent object of enormous proportions hurtling through the 
atmosphere at a terrifying velocity in a trajectory directed south west by west. Messages 
of condolence and sympathy are being hourly received from all parts of the different 
continents and the sovereign pontiff has been graciously pleased to decree that a special 
missa pro defunctis shall be celebrated simultaneously by the ordinaries of each and 
every cathedral church of all the episcopal dioceses subject to the spiritual authority of 
the Holy See in suffrage of the souls of those faithful departed who have been so 
unexpectedly called away from our midst.340 
Though presumably Derrida was not thinking of this moment specifically when he threw out 
Joyce’s name as an exemplar of “serious” engagement with the nuclear epoch—and indeed, to 
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really explore Derrida’s claim would probably require a far less “obvious” nuclear moment—the 
appropriateness of this passage for the present discussion cannot be denied. 
 First, it needs to be emphasized that this moment does not actually occur in the “reality” 
of Ulysses’ narrative space. The movement from the tin being thrown to an explosion that sends 
Fottrell’s hat to the extreme north of Ireland, and Falkiner’s umbrella to the extreme south, is 
hyperbolic, exaggerated, and completely imaginative. It presents a fantasmatic space of 
destruction, a fantasy that is thoroughly nuclear in its instantaneity, violence, and extremity. 
Indeed, if such a passage were to appear in a post-1945 novel, there would be no doubt about its 
essentially nuclear nature. Extrapolating a massive catastrophic explosion or earthquake from 
such a relatively minute, banal act of violence emphasizes that for Joyce there is a clear telos to 
the violence of modernity. Such a relatively innocent gesture both contains and underlies the 
extension of this violence to a scale beyond anything else in the world of Ulysses. Further, the 
object of this violence, Leopold Bloom, the modernist subject par excellence—who also shortly 
transforms into Elijah or perhaps Christ apocalyptically descending from heaven—is missed. The 
thrown tin box functions as a letter that cannot reach its destination. Bloom, the target of 
violence, both dissipates as a subject, and is reified into an iconographic messianic figure 
emptied of any spiritual or meaningful content. The destruction carried out by the citizen against 
a specific target that threatens the citizen’s very integrity results in the unintended breakdown of 
the law and the State, the very structures that permitted the citizen to be a citizen in the first 
place. (A kind of MAD.) And of course the real work only begins in the ruins and aftermath of 
the event, in the “work of salvage,” the removal of debris and human remains. As has become so 
familiar with contemporary catastrophic events—Katrina, Haiti, Fukushima, etc.—“condolences 
and sympathy are being hourly received from all parts of the different continents.” The 
144 
 
interconnectivity of a global communications network immediately broadcasting the catastrophe, 
making the catastrophe always already global (in a sense), is prefigured in Joyce, and gets 
expressed in an international missa de profunctis, or requiem for the dead. Indeed, it is virtually 
impossible to read the above without noting Joyce’s prescience (even to the extent that later in 
the paragraph he anticipates the flowering of acronyms that would accompany the establishment 
and growth of the military-industrial complex). 
 As Saint-Amour argues, this and other moments from Ulysses convey something that is 
unmistakably nuclear.341 Not merely because “the catastrophe was terrific and instantaneous,” 
but also because what gets truly destroyed, “the palace of justice,” is a wholly archival 
institution. What is threatened, more immediately than even human bodies or survival, is an 
archival site. Only the relatively unnecessary accoutrements of modern life (a hat and umbrella) 
undergo violent spatial displacement. But the primary “mass of ruins” is the center of juridical 
power. The persistence of coherent laws and State power absolutely depend upon the presence 
and maintenance of the historical, juridical archive in order to function. The Joycean 
imagination, long before the explosions at Alamogordo, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki, understands 
that “the uniqueness of nuclear war. . . even if it remains a decoy, a belief, a phantasmatic 
projection, is obviously the possibility of an irreversible destruction, leaving no traces of the 
juridico-literary archive and therefore the basis of literature and criticism.”342 Bloom’s descent 
from the heavens following the explosion can only be read as a parody of the apocalyptic mode: 
“an absolute self-destructibility without apocalypse, without revelation of its own truth, without 
absolute knowledge.”343 Joyce, in this moment, forecloses literature as vehicle for revelation—
apocalyptic or otherwise, which is something The Crying of Lot 49 further explores—and 
nothing but Ulysses’ own precariousness as an archival object is left, attempting to overcome its 
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own disappearance from history, its deletion from the archive, its de(con)struction of tradition.344 
That the language of this nuclear moment acts through a desperate proliferation of signs and 
inscriptions, producing meaningless acronyms designating those whose role it is to salvage the 
ruins of modernity (“Hercules Hannibal Habeas Corpus Anderson K.G. . . .”)—this can be 
historically projected both forward and backward as an awareness that perhaps the only way of 
staving off such a disaster lies in a flurry of archival and linguistic production (something like 
Ethelmer’s fabulistic history). If we have perhaps never been modern, in the final pages of 
“Cyclops” we have always already been post-nuclear.  
This striking intersection between state power, the juridical archive, and Joyce’s 
“traditional accent of the ecstasy of catastrophe,”345 along with the parodic proliferation of 
bureaucratic functionaries overseeing the aftermath of the disaster, displays a deep unease with 
biopolitical power that Pynchon very much shares, and interrogates to the nth degree over the 
course of his career. As he writes in his brief essay, “Is it O.K. to be a Luddite?”: “Since 
Hiroshima, we have watched nuclear weapons multiply out of control, and delivery systems 
acquire, for global purposes, unlimited range and accuracy. An unblinking acceptance of a 
holocaust running to seven- and eight-figure body counts has become—among those who, 
particularly since 1980, have been guiding our military policies—conventional wisdom.”346 In 
Mason & Dixon, this conventional wisdom of the US government (and the Reagan 
administration), its unblinking acceptance of and teleological drive toward mega-death, its 
technocratic, biopolitical population mathematics of destruction is prefigured through one of the 
novel’s discussions of the American landscape and Benjamin Franklin. 
In Chpater 50 of Mason & Dixon, in which Dixon stumbles upon the tavern “The Rabbi 
of Prague, headquarters of a Kabbalistick Faith,”347 a discussion about the Line and the coming 
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revolution takes place amongst the inn’s patrons. The discovery of the “new world,” for the 
various Kabbalists talking to Dixon, made it clear that “‘By the time of Columbus, God’s project 
of Disengagement was obvious to all,— with the terrible understanding that we were left more 
and more to our own solutions.’ / ‘America, withal, for centuries had been kept hidden, as are 
certain Bodies of Knowledge.’”348 The North American landscape is a text, harboring a secret 
body of knowledge to Dixon’s interlocutors, and is “‘meant to be studied with the same 
dedication as the Hebrew Kabbala would demand.’” As Dixon “may imagine, [they] take a lively 
interest in this Line of [his . . .] inasmuch as it may be read, East to West, much as a Line of Text 
upon a Page of the sacred Torah [. . .] ’Twill terminate somewhere to the West, no one, not even 
[Mason], knows where. An utterance. A message of uncertain length, apt to be interrupted at any 
Moment or Chain.” 349 The Mason-Dixon Line, for these hermeneutists, inscribes further writing 
upon the already textual landscape. In the wake of God’s disengagement, the secret of the new 
world becomes available to interpretation, and to read the Line written on the landscape is to 
approach some hidden secret. 
Recall, however, Cherrycoke’s invective against linear history, in which any single break 
in the chain of a monumental (rather than fabulistic) national history threatens everyone with 
destruction. The Line that Mason and Dixon wrote upon the landscape through an interpretation 
of light harbors the potential to be extended west indefinitely. Consequently, to read the Line as 
a (Euclidean) line, as something that will continue both temporally and spatially, cannot be done. 
The Kabbalists are here quite aware of their own inability to read the Line and whatever secret 
knowledge it harbors. Linear, teleological, diachronic history, the kind of history that can be 
broken, “apt to be interrupted at any Moment,” contains a secret unavailable to traditional forms 
of theological and textual interpretation. The inheritor of the secret knowledge, then, is not the 
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Kabbalists, the preterit Dixon, nor Cherrycoke as-historian-against-the-grain, but rather 
Benjamin Franklin, and specifically the Franklin of the Autobiography who seeks moral 
perfection through his “Method for conducting that Examination”350: his famous schedule that 
effectively secularized the Puritan work ethic in the service of capitalist growth. For Franklin’s 
personal schedule, his method for approaching moral perfection, is a thoroughly linear sense of 
individual history, and in the wake of a disengaged deity, is one that readily suggests itself for 
the elect of Pynchon’s world.351 
Consequently, the Line’s extension in space and time not only signals the course of 
empire, Manifest Destiny, a progressivist, linear sense of history, the extermination of native 
cultures, the coming Civil War, the dialectic of the Enlightenment, and, if drawn far enough 
west, the explosions of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It is all of these things, but for the Kabbalists 
the Line is the manifestation of the new world’s secret knowledge of itself. And though Mason 
and Dixon may be its surveyors, reading the above heavens to inscribe the Earth below, they, nor 
the Kabbalists, are its audience: 
“Another case of, ‘As above, so below.’” 
“No longer, Alas, a phrase of Power,— this Age sees a corruption and disabling 
of the ancient Magick. Projectors, Brokers of Capital, Insurancers, Peddlers upon the 
global Scale, Enterprisers and Quacks,— these are the last poor and fallen and feckless 
inheritors of a Knowledge they can never use, but in the service of Greed. The coming 
Rebellion is theirs,— Franklin, and that Lot,— and Heaven help the rest of us [emphasis 
mine], if they prevail.” 
  [. . .] 
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“Eh?— for they esteem Franklin a Magician. A Figure of Power. We know what he is,— 
but to the Mobility, he is the Ancestor of Miracles,— or, of Wonders, which pass as well 
with them,— without which, indeed, they would soon grow inquisitive and troublesome. 
For, as long as it remains possible to keep us deluded that we are ‘free men,’ we back 
Inhabitants will feed the Metropolis, open new roads to it, fight in its behalf,352— we may 
be Presbyterian today, and turn’d only by the force of God, but after very few seasons of 
such remorseless Gulling, we must be weak and tractable enough even for the 
Philadelphian men of affairs, who themselves cannot be reckon’d as any sort of Faithful, 
but rather among Doubt’s advancing Phalanx,— of whom one must ask, If they no longer 
believe in Bishops, where next, might their Irreverence not take them?”353 
One of the most powerful indictments of the origins of the nation and the myth of the founding 
fathers in the novel, these Kabbalists make it clear that “Franklin, and that Lot” are the inheritors 
of the secret of the new world. Access to this secret can only express itself in capitalist expansion 
(nodding as well to Reagan’s Friedmanian free-market economic policies). The echo of the threat 
“the rest of us” feel in the face of The Bomb from the introduction to Slow Learner here is 
projected backward and reads the American Revolution purely in terms of power and capital. 
The delusion of “freedom” merely serves the (secular) elect of “Franklin and that Lot” in order 
to, “against the Day,”354 wage war. 
 Benjamin Franklin plays many roles in Mason & Dixon. But more than the historical, 
mythical, or Pynchonian Franklin—all versions deserving of attention—the Kabbalistic Franklin 
plays a kind of secular wizard, an instantiation of scientific thought, a capturer of lightning. (As 
the fictional epic poem quoted throughout the novel, The Pennsylvaniad, puts it: “‘The Kite, the 
Key, the mortal Thundering / As Heaven’s Flame assaults the hempen String.’”355) Franklin’s 
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interpretation of the “secret” of the new world presents itself as miracles and wonders, but we 
know, the scholars, that the final question in the above passage should be taken seriously. Where 
does this kind of “irreverence” take them? What is more irreverent than threatening to destroy 
the world? (For there is no telos to the Kabbalists’ question.) In this fashion Pynchon writes the 
Bomb directly into the history Mason & Dixon purports to represent as a teleological destination 
for science and secularization, and as a projection into the past of the basic power the state will 
have over the species’ future. The beginning of American juridical power, on the eve of the 
Constitutional Congress, instantiates the narrative of the Bomb’s eventual history, a history 
intimately tied to the state. Marrying politics with technology in the American political 
imagination, this narrative, for the Kabbalists who can “read” it, is a linear narrative without end, 
or perhaps even any event. 
 Pynchon’s project throughout Mason & Dixon is thus clear vis-à-vis the Bomb: to write a 
different kind of history for the hermeneutists to read. There is more in the textual, material, and 
historical world than merely resources to be instrumentally exploited, atoms split for war, what 
Heidegger calls “standing reserve.” Further, as Pynchon makes clear through his portrayal of 
both Mason and Dixon, science is not excluded out of hand from this historical task. They study 
the phenomenon of light, and throughout the novel it resists their attempts to objectify it. To 
write light, to interpret something that is both particle and wave, to understand things like the 
solar parallax, the traversal of Venus, light’s aberration, etc., requires of them a non-
instrumentalizing awareness. Mason and Dixon are thus deeply engaged in the work of 
Pynchonian imagination. Requiring the same sense of fabulism that Cherrycoke’s historian 
demands, their study of light produces strikingly complex narrative and poetic moments. 
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Though there are many points that deserve considerable attention with regard to 
manifestations of luminous textuality throughout the novel,356 the final two pages are particularly 
suggestive: 
“Whilst I’m of use [. . .] they shan’t seek my dissolution, not in the thick of this Dispute 
over the Bradley Obs so-call’d, these being many of them, my own. No one wants to 
repeat what went on between Newton and Flamsteed. Excepting perhaps one of 
Kabbalistick Turn, who believes those Arrays of Numerals to be the magical Text that 
will deliver him to Immortality. Or suspects that Bradley found something, something as 
important as the Abberation, but more ominous,— some-thing France may not have, or 
not right away, and Jesuits must not learn of, ever,— something so useful and deadly, 
that rather than publish his suspicions, or even reduce the data any further, Bradley 
simply left them as an exercise for anyone strongly enough interested. And what could 
that be? What Phantom Shape, implicit in the Figures?”357 
Mason, on his death bed, is discussing eighteenth century astronomer James Bradley, who in 
1725 observed that, rather than trace small individually distinct ellipses in the night sky, as could 
be expected for parallax, the stars traced identical ellipses. These identical ellipses implied that 
all the stars were the same distance from the earth, producing quite the controversy as it 
threatened a regression to geo-centrism. To explain this aberration Bradley realized that the 
velocity of the earth itself changed the apparent position of the star being observed. Even though 
the earth’s velocity is relatively minor in relation to the speed of light, Bradley’s observations led 
him to conclude that the speed of light is thus finite. Consequently, to “see” any particular star, 
you have to look slightly to the side of the star’s “true” location. In drawing our attention to 
Bradley’s aberration of light, Pynchon is giving Mason many roles here. 
151 
 
 First, Mason is bemoaning his basic function in the novel: someone tasked to interpret 
how light functions in the heavens in order to draw a line upon the Earth. If one can never see a 
star’s “true” position, if one is forced to look awry at the side of an object to be able to “see” it, 
then Mason, in these final moments realizes his hopeless failure to glimpse anything resembling 
the truth. His task, to trace a specific geometry on the earth, is ultimately grounded upon light’s 
inexplicable behavior. Consequently, material reality itself cannot be understood within the 
world of Mason & Dixon without engaging in some amount of fabulous counterfeiting, and any 
final revelation of the world, let alone history, is withheld. (The structure of the novel’s 
presentation of an alternate history can also be understood as Pynchon’s own highly mediated 
and bent engagement with light.) 
More importantly, however, is Mason’s conjecture that Bradley may have “found 
something.” This thing, “something so useful and deadly” that France may not have right away, 
and the Jesuits may never have, should be read as The Bomb. (Recall that France did not test a 
nuclear weapon until 1960, and Italy has yet to. But it is also “an exercise for anyone strongly 
enough interested.”) Consequently, it is important to recall that the problem presented by 
Bradley’s aberration would not be satisfactorily explained until Albert Einstein’s formulation of 
general relativity:  
According to the general theory of relativity, the geometrical properties of space are not 
independent, but they are determined by matter. Thus we can draw conclusions about the 
geometrical structure of the universe only if we base our considerations on the state of the 
matter as being something that is known. We know from experience that, for a suitably 
chosen co-ordinate system, the velocities of the stars are small as compared with the 
velocity of transmission of light. We can thus as a rough approximation arrive at a 
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conclusion as to the nature of the universe as a whole, if we treat matter as being at 
rest.358 
The phantom shape implicit in Bradley’s (secret) figures can thus be read as the emerging shape 
of modern, post-relativistic physics itself, as it roughly approximates “the nature of the universe 
as a whole.” General relativity, which understands that gravity is a geometric property of space-
time, and that the curvature of space-time is a direct result of the energy and momentum of 
whatever matter and radiation are present, is here prefigured in Mason’s dying words. To explain 
why the actual position of stars were slightly different than where we see them requires 
understanding that gravity bends the curvature of space-time, and light follows that curve. The 
“phantom shape in the figures” is thus a host of different things: the flaws in our understanding 
of the world as defined by Newtonian mechanics, Einstein’s general theory of relativity, 
Gravity’s Rainbow itself, the foundation of the science that would lead to the Bomb, etc. 
Mason’s interpretation of Bradley is not only a prophetic accounting of the future of theoretical 
physics, but of the history that would accompany and be directly shaped by its development. 
 Further describing this emerging shape, Mason says,  
“ ’Tis a Construction [. . .] a great single Engine, the size of a Continent. I have all the 
proofs you may require. Not all the Connexions are made yet, that’s why some of it is 
still invisible. Day by day the Pioneers and Surveyors go on, more points are being tied 
in, and soon becoming visible, as above, new Stars are recorded and named and plac’d in 
Almanacks. . . .”359  
In Mason’s dying words, Bradley’s observations become a vast metaphor for the futurity that 
Pynchon is writing his post-Cold War novel in the wake of. The construction the size of a 
continent, quite clearly, is the vast undiscovered territory of modern physics. But it is also US 
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history itself, both as something to be constructed, and something emerging from the great single 
engine of modernity: Adams’s dynamo. For Pynchon Hiroshima is, in a concrete as well as a 
fabulously textual sense, the most visible manifestation of these various phantom shapes, and 
plays a significant role in the historical background of Mason & Dixon and all of his fiction, 
whether that fiction be explicitly nuclear or not. In short, The Bomb is the phantom shape 
implicit in the figures of Mason & Dixon. 
 
3.4 HISTORICAL LUMINOSITY: CRYSTALLIZING NARRATIVE TEMPORALITY 
IN AGAINST THE DAY 
 
The third section of Against the Day, “Bilocations,” opens: “While the Inconvenience was in 
New York, Lindsay [Noseworth] had heard rumors of a ‘Turkish Corner’ that really was 
supposed, in some not strictly metaphorical way, to provide an ‘escape nook to Asia.’”360 
Throughout Pynchon’s longest novel, in some not strictly metaphorical way, escape nooks to 
alternate realities, other temporalities,361 dreams, parallel worlds, and Slothropian Zones 
proliferate.362 Set between the Chicago World’s Fair of 1893 and the post-World War I era of 
1923, Against the Day multiplies Mason & Dixon’s non-linear treatment of history through a 
proliferation of narrative threads that, when woven together, create a dizzyingly complex 
encyclopedic novel that continually questions its own relationship to history, time, and narrative. 
 At the heart of these questions is Lindsay Noseworth’s suspicion “that light might be a 
secret determinant of history.”363 Though any discussion of Pynchon that attempts to schematize 
his novels threatens massive over-simplification (and oftentimes downright misreading), one 
might broadly suggest that, while Mason & Dixon frequently approaches light as an ultimately 
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unknowable object given to hermeneutic activity, in Against the Day light becomes a material 
force determining and tying together the novel’s multi-layered narrative. For Mason and Dixon 
and the Newtonian universe they (unsuccessfully try to) inhabit, the paradoxes and aporias of 
light are largely problems of space. In Against the Day, however, light’s behavior is confounding 
spatially and temporally.364 In other words, relativity, which was merely implicit in the figures of 
Mason & Dixon’s universe, fully emerges as a lens through which to understand how Pynchon 
constructs his luminous narratology of space-time in Against the Day.365 
 As important critic of postmodern literature Brian McHale has perceptively noted, 
“Against the Day is, among other things, a massive anthology of popular genres—a virtual 
library of entertainment fiction,” adding that the novel refines Pynchon’s “practice of what we 
might call mediated historiography—the writing of an era’s history through the medium of its 
popular genres [. . .] captur[ing] the way a historical epoch represented itself to itself.”366 
Pynchon’s remediation367 of a great many novelistic genres of the late-nineteenth and early-
twentieth centuries in Against the Day368 continually foregrounds and questions narrative’s 
relationship to time and history, sharing Paul Ricoeur’s “thesis [. . .] that speculation on time is 
an inconclusive rumination to which narrative activity alone can respond.”369 Significantly vis-à-
vis Ricoeur, however, Against the Day, through its remediation of popular genres, elides, 
obfuscates, or complicates other historically significant ways that the historical epoch of the 
early twentieth century represented itself to itself: namely, literary modernism. The novel is 
obviously concerned throughout with the crises of modernity: the violence of European 
imperialism,370 the increasingly brutal realities of an emerging multinational capitalism, and the 
imminence of the First World War. Against the Day’s mobilization of a plethora of popular 
genres, however, does not signal that it is engaged in some kind of anti-modernist (or even 
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postmodernist), revisionist rewriting of the early twentieth century, but rather that its relationship 
to time and modern crisis, and thus eschatology as well, is engaged in a significantly different, 
crystalline project of thinking about the relationship between time and narrative than Ricoeur’s 
reading of Virginia Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway (1925), Thomas Mann’s Der Zauberberg (1924), 
and Marcel Proust’s A la recherche du temps perdu (1913-1927).371 
Ricoeur opens the second volume of his masterful three volume study, Time and 
Narrative, with a discussion of narrative ends. Drawing upon Frank Kermode and Northrop Frye, 
Ricoeur writes:  
Apocalypse can thus signify both the end of the world and the end of the book at the 
same time. This congruence between world and the book extends further. The beginning 
of the book is about the beginning and the end of the book is about the end. [. . . ] In this 
way, the eschatological myth and the Aristotelian muthos are joined together in their way 
of tying a beginning to an ending and proposing to the imagination the triumph of 
concordance over discordance. [. . .] The apocalypse, therefore, shifts its imagery from 
the last days, the days of terror, of decadence, of renovation, to become a myth of 
crisis.372   
This move from Biblical apocalypse to the modern narrative of crisis was initiated, according to 
Ricoeur, in Elizabethan tragedy; and this is precisely what the modern novel narrates: the 
reconfiguration of time which occurs again and again in modernity is precisely the crisis of 
temporality itself, its aporias, problems, etc., which narrative serves to reconcile. For the 
modernist novels of Woolf, Mann, and Proust that Ricoeur concerns himself with, however, this 
occurs in a mode significantly different to pre-modern narrative eschatology. This shift from 
teleology and eschatology to perpetual crisis in modern narrative, in what Ricoeur calls a “fictive 
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experience [of time,] has to do with a different dimension of the literary work than the one we 
are considering here, namely, its power to project a world.”373 This power to project a world 
makes the fictional narrative a privileged mode of a “‘tale of time,’ or better yet, as a ‘tale about 
time.’”374 In other words, when what Ricoeur calls mimesis2375 functions as a narrative about 
time rather than simply as Aristotelian muthos in the classical sense, time becomes the subject of 
narrative itself. In doing so, the tension between Erzählzeit (time of narrating) and the erzählte 
Zeit (narrated time) creates a multiplicity of modes of constructing these narratives, as well as 
narrating or refiguring time—i.e. Ricoeur is clear to note how his examples are all incredibly 
different in how they construct the time of the narrative and how time gets narrated. Ultimately, 
what erupts into these tales about time is what he calls historical time, that which will join 
together what he calls “objective time” and “phenomenological time” in volume three of Time 
and Narrative.376 These modernist narratives cannot help but to confront, in becoming narratives 
about time, the intrusion of historical (i.e. not eschatological) time into any fictional narrative. 
 What occurs in Pynchon’s narrative engagement with time in Against the Day, however, 
is something significantly different than simply the intrusion of historical time into his narrative 
(though of course this does occur). Fredric Jameson, in his famous essay on postmodernism, has 
argued that the postmodern turn concerns a shift from the temporal concerns of modernism—i.e. 
Ricoeur’s reading of Woolf et al—to spatial concerns: 
[T]his latest mutation in space—postmodern hyperspace—has finally succeeded in 
transcending the capacities of the individual human body to locate itself, to organize its 
immediate surroundings perceptually, and cognitively to map its position in a mappable 
external world. It may now be suggested that this alarming disjunction point between the 
body and its built environment—which is to the initial bewilderment of the older 
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modernism as the velocities of spacecraft to those of the automobile—can itself stand as 
the symbol and analagon of that even sharper dilemma which is the incapacity of our 
minds, at least at present, to map the great global multinational and decentered 
communicational network in which we find ourselves caught as individual subjects.377 
Jameson’s argument is compelling and has been highly important for theorizing the postmodern. 
With regard to Pynchon, however, to make the argument that his postmodernism is a result of 
this shift would be to ignore his basic obsession with physics, specifically Einstein’s theory of 
relativity. For Pynchon, there is no gap between space and time; it is always space-time. 
Nowhere is this more apparent than in Against the Day. 
And this is incredibly important for the manner in which the novel reinhabits, reinscribes, 
and rewrites the crisis of modernity, or modernity’s formulation of crisis. For Ricoeur, the aporia 
of time was already thoroughly formulated in St. Augustine’s Confessions: “the skeptical 
argument is well-known: time has no being since the future is not yet, the past no longer, and 
present does not remain. And yet we do speak of time as having being. [. . .] How can time exist 
if the past is no longer, if the future is not yet, and if the present is not always?”378 One of 
Ricoeur’s principal aims in Time and Narrative is to reconcile the aporias of time —that it 
appears to exist, to have being—by combining the Augustinian aporia with Aristotle’s sense of 
narrative from the Poetics. For Ricoeur, the absence of any theory of narrative in Augustine or a 
theory of time in Aristotle permits and necessitates the combination of these two thinkers to 
understand time and narrative as indissolubly linked—i.e. neither can be understood in isolation 
without the other. In short, “time becomes human to the extent that it is articulated through a 
narrative mode, and narrative attains its full meaning when it becomes a condition of temporal 
existence.”379 For many writers Ricoeur’s thinking would be more than sufficient to account for 
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the relationship between time and narrative in their work. But Ricoeur is, at the end of the day, 
operating amidst a fairly Newtonian world-view of temporality, no matter how complex his 
discussions of universal time and historical time may be.380 In short, for Ricoeur, it is thinking 
through the being of time that produces aporias. For Pynchon, the aporia presented by relativity 
is that time may not exist—i.e. it may have no being whatsoever.381 
 As Ricoeur acknowledges near the end of the third volume of Time and Narrative: 
“There comes a moment, in a work devoted to the power of narrative to elevate time to language, 
where we must admit that narrative is not the whole story and that time can be spoken in other 
ways, because, even for narrative, it remains inscrutable.”382 In Against the Day, Pynchonian 
time often speaks in different ways than those considered by Ricoeur. And to get an inkling of 
what I mean by this requires a brief detour (through a path that is, admittedly, not explicitly 
suggested by the novel).  
In Kurt Gödel’s brief and largely unknown work on relativity, “A Remark About the 
Relationship Between Relativity Theory and Idealistic Philosophy” (he was of course famous as 
a mathematician and not as a physicist), published in the book, Albert Einstein: Philosopher-
Scientist, occasioned by Einstein’s seventieth birthday, he comes to a quite surprising 
conclusion. As Palle Yourgrau details in his fascinating account of the forgotten relationship 
between Einstein and Gödel, who were both at Princeton’s Institute for Advanced Study during 
the 1940s and were good friends, Gödel provides a proof that “if relativity theory is valid, 
intuitive time disappears.”383 As Yourgrau provides a much better summation of the problems 
regarding relativistic time than I could briefly summarize, I will quote at length: 
The problem Gödel inherited from Einstein had been understood for centuries to concern 
the most fundamental aspect of human experience [time]. [. . .] With the advent of 
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Einstein’s theory of relativity, however, the mystery of this form of being was widely 
taken to have been solved. Philosophers could finally relax. Einstein had taken care of 
business. 
 Appearances, however, can be deceptive. The universe, for example, as everyone 
knows, is very old. Its exact age is a matter for debate, but there is no disagreement that it 
runs to billions of years. [. . .] In truth, however, it is more than marvelous to have 
discovered the age of the universe. It is impossible. For if the universe is n years old, its 
present state comes n years after the moment when it all began. In 1905, however, 
Einstein had demonstrated in the special theory of relativity that there is no such thing as 
“the present state of the universe,” that is, what would be revealed by a snapshot of the 
universe as it exists at this very moment. The relativity of simultaneity implies that what 
is taken to be “now” relative to one inertial frame will differ from what is “now” in 
another frame if the second frame is in motion relative to the first. It follows immediately 
that if the theory of relativity is correct, there simply is no such thing as “the present state 
of the universe” of four-dimensional space-time. Einstein himself said this quite clearly: 
“The four-dimensional continuum is now no longer resolvable objectively into sections, 
all of which contain simultaneous events; ‘now’ loses for the spatially extended world its 
objective meaning.”384 
Gödel’s engagement with this problem, as in his famous incompleteness theorem where he 
demonstrated the incompleteness of systems in reality through demonstrating the incompleteness 
of all and any formal systems, was to demonstrate the complete distinction between the intuitive 
and formal (subjective and objective) concepts of relativistic time; in other words, he 
demonstrates the incommensurability between what we “experience” as time (or calendrical 
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time) and time as understood by the formal explanation of relativity. Through a small number of 
brilliant steps Gödel arrives at the conclusion that, because he can prove that time does not exist 
in his purely formal/theoretical construction—his formal-speculative universe in which time 
travel is theoretically possible (what is now called the “Gödel universe”)—therefore, according 
to his proof, time does not exist in our universe. In short, because time travel is formally or 
theoretically possible in a very different universe than our own, though one still defined by 
relativity, time does not exist anywhere. “The final step is taken; the curtain comes down: time 
really does disappear.”385 
 As Yourgrau repeatedly points out, Gödel’s short article on relativity has been ignored by 
physicists (probably because he was a mathematician, dabbling in something he did not 
“understand”) and philosophers alike. I would like to suggest, however, that whether knowingly 
or not, the fabric of Pynchonian space-time in Against the Day narratologically explores many of 
the implication of Gödel’s largely unacknowledged and profound conclusions. 
 As so many of Pynchon’s long novels begin, the first line of Against the Day—“‘Now 
single up all the lines!’”386—already betrays certain ruptures and failures of the narrative, as well 
as certain aspects of the novel’s trajectory. Just as “A screaming comes across the sky” and 
“Snow balls have flown their Arcs” immediately project certain kinds of ends—the Rocket 
approaching its asymptote at the end of Gravity’s Rainbow and the end of the Cold War, 
respectively—this call to single up the lines, to braid them together into something cohesive and 
linear, betrays the simple fact that no account of Against the Day’s narrative, let alone the world 
it is about to project, can be “singled up.”  
Opening during the 1893 World’s Fair (so significant for Henry Adams’s Education) 
with the Chums of Chance descending on Chicago in their air-machine, the novel immediately 
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confronts its readers with problems of space-time that merely an “alternate” or “fantastic” history 
would not afford. The Chums, as the narrative proceeds, literally travel through time, travel to an 
“alternate world” hidden by the sun (our own. . .), find themselves at many of the significant 
historical moments both before and during World War I, and are fictitious characters that are 
fictitious within the novel itself (i.e. Reef Traverse actually reads one of the novels of their 
adventures). In this sense, the Chums are complex Pynchonian agents and/or subjects of history. 
Indeed, as McHale suggests, 
The Chums receive special treatment because they have been reserved for a special 
destiny. In a novel so invested in tracing the buildup to the Great War, and so relentless 
in foreshadowing it, it is only from the perspective of the Chums that we witness the war 
in present time. Whereas other characters [. . .] flash back to their Great War experiences 
after the fact, in retrospective, only the Chums are permitted to reflect the war experience 
as it happens [. . .]. The paradox is powerful: Pynchon reserves for the most lightweight 
of all the genres he poaches [. . .] the mission of bearing witness to the weightiest, the 
gravest, of historical catastrophes.387 
As experienced by the Chums, then, both history and time present themselves in the novel as 
open and fluid, bespeaking a sense of space-time that is inextricably linked at all moments. In a 
quite real sense, then, the linear, diachronic succession of time that is anathema to most 
Pynchonian worlds here can be understood in terms of the geometrical and gravitational 
implications of relativity. Each moment in Against the Day cannot be captured within an inertial 
frame without referencing many other frames that are constantly changing and in motion. The 
novel’s continual references to the cyclicality of history and Nietzsche’s notion of the Eternal 
Return signal less a kind of Yeatsian notion of time or a narrative structure akin to Joyce’s 
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Finnegan’s Wake (1939), than, for lack of a better term, a “Gödelian history,” a history whose 
parameters cannot be understood diachronically, nor temporally at all. 
To give one example among many of how Pynchon might be said to be projecting what I 
am calling a Gödelian history, immediately before the Chums encounter Iceland spar for the first 
time, a mythical crystal that allows one to read reality differently than it appears, a significant 
disagreement about the linearity of temporality takes place in a meeting of the Transnoctial 
Discussion Group.388 
“We learned once how to break horses and ride them for long distances, with oceangoing 
ships we left flat surfaces and went into Riemann space, we crossed solid land and deep 
seas, and colonized what we found,” said Dr. Vormance. [. . .] “And what of colonizing 
dimensions beyond the third? Colonize Time. Why not?” 
“Because, sir,” objected Dr. Templeton Blope, of the University of the Outer 
Hebrides, “—we are limited to three.” 
  [. . .] 
“Time moves on but one axis,” advised Dr. Blope, “past to future—the only 
turnings possible being turns of a hundred and eighty degrees. In the Quaternions, a 
ninety-degree direction would correspond to an additional axis whose unit is √-1. A turn 
through any other angle would require for its unit a complex number.” 
“Yet mappings in which a linear axis becomes curvilinear—functions of a 
complex variable such as w=ez, where a straight line in the z-plane maps to a circle in the 
w-plane,” said Dr. Rao, “do suggest the possibility of linear time becoming circular, and 
so achieving eternal return as simply, or should I say as complexly, as that.”389 
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Keeping in mind that this discussion is ostensibly set before Einstein’s publication of his theory 
of special relativity in 1905, this debate between an explanation of space-time as three 
dimensional and the notion of multiple, parallel dimensions expressing themselves in relativistic 
geometries, mappable through Riemannian equations, is dependent upon a relativistic notion of 
light. And the Chums are in fact about to travel along an additional 90° axis, perpendicular to the 
narrative itself, through space-time, across the night, against the day. 
 The Chums’ ability to bend themselves through the fabric of Pynchon’s very world as 
light is bent through space is why light bears the weight of the novel’s history, both in 
metaphorical and literal terms. The Chums bear witness to history, to the horrors of the First 
World War and what could ostensibly be called the present (or contemporary). They also bear 
witness to certain notions of history: Nietzsche’s Eternal Return, Yeats’s widening gyre, and 
Benjamin’s reading of Klee’s Angelus Novus (1920), in which the angel “turned toward the past 
[. . .] sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in 
front of his feet.”390 It is their discovery of the archive on their journey to the North Pole that 
allows them to bear such witness. 
 Nodding to Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein (1818), in which Victor, the monster, and 
Walton all construct the North Pole as a teleological destination, after leaving the Discussion 
group on their way to the pole the Chums discover  
the great Library of Iceland behind the translucent green walls facing the sunlit sea. Some 
of these spaces were workshops or mess-halls, some centers of operation, stacked to the 
top of the great cliff, easily a dozen levels, probably more. Among the library shelves 
could be found The Book of Iceland Spar, commonly described as “like the Ynglingasaga 
only different,” containing family histories going back to the first discovery and 
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exploitation of the eponymic mineral up to the present, including a record of each day of 
this very Expedition now in progress, even of days not yet transpired. 
 “Fortune-telling! Impossible!” 
 “Unless we can allow that certain texts are—“ 
 “Outside of time,” suggested one of the Librarians.391 
The Chums encounter a massive “secret library” beyond the reaches of the “known world” that is 
structured as a crystal. Containing what appears to be an entire infrastructure attached to it, 
everything from mundane living quarters and “mess halls,” to a whole bureaucratic apparatus 
and multiple centers of operation, the library’s highly organized community is all designed 
around housing The Book of Iceland Spar. This book is “the genuine article, and the sub-
structure of reality. The doubling of the Creation, each image clear and believable . . . . And you 
being mathematical gentleman, it can hardly have escaped your attention that its curious advent 
into the world occurred within only a few years of the discovery of Imaginary Numbers, which 
also provided a doubling of the mathematical Creation.”392 To read history, to bear witness to the 
atrocities of the past, present, and future, the Chums must read The Book of Iceland Spar with a 
piece of Iceland spar, on Iceland in a library whose walls are built out of Iceland spar. This book 
only appeared after the mathematical revolution of theorizing imaginary numbers, creating a 
further temporal doubling of the book’s spatiality. There are clearly more than two (or three) 
dimensions at play here, both narratively and historically. The metafictional multiplication of the 
lenses through which the primary text gets read, or whatever light the ur-text emits, allows the 
Chums the chance to step outside of time, into a non-time, where they can see a Gödelian history 
unfold, refracted through multiple crystalline structures, both within the narrative and extra-
diegetically. These crystals refract and are refracted by the multiple other genre modes in the 
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novel and “reality” as well. This hyperarchive of history, time, and narrative when bent through 
the crystal of the Chums’ agency, creates a kind of archival time. History and space-time can 
only be perceived by humans in Against the Day through refraction. As light is bent through the 
apparatus to enable the chums to read space-time, the distortions of what they read must be re-
refracted by the structure of the library itself.  
In many ways then, I think Pynchon is inviting us to read the entirety of Against the Day 
as his attempt to create a perspective on history in which time does not exist. Rather than submit 
to Fukuyama’s notion of time in which it is history that is over and is now quickly being 
forgotten, Pynchon’s texts project a world, quite simply, in which time simply is not there and 
history is all we have; we can only experience history through its narrative and the archive which 
allows it to exist. If the mode of reading the archive, of the archive writing, through the 
refraction of light, is to submit oneself to the writing of history as well, it is because, as one of 
the Chums puts it, the novel aspires, “‘to know light [. . .] I want to reach inside light and find its 
heart, touch its soul, take some in my hands whatever it turns out to be, and bring it back, like the 
Gold Rush only more at stake, maybe ’cause it’s easier to go crazy from, there’s danger in every 
direction, deadlier than snakes or fever or claim jumpers—.”393 The refraction of genres and 
temporalities, the fantasmatic threads Pynchon refuses to single up, project the historical thrust 
of the dynamo: to capture electricity, to single up the threads of force. But more than attempting 
to master matter or electro-magnetism, modernity’s project is conceived throughout the novel as 
an attempt to capture light. As John Canady productively explores in his study of the relationship 
between literary expression and the quantum physics that led to the Manhattan Project and The 
Bomb, the imagination of modern physicists was obsessed with the problem of light—i.e. 
whether it was a particle or wave. Light presented itself as a still-unknown, something beyond 
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the futile reach of our hands. But not only would the capture of this light lead to nuclear physics, 
but, as Chum of Chance Roswell puts it, “‘the future of light is, in particular the moving pictures. 
The public loves those movies, can’t get enough of ’em, maybe that’s another disease of the 
mind, but as long as nobody finds a cure for it, the Sherriff will have to keep settling for traildust 
in my case.’”394 The power of light is not only destructive, but absorptive, controlling, and 
epidemiological. For Pynchon, power over light becomes power over history. 
In Pynchon, the more-than-Promethean quest after light during modernity resulted, quite 
simply, in the technology of the novel’s contemporary moment: the millions of miles of fiber-
optic cable through which the internet flows,395 the mirrors that allowed nuclear fission to occur 
and thus heat up the Cold War with the threat of thermonuclear conflagration,396 to the LED’s on 
virtually everything, the high definition television, etc.—postmodernity communicates itself 
through highly complex optical technology. Pynchon’s exploration of the optical society, not 
simply the society of the panoptic spectacle, but of the fiberoptic cable and wireless internet—
what Gilles Deleuze calls the “control society”397 or others the “network society”398—is 
everywhere a challenge to articulate a different relationship to time. Not the universe of clocks, 
“there to glorify and celebrate one particular sort of time [. . .] vulnerable to the force of gravity,” 
but a force that would “‘Make gravity impervious to time? Why?”399 The call to single up the 
lines in Against the Day gets expressed as an attempt to articulate an alternative historical 
trajectory, an escape velocity that would make gravity impervious to time. Rather than Gravity’s 
Rainbow’s final asymptotic singularity, a black hole capturing the escaping light of the novel, 
Against the Day, by multiplying lines of flight, travels “through unknown topographies of 
Time,”400 attempting to imagine a mode of being that can escape the optical society’s temporal 
capture.  
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And the novel ends on what is assuredly one of Pynchon’s most optimistic notes. 
Through the course of the narrative the Chums have built a vessel not only able to achieve 
escape velocity from Earth’s gravity, but from time. In the form of the Chums’ air-ship, the 
Inconvenience, 
a ship exceeding the usual three dimensions [. . .] once a vehicle of sky pilgrimage, has 
transformed into its own destination, where any wish that can be made is at least 
addressed, if not always granted. For every wish to come true would mean that in the 
known Creation, good unsought and uncompensated would have evolved somehow, to 
become at least more accessible to us. No one aboard Inconvenience has yet observed any 
sign of this. They know—Miles is certain—it is there, like an approaching rainstorm, but 
invisible. Soon they will see the pressure-gauge begin to fall. They will feel the turn in 
the wind. They will put on smoked goggles for the glory of what is coming to part the 
sky. They will fly toward grace.401 
Though obviously a gesture toward the happy ending of the genre novels Pynchon has 
relentlessly mined throughout the course of the novel, there is surely an absence of the kind of 
eschatological doom marking the end of Gravity’s Rainbow, the ominous call of the future in 
Mason & Dixon, or the ungrounded anti-revelation of The Crying of Lot 49. Rather, still bearing 
in mind the slipperiness of Pynchonian irony, I believe we are invited to take this final moment, 
flying toward grace at some point in the future, quite seriously. Even going so far as to read this 
last sentence as a rare moment of sincerity in Pynchon, Against the Day’s attempts to articulate 
what I am calling archival time and Gödelian history should be read as an attempt to imagine the 
world, the species’ ontological condition, and historical possibility as open, undecided, not 
foreclosed, its narrative not already written in nuclear light. If Mason & Dixon was a first step 
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toward a history not dominated by the grand narrative of the United States versus the Soviet 
Union and a call for the reassessment of the violence of American history, Against the Day 
importantly returns to some of the ground Pynchon explored in V.: the brutality of Western 
imperialism and its legacies for contemporary US foreign policy. The decade between Mason & 
Dixon, a novel Pynchon had reportedly been writing since 1975, and Against the Day, a decade 
marked by both 11 September 2001 and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, saw the terrain of 
Pynchon’s imagination shift from the Adamsian nightmare of nuclear power out of control, to 
the more localized narratives of networked resistance and alternatives to the destructive 
technocracy of light. Against the Day everywhere acknowledges that though power over light 
translates into power over history, this power is accessible by the imagination and the multitude. 
Rather than sounding a death-knell for the novel in the age of electronic media, Pynchon locates 
in the ongoing project of the historical novel a mode of accessing good unsought and 
uncompensated. 
 
3.5 ARCHIVAL TIME: PYNCHONIAN INFORMATICS IN THE CRYING OF LOT 49 
AND INHERENT VICE 
 
[R]ecording, filing and memorizing everything of our own past and the past of all 
cultures. Is this not a symptom of a collective presentiment of the end, a sign that events 
and the living time of history have had their day and that we have to arm ourselves with 
the whole battery of artificial memory, all the signs of the past, to face up to the absence 
of a future and the glacial times which await us? 
  —Jean Baudrillard, The Illusion of the End402 
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 The Crying of Lot 49 has long been understood as a text that withholds any and all apocalyptic 
closure, or else that its lack of revelation—the fact that there is no way of knowing whether or 
not Oedipa Maas is capable of knowing anything or not—is precisely what is revealed.403 
Inherent Vice on the other hand—which can in many productive ways be considered the middle 
novel in a California Trilogy (beginning with The Crying of Lot 49 and concluding with 
Vineland)—ends with something like a moment of prescient, if modest and secular, revelation. 
Set in Los Angeles during the summer of 1970,404 presumably a few years after Oedipa 
attempted to sort out Pierce Inverarity’s will, Pynchon’s most recent novel, and second shortest 
behind The Crying of Lot 49, returns to the fertile field of detective metafiction, upping the ante 
on Oedipa’s accidental house-wife-turned-detective, with a professional—if usually stoned—
private investigator as its protagonist. Doc Sportello is a detective thoroughly hard-boiled in late-
1960s psychedelia, who, despite being another Pynchonian schlemihl, often shows Odyssean (if 
often unintentional) levels of craftiness. Like Oedipa, Doc stumbles upon a vast conspiracy—the 
Golden Fang—that (like the Tristero) may not in fact exist. Doc is introduced to this mystery 
while chasing rumors of real-estate developer Mickey Wolfmann around Los Angeles, who, with 
the exception of an important scene in a Las Vegas casino, remains an absent Inverarity-like 
figure of late-capitalism hovering on the edges of the narrative. After choosing to give all his 
money away, trying to undo the evils of his capitalist accumulation, betting “he can make the 
money start to flow a different direction,”405 Wolfmann then disappears, presumably captured by 
the Golden Fang, and returns reprogrammed into a good capitalist, “‘suddenly no more acid-head 
philanthropist. They did something to him.’ Who?’ ‘Whoever.’”406 While on the path of 
Wolfmann and the Golden Fang, Doc discovers a smaller conspiracy, one he helps with, and 
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though the mystery of the Golden Fang remains, at the end Doc resolves in a relatively satisfying 
way many of the mysteries the novel has presented him with. 
 Though there are many other parallels, narrative and otherwise, between The Crying of 
Lot 49 and Inherent Vice, one of the most significant differences is that the conspiracy 
encountered in the latter is not of the preterit, an alternative, underground, anarchic postal system 
attempting to subvert the normal communicational channels woven by certain developments 
attending the advance of Western imperialism. The Golden Fang (also a tax-haven for a group of 
malevolent dentists) is a familiar figure of the Pynchonian “Them,” a vast conspiracy of the elect 
whose avatars we may encounter (such as Ronald Reagan407), but an entity we can never truly 
know. Further distinguishing Inherent Vice from The Crying of Lot 49, the former adheres much 
more closely to the hard-boiled detective genre, and not just through its frequent and informed 
references to detective films. Doc, who idolizes the likes of James Garfield enough to have 
purchased the suit Garfield wore in The Postman Always Rings Twice (1946),408 self-consciously 
models himself on the filmic detectives of the 1940s-1960s. Displaying a similar level of irony, 
cynicism, and detachment to the Southern California hippie counterculture that hard-boiled 
detectives showed toward society at large, Doc continually receives impressions about the 
coming absorption of the counterculture into mainstream America and its subsequent 
commodification, “how the Psychedelic Sixties, this little parenthesis of light, might close after 
all, and be lost, taken back into darkness. . . how a certain hand might reach terribly out of the 
darkness and reclaim the time, easy as taking a joint from a doper and stubbing it out for 
good.”409 In this fashion, Inherent Vice is in many ways not only a reimagining and reworking of 
the world of The Crying of Lot 49 and a reflection on the failures of the 1960s.410 It also 
continually signals an engagement with history thoroughly informed by the forty years that 
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separate it from its setting, and it is particularly concerned with mapping certain developments of 
information technology. 
The future history of the novel everywhere looms over Pynchon’s California, taking 
paranoid and chaotic tacks. Richard Nixon and Ronald Regan play significant roles; Las Vegas 
will become a hyperreal “big Disneyland imitation of itself”411—i.e. the continuation of an even-
more-organized crime; and the utopia that Wolfmann was trying to build out in the desert, 
Arrepentimiento, a place that if there was space anyone could live for free, “someday they’ll get 
Mickey to approve a rocket strike, and Arrepentimiento will be history—except it won’t be that, 
because they’ll destroy all the records too.”412 In Pynchon’s vision of the last forty years of 
California’s history, whatever utopian project California might have had, if there ever was one, 
can only be seen as having failed. In Pynchon’s paranoid Southland, any effort to redistribute 
wealth will be met with coercion and violence that result, in the extreme, with nuclear missile 
strikes on US soil and the disappearance of the historical record, the destruction of the archive, in 
order to prevent any possible alternative mode of living. 
But unlike the door foreclosing the future and any hope of establishing epistemological 
truth at the end of The Crying of Lot 49, leaving it forever unclear whether the Tristero exists or 
not, Inherent Vice imagines a form of communication “on some other frequencies,”413 that we 
now know is possible, even if this communication on other frequencies gets articulated with the 
usual Pynchonian absurdity and black irony. The novel’s relatively hopeful ending, which I will 
discuss at further length below, presents an alternative to the total control over the obscuration 
and destruction of knowledge by Pynchon’s invisible forces. There is a sense at the end of 
Inherent Vice that the possibility for the Internet to bring about a nomadic network of fellow 
citizens—a collective—might in fact exist, and that there may even be contemporary instances of 
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such collectivity. Oedipa’s world was closed, Slothrop’s was asymptotic and distributed, but 
Doc, a thoroughly charismatic actor, someone who rarely reveals anything to anyone while still 
being able to (seemingly) stay quite connected to the world around him in meaningful ways 
(even in the absence of apparent connections), inhabits a unique position in the Pynchon oeuvre. 
He is a figure who can successfully and fortuitously negotiate the distributed networks of late-
capitalism, a post-Baudrillardian historical subject for whom cybernetic control is not a 
completely terrifying dystopian vision, but rather a system that can be exploited in the sense 
Eugene Thacker and Galloway give the word in The Exploit (2007).414 And through Doc, 
Pynchon is also able to engage with the history of the Internet, with what has happened to the 
digital computer since the late 1960s. 
Less explicit about its concerns with cybernetics than The Crying of Lot 49—a novel that 
thoroughly engages with informational and communications systems of all kinds, to the point 
that near the end of the novel Oedipa famously perceives that walking through San Narciso “was 
like walking among matrices of a great digital computer, the zeroes and ones twinned above, 
hanging like balanced mobiles right and left, ahead, thick, maybe endless”415—Inherent Vice 
places its concerns with cybernetic systematicity at the relative margins of its narrative, even if 
they play a significant role in how the novel is conceived and structured. But the manner in 
which cybernetics are present in the novel is significant in a number of ways. 
When Doc worked for “Gotcha! Services and Settlements, [who] decided to hire him as a 
skip-tracer”416 so that he could pay off the debt he owed them—a job that ultimately led to Doc 
becoming a private investigator—he worked with one Fritz Drybeam, who now frequently 
provides Doc with information and expertise during the course of his convoluted investigations. 
Fritz, who still runs the Gotcha! collection agency, and is thus deeply interested in surveillance 
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and information, has somehow become connected to the fledgling ARPAnet, a network that 
would evolve and, in a certain sense, would one day become the internet. Begun in 1969 when 
computers at the University of California Los Angeles and Stanford University were linked 
together over a special phone line provided by AT&T, quickly adding the University of 
California Santa Barbara and the University of Utah to its network, ARPAnet, as the popular 
(and somewhat true) fiction goes, was originally conceived by the Advanced Research Projects 
Agency417 and the RAND Corporation as a potential deterrent against communications 
breakdown in the event of a large-scale thermonuclear war.418, 419 
Visiting Fritz to see if he can find anything out about the baffling disappearance of 
Mickey and his ex-girlfriend Shasta Fay Hepworth, Doc basically stumbles upon the internet: 
“Tell me how many idiots you know got anything like this.” 
“Wow, Fritz.” It was like being inside a science-fictional Christmas tree. Little 
red and green lights were going on and off everywhere. There were computer cabinets, 
consoles with lit-up video screens, and alphanumeric keyboards, and cables running all 
over the floor among unswept drifts of little bug-size rectangles punched out of IBM 
cards, and a couple of Gestetner copy machines in the corner, and towering over the 
scene along the walls a number of Ampex tape reels busily twitching back and forth. 
“ARPAnet,” Fritz announced. 
“Ah, no I better not, I’ve got to drive and stuff, maybe just give me one for later—
” 
“It’s a network of computers, Doc, all connected together by phone lines. UCLA, 
Isla Vista, Stanford. Say there’s a file they have up there and you don’t, they’ll send it 
right along at fifty thousand characters per second.”420 
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The fact of the matter is that many of us idiots walking around in 2009 (and beyond) have 
something that resembles this computer system in their pockets, at a tiny fraction of the size and 
cost, and exponentially many times its speed. To reflect this condition of contemporaneity, over 
the course of the novel Fritz’s ARPAnet begins to evolve, more and more resembling today’s 
Internet with all its multiplicitous capabilities. To exploit some of these capabilities Fritz hires a 
teenage hacker named Sparky who “has to call his mom if he’s gonna be late for supper, only 
guess what—we’re his trainees!”421 Sparky has the ability to “get into the CII computer up in 
Sacramento without them knowing,”422 as well as the California Department of Motor Vehicles 
and the Federal Aviation Administration. Though clearly an anachronism here—there was no 
way ARPAnet could have accessed any of these databases at the time—Pynchon’s ARPAnet is a 
powerful symbol. As Galloway and Thacker put it, “The network, it appears, has emerged as a 
dominant form describing the nature of control today, as well as resistance to it.”423 In Inherent 
Vice ARPAnet and the various networks of contemporaneity are both a mode of resistance to the 
paranoid conspiracies familiar to any reader of Pynchon, and a system of control, where 
“someday everybody’s gonna wake up to find they’re under surveillance they can’t escape.”424 
 But as usual in Pynchon, with his unceasing sense of irony, anything that may at first 
appear black and white, especially a binary, digital system contains “excluded middles.”425 For 
Doc, however, they are not necessarily “bad shit, to be avoided,”426 but rather articulate 
themselves as psychedelic. Doc’s first reaction to ARPAnet is not systematic. It is neither a 
system of surveillance and control, nor is it a rhizomatic network capable of mass-scale 
democratization. Rather, he thinks it is some drug that he “better not” take because he’s “got to 
drive and stuff,” but maybe he’ll take “one for later.” Doc, though not a frequent user of, and 
fairly ambivalent about, psychedelics, is quite familiar with LSD, and twice during the novel is 
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drugged (at which time he has psychedelic visions, more on this in a moment). After learning of 
ARPAnet’s capabilities and inquiring after the location of Shasta, Doc then wants to know, 
“‘Does it know where I can score?’”427 Further, Fritz later characterizes Sparky’s experience of 
ARPAnet itself as psychedelic:  
“[H]e gets on this ARPAnet trip, and I swear it’s like acid, a whole ’nother strange 
world—time, space, all that shit.” 
 “So when they gonna make it illegal, Fritz?” 
 “What. Why would they do that?” 
 “Remember how they outlawed acid as soon as they found out it was a channel to 
somethin they didn’t want us to see? Why should information be any different?”428 
Pynchon thus frames the internet as a certain kind of psychedelic drug. It simultaneously gives 
an individual access to different ways of being, alternative frequencies of communication, and 
new avenues for the emergence of the imagination in which “space, time, all that shit” is 
experienced differently, but already access to information is being framed as something that 
should be controlled and regulated for it is “a channel to something they didn’t want us to see.” 
 ARPAnet in Inherent Vice is carefully constructed as a system that has multiple 
potentialities, both sinister and liberatory. Like the historical ARPAnet, which was initially 
funded by the US Department of Defense, Pynchon’s ARPAnet is also a product of the military 
industrial complex, but for Fritz, “hell, it’s government money, and those fuckers don’t care what 
they spend, and we’ve had some useful surprises already.”429 ARPAnet quickly evolved during 
the 1970s and 1980s into something quite different than merely a military communications 
network, transforming into a largely civilian and academic system that grew too large too 
quickly for any single entity to control. Pynchon’s ARPAnet, however, is already being 
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surveilled by the FBI.430 By the end of the novel, Fritz’s (psychedelic) experience of the Web 
produces increasing levels of anxiety, to the point that “‘he also thinks the ARPAnet has taken 
his soul,’” but, as Sparky points out, “The system has no use for souls. Not how it works at all. 
Even this thing about going into other people’s lives? it isn’t like some Eastern trip of absorbing 
into a collective consciousness. It’s only finding stuff out that somebody else didn’t think you 
were going to. And it’s moving so fast, like the more we know, the more we know, you can 
almost see it change one day to the next.”431 Pynchon’s ARPAnet is experienced both as 
psychedelic and as purely, coldly informatic; it is dynamic and fluid, exponentially growing 
(according to Moore’s Law), changing from one day to the next, while it is simultaneously 
inhuman, soullessly accumulating data for the simple sake of accumulating data. 
 Consequently, unlike the relatively dystopian world of San Narciso, whose suburban 
“swirl of houses [. . .] sprang at [Oedipa] now with the same unexpected, astonishing clarity as 
the circuit card had,”432 Inherent Vice is not only a paranoid denouncement of cybernetic 
systems reifying the human, remaking the world through their brutal, informatic logic. It is this 
as well, of course, but the psychedelic coloring that Pynchon gives to ARPAnet moves it into the 
realm of Against the Day’s Iceland spar: something that houses the potential to provide a 
different perspective on a refracted and rewritten history. History becomes ““all data. Ones and 
zeros. All recoverable. Eternally present.’”433 Though Pynchon always acknowledges the 
violence attending modernity’s capture of light, his representation of ARPAnet in Inherent Vice 
leaves opens the possibility for imagining a different future through a complex rereading and 
reinterpretation of the data of history, which is now eternally present in this luminous archive. 
For it should be remembered that the internet truly came into its own during 1990s and 2000s 
through the massive amount of fiber-optic cable that was laid all over the globe, an effort that 
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now allows  nearly instantaneous communication with virtually anywhere through the 
transmission of light. This is a system that was initially funded by the US Department of Defense 
in order to counteract modernity’s other significant capture of light—the nuclear bomb—and as 
such, the fiber-optic capture of light should be read with regard to Pynchon’s oeuvre as both an 
outgrowth of the violence of the bomb, as well as a mode of resisting an eschatological 
foreclosure of history. In this fashion, Pynchon is very much concerned with what I have called 
the optical society, a society whose ability to use, capture, transform, and transmit light might 
productively be considered one of the most distinguishing features of twentieth and twenty-first 
century American culture. If the luminous master signifier of the US national fantasy during the 
Cold War was the nuclear bomb, for the Pynchon of 2009, contemporaneity’s luminous master 
signifier is the fiber-optic network. 
 Following this, Doc’s psychedelic experiences in the novel are telling in terms of their 
insight into the optical society. Attempting to find Shasta on other frequencies, Doc purposely 
takes acid at one point. 
At least it wasn’t quite as cosmic as the last trip this acid enthusiast had acted as travel 
agent for. When it began exactly wasn’t too clear, but at some point, via some simple, 
normal transmission, Doc found himself in the vividly lit ruin of an ancient city that was, 
and also wasn’t, everyday Greater L.A.—stretching on for miles, house after house, room 
after room, every room inhabited. At first he thought he recognized the people he ran 
into, though he couldn’t always put names to them. Everybody living at the beach, for 
example, Doc and all his neighbors, were and were not refugees from the disaster which 
had sunk Lemuria thousands of years ago. Seeking areas of land they believed to be safe, 
they had settled on the coast of California.434 
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If acid, for Doc, “was a channel to somethin they didn’t want us to see,” his drug-induced vision 
“reveals” the real of history, tearing the veil of māyā from the occluded, hidden history of Los 
Angeles that They don’t want him to see. This, in essence, is a vision of a Gödelian history that 
projects itself backward and forward through time, depicting LA as the vast megalopolis it had 
become by 2009, and as an ancient city, built in the aftermath of Lemuria’s destruction, a 
mythical civilization that supposedly resided on a continent in the Pacific that also sunk around 
the time Atlantis disappeared. Simultaneously decadent and highly technological, post-
apocalyptic and suburban, Doc’s vision of LA can appropriately be viewed as what Pynchon sees 
when he attempts to look at (something that I think can here productively be called) the Lacanian 
Real of the optical society. That this Real is historically projected in time and space, “vividly lit,” 
in some slightly alternate universe (our own), as always already post-apocalyptic should also 
emphasize Pynchon’s writing of the disaster, a present that is always already post-apocalyptic. 
 Mike Davis’s popular and incisive 1999 study of Los Angeles and the disaster 
imagination, Ecology of Fear, though not explicitly evoked by Pynchon, I think can be 
productively used as a possible touchstone for Inherent Vice’s vision of historical disaster. For 
Davis, that Southern California was “at risk from multiple, interlinked disaster [. . .] writes one 
geographer, ‘is the epitome of this phenomenon.’”435 Due to its unique Mediterranean ecology, 
the fault lines upon which it resides, its vicinity to the ocean, the proximity of the desert, etc., 
Southern California for Davis defines a complex web of risk, of disasters that are both constantly 
projected in the imagination—say, Hollywood disaster films—and many that have definitively 
occurred throughout Los Angeles’s history. Doc’s post-apocalyptic vision of the mythical 
Lemuria should thus also be read as his realization of the foreclosure of the counterculture’s 
utopian project (or lack of one, especially in the wake of the Manson murders). The vast suburbs 
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of Los Angeles have counterintuitively metastasized throughout a landscape that is often 
bombarded by earthquakes, wildfires, mudslides, tornadoes, not to mention the riots of 1965 and 
1992, etc. The contemporary history of Los Angeles, for Davis, can most productively be told 
through an ecological, historical, and cultural study of catastrophe; and for Doc, the metaphor of 
Lemuria is able to capture this fallen, secular Los Angeles.  
Consequently, we can here understand that if there is an apocalyptic vision available to 
Pynchon in 2009, even in light of the massive technological transformation that urbanity made 
on the physical world of Southern California during the late twentieth century (for both good and 
ill), the sense of disaster that is glimpsed in Inherent Vice is distributed throughout history—both 
materially and imaginatively. Doc’s hallucination continues, quickly transcending the boundaries 
of his locality, and he soon perceives that the entirety of history—both locally in Los Angeles 
and Vietnam, but also between Lemuria and Atlantis—is something that can be narratively 
understood as one vast conspiracy of ancient forces: 
and somehow unavoidably the war in Indochina figured in. The U.S., being located 
between the two oceans into which Atlantis and Lemuria disappeared, was the middle 
term in their ancient rivalry, remaining trapped in that position up to the present day, 
imagining itself to be fighting in Southeast Asia out of free will but in fact repeating a 
karmic loop as old as the geography of those oceans, with Nixon a descendent of Atlantis 
just as Ho Chi Minh was of Lemuria, because for tens of thousands of years all wars in 
Indochina had really been proxy wars, going back and forth, back to the previous world, 
before the U.S., or French Indochina, before the Catholic Church, before the Buddha, 
before written history, to the moment when three Lemurian holy men landed on those 
shores, fleeing the terrible inundation which had taken their homeland, bringing with 
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them the stone pillar they had rescued from their temple in Lemuria and would set up as 
the foundation of their new life and the heart of their exile. [. . .] Ever since France began 
colonizing Indochina, on through the present occupation by the U.S., the sacred stone had 
remained invisible, withdrawn into its own space. . . .436 
Though I think this passage initially encourages a postcolonial reading that would emphasize the 
conflict between the occident and the orient, between Western and Eastern Imperialism, and this 
is something that should be mentioned, as it is clearly something Pynchon is concerned with 
here, it is also important that Indochina is seen here as a “proxy” space whose role is simply to 
be a parcel of land fought over by the expression of some “ancient” forces. That this reifies the 
historical subjectivity of the native Vietnamese inhabitant is I think Pynchon’s point. To 
understand Southeast Asia as merely an area capable of staging the historical battle between 
Lemuria and Atlantis, a conflict that I think should clearly be read in light of the Cold War as 
one between the United States and the Soviet Union, is to understand Vietnam as a place where 
the obscene truth of the “absent” violence of the Cold War, the possibility of total nuclear 
annihilation, can be expressed. By drawing history’s traces through the fantasmatic construction 
of Lemuria, Pynchon situates his Los Angeles, like Vietnam, as a complex node in a global 
network of disaster. 
 But Doc’s vision here allows a glimpse of a physical manifestation of some ancient 
alternative. In the aftermath of The Crying of Lot 49’s foreclosure of historical revelation, Doc’s 
acid trip, though something we should not take completely seriously (after all), does beg the 
question of what would happen if the “sacred stone,” whatever that may be, reappeared. If the 
stone is “withdrawn into its own space,” this space collapses into itself, overwhelmed by its own 
immense gravity in the face of the Cold War and The Bomb. By inscribing Los Angeles into the 
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same conceptual space as Vietnam, Pynchon understands Southern California as inhabiting a 
similar realm. Further, if this “sacred stone” of Lemuria presents the possibility of manifesting a 
different history in the absence of the Cold War, Doc very much understands ARPAnet in these 
terms, as a possible site for the emergence of possibilities that imagine an alternative history to 
his horrifying psychedelic vision. 
 At the end of the novel, driving aimlessly south from Gotcha!, ARPAnet, and Sparky—
who tells Doc that he will help him “set up your own system if you want. It’s the wave of the 
future, ain’t it”437—Doc encounters a significant fog that makes the  
third dimension grow less and less reliable. [. . .] Doc wondered how many people he 
knew had been caught out tonight in this fog, and how many were indoors fogbound in 
front of the tube or in bed just falling asleep. Someday—he figured Sparky would 
confirm it—there’d be phones as standard equipment in every car, maybe even dashboard 
computers. People could exchange names and addresses and life stories and form alumni 
associations to gather once a year at some bar off a different freeway exit each time, to 
remember the night they set up a temporary commune to help each other home through 
the fog.438 
Doc’s prescient vision of the internet, social media, and the ubiquity of information technology, 
like Slothrop’s vision of the Bomb, is both veiled and brought about by fog. And I think we are 
encouraged to read this moment in two ways.  
First, the future of network technology, the computers in our cars and phones, makes it 
possible to share a relatively striking moment of unselfish collectivity. The anonymity of the 
streets, the fog both veiling the world around Doc and to which this nomadic caravan of cars 
responds to by relying on each other in order to pass through this two-dimensional smooth space, 
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is captured by the ARPAnet, allowing this collective to historically acknowledge how 
spectacular this moment of cooperation actually is considering the solipsism images of the car 
can so often represent in contemporaneity. This becomes an event, in the full sense of the word, a 
thing to be celebrated, a moment of fidelity (even a kind of minor revelation), and it achieves this 
evental status through its ability to be recorded. The history of this collectivity becomes a node 
within the very system that makes the experience possible—Doc is anticipating the moment 
when the instantaneous recording of even the most trivial events immediately develops its own 
kind of history. As Sparky says, “the more we know, the more we know”; the accumulation of 
knowledge and the speed at which we communicate have been exponential in their development. 
The hyperarchival, recursive impulse of this collectivity should be thus read in light of the 
current state of social media, with the recording, acknowledging, and “liking” of a large 
multiplicity of various events at many different levels of locality (including the event of liking 
the event).  
So secondly, the utter banality of this collectivity should be noted. That this “temporary 
commune” can only be brought about through a ubiquitous system of command and control 
should be understood with the full incisive brunt of Pynchonian irony and Norbert Weiner’s fears 
about cybernetics.439 How small, mundane, and common is this event and its subsequent 
inscription into history? This type of archival temporality, this sharing of an event both as it 
happens, but also as it is going to happen—how the consciousness of conserving this event in the 
digital archive always inscribes the events’ own future upon the event itself—occurs through a 
technology that surrounds us today. (To paraphrase Galloway: code is the air we breathe.) In 
other words, though this may not be a “new” type of technology—as by now we are quite aware 
that the recording of history very much dictates how we narrate the past440 and experience the 
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future—its ubiquity normalizes this type “historical time” across a range of possibilities for 
communicating between subjects.  
Thus Doc’s aptitude, here as elsewhere, with “reading” this historical time as well as the 
very genre he is inscribed within, makes him a kind of contemporary “hero of the archive.” Doc 
cannot only project his digital future into the present, the novel leaves him on the doorstep of 
having his own ARPAnet, after which his ability to make connections and accumulate data will 
only increase. He is a digital subject, a citizen of the optical society who can connect to those 
around him and decode his immediate historical locality to some degree, though the late-
capitalist mystery of the Golden Fang, like the Tristero for Oedipa, will remain opaque to him. 
Doc’s resistance to forces like the Golden Fang must remain local, and in some ways, impotent 
and flailing; but as he enacts a certain kind of ethical being throughout the novel (even if he is 
unable to fully articulate his honorable hippie-stoner ethics into some kind of creed), this ability-
to-connect-as-resistance, to help people out against Them, enables him to walk a fine line 
between control and resistance, surveillance and liberality; he is a hero for the optical society, for 
a world drenched in fog behind which there may be nothing whatsoever.441 
The lines that conclude the novel—Doc’s final vision of driving south from Los 
Angeles—consequently engages a complex temporality in which the optical society’s history 
must be read through how it recursively constructs that history. 
Maybe then it would stay this way for days, maybe he’d have to just keep driving, down 
past Long Beach, down through Orange County, and San Diego, and across a border 
where nobody could tell anymore in the fog who was Mexican, who was Anglo, who was 
anybody. Then again, he might run out of gas before that happened, and have to leave the 
caravan, and pull over on the shoulder, and wait. For whatever would happen. For a 
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forgotten joint to materialize in his pocket. For the [California Highway Patrol] to come 
by and choose not to hassle him. For a restless blonde in a Stingray to stop and offer him 
a ride. For the fog to burn away, and for something else this time, somehow, to be there 
instead.442 
Inherent Vice closes with Doc’s hopeful imagining of some alternative history and future. The 
fog of postmodernity, from Slothrop to Doc is something we must be helped home through. But 
this does not mean that some desirable destinations are not possible for Doc and his caravan of 
drivers. Most significant among these is how Doc’s vision holds out the utopian possibility of 
racial equality. Indeed, this potential destination “where nobody could tell anymore who was [. . 
.] anybody,” moves toward an anti-surveillance society, where the ease with which humans are 
categorized and reified disappears. If Doc lacks the force to reach this utopian subjectivity, there 
still remains the more modest promise of a small amount of chemical pleasure, an understanding 
police force, and a fantasmatic (Californian) sexual imaginary. But most importantly, there 
remains the hope that there will be something else there instead. Straddling 1970 and 2009, this 
“something else” is both the history of those 40 years and futurity itself. 
 Pynchon’s sense of an ending in 2009 should consequently be read against his asymptotic 
projection of a thermonuclear future in the 1973 of Gravity’s Rainbow. Though more obviously 
cataclysmic, Slothrop’s dispersed subjectivity—he achieves a kind of “network-being”—can be 
understood quite differently from Doc’s own network-being. Rather than being dispersed, Doc is 
another Pynchonian hermeneutist, someone for whom the work of history resides in his ability to 
perceive other frequencies of communication. If Slothrop can perceive these other frequencies, 
his dispersal results from his inability to decipher them (as in his inability to read the image of 
Hiroshima). Doc, on the other hand, though he surely cannot read the Golden Fang, can, out of 
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the fog of postmodernity, to imagine “something else this time”: namely, something other than 
the disaster ecology of the late-twentieth century. For Pynchon’s eschatology in Inherent Vice 
has evolved into a much more multiplicitous, dispersed, and rhizomatic sense of doom than the 
singularity dominating the end of Gravity’s Rainbow; but the ability to catch some glimpse 
behind the fog, behind the veil, that there may well be a kind of utopian project after all, also 
serves to revise The Crying of Lot 49’s project of foreclosing revelation as a mode of 
understanding. In short, as the most recent novel in Pynchon’s luminous historical drama, the 
possibility for some type of future that is not about to be eschatologically foreclosed through 
MAD emerges, but having come this far, and avoided global catastrophe, in the face of the very 
real disasters of the optical society and the early twenty-first century, hopefully the utopian 
destination is not too far off. 
 
3.6 WRITING THE NETWORK OF PYNCHON AND POST-NUCLEAR 
SUBJECTIVITY IN GRAVITY’S RAINBOW 
 
To give a picture of Dublin so complete that if the city one day suddenly disappeared 
from the earth it could be reconstructed out of my book.  
—James Joyce443 
 
It is upon losing what we have to say that we speak—upon an imminent and immemorial 
disaster—just as we say nothing except insofar as we can convey in advance that we have 
to take it back, by a sort of prolepsis, not so as finally to say nothing, but so that speaking 
might not stop at the word—the word which is, or is to be, spoken or taken back. 
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 —Maurice Blanchot, The Writing of the Disaster444 
 
Throughout this chapter I have endeavored to read Pynchon somewhat methodically, yet with an 
ear toward his constant recursive irony and play, my hope being that this criticism-as-
methodical-play still presents a clear account of the complex network of nuclear light woven 
throughout his massive fiction. The large sweep of narrative this chapter covers, however (even 
as it relatively ignores Vineland and V.), is miniscule compared to the worlds created in the 
works I discuss; and if I touch on only a few exemplary moments (as I currently do), this is 
simply a result of the massiveness of Pynchon’s historical project, and is unavoidable. As many 
critics I think are correct in suggesting, it is appropriate at this point to consider his entire oeuvre 
as one vast historical work that is clearly as ambitions as a Joyce or a Proust (if not in fact a bit 
more so). In this, Pynchon may very well be incomparable as an American writer. Virtually no 
one else (with the exception of Balzac [perhaps]) has taken on such an ambitious lifetime project, 
which now spans upwards of fifty years and eight large and significant volumes. The historical 
time-span covered in his novels and short stories, the transnational multiplicity of geographic 
settings, the overflowing abundance of characters, the ever-present and complex political 
concerns, the various utopian and dystopian projections, and the hyperactive referentiality of 
Pynchon’s fiction, especially considered as a whole (which only multiplies the number of 
connections between the works), has no equal at the moment. This has made it a frankly daunting 
task to adequately account for his encyclopedic breadth and the power of his vision. 
Nevertheless, though subtle and always ironic, Pynchon’s stated interest in a number of 
interconnected forces, many of which I have traced the development of here—emphasizing 
specifically the networks formed between technologies of destruction and accumulation, nuclear 
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physics and cybernetics—signals his deep and abiding concern with twentieth and twenty-first 
century history, and, somewhat counterintuitively, his vast capacity for (something like love or 
hope? or perhaps simple) generosity toward his audience, even in the face of utter disaster. 
To read Thomas Pynchon is to read an encyclopedia for a vibrantly imagined, infinitely 
detailed, textually layered, entertaining, carnivalesque, and horrifying Borgesian world which 
does not exist (and frequently comes into contact with our own in a variety of often traumatic 
ways). Despite the breadth and scope of his fiction, however, it is also surprisingly consistent in 
style and form (e.g. the songs in every novel, the silly names, the poaching of genres, the 
Faulknerian syntax, etc.); and this is because Pynchon’s structures his prose and conceives of his 
narratives as networks. No other critical metaphor can quite capture Pynchon’s hyperarchival 
prose. A dizzying number of aspects in Pynchon’s world(s) readily encourage connections 
between other aspects, connections that can be fantastic and oblique, and that often seem to point 
toward a moment when the lines could be singled up, when the interpretive threads could be 
woven together into something else, even if that destination can never arrive. And though I think 
part of the value of his work is the generosity with which Pynchon encourages a multiplicity of 
readings as a sheer aspect of the exuberance of his poetics and historical vision, he is also clearly 
aware of many of the hermeneutic problems his mega-narrative presents,445 and addresses these 
problems quite explicitly in many of the moments I have chosen to focus on. For his project is 
also one of return, of revising, rewriting, reinterpreting, and reimagining not only the events of 
history, but the events of his own work,446 a project of rigorous difference and repetition, a 
library that is constantly in the act of rewriting itself. 
The field of postmodern American (meta)fiction, Pynchon’s archival impulse is 
exemplary. With the announcement of such works as Mark Z. Danielewski’s The Familiar 
188 
 
(2014- ), a novel to be serialized in twenty-seven volumes once every three months for seven 
years,447 and Richard Grossman’s forthcoming three-million page novel, Breeze Avenue 
(2014),448 we might do well to consider Pynchon’s work as a forerunner to (if not a certain kind 
of apogee of) the late-twentieth, early twenty-first century mega-text.449 This is in no way to 
suggest that conceiving text as simply overwhelming in size is an even remotely new 
phenomenon,450 but the current capacities of both digital and print information storage is 
undeniably staggering, and I think one is encouraged to consider that aesthetic production will 
find new ways of using the exponentially increasing capacity of the external memory of 
contemporaneity. Pynchon’s encyclopedic worlds are projected through a willful mass-
accumulation within and of (deconstructed) information networks, an accumulation that at first 
resembles the unfiltered data of the real, seemingly chaotic or anarchic, but also a mode of 
gathering together that is at times undeniably meticulous and deliberate. Pynchon’s 
hyperarchival meshwork of textuality consistently strives to represent life in the network/optical 
society. By enacting the information overload introduced by cybernetic systems in his own work, 
while attenuating that overload through the interpretive apparatus of narrative, Pynchon 
constructs an archive-as-world that I believe will continue to bear critical fruit long into the 
twenty-first century, and his critical legacy may very well serve as a touchstone for how to read 
such madly ambitious and difficult and long work that somehow is able to capture the 
imagination and, perhaps most heroically, still entertain. 
So it is with this admitted appreciation that I would like to conclude this chapter by 
revisiting one of the more canonical moments in Pynchon, if for no other reason than it is the 
subject of Harold Bloom’s editorial introduction to critical collections on both Pynchon in 
general and Gravity’s Rainbow specifically. Bloom’s short introduction (that is probably half 
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quotation) is unavoidable for anyone beginning to read in Pynchon, as each book gathers 
together some very well-chosen essays on an array of important topics. Further, as is his wont, 
Bloom makes some bold claims: Pynchon is indeed “the crucial American writer of prose fiction 
at the present time. We are now, in my judgment, in the Age of John Ashbery and Thomas 
Pynchon, which is not to suggest any inadequacy [in James Merrill and Philip Roth], but only to 
indicate one critic’s conviction as to what now constitutes the Spirit of the Age.”451 This 
introduction to Pynchon is also unavoidable, not only because of his agonistic treatment of 
Pynchon and Ashbery (writers who I obviously think are incredibly significant as well), and how 
it is difficult to study Pynchon and not to agree with Bloom to some extent (even if one must 
endlessly qualify themselves), but because it contains his shockingly short list of the American 
twentieth-century Sublime. The famous Byron the Bulb episode from Gravity’s Rainbow is, in 
1986, the most recent example for Bloom. He says that the story “touches one of the limits of art 
[. . . and suggests] what is most vital and least problematic about Pynchon’s achievement as a 
writer.”452 
“The Story of Byron the Bulb” makes its narrative entrance into Gravity’s Rainbow when 
the famous Bulb appears above Lazlo Jamf in the fourth section of the novel, “The 
Counterforce.” Byron is an immortal bulb that has “been around, in fact, since the twenties [. . .]. 
Wotta history, this bulb, if only it could speak—well, as a matter of fact in can speak.”453 The 
following eight pages relate the story of poor immortal Byron, who for Bloom, “unlike Slothrop, 
cannot be scattered, but his high consciousness represents the dark fate of the Gnosis in 
Pynchon’s vision. For all its negativity, Gnosticism remains a mode of transcendental belief. 
Pynchon’s is a Gnosis without transcendence. There is a Counterforce, but there is no fathering 
and mothering abyss to which it can return.”454 Bloom’s reading here is convincing, if for the 
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simple fact that, as many critics of Pynchon have recognized, there are (not even hidden) Gnostic 
and Freudian elements in his work. Indeed, it is difficult to deny the Gnosticism of: “light-
energy,” the single identity imposed by the gods, the sleeping third eye, etc. in passages such as 
the following: “He has come to see how Bulb must move beyond its role as conveyor of light-
energy alone. Phoebus has restricted Bulb to this one identity. ‘But there are other frequencies, 
above and below the visible band. Bulb can give heat. Bulb can provide energy for plants to 
grow, illegal plants, inside closets, for example. Bulb can penetrate the sleeping eye, and operate 
the dreams of men.’”455 But I think that primarily reading Byron the Bulb, here and elsewhere, as 
a figure of the despair of Pynchon’s Gnostic vision does not do justice to the importance of 
Byron as a figure in Gravity’s Rainbow. 
In the moment quoted above, Byron is addressing the ontological condition of, for lack of 
a better term, his “Bulb-ness” and is attempting to communicate a kind of “Bulbology” to his 
fellow Bulbs in the Grid—what it means to be a Bulb, what the proper utopian project of the 
Bulb is (which he has realized through a kind of transcendence). And it here where I think one 
must make a contrast to Bloom by emphasizing Byron’s nonhuman subjectivity and 
consciousness. Pynchon, as is so often the case, is most interesting if we begin by taking him 
quite literally, which suggests that this immortal bulb is real within the diegetic space of his 
narrative. Surely this is in no way to ignore the allegorical power of the episode and its resonance 
with the rest of the novel, but rather to emphasize the materiality of Pynchon even at his most 
fantasmatic. Rather than have recourse to the Gnostic Pynchon, the Pynchon for whom the text is 
always a Gordian knot that no hermeneutics can cut, Pynchon’s decision to construct his 
“transcendent” or “messianic” non-distributed, post-nuclear subject must be read in all its vibrant 
materiality. 
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Byron communicates his story, is able to speak, by “dictating the muscular modulations 
of Paddy McGonigle’s cranking tonight, this is a loop here, with feedback through Paddy to the 
generator again. Here it is.”456 Byron is able to generate discourse, and thus provides a text to 
read (in a Gnostic or whatever fashion), through his vibration, creating a virtuous feedback loop 
in the small network connecting a generator, the muscles in Paddy’s body, and Byron the Bulb. 
Beyond being simply a tiny anti-entropic perpetual motion machine, this bodily circuit makes 
possible the discursive articulation and resonance of Byron’s nonhuman being. Further, he can 
communicate on Pynchon’s Ellisonian bandwidth because “there are other frequencies, above 
and below the visible band.” Byron’s power, both in his ability to speak and his influence over 
the material world derive from his perception and utilization of the material frequencies of light. 
Consequently, I think we are invited to read Byron as an articulation of one kind of post-nuclear 
subject, a citizen of the optical society whose emergence is unpredictable and nonhuman, and 
who can communicate on other frequencies. Further, Byron’s singularity is provided by 
Pynchon’s calculus, where “Statistically (so Their story goes), every n-thousandth light bulb is 
gonna be perfect, all the delta-q’s piling up just right, so we shouldn’t be surprised that this one’s 
still around, burning brightly.”457 Byron is a statistically unlikely but probable emergent 
subjectivity from the Grid, from the global network of postmodernity. 
Consequently, Byron as a speaking, nonhuman, luminous being should in one sense be 
understood as one of Pynchon’s most important forces—light—writing. (This is not a metaphor.) 
As such, the questions that arise with regard to Byron the Bulb and his story involve what Vicki 
Kirby calls Nature’s scriptability: “If we take very seriously the notion of an originary 
writing/mathesis, then intelligence, agency, literacy, and numeracy are implicated in the 
ontogenesis of scriptability. And with no pre-scription, no natural exemption from 
192 
 
writing/technology/invention, then the question of language (and being, more generally) 
radically presents itself.”458 To parse Kirby’s language a bit, her project boldly takes up the 
modes in which we (sometimes metaphorically) understand natural phenomena to be doing a 
kind of writing—e.g., DNA’s ability to communicate—and, if we remove our current 
exemptions and limits on what constitutes “writing,” exemptions that are largely (still) 
anthropocentric with regard to scriptability (and not wholly adequate anyway), we might then 
radically expand what might be considered writing or what she here calls “mathesis.” The radical 
notion she attempts to take up, that also provides the epigraph to this chapter, is to contemplate 
what a critical practice of reading the writing of Nature (which includes the human) might look 
like, a mode that might revise-by-extension Derrida’s famous dictum about the outside of texts, 
to “a more radical commitment to a horizon of possibility and change that embraces this dictum 
without reservation might argue that ‘there is no outside of Nature.’”459 This radical question of 
a deeper and more material notion of language, rather than consider Byron as a stand-in for a 
human subject or as a radically nonhuman other, Kirby’s perspective allows us to understand that 
Byron’s writing—light writing—is deeply connected to his being, and the being of the twentieth-
century’s project of capturing of light. In the world of Gravity’s Rainbow Byron’s writing is an 
emergent mathesis (like five-thousand monkeys typing), but it is also one intimately tied to the 
human through the network which allows its expression. In this fashion, Byron inhabits a kind of 
nonhuman dialogical terrain. He is, among other things, an artificial intelligence and a 
posthuman singularity, the Adamsian dynamo (and perhaps a messianic event in the Benjaminian 
sense), a revolutionary and a Gnostic sage, and ultimately, may simply be yet another victim of 
late capitalism on an epically tragic (and comic) scale. 
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In Against the Day light achieves mathesis through its refraction and reinterpretation 
through the many layers of Iceland spar, narrative, and genre. In that novel light displayed a 
certain kind of historical power, but I think we must read this activity of light always already in 
the wake of Gravity’s Rainbow, or at least as a later reconsideration of the historical role that the 
capture of light plays. In the “Story of Byron the Bulb,” through sheer mathematical 
happenstance of production on a large enough scale—the worldwide manufacturing of light 
bulbs—light has emerged from a human network, materially embodied in an individual bulb with 
a consciousness capable of writing. For all intents and purposes, Byron attains a kind of 
nonhuman historical subjectivity. And like Bloom’s use of long quotations, I feel that Byron’s 
fate deserves to be quoted in full. Having become aware of the worldwide conspiracy of General 
Electric and Krupp to control the world’s tungsten prices so as to control bulb-life spans and thus 
bulb’s very being, 
Byron, as he burns on, sees more and more of this pattern. He learns how to make contact 
with other kinds of electric appliances, in homes, in factories and out on the streets. Each 
has something to tell him. The pattern gathers his soul (Seele, as the core of the earlier 
carbon filament was known in Germany), and the grander and clearer it grows, the more 
desperate Byron gets. Someday he will know everything, and still be as impotent as 
before. His youthful dreams of organizing all the bulbs in the world seem impossible 
now—the Grid is wide open, all messages can be overheard, and there are more than 
enough traitors out on the line. Prophets traditionally don’t last long—they are either 
killed outright, or given an accident serious enough to make them stop and think, and 
most often they do pull back. But on Byron has been visited an even better fate. He is 
condemned to go on forever, knowing the truth and powerless to change anything. No 
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longer will he seek to get off the wheel. His anger and frustration will grow without limit, 
and he will find himself, poor perverse bulb, enjoying it. . . .460 
If for Pynchon the twentieth-century’s project was the capture of light, as I have been arguing 
here, the light bulb is the clearest expression of the hegemonic nature of this project. The light 
bulb describes a significant node of the optical society, its lifespan is determined by international 
market forces speculating on tungsten shares, a price that is set by Them, and all bulbs are 
manufactured as similarly as possible. Control of light bulbs, and consequently of light itself 
resembles, quite familiarly, some nightmarish dystopia of the twentieth century.461 Thus Byron is 
less the achievement of an ideal, but an unforeseen outgrowth of capitalist production pushed 
past its own obscene logic. If the biopolitical project of controlling bulbs’ lives, of mechanizing 
the power over life (and death), is pushed far enough, a subject will emerge that biopower cannot 
kill. But this subject, for Pynchon, is necessarily always already nonhuman. Thus, rather than 
suspect an eschatological messianism or a heroic postmodern political subject in Pynchon, there 
is a deep despair in positing this emergent, resistant singularity who “know[s] the truth and [is] 
powerless to change anything,” and this biopolitical power over life, and most importantly, to 
make live, is explicitly tied to the forces at work during the Second World War. 
The conspiracy controlling the bulbs is both American and German, and “when the War 
came, some people thought it unpatriotic of GE to have given Germany an edge like that. But 
nobody with any power. Don’t worry.”462 Thus power over light bulbs easily translates into 
power over mechanized death through the manipulation of world markets so as to ensure the 
eruption of total war (in which Germany would have the “edge”). This is the essence of Byron’s 
paranoiac vision: modernity’s project of capturing light results in Auschwitz and Hiroshima. His 
knowledge of history is total, but this singular subject of the optical society is impotent to stop 
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the control of light or combat the horrors of modernity, his youthful dreams of revolutionary 
change having evaporated with the appearance of the wide open, yet striated space of the Grid 
imposed over the smooth space of the Zone. His ability to communicate with the other subjects 
in the Grid—a space of ubiquitous surveillance and control—makes him no less “condemned to 
go on forever, knowing the truth and powerless to change it,” nor does his hyperarchival ability 
to access all knowledge on the Grid contribute to effective change. In fact, “he will find himself, 
poor perverse bulb, enjoying it . . . .” The Grid’s dominating logic of controlling “the ratio of the 
usable power coming out, to the power put in. The Grid demanded that this ratio stay as small as 
possible. That way they got to sell more juice”463—or rather, the basic imperative of capital to 
accumulate, to create surplus profit—this ratio produces the postmodern subject whose own 
knowledge of the Grid’s horrors and his resistance to the system can be turned into a kind of 
perverse, masochistic pleasure. 
In addition to his other resonances, we should read Byron as what Giorgio Agamben has 
famously called homo sacer (or bare life). The power the Grid has over him, through his total 
capture, is not simply expressed in Byron’s impotence to effect change, it is the Grid’s power to 
make Byron live (to make live, as Agamben’s translators puts it) through which its sovereign 
power is exercised. Byron inhabits “the state of exception, which was essentially a temporary 
suspension of the juridico-political order [the laws regulating a bulb’s lifespan], now becomes a 
new and stable spatial arrangement inhabited by bare life that more and more can no longer be 
inscribed in that order.”464 Byron does not fit into the established order of the Grid; his obscene 
immortality is exceptional. And yet the Grid is fully aware of his presence, and makes a new and 
stable spatial arrangement in which Byron continues to play his function within the logic of the 
system, illuminating rooms everywhere. As such, the Grid, or “the camp, which is now securely 
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lodged within the city’s interior, is the new biopolitical nomos of the planet,” the space where 
“the sovereign is the point of indistinction between violence and law, the threshold on which 
violence passes over into law and law passes over into violence.”465 Byron is a historical object 
of a biopower whose reach, given Byron’s non- or posthumanity, extends all the way down to 
matter, energy, and electricity itself. 
I think we are encouraged, then, to not read Byron as some sort of transcendental subject 
or, on the other hand, some totally reified object of biopower, but rather as an emergent 
outgrowth of postmodernity’s capture of light. Byron emerges from the very Grid whose project 
is control, becoming in the process the being made to live, to survive.466 Quite importantly, 
however, he is simultaneously a witness to the history of modernity as well as one who is able to 
speak. As Agamben argues, “The authority of the witness consists in his capacity to speak solely 
in the name of an incapacity to speak—that is, in his or her being a subject.”467 And in this 
Byron’s speech is authoritative, clearly articulating a form of subjectivity that is resistant to 
reification. His quite literal incapacity to speak (he is, after all, a light bulb), gives his story, 
communicated on other frequencies, the historical authority of the witness. It is through his 
writing by way of a network, through his ability to develop a communicational network of 
different beings, that he is able to articulate his own subjectivity. Even if he is controlled by the 
logic of modernity, his emergence leaves open other possibilities for witnessing and speaking. 
And in this, it is Byron’s formal articulation of a network that is the most significant 
aspect of his speech. By creating a network, materially linking the nonhuman and human, labor 
and electricity, Byron anticipates and Pynchon’s world projects further possible networks, and 
indeed, a network of networks, or an Internet. Like the next words about to be uttered for Oedipa 
as The Crying of Lot 49 concludes, Slothrop’s dispersed being, the hyperarchival Iceland spar 
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and non-temporal Chums of Chance, or Doc’s networked-being, Byron holds out the hope of 
alternatives, of other networks being formed, of different frequencies for different kinds of 
communication. Unlike these other Pynchonian subjects, however, for whom light can only be 
approached through remediation—e.g., nuclear light can only be perceived by Slothrop through 
the remediation of the nuclear text, an experience that destroys him—Byron is capable of bearing 
witness to the capture of light. This is a terrible, nihilistic, Promethean knowledge in which 
nothing is gained by enduring pain through eternity (by anyone). Though these are Captain 
Blicero’s words—who assembles and fires the 00000 rocket (more on this in a moment), I think 
we can safely assume that, among other things, Byron’s resistance to the Grid can be read as a 
result of his bearing witness to certain aspects of European colonialism and the Shoah: “‘In 
Africa, Asia, Amerindia, Oceania, Europe came and established its order of Analysis and 
Death.”468 But he also bears witness to an American postwar project that would be a continuation 
and replacement of that phase of history; and a Bomb that has introduced the real possibility of 
global mega-death and an eschaton: “Now we are in the last phase. American Death has come to 
occupy Europe. It has learned empire from its old metropolis.”469 It is difficult to argue that the 
most visible outgrowth of this American Death, this global power over destruction, this telos of 
European Death is The Bomb (in a fairly non-metaphorical way). Brought about by scientific 
analysis, during the Cold War the atomic Bomb and later the hydrogen Bomb were installed 
throughout Europe, often targeting other locations in Europe. Consequently, Byron, through 
writing/speaking, inscribes nuclear light into Gravity’s Rainbow’s world, a world that in 1973, 
even though the US and USSR were experiencing a moment of relative détente, remains perched 
upon the last delta-t of annihilation, the explosion of nuclear light that can never be glimpsed, or 
if glimpsed, a light that would inscribe the viewer forever.470  
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It is thus of immense importance that Byron is able to bear witness to the horrors of 
modernity in the past, present, and future through writing. Further, he should be read not only as 
an expression of Pynchon’s Gnostic despair, but his material and optical hope, his 
acknowledgment of the emergence of other alternatives to MAD, different subjective and 
imaginative possibilities, that though always already textual, can nonetheless bear witness to 
what, essentially, cannot be witnessed. The eschatological (but asymptotic) narrative structure of 
Gravity’s Rainbow (and the Cold War more generally), like the ending of The Crying of Lot 49, 
gets right up to the moment of revelation and closure, but withdraws, withholding the event to be 
witnessed. But Byron, in a very real sense, already is the event: the capture of light that signals a 
new level of global control and violence. For  
America was the edge of the World. A message from Europe, continent-sized, 
inescapable. Europe had found the site for its Kingdom of Death, that special Death the 
West had invented. Savages had their waste regions, Kalaharis, lakes so misty they could 
not see the other side. But Europe had gone deeper—into obsession, addiction, away 
from all the savage innocences. America was a gift from the invisible powers, a way of 
returning. But Europe refused it. It wasn’t Europe’s Original Sin—the latest name for that 
is Modern Analysis—but it happens that Subsequent Sin is harder to atone for.471 
If we recall Derrida’s notion of the fabulously textual nuclear referent, it is through Captain 
Blicero’s interpretation of history (which resembles Adorno and Horkheimer’s critique of the 
enlightenment), that we should understand the capture of the force of Death and Byron’s 
nonhuman subjectivity. Byron is the subject who can actually bear witness to and write the 
nuclear text (an impossible figure in Derrida’s nuclear criticism, though of course Byron is 
textual himself). The most visible outgrowths of the American regime of death, thermonuclear 
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weapons and optical networks of all kinds, have enmeshed the entire globe in its subsequent 
postcolonial sin. Byron is simultaneously the obscene outgrowth of this systemic thanatos whose 
power is expressed through the biopolitical imperative that he survive, and a being that can 
presumably access the various networks of the military industrial complex at will. Even if he can 
do nothing else with this hyperarchival access (for he is a kind of “ghost in the machine”), his 
ability to write—to imagine other ways of being, to imagine a world not controlled by the now 
inhuman capture of force, to communicate on other frequencies, to write the nuclear text—these 
capacities of Byron project worlds. By giving Byron complete access to the archive of human 
knowledge, allowing him to understand his own luminous nonhuman subjectivity, and inscribing 
him with a necessary (and perhaps new) appreciation of the nonhuman and material world in the 
face of the logic of late capitalism, Pynchon casts Byron in the role of author for the optical 
society.472 
 If modernity’s project for Pynchon was in many ways the capture of that most classically 
ethereal substance, light, and how the subsequent advances in the field of optics has led to a great 
many technological changes in the species’ material condition—our simultaneous ability to 
destroy ourselves and (potentially) communicate globally with anyone—then light in Pynchon’s 
world is the Adamsian material force of postmodernity, and its symbols are The Bomb and 
ARPAnet. Byron is one of this force’s authors. Not in the sense that he is the pure, Platonic force 
of light itself—quantum physics teaches us that there is no such thing (it’s not quite like 
gravity)—but in the sense that for Pynchon the author’s role is to bear witness to the world 
around him and project an alternative one. In this, Pynchon consistently holds out the possibility 
of what Ernst Bloch calls “anticipatory illumination” 473 in his fiction. Byron, Slothrop, 
Cherrycoke, Mason and Dixon, Oedipa, Doc, and the Chums of Chance all serve a utopian 
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function, in one way or another (and this could be said of a great number of Pynchon’s 
characters). But as historical subjects, they also must negotiate their contemporary modes of 
being in all their systemic horror, strangeness, historical contingency, and futility. If Byron, and 
thus Pynchon and the reader herself, has total access to this world,474 then Pynchon’s work 
emphasizes the importance of the author function as a necessary utopian dialogical project of 
rewriting and reinterpreting the material world and the subject’s relationship to it if there is to be 
any articulable future. 
 Pynchon’s work in the wake of the Cold War, which rivals in length and scope the work 
he did during the first thirty years of his career, has become increasingly difficult to consider 
through the same lens of Black Humor and recursive irony that his first three novels encouraged. 
If Byron the Bulb is nonetheless condemned to perversely enjoy his eternal oppression, 
Pynchon’s (and his own) writing illuminates a world a little further away from the asymptotic 
disaster of MAD, a temporality for which that eschatological narrative can no longer suffice. 
That this is also a world in which disaster has proliferated, where They have gotten stronger and 
more mysterious, where the paranoiac’s ability to make connections has been exacerbated, where 
reification through surveillance and control has reached an almost aesthetic level of complexity, 
so have his characters responded sincerely, if obliquely, in kind. To enter Pynchon’s world(s), 
especially his work of the past fifteen years, is to fully immerse oneself in what it means to live 
in the network society, and to realize how difficult and absolutely necessary the imaginative 
articulation of alternative narratives are, while simultaneously forcing one to continually bear in 
mind the ease with which these narratives are absorbed by the cultural logic of late capitalism. 
 Thomas Pynchon’s luminous contemporaneity, his other temporal, spatial, and radial 
frequencies, and his tangled web of global history stage a profound encounter with the twentieth 
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century, an epoch that in his fiction achieves a(n often obscene) vitality all its own. In this, 
Pynchon complexly engages with Badiou’s “passion for the real.” By providing the nonhuman 
forces of contemporaneity—light, gravity, entropy, electricity, capital, information, etc.—with 
agency, Pynchon asks a more fundamental question than the very old one involving the 
distinction between human and nature, and Badiou also asks this question: 
What is the true life—what is it to truly live—with a life adequate to the organic intensity 
of living? This question traverses the century, and it is intimately linked to the question of 
the new man, as prefigured by Nietzsche’s [übermensch]. The thinking of life 
interrogates the force of the will-to-live. What is it to live in accordance with a will-to-
live? More specifically: What is the century as organism, as animal, as a structured and 
living power? In part, we still belong to this vital century. We necessarily partake of the 
life that is its own. As Mandelstam says, in the poem’s opening line, the century, 
considered as a beast, is “my beast.”475 
By projecting his vast historical worlds Pynchon’s nuclear drama of light attempts to textually 
transcribe the vital materiality of the twentieth century by ironically and complexly (and 
entertainingly) engaging with its passion for the real. Between the dynamo and the cybernetic 
network, the twentieth century assumes the status of organism, both structurally, at the level of 
language and narrative, and dynamically, at the level of its emergence from the species’ 
manipulation of material forces. Consequently, Pynchon forces us to consider what the emergent, 
utopian prospects of the present might be, and question what kinds of narratives a vital history—
like his historical fiction and the multiplicitous, rhizomatic work that it does—might produce in 
the wake of the twentieth century. At its root, Pynchon’s work shows a deep sympathy with a 
material ecology that does not distinguish between biological life and other forms of vitality, and 
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displays a marked antipathy for any reification of the material world. The project of bringing 
matter closer, of turning the atom into a tool for massive destruction, may be most visible in the 
images of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but it is a project that in Pynchon’s world radiates outward 
to all points in his network, and consequently must be acknowledged, resisted, and exploited. 
Pynchon’s projection of his vast world testifies to the vital importance of the imagination, the 
necessity of understanding our own implication in the world and its luminously violent history, 
and the possibility that matter/writing can articulate temporal and ontological alternatives; that 
there are other frequencies of being that eco-poetic, narrative expression can vibrate on and 
continue the impossible task of shaping the emergent past, present, and future. 
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 4.0 THE INVERTED NUKE IN THE GARDEN: DAVID FOSTER WALLACE’S 
ARCHIVAL APOCALYPSE 
  
 Our life has no end in just the way in which our visual field has no limits. 
  —Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus476 
 
4.1 A SUPPOSEDLY FUN THING I’LL NEVER DO AGAIN: ON DAVID FOSTER 
WALLACE 
 
For a project of nuclear criticism, the work of David Foster Wallace offers a surprisingly rich 
field in which to operate, as well as substantial critical rewards. Recursively dense, both 
syntactically and thematically, Wallace’s writing walks the knife-edge between encyclopedic 
accumulation and a grammatological disaster that threatens language and narrative. Whether 
writing on early-1990s hip-hop, David Lynch, tennis, Cantorian set theory, cruise ships, 
addiction, entertainment, or American usage, he is an enviably meticulous writer, perhaps the 
most syntactically acrobatic, yet nonetheless achingly precise, since Henry James. His erudition 
and rigor never abate, nor does his sheer fascination and curiosity. Latecomer though he may be, 
his writing is not a literature of exhaustion—though it can be exhausting to read—but of an 
almost disturbingly sincere hope and excitement. For a body of work so helplessly aware of the 
apocalyptic threads always already woven so densely around the possibility of writing itself, it is 
not only surprisingly optimistic at times, but downright refreshing. Wallace conceived of fiction 
as a task with an ethical imperative to do something in the world, to provide something, to be a 
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gift, and not simply a brutal, hopeless representation of a brutal, hopeless reality. For if there is 
nothing so brutal and hopeless as the end of the human species on Earth, then Wallace may have 
paved the first foot of a road toward an emergent and incredibly necessary anti-eschatology; his 
work is a testament to the serious role that literature can play in a time of perpetual crisis. 
Among the many important writers of the 1990s, the accomplishment of Wallace in 
particular was to define a unique web of contemporaneity in a historical period whose narrative 
had imploded, a writer for whom the truly nuclear disaster was of that narrative’s dissolution 
rather than its fruition. History had not been violently, instantaneously ended, as so many 
assumed had assumed it would be during the Cold War, but rather Perestroika was, for many in 
the West, less an end than an exhaustion (Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last 
Man [1992] rings as a tinny, hollow clamor of triumph). And this stance can be seen in 
Wallace’s own sense of literary production. In an interview with Larry McCaffery describing his 
goals for the early novella “Westward the Course of Empire Makes its Way,”477 Wallace said, 
“My idea in ‘Westward’ was to do with metafiction what Moore’s poetry or like DeLillo’s Libra 
had done with other mediated myths. I wanted to get the Armageddon-explosion, the goal 
metafiction’s always been about, I wanted to get it over with, and then out of the rubble reaffirm 
the idea of art being a living transaction between humans, whether the transaction was erotic or 
altruistic or sadistic.”478 Wallace considered the metafictional postmodern literary production of 
the 1960s and 70s as a literature obsessed with its own end.479 In the case of someone like Don 
DeLillo—who ended White Noise (1985) with a group of suburban Americans perched on the 
edge of a “computerized nuclear pulse,”480 an “ambient roar, in the plain and heartless fact of 
their decline”481— Wallace saw himself as coming to the party after it was already over, while 
everyone remained standing around holding their drinks, wondering whether to go home or not. 
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Much of his early work, like The Broom of the System (1987) and “Westward the Course of 
Empire Takes its Way” (1989), is a literature about the end of ends, an aesthetic of temporal and 
narrative continuity without a coherent telos. For the Wallace after “Westward,” metafictional 
narrative had reached a breaking point in much the same way that the historical nuclear narrative 
had. No longer was it possible to stress the crisis that either literature or the nuclear presented 
with a straight face. The sheer absurdity of nuclear war made much of the paranoiac literary 
production of the past seem naïve, obsessive, and short-sighted, something to be gone beyond, 
something to be ironized to the point of sincerity.   
And Wallace’s fiction, though at times thoroughly apocalyptic, is also concerned with the 
problems of solipsism and irony, of a world in which narrative is not sufficient to create meaning 
outside of the individual. If the US had lost its big Other with the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, Wallace understood this in narrative terms, not merely as the end of a grand narrative, nor 
simply acknowledging François Lyotard’s claim in The Postmodern Condition (1979) that 
postmodernity was the end of grand narratives in general, but as a kind of Nietzschean Last Man. 
For Wallace, like Zarathustra, attempted to take irony beyond itself, toward what some have 
called a “new sincerity,”482 but what is perhaps more reminiscent of the kind of meta-self-
referential labyrinths in Human, All Too Human (1878). He was an exhausted late-comer, an 
untimely being in the midst of a whimper. His fiction presented a culture turned in on itself, 
parasitically consuming not only its cultural products, but its waste and detritus as well. 
Furthermore, this consumption was cyclical and recursive, a nuclear fusion out of control, 
producing and consuming its own byproduct exponentially. 
This recursive consumption/production without limit is one of the central aspects of the 
world of Infinite Jest (1996), his magnum opus.483 Widely hailed as a continuation of (and 
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successor to) the work of Thomas Pynchon and others, it is considered the most significant post-
Cold War American novel by many. Indeed, this novel is now firmly entrenched as particularly 
demonstrative of a 1990s ideology in its approach to aesthetics, politics, and history, an approach 
that Wallace’s neologism from Infinite Jest—après garde484—might best describe.   
A few other factors contribute to the canonical position David Foster Wallace is now 
quickly inhabiting. His suicide by hanging, considered by most to be wholly related to his 
clinical depression complicated by a cessation of medication,485 has thrown him into a realm 
reserved for those who lived and died in an untimely fashion, and did so famously.486 Wallace 
was and is uniquely popular. The media blitz surrounding the publication of Infinite Jest, from its 
clever and slightly ominous pre-advertisement, to its post-publication media attention,487 appears 
today as something like the last gasp of the halcyon days of the publishing industry—something 
now virtually impossible due to the internet’s ubiquity and “democratic” leveling. This is also to 
say, however, that a distinct aspect of Wallace’s popularity and influence is directly related to the 
early adoption of him by internet communities as a significant writer, most notably by fansites 
like the wallace-l listserv and the famously useful and important website The Howling Fantods. 
Unlike, say, the contemporaries he is most often connected with, writers like Richard Powers, 
Jonathan Franzen, David Eggers, and William T. Vollmann, whose collective under-
representation in such forums is perhaps curious (comparatively), Wallace’s work somehow 
appears to demand, and quite often produce these types of communities. So much of his fiction 
and nonfiction presumes the ubiquity of communication and information networks, that, in 
perfect symmetry, his work found itself the subject of a quite lively discussion because of 
advances in those very networks, a discussion that was impossible to conduct even a few years 
before. 
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Quite quickly, Wallace has been acknowledged as part of an emerging (or perhaps 
disappearing) canon, so it is revealing that his praise has been so polyphonic and celebratory. He 
has been called by such emissaries of fiction as George Saunders, “the first among us,” who 
added in a memorial that he was “the most talented, most daring, most energetic and original, the 
funniest, the least inclined to rest on his laurels or believe all the praise. His was a spacious, 
loving heart, and when someone this precious leaves us, especially so early, love converts on the 
spot to a deep, almost nauseating sadness, and there’s no way around it.”488 Author of Elegant 
Complexity: A Study of David Foster Wallace’s Infinite Jest (2007), a Bloomsday-esque 
companion to Wallace’s sprawling novel, Greg Carlisle writes, “We’ve been admiring and 
eulogizing him, which is of course appropriate, but now the time has come to evolve the critical 
conversation about Wallace and to champion him for what he is: the most important author of the 
late 20th and early 21st centuries.”489  Michael Sheehan, in the introduction to a recent 100-page 
section devoted to Wallace in the Sonora Review, said, “in Wallace’s work, we see the infinite 
depth of the everyday, of every moment, which is at once endlessly interesting and also 
potentially paralyzing.”490 It is precisely the “presence” of the infinite in Wallace’s work, as 
opposed to (perhaps) Pynchonian entropy, that occasions such loud appraisals. For he was at all 
times engaged in some type of infinity, positive or negative, large or small, vicious or virtuous. 
For instance, Wallace ends Everything and More: A Compact History of ∞, his quite 
readable pop-math book on the subject of infinity and Cantorian set theory, with the following 
statement: “there are actually a whole ∞ of Zeno-type ∞s nested between No and c, and that 
sooner or later a principle would be found that proved this. As of now no such principle’s ever 
been found. Gödel and [Georg] Cantor both died in confinement, bequeathing a world with no 
finite circumference. One that spins, now, in a new kind of all formal Void. [Yet m]athematics 
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continues to get out of bed.”491 Any critical reading of Wallace must take this statement very 
seriously. He was deeply and intimately aware of a host of difficult subjects and fields, Cantorian 
set theory and transfinite mathematics being only the most clearly involved with the problems 
presented by infinity. And unlike postmodern critiques of representation and mediation, the fact 
that infinity could be abstractly represented and manipulated in a formal system like set theory—
even if that system was understood always already as incomplete and inherently flawed—was for 
Wallace of the utmost importance. He was also intimately familiar with the revolutions in critical 
theory and poststructuralism during the 1960s-80s. It was this relationship, between the material 
though abstract mathematical conception of infinity and the limits of the text (or the infinite 
book), which Wallace pursued and questioned to exhaustive length in his work. 
Bred upon Heidegger and the poststructuralists while attending Amherst, Arizona, and 
Harvard (briefly), he understood this transfinite engagement in textual terms, and oftentimes, in 
what I call archival terms. Wallace saw that the ontic limits of experience were increasingly 
defined along digital lines. The codes, screens, and apparatuses used to conduct information, the 
basic technology of late capitalism was, for Wallace, deeply textual. As he was greatly 
influenced by and precociously familiar with twentieth Century continental philosophy, critical 
theory, deconstruction, and American postmodern criticism, it is not surprising that he 
champions a familiarity with these discourses in his mostly overlooked first published essay. At 
the age of 24, while an MFA student, Wallace published his first novel, The Broom of the 
System, which he has called “a conversation between Wittgenstein and Derrida.”492 A year later, 
Wallace was invited to write an essay on the state of US fiction in The Review of Contemporary 
Literature.  In that article he wrote: 
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The climate for the “next” generation of American writers—should we decide to inhale 
rather than die—is aswirl with what seems like long-overdue appreciation for the weird 
achievements of such aliens as Husserl, Heidegger, Bakhtin, Lacan, Barthes, Poulet, 
Gadamer, de Man. The demise of Structuralism has changed a world’s outlook on 
language, art, and literary discourse; and the contemporary artists can simply no longer 
afford to regard the work of critics or theorists or philosophers—no matter how 
stratospheric—as divorced from their own concerns.493 
In much of this essay, Wallace was responding to the new, cynical minimalism/realism of writers 
like Brett Easton Ellis and others,494 as well as what he considered to be a rampant anti-
intellectualism in Creative Writing Programs. For such a young writer, being educated at a time 
when “French theory,” among other things, had inundated the academy, a familiarity with the 
achievements of poststructuralism could not but help to appear de jure to Wallace495 (whose own 
parents were academics in English and Philosophy496). 
Because of the intellectual milieu Wallace inherited, he is oftentimes considered to be 
one of the first members of a generation succeeding literary postmodernism. This reading of 
Wallace is largely owed to Marshall Boswell’s study, Understanding David Foster Wallace 
(2003), Wallace’s own essay, “E Unibus Pluram: Television and U.S. Fiction,” and a lengthy 
interview he conducted with McCaffery that appeared in a 1993 issue of The Review of 
Contemporary Fiction. His relationship to poststructuralism, however, has largely been 
downplayed or simply overlooked in much of the criticism addressing his work up until this 
point. In fact, Wallace’s attention to postmodern fiction in “E Unibus Pluram” and its 
relationship to television has been taken almost as gospel by many critics, without regard for the 
intentional fallacy, while this earlier essay, stressing the importance of taking seriously the 
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achievements of such “aliens,” has been all-but-ignored before the recent surge in attention to his 
work. 
 That this perhaps should not be surprising is indeed a testament to Wallace’s 
achievement, as he has been able to effectively bridge the gap between art and criticism, theory 
and practice, in what might be considered, at least in 1996, a novel manner. If anything, the 
strength of Wallace’s work often rests on his hyperawareness of the mediation by which we 
experience the world, and ultimately, how relatively new this condition really is. If everything is 
text, then for Wallace everything is structured by the underlying codes, networks, and 
information that support those texts, those mediations. By inhabiting a theoretical stance 
throughout his body of work that takes the discursive nature of reality as a given, concedes that a 
text always already houses its own misreading or deconstruction, and acknowledges that the 
greatest “truth” of material existence might simply be the singular emergence of higher levels of 
order out of chaotic systems, Wallace, perhaps most impressively, resists being a cog in the 
culture industry despite his popularity. That he has been able to do so, in Fredric Jameson’s 
terms, requires one to think about the new.   
We can now begin to move in the direction of a new description of the art object in 
general, or rather the new kinds of installations in which a “textual” process is 
immobilized in the current worldwide proliferation of postmodern artistic production. I’m 
trying to avoid the word “object,” still redolent of a modernist production of individual 
things, whether canvasses, scores that can be performed or repeated, or books that have 
boundaries and limits and that can be held in the memory (as opposed to those texts that, 
whether by fragmentation and imperfection or by a dizzying multiplication of presences 
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on the page, somehow evade form and reification—I guess I’m thinking of David Foster 
Wallace’s Infinite Jest).497 
That Wallace, in an aesthetic regime now dominated by an acute encounter with 
poststructuralism—an encounter which has now reached the point of being blasé—could 
nevertheless “evade . . . reification,” according to Jameson, cannot be stressed enough. 
 Wallace’s aesthetic, from his first novel to his recently published posthumous work, can 
be considered, over-simply, as a resistance against reification. What Jameson notes about the 
“proliferation of postmodern artistic production,” is essentially that there is no avant garde, that 
there is virtually no art being made at the present moment not dominated by the reification so 
paradigmatic of the aesthetic regime of late capitalism. The most complex works of 
contemporary art are not complex as objects, but as ideas, as theory, and the culture industry has 
wholly absorbed this form of aesthetic complexity, something Wallace is intensely aware of in 
“E Unibus Pluram.” To be on the “cutting edge of art,” is to be on the cutting edge of theory, and 
as such, the distance between the artist and critic has blurred. 
Let’s rather imagine that these newer works, or “texts” as it is more appropriate to call 
them, are mixtures of theory and singularity, which is to say that in some fashion they 
transcend the old opposition between a work and its criticism or interpretation that held 
for an aesthetic committed to the concept of the work in general, and to the security of 
closure and of reified form. Now that opposition—between the critic and the creator, the 
artist and the review—an opposition over which so much bad blood has been spilled at 
least since the eighteenth century—is no longer binding; and the critic has been 
transformed, has mutated, into something like the curator, or has indeed become 
indistinguishable from the writer himself.498 
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We might look to the likes of Jorge Luis Borges, Vladimir Nabokov, Umberto Eco, and William 
Gass, among many others, as examples of Jameson’s point, but, as he emphasizes that Infinite 
Jest somehow escapes the reification such metacritically aware works produce, so too would we 
be right to pause a moment before grouping Wallace with such figures. As Zadie Smith 
conjectures, “certainly that unusual triune skill set—encyclopedic knowledge, mathematical 
prowess, complex dialectical thought—would have had an easier passage to approval within the 
academic world from which he hailed than in the literary world he joined.”499 In Wallace’s case, 
and I think Jameson would agree, the problem is not whether he formally resembles a critic-
novelist hybrid, but rather that by the early 1980s, to make this distinction was already untenable 
and outdated.500 It is precisely with the awareness of the mutation of the critic, and by proxy the 
writer himself, that Wallace works and seeks to complicate.   
One of the arguments I wish to put forward here is that whatever is new about Wallace, is 
not so merely in terms of his relationship to the literary postmodern, which is of course true and 
has largely begun to be explored by scholars such as Marshall Boswell and many others, but also 
that Wallace’s access to texts, all kinds of texts, is equally novel and important. If the 1990s were 
a distinctly nuclear era simply because of the relative absence of the nuclear referent, they were 
so because of the ascendency of communication and information technologies. Both formally, 
technically, scholarly, and critically—not to mention the fact that Infinite Jest is inundated with 
these technologies—Wallace presents a world that is tirelessly archival, a world in which not 
only textual production has increased exponentially, but also one’s access to texts and 
information. Further, informational access is a fundamental base upon which he structures his 
writing; his project requires access, perhaps best summed up by what Hal Incandenza, 
protagonist of the first half of Infinite Jest, says to a cab-driver: “‘The library, and step on it.’”501 
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Following this, I hesitate to coin a neologism for how I understand Wallace to be “new,” 
for often what sets him apart is his recognition of a kind of Kierkegaardian or Deleuzian 
repetition. Furthermore, for my purposes, the neologisms that have been spawned by Wallace’s 
newness are equally insufficient: “post-postmodernism,” “radical realism,” “the new sincerity,” 
and “high-postmodernism.” I would also like to suggest that Mark Fisher’s political and aesthetic 
mobilization of Michael Schudson’s term for certain types of advertising, “capitalist realism,” 
might be appropriate, though also insufficient.502 Wallace’s own stance, as well as how critics 
have distinctly approached him as coming after something, however, would not necessarily be 
damaged by such a categorical neologism. 
“E Unibus Pluram” has often been read as Wallace’s manifesto about whatever aesthetic 
approach might come after postmodernism. I would like to stress, however, that Wallace’s most 
crucial insight in that essay is not simply that US television had adopted the irony postmodern 
fiction had developed to such excruciatingly recursive length, but the deeper fact of the 
inescapable systematicity of this transformation. For, as he writes, “one of the most recognizable 
things about this century’s postmodern fiction has always been the movement’s strategic 
deployment of pop-cultural references—brand names, celebrities, television programs—in even 
its loftiest High Art projects.”503 This can easily be parsed as a kind of “capitalist realism,” but 
what is striking on a deeper level is that these discrete images and symbols are divorced from 
real meaning, and we already know that, regardless of whether or not these images and symbols 
are employed in advertising or “High Art.” What Wallace cannot do anymore is find this 
awareness altogether that novel, nor that upsetting. He argues, drawing upon the formal 
innovations of Pynchon, John Barth, Robert Coover, Donald Barthelme, DeLillo and others, that 
“television’s self-mocking invitation to itself as indulgence, transgression, a glorious ‘giving in’ 
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(again, not exactly foreign to addictive cycles) is one of two ingenious ways it’s consolidated its 
six-hour hold on my generation’s cojones. The other is postmodern irony.”504  It is less-than-
surprising to Wallace that a specific form like literary irony could infect the very non-literary, 
advertising, mass-entertainment system of television, and this infection would not merely blur 
the lines between high and low art, but erase those lines altogether. What Wallace is calling 
postmodern irony is an emergent property of 1990s US culture itself. Without faith in narrative, 
fully aware of the dominance of late capital, and in no condition to resist, let alone protest this 
condition,  
the most frightening prospect, for the well-conditioned viewer, becomes leaving oneself 
open to others’ ridicule by betraying passé expressions of value, emotion, or 
vulnerability. Other people become judges; the crime is naïveté. The well-trained viewer 
becomes even more allergic to people. [. . .] [F]urther viewing begins to seem almost like 
required research, lessons in the blank, bored, too-wise expression that Joe must learn 
how to wear for tomorrow’s excruciating ride on the brightly lit subway, where crowds of 
blank, bored-looking people have little to look at but each other.505 
Implicit in Wallace’s criticism of the modern viewer is how much she resembles a particularly 
savvy humanities scholar or graduate student, someone who has been educated in the art of 
critical distance and doubt, and furthermore, someone who has been exposed to a staggering 
amount of aesthetic material.506 Though he does propose that a new generation of “sincere” 
writers might emerge from such hip, cynical malaise (and we may even suggest he was right), in 
a world in which a boiled down Heideggerian Angst became a lesson in basic social survival, the 
reification of the art object had become so complete that it ceased to be something to comment 
upon seriously with vitriolic ire. Yes, one could turn irony upon irony, or better yet, as so many 
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have argued Wallace himself strove to do (and accomplished), turn the meta-ironic handle so far 
that a strange sort of sincerity emerged, but in the end, the reasons for the cultural emergence of 
what others might call “cool,” the meme of contemporary ironic detachment, were far deeper 
than merely the vicissitudes of contemporary capitalism. 
 In “E Unibus Pluram” everything Wallace is analyzing is undergirded by the systems 
along which information flows. The transmission of codes, the conveyance of information, in 
short, language games, are thrust into increasingly complex relationships with other information, 
to the point where there is no stable origin point from which to really consider any of the 
resultant hybridities. With the proliferation of new nodes, new networks, and a host of new 
information to flow between participants with almost entirely unparsable rules, it is no wonder 
that television adapted the complexities of postmodern aesthetic production. In response, Tom 
LeClair argues, in a slightly overlooked essay, that Wallace and “these younger writers more 
thoroughly conceive their fictions as information systems, as long-running programs of data with 
collaborative genesis.”507 By anticipating the very transformation of the aesthetic object into not 
merely another commercial product (like Warhol), but more drastically, to divest the object of 
any real importance whatsoever, to acknowledge from the beginning that the object is always 
already yet more connected information within mountainous streams of data, information without 
perceptible difference between signal and noise, Wallace achieves what I will call hyperarchival 
realism. 
 An excellent example of this hyperarchival realism is buried in a footnote to an endnote 
following a not uncharacteristically long sentence from Infinite Jest. This sentence, discussing 
the father of the protagonist of the first half of the novel, cannot help but suggest lengthy 
quotation: 
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 His strategic value, during the Federal interval G. Ford-early G. Bush, as more or less the 
top applied-geometrical-optics man in the O.N.R. and S.A.C., designing neutron-
scattering reflectors for thermo-strategic weapons systems, then in the Atomic Energy 
Commission—where his development of gamma-refractive indices for lithium-anodized 
lenses and panels is commonly regarded as one of the big half-dozen discoveries that 
made possible cold annular fusion and approximate energy-independence for the U.S. 
and its various allies and protectorates—his optical acumen translated, after an early 
retirement from the public sector, into a patented fortune in rearview mirrors, light-
sensitive eyewear, holographic birthday and Xmas greeting cartridges, videophonic 
Tableaux, homolosine-cartography software, nonfluorescent public-lighting systems and 
film-equipment; then, in the optative retirement from hard science that building and 
opening a U.S.T.A-accredited and pedagogically experimental tennis academy apparently 
represented for him, into “après-garde” experimental- and conceptual-film work too far 
either ahead of or behind its time, possibly, to be much appreciated at the time of his 
death in the Year of the Trial-Size Dove Bar—although a lot of it (the experimental- and 
conceptual-film work) was admittedly just plain pretentious and unengaging and bad, and 
probably not helped at all by the man’s very gradual spiral into the crippling dipsomania 
of his late father.508 
Filled with an almost paralyzing amount of information, Wallace’s syntax here is not only 
maddeningly precise, it is wholly in the service of character description. This is not a character 
that can be described by the brand logo on their t-shirt. An effluvium of information: historical 
allusions, high-level optical science,509 the development of nuclear technology during the Cold 
War, film engineering, experimental art—all of these are present, topped off with a metafictional 
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realization that even the very sentence this impressive archival descriptive feat is taking place in 
may be “pretentious and unengaging and bad,” but nevertheless follows with a key piece of plot 
information heavy in emotional affect: the father’s crippling dipsomania. Wallace’s syntax seems 
to at times require logorrhea, of course exacerbated by the nine-page endnote attached to this 
sentence detailing the character’s (James Orin Incandenza’s) filmography.   
The hyperarchivally realist moment occurs one further level down, as Wallace gives us 
the source for this filmography in a footnote to the title to the endnote:  
a. From Comstock, Posner, and Duquette, ‘The Laughing Pathologists: Exemplary Works 
of the Anticonfluential Après Garde: Some Analyses of the Movement Toward Stasis in 
North American Conceptual Film (w/ Beth B., Vivienne Dick, James O. Incandenza, 
Vigdis Simpson, E. and K. Snow.’ ONANite Film and Cartridge Studies Annual, vol. 8, 
nos. 1-3 (Year of the D.P. from the A.H.), pp. 44-117.510 
Unlike the longer sentence which this footnote is attached to, it cannot be read without some 
knowledge of the world in which a book or work like that would appear. The description of 
Incandenza,511 though obsessively compulsive, simply requires a better-than-working knowledge 
of the English language, a good dictionary, and a reference work or two. But beyond information 
readily available to someone at a university library, the world of the novel is in a state of 
becoming during this very sentence (while simultaneously being self-contained). The footnote, 
on the other hand, could not be more opaque. At least some knowledge of the fact Infinite Jest 
takes place in an imagined 2009 is required, and that various political and historical 
developments in that world have occasioned particular peculiarities in the citation (“Year of the 
D.P. from the A.H.,”512 for instance).513 Furthermore, and it should be clear, there is a host of 
information that is wholly unnecessary to any aspect of the novel whatsoever other than it 
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reinforces the novel’s form (page numbers, volume numbers, many of the names, etc.).514 
Information, functioning at this many levels of mediation and recursion to the text proper, 
accumulates and multiplies, creating hermeneutic circles ungraspable by anything other than an 
awareness of the metacritical recursivity of archival form. And of course, the title to the chapter 
of the book (whose own title carries the historical marker of the Organization of North American 
Nations, or ONAN [of course also a reference to Onan in the Bible or masturbation (the self-
reflexivity now doubling back on the very presence of such a footnote to such a sentence in the 
first place—an acknowledgment of the masturbatory quality of his own engorged syntax and 
writing style)]). . . the title itself does not sound unfamiliar to anyone operating in an academic 
environment whose very task is to interpret and read such footnotes as this one, while 
simultaneously quite clearly revealing how aesthetic production might evolve post-1996 when 
Infinite Jest appeared, etc., ad nauseum. 
  If Wallace’s monologically consistent logorrhea at times can grate, often verging on an 
exercise in exhaustion, it is not by accident. John Barth’s classic essay, “The Literature of 
Exhaustion” (1967), is one patricidal target for much of Wallace’s work. Apropos the context in 
which it was written—while Barth was a faculty member of the State University of New York, 
Buffalo in 1967—he wrote of the apocalyptic fervor with which literature was then being treated: 
Whether historically the novel expires or persists as a major art form seems immaterial to 
me; if enough writers and critics feel apocalyptical about it, their feeling becomes a 
considerable cultural fact, like the feeling that Western civilization, or the world, is going 
to end rather soon. If you took a bunch of people out into the desert and the world didn’t 
end, you’d come home shamefaced, I imagine; but the persistence of an art form doesn’t 
invalidate work created in the comparable apocalyptic ambience.515 
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The crisis in American letters, on both the critical and creative sides of the aisle, had not abated 
by the time Wallace composed his response to Barth’s “Lost in the Funhouse” (1967), 
“Westward the Course of Empire Takes Its Way,”516 but what Wallace wanted to end once and 
for all was the very conversation, the discursive mode that approached art as something ending 
or being on the precipice of ending. Whether the end had already occurred, would never occur, 
or what have you, was not so much the point as simply exploring the very question that, as it 
would occasion such metafictionally recursive labyrinths, it could also occasion investigations on 
how to end the question itself. 
 If Wallace failed in this task, it was because the very system of informational 
promulgation that makes such aesthetic production possible in the first place is simultaneously 
the system’s capability of deleting any information whatsoever. Furthermore, the network 
latencies and server crashes inherent in any such complex system, the rules broken in the 
language game, the signifiers under erasure, the transcursive infinities spiraling in Gödelian 
loops—these things cannot be helped. They are abstract materialities faced in any emergent 
system, and it takes time to find a metaphorical language to represent them. If Wallace took 
Derrida’s notion of the structural capacities of absence seriously, he did so in foregrounding an 
anti-eschatological stance wholly appropriate to a historical period in which it seemed possible 
that, though the US had lost its national fantasy, it not only could exist in a world without such a 
narrative, but possibly thrive. Though in no way could he be said to have achieved such a thing, 
and in fact, he is at times prophetically apocalyptic in Infinite Jest, Wallace nonetheless attempts 
to explore a history without end. 
 This attempt takes many forms. The Broom of the System, by explicitly invoking Ludwig 
Wittgenstein while erasing Derrida from the text, announces a literary goal: how to go beyond 
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the apocalyptic crises of language, texts, networks, information systems, and social 
communication. Though many consider it a failure, it not only lays an important lexical 
foundation for the rest of Wallace’s work, something he later commented upon at length in 
“Authority and American Usage” (1999), it does so through a theoretical encounter between two 
of the most grammatically rigorous Twentieth-Century thinkers, Wittgenstein and Derrida. 
Ultimately, as Wallace realized fiction necessitated accumulation—that because language was 
never static a text must always participate in a unique, never-to-be-repeated language game, and 
furthermore, that this experience was fundamentally positive both for humans and the various 
languages they spoke—the apocalypticism often associated with poststructuralism proved too 
narrow for a fictional project that was to span decades, and the bright aspects of Wittgenstein’s 
later conclusions in Philosophical Investigations prevailed, a victory that would continually 
prove productive for Wallace. 
Broom was also particularly effective on this front through its presentation, destruction, 
and transformation of certain parts of the American landscape, specifically through its creation of 
the Great Ohio Desert, or GOD, a 100 square mile manmade wasteland in Ohio. If this shows 
nothing else than a familiarity with Leo Marx’s book, The Machine in the Garden (1964), then 
this also must mark a key node around which Wallace’s (anti-)apocalyptic stance gets mobilized 
in fictional form, as well as describing a relationship with an American literary tradition, one he 
is not only keenly entering into, but commenting upon as well. But this is also to say that the 
very landscape that appears in this fictional world is a product of the text that engenders it. 
Wallace’s decision to end the novel mid-sentence, presumably omitting the word “word,” does 
not accept the idea that the space of textual production, the landscape of the text, is an 
apocalyptic one. 
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The novella “Westward the Course of Empire Takes its Way” continues Wallace’s 
project in a much more incisive and specific manner, taking as a model for its more than 150 
pages John Barth’s short story “Lost in the Funhouse.” Through a long car journey to Collision, 
Illinois, where the commercial to end all commercials will be shot at the gathering of everyone 
that had ever appeared in a McDonald’s commercial, Wallace mirrors Barth’s story to the point 
of plagiarism. Here he is at his most explicit concerning the crisis facing literary production, and 
fiction in particular. One reviewer has stressed that he is so plagued by influence that he has, 
extending Harold Bloom’s metaphor, a “panic of influence,”517 but this wholly misses the point. 
Wallace knew about Bloom’s “anxiety of influence,”518 sure, to the point of panic, but he was so 
self-aware of this influence that he did not flinch at making John Barth a character in the story, 
as well as himself, his fellow classmates, perhaps a female love interest, and his own literary 
future. Of course, “Westward” is also self aware of its metafictional labyrinths, and what they 
might signify, what being aware of being aware of these labyrinths might mean, etc. ad nauseam.   
What should be stressed about “Westward” is not merely Wallace’s relationship to 
literary postmodernism in general and Barth in particular, but that it was a logical and necessary 
next step in developing an anti-eschatological aesthetic, one that could critique apocalyptic 
discourse past the point of absurdity, to emerge out of the other end with a coherent and serious 
literary project. Even if “Westward” ultimately is a failure—which it is not despite Wallace’s 
urging that it is519—hardly matters, for if it does nothing else, the structural supports it 
constructs—aesthetically, theoretically, and ethically—are absolutely necessary for the serious 
work to follow, namely Infinite Jest. What Wallace achieves in “Westward” is the possibility not 
only of what so many have called a post-postmodernism (a term I find problematic and not 
terribly useful), but a world that could be both projected and inhabited after the dissolution of 
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post-nuclear grand narrative. It is no coincidence that Wallace’s anti-eschatological aesthetic 
finds its most cogent expression in literary formal terms in a year that saw similar political 
upheavals, namely the fall of the Berlin Wall. “Sarcasm, parody, absurdism and irony are great 
ways to strip off stuff’s mask and show the unpleasant reality behind it. The problem is that once 
the rules for art are debunked, and once the unpleasant realities the irony diagnoses are revealed 
and diagnosed, then what do we do? Irony’s useful for debunking illusions, but most of the 
illusion-debunking in the U.S. has now been done and redone.”520 Irony’s usefulness in 
debunking illusions, or as Nietzsche put it, penetrating the veil of māyā, is for Wallace itself not 
only an illusion, but something that can be ironized to the point of shutting down any 
apocalypticism, any faith, belief, expectance, or hope in revelation whatsoever. To massively 
overly simplify, the world into which Wallace was writing, the world “Westward” allowed him 
to enter, was one in which to even talk about the ending of a grand historical narrative was 
suspect, a rhetoric that should and would be critically deconstructed to the point of stasis. No 
longer could we look at such “serious” projections of technological destruction without irony, 
and furthermore, an irony wholly infused with a profound sense of the disaster(s) of the twentieth 
Century. 
It is through this lens that Infinite Jest should primarily be read. Though it is surely a 
novel deserving considerable critical attention, it is always already so brutally aware of how it 
might be read, perceived, and commented upon, that to do so places one immediately in 
Wallace’s very narrative predicament after “Westward.”521 It should come as no surprise, then, 
that in a novel so metacritically aware, the primary apocalyptic threat is text itself. The “end of 
the end,” the nuclear critical task of reading literature in light of its disappearance, is actualized 
in Infinite Jest; the nuclear bomb, through its relative absence in the post-1989 political sphere, 
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finally destroys the text, and we are left with remainders of remainders—and it destroys the text 
by becoming text in text (ad infinitum) by accumulation. In Infinite Jest, there is a short film 
made by Incandenza: the Entertainment, also known as Infinite Jest (V),522 also known as the 
“samizdat,” of which, presumably, only one master copy exists. This film causes anyone who 
watches it to become so enamored with it that they lose all desire and will to do anything else but 
watch it. Doing so, of course, results in death, as the viewer/reader ceases eating, moving, 
drinking, or using the bathroom. Its threatened mass-dissemination would result in millions of 
potential deaths. This is the apocalypse marking the novel’s horizon. We should understand from 
this particular, and quite ingenious apocalypse, that Wallace’s novel might very well always 
already be the Entertainment, or at least is engaging in the very same recursive 
entertainment/exhaustion that he sees metafiction participating in. For, even though Wallace 
unabashedly accumulates text, there is always a certain apocalyptic guilt in him for doing so—
there is awareness on his part that there may very well be something perhaps quite dangerous in 
literature, in text; when one revels the textuality of the text within a historical period marked on 
all sides by textual absence, more text might not be the answer, and in fact, accumulation may 
define the nuclear technology as much as its destructive capabilities. 
In Infinite Jest, the nuclear and apocalyptic recursively and repeatedly emerge out of text 
itself; the archive is apocalyptic, the end is a singularity emerging out of the collection and 
ordering of multiplicitous rhetorical, discursive, literary, and textual eschatons. This is not 
accounting for its bulk, its nearly 400 endnotes, or its lexical overflow. Nor does it account for 
how the nuclear does appear in the text: as an elaborate nuclear war simulation played on a 
tennis court, and as the potential yet ambiguous possibility that the US inverted nuclear missiles 
in their silos and detonated them. These two moments, transcribed by the apocalyptic horizon of 
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the Entertainment, are paradigmatic images of nuclear technology in American literature. With 
the exception of Pynchon’s final image in Gravity’s Rainbow, there are perhaps no two richer 
nuclear “representations.” As such, though it is difficult to read Infinite Jest not as some sort of 
culmination of a narrative of nuclear-literary development, it is also quite easy to read it as a 
beginning, or at least something new. 
After Infinite Jest, overt apocalyptic themes are nearly completely absent from Wallace’s 
work. This is not to suggest, however, that his later work is of less importance to a nuclear 
critical stance somehow, nor that it wholly transcends the problems he was so aware of up until 
Infinite Jest. His subsequent work in a multitude of arenas, however, could be seen as an 
expression of a project completed, an anti-eschatological mode achieved. No longer did one need 
textual over-accumulation, but rather micro-investigations of various problems, especially what 
it means for individual subjects to exist in what might be thought of as a post-Infinite Jest 
world—these took precedence over huge narratives with huge concerns. Consequently, though it 
is of less importance for my purposes here, it should not be overlooked that Wallace’s relevance 
to this discussion does not end with Infinite Jest, but that it quite simply find its most coherent 
and complete expression therein. 
 
4.2 GARDENING THE MACHINE: NARRATIVE LIMINALITY AND THE BROOM OF 
THE SYSTEM 
 
The twentieth century will undoubtedly have discovered the related categories of 
exhaustion, excess, the limit, and transgression—the strange and unyielding form of these 
irrevocable movements which consume and consummate us. 
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  —Michel Foucault, “Preface to Transgression”523 
 
Throughout The Broom of the System, Lenore Beadsman, protagonist and telephone operator in 
the Bombardini Building for the publishing company Frequent & Vigorous, experiences a 
repetitive technological problem: telephone calls do not arrive at their intended destination and 
conditions somewhere in the Bombardini Building are to blame.524 Near the end of the novel a 
repairman who’d been inspecting the telephone problem for weeks revealed to Lenore that, 
because a sub-basement communications and cable tunnel was somehow being kept at a steady 
98.6°, the “‘sub par service is due to your lines are bleeding calls into each other because 
somehow your tunnel’s ninety-eight point six goddamn degrees,’” that “‘it’s kind of decided it’s 
a real freakin’ human being or something.’”525 At the center of this problem, Lenore knows, is 
her great-grandmother, Lenore Beadsman Sr., former student of Ludwig Wittgenstein, whose 
body-temperature must be maintained at a steady 98.6° by medical necessity. Lenore Sr.’s 
absence throughout Broom, from her mysterious disappearance from a nursing home, to the 
manifestation of that absence (or subterranean “presence”) as material disruption in the means of 
communication, is of immense structural importance throughout the novel.   
She represents, dialectically, one side of a teleological horizon the novel repetitively and 
continuously posits and revolves around. Primarily she plays a stand-in for Wittgenstein, but by 
doing so reveals a narrative limit, an eschatological boundary whose transgression would destroy 
the narrative itself. Lenore Sr. has only left behind “her notebooks, yellow and crispy, old, and 
her copy of the Investigations, and a small piece of fuzzy white paper, which actually turned out 
to be a torn-off label from another jar of Stonecipheco food. Creamed peach. On the white back 
of the label something was doodled. There was nothing else in the drawer. Which is to say there 
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was no green book in the drawer.”526 (We are also pretty sure she used a mnemonic-enhancing 
drug on a cockatiel, who goes on to become a Christian talk show host.) In other words, Lenore 
Sr. is a fairly blunt theoretical construct, a character who primarily serves to represent one side in 
a theoretical exploration. She reads Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (1953). She was 
one of his students. Her physical presence is enough to scramble technological communication 
because she ultimately disrupts the material context or medium (the temperature) required for 
communication itself to function properly. And, she has the green notebook. As so much of 
Wittgenstein’s work was unpublished in his lifetime, the presence/absence of this notebook 
implies within the space of the novel that there is further work he did beyond The Blue and 
Brown Books (1958) and the Philosophical Investigations, and that somehow Lenore Sr. has 
special knowledge of how, to quite literally, go beyond Wittgenstein. Lenore Sr.  
has, from what little I can gather, convinced Lenore [Jr.] that she is in possession of some 
words of tremendous power. No, really. Not things, or concepts. Words. The woman is 
apparently obsessed with words. . . . Words and a book and a belief that the world is 
words and Lenore’s conviction that her own intimate personal world is only of, neither by 
nor for, her. Something is not right. She is in pain. I would like the old lady to die in her 
sleep.527   
Lenore Jr.’s pain results primarily from her fear that she is a fictional construct, a text, a 
character in a novel. The irony that she indeed is, however, is not really Wallace’s point of 
exploration here. Rather, it serves to reveal how Wallace is reading Wittgenstein.   
For him, Wittgenstein’s work in the Investigations has apocalyptic implications. Namely, 
the horrors of solipsism. If we are in many ways constructed by language, what happens when 
language is no longer possible because there is no one to converse with? When there is only one 
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lonely mind operating without discursive social context? In many ways, for this early novel it is 
easy to see Wallace struggling with what it meant to be a novelist. If the language on the page 
only exists in the isolation of the text, and furthermore, the world it describes cannot be anything 
except textual, how does one escape recursive solipsism? How is one anything except a name? 
Wittgenstein’s answer deserves lengthy quotation: 
“What the names in language signify might be indestructible; for it must be possible to 
describe the state of affairs in which everything destructible is destroyed. And this 
description will contain words; and what corresponds to these cannot then be destroyed, 
or otherwise the words would have no meaning.” I must not saw off the branch on which 
I am sitting. 
 One might, of course, object at once that this description would have to except 
itself from the destruction.—But what corresponds to the separate words of the 
description and so cannot be destroyed if it is true, is what gives words their meaning—is 
that without which they would have no meaning.—In a sense, however, this man is surely 
what corresponds to his name. But he is destructible, and his name does not lose its 
meaning when the bearer is destroyed.—An example of something corresponding to the 
name, and without which it would have no meaning, is a paradigm that is used in 
connexion with the name in the language game.528 
The problem with this, in eschatological terms, is that: what if that word only exists as text? For 
it is possible to destroy text, to quite literally destroy Lenore Beadsman Jr. and the textual world 
she inhabits by erasing The Broom of the System, by deleting it. It might be then said, that by 
reading Wittgenstein in such a fashion, Wallace can be seen as attempting to exorcise his own 
anxiety as a first novelist, a novelist whose own text might be erased—i.e. not read, published, 
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etc.—and through this exorcism consequently contends with the act of writing a novel as a 
potentially selfish, lonely, and narcissistic act. 
 In an early essay, on David Markson’s Wittgenstein’s Mistress (1988), Wallace wrote that  
the novel succeeds in doing what few philosophers glean & what neither myriad 
biographical sketches nor Duffy’s lurid revisionism succeeds in communicating: the 
consequences, for persons, of the practice of theory; the difference, say, between 
espousing ‘solipsism’ as a metaphysical ‘position’ & waking up one fine morning after a 
personal loss to find your grief apocalyptic, literally millennial, leaving you the last and 
only living thing on earth, with only your head, now, for not only company but 
environment & world, an inclined beach sliding toward a dreadful sea.529   
More of a critical manifesto than a proper book review, Wallace’s assessment of Markson clearly 
expresses his apocalyptic reading of Wittgenstein. But it also reveals to Wallace why he’s 
“starting to think most people who somehow must write must write.”530 Lenore Sr. functions, 
both in terms of being a character in the novel and a stand-in for Wittgenstein, as a foil, a limit 
within which the world of the text must always operate, a boundary necessary for any language 
game to be played whatsoever, while simultaneously being a danger to the very act of 
communication itself. 
 Wallace’s decision to end the novel by erasing the word “word,” contends with this limit 
in a complex way. In Broom’s final line, Rick Vigorous says, “‘You can trust me. . . I’m a man 
of my[.]”531 By omitting “word,” Wallace blatantly calls attention to the textuality of the text. 
We know the final word is “word.” Something in language has given us to understand that what 
the entire novel was attempting to communicate was simple: a “word.” But furthermore, we 
know that the final word of the novel, what it was attempting to communicate could have 
229 
 
perhaps been anything, say, “rutabaga” or Wittgenstein’s philosophical grunt, and the only way 
we ever have of knowing is the linguistic context in which it appears; but because this word is 
absent, that this linguistic moment was not provided, we can never truly know if whatever the 
novel was attempting to communicate actually comes across. This, in many ways, is a kind of 
inversion of Pynchon’s final line of The Crying of Lot 49.532 Rather than fulfilling the language 
game promised by the title, by the name, Wallace’s novel refuses to acknowledge that even a 
“word” has a stable meaning, that it fulfills the rules of the language game. There is, however, 
another reading of this moment that to my knowledge no one has yet suggested. And this reading 
represents the other teleological limit of the text, Norman Bombardini’s “eating to infinite 
largeness.”   
Early on in the novel, the character of Norman Bombardini, owner of the Bombardini 
Building, decides to eat, consume, incorporate, etc., the entire universe. He decides, after both a 
disastrous divorce and experience with Weight Watchers, that “Weight Watchers holds as a 
descriptive axiom the transparently true fact that for each of us the universe is deeply and sharply 
and completely divided into for example in my case, me, on one side, and everything else, on the 
other. This for each of us exhaustively defines the whole universe, Vigorous. The whole 
universe. Self and Other.”533 Holding to this, it follows that Weight Watchers, in attempting to 
decrease one’s weight, is ipso facto suggesting that there must be as much other and as little self 
as possible. Bombardini has taken the other tack.  
“We each ought to desire our own universe to be as full as possible, that the Great Horror 
consists in an empty, rattling personal universe, one where one finds oneself with Self, on 
one hand, and vast empty lonely spaces before Others begin to enter the picture at all, on 
the other. . . . Rather than diminishing Self to entice Other to fill our universe, we may 
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also of course obviously choose to fill the universe with Self. . . . Yes. I plan to grow to 
infinite size.”534  
What has not been suggested about the novel, however, is that Bombardini actually accomplishes 
his goal, that he did in fact apocalyptically become the universe. 
There is evidence to support such a reading. At the climax of the plot arc, Bombardini, 
now quite massive indeed, is throwing his entire weight against the Bombardini Building (which 
he owns), causing it to shake, and adding the (unrealized) potential for a quite real disaster to the 
final confrontation between many of the most significant characters. The narrative proper pretty 
much ends here, with a final dénouement of Rick Vigorous providing the subsequent story. Other 
than the final scene with Vigorous, we don’t encounter any of the characters again, and he, it 
could be said, is merely there to begin to “speak” the last unuttered word. Nor do we really get 
an account of what Bombardini’s ultimate fate might be. Wallace, even this early in his career, is 
committing himself to a kind of aesthetic anti-eschatology—i.e., he often omits the most crucial 
points of narrative information in the text proper, and almost always eschews an “ending,” 
leaving events and how one might read those events ambiguous, hazy, and open to interpretation. 
The irresolution of Bombardini’s narcissistic, eschatological fate, should then strike one as 
significant (in the same way that the absence of the word “word” is significant). The possibility 
that Bombardini did in fact achieve his goal presents the possibility that he in fact consumed 
Vigorous and the world, that the text ends, in that the world ends by becoming all Bombardini, 
but it ends by simultaneously avoiding completion, by having the text resist being a whole that 
could be consumed in its entirety. 
As stated earlier, Bombardini should be read as the dialectical opposite of Lenore Sr., a 
teleological limit that, if not exactly reached, structures the novel at its most basic level. The 
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novel is everywhere concerned with the problems of communication, especially how they 
manifest between the aporia self and other. Bombardini makes imaginatively possible not simply 
a fairly obvious critique of the American consumer, but an eschaton that can be reached through 
accumulation. Lenore Sr., paradoxically enough, embodies what might be called the threat of 
language, the reifying threat toward the subject when the self is seen as possibly nothing more 
than a linguistic construction. This threat, if not clearly destructive, empties the subject of 
presence, and potentially even body, all the while withholding that one transcendent, revelatory 
word the green book might contain. On the one hand, being consumed into Bombardini’s 
“Project Total Yang,” is completely destructive—it erases the other—but on the other hand, it is 
completely unifying. Bombardini’s apocalypse is one that cannot really be said to have been 
completed. For, if the final “word” of the novel has been erased, then there is always something 
that resists the all-absorptive quality of “eating to infinite largeness.” The word is not uttered, nor 
written down, and consequently cannot be consumed. Infinite accumulation—apocalypse 
through absorption—is ultimately impossible, for the very same reason that counting to infinity 
is impossible. And on Lenore Sr.’s side, language might be eminently destructible, but there is 
always some name left behind. 
And it is no accident this name is in fact “Lenore.” Lenore Jr. is the textual void, the 
supplement resisting the narrative’s reification, as the novel as a whole does by refusing to 
complete itself on its last “word.” Unlike Oedipa Maas, Lenore asks not, “can she project a 
world?” but rather, “am I the world’s projection, an emergent signal from the background noise, 
the surrounding texts?” For Wallace, Lenore was an unambiguous autobiographical projection, a 
writing of the young, aspiring, unsure, deeply (and textually) unsettled novelist-self right into the 
ribs of The Broom of the System. One of the central problems in Lenore’s world is that she is in 
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charge of directing communication to the appropriate people, but the wrong connections are 
being made within the network. She quite literally cannot read the incoming and outgoing 
language. And this is not because there is something inherent in language that breaks down, but 
rather it is the system along which these codes are transmitted that is flawed. Novelistic 
discourse itself, understood as a kind of systemic irony, becomes for Wallace a mode of 
problematizing what is transmitted from one node to the next, how a particular random 
assemblage begins to take on order. 
By projecting Lenore futuristically into the year 1990 in Cleveland, Ohio, Wallace is 
forcing the text to inhabit a landscape marked by ordered breakdown. One of the more clever 
aspects of the novel is the manufacturing of the Great Ohio Desert, or GOD. In 1972, the 
governor of Ohio felt that,  
“Guys, the state is getting soft. I can feel softness there. It’s getting to be one big suburb 
and industrial park and mall. Too much development. People are getting complacent. 
They’re forgetting the way this state was historically hewn out of wilderness. There’s no 
more hewing. . . . We need a wasteland. . . . a desert. A point of savage reference for the 
good people of Ohio. A place to fear and love. A blasted region.  Something to remind us 
of what we hewed out of. A place without malls. An Other for Ohio’s Self.”535   
The result was a tourist destination, a great blasted landscape with black sand. Lenore must 
inhabit, traverse, and commune with this desert space. To reverse Leo Marx’s famous 
formulation, it is her garden in the machine.536 Or, more realistically, her wasteland in the 
machine. The world of Ohio in Broom’s projected 1990s is a thoroughly developed, machinic 
landscape—indeed a network of human relationships having totally replaced any “wilderness” 
(to the point that one suburban development is “in the shape of a profile of Jayne Mansfield”537). 
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Consequently, the citizens of Ohio, rather than go commune with nature in some protected 
wilderness area, go to a manufactured post-apocalyptic wasteland—ordered like a garden, built, 
maintained, but ultimately more savage than the landscape that was there in the first place. We 
must consequently look at the GOD less as some kind of clever joke on Wallace’s part, and take 
its existence and manufacture seriously. Within the logic of Broom, something like the GOD 
must exist, it’s emergence from the surrounding suburban noise is necessitated by the very chaos 
of the systems structuring the network which keep failing. The desert is a kind of ordered 
deconstruction, a breakdown necessitated by the ubiquitous (though failed) connectivity of a 
projected future. Rather than intrude upon the pastoral, the pastoral is hewn from the machine, 
not giving the illusion of some restored, idyllic past, but projecting a post-apocalyptic present 
instead. 
 The GOD, and specifically Lenore Jr.’s experience there, functions as an object of 
narrative synthesis, of dialectical resolution. It is simultaneously assembled, made, accumulated, 
while always already being a space of destruction. For Lenore to experience the desert is to allow 
her, quite literally, to complete the novel she is in. She finds an appropriate male love interest, 
moves away from the influence of her family, and escapes the parasitic Vigorous once and for 
all. The desert is a kind of textual space that materializes the narrative’s limits, the limits of 
Bombardini and Lenore Sr., while simultaneously making possible the narrative’s forward 
movement, for Wallace to begin his project from a space that rigorously ironized liminality itself 
while still achieving affective narrative cohesion. 
 Many, including Wallace himself, have perceived Broom as a failure, a piece of juvenilia 
too self-aware and anxious to succeed in its literary project. And though some have contended 
otherwise,538 it should not surprise us that Broom might in fact be a failure. It continually fails to 
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aesthetically harmonize its various structural elements in favor of theoretically exploring what it 
means to be constructing such elements in the first place. In the words of Theodor Adorno: 
“What is qualitatively new in recent art may be that in an allergic reaction it wants to eliminate 
harmonizations even in their negated form, truly the negation of negation with its own fatality: 
the self-satisfied transition to a new positivity, to the absence of tension in so many paintings and 
compositions of the postwar decades.”539 If narrative textuality is a thing to be deconstructed, an 
object whose eschatological limits must be, if not transgressed or really reached, but structure 
and form the object itself, then Wallace’s failure results from his attempts to negate the object’s 
own destruction and fatality, to negate this negation. In beginning his career from a formally 
anti-eschatological stance, having already exhausted ends at his “origin,” he is able to 
structurally begin something new. This structure permits attending to the apocalyptic linearity of 
postmodern metafictional narrative itself. 
 The “failure” of Broom, if it can indeed be located, was always already inscribed into 
Wallace’s first attempt at a novel. The novel’s other philosophical guide-post had already done 
an impressive amount of work in exploding the textual foundations upon which Wallace might 
have stood, and he was acutely aware of this fact. For him to be able to actually contend with 
literary narrative, with the history of American literature, he had to contend with the theoretical 
milieu he was writing into first. And to do this, he had to explore the fluidity of liminal 
structures, and the implications of transgression. If Lenore Sr. is absent, a phantom, a name 
without material signification, a name that cannot be destroyed even if it ceases corresponding to 
a living breathing being, we must understand this absence to also “signify” another phantom: 
Jacques Derrida. 
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 Wallace firmly felt, from the very beginning of his career, the critical importance that 
revolutions in theory and philosophy had to have on any of the fiction being composed in 
theory’s wake. No longer could he seriously contend with his literary forebears, to say nothing of 
something like Harold Bloom’s “anxiety of influence,” without first contending with the 
theoretical landscape of the era. In other words, to compose a novel like Broom, obsessively 
concerned with its structure as it is, Wallace took the lessons of Derrida very seriously, and 
perhaps especially Derrida’s early and important critique of structuralism:  
And again on the basis of what we call the center (and which, because it can be either 
inside or outside, can also indifferently be called the origin or the end, archē or telos), 
repetitions, substitutions, transformations, and permutations are always taken from a 
history of meaning [sens]—that is, in a word, a history—whose origin may always be 
reawakened or whose end may always be anticipated in the form of presence. This is why 
one perhaps could say that the movement of any archaeology, like that of any 
eschatology, is an accomplice of this reduction of the structurality of structure and always 
attempts to conceive of structure on the basis of a full presence which is beyond play.540 
To parse this in terms of the novel, we would do well to again refer to Norman Bombardini, and 
especially his own phantom-like nature at the end of Broom. In Bombardini’s world of total-self, 
there cannot be a center, for a center would imply that there is some subject who is Norman 
Bombardini in the first place. In addition, such a universe would have no coherent “archē” or 
“telos,” no origin or end. It would be a narrative-textual space that could never be an accomplice 
of eschatology, for it would be a kind of “universe without organs,”541 a vast physical region 
with no distinction between any one thing and another. If there is an anxiety in Wallace, the 
figure of Bombardini signals a problematic obsessively pursued on his part: namely, that 
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language, and thus textuality (to say nothing of narrative yet), prevented, before one even started, 
the possibility for fashioning coherent meaning in something that had to first pursue the question 
of the “structurality of structure”—i.e. the self-awareness of fashioning an aesthetic object. 
Broom understands the failure inherent in any structural project, in attempting to refashion some 
solid ontological ground upon which to then proceed in the wake of poststructuralism, and 
especially in the form of a novel. 
 Ultimately, Broom’s “failure” allowed him to acknowledge that structural aporias—
namely those of any eschatologies whatsoever—could not be resolved in a form obsessed by 
those very aporias. Acknowledging this allowed him to then turn toward the historical, material 
archive of American fiction, and specifically the work of John Barth. Such a turn further allowed 
him to confront various historical materialities, namely the effect on narrative and American 
fiction that nuclear and information technology had. 
 
4.3 THE THREAT OF THE TEXT: IRONIC APOCALYPSE AND “WESTWARD THE 
COURSE OF EMPIRE TAKES ITS WAY” 
 
There is disaster only because, ceaselessly, it falls short of disaster. The end of nature, 
the end of culture. 
 —Maurice Blanchot, The Writing of the Disaster542 
 
He dreams of a funhouse vaster by far than any yet constructed; but by then they may be 
out of fashion, like steamboats and excursion trains. 
  —John Barth, “Lost in the Funhouse”543 
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 One of the most persistent fears Wallace’s work revolves around is the suspicion that there may 
be something actually quite dangerous about literature, both in its composition and its 
contemplation.544 Somewhere within the dialogic interaction between text and reader, and 
between author and writing, Wallace saw contemporary American literature following a 
potentially catastrophic path of recursivity and self-conscious irony despite the exhaustive and 
commendable lengths postmodern metafiction had pursued to complicate these dialogic 
relationships and to strip them of any pretense of transparency or authenticity. For a US culture 
so often criticized as narcissistic and historically ignorant, as apocalyptically self-absorbed with 
the reproduction of itself, the dangers of postmodern self-consciousness, of the text spiraling into 
total solipsism, could not help but be felt acutely by Wallace.  
In “Octet,” a short story from his collection Brief Interviews with Hideous Men (1999),545 
Wallace locates (as he so often does) part of this danger in the very act of writing itself. An 
example of this occurs, among many other places, in a quite lengthy footnote that deserves full 
quotation simply for its incredible syntax: 
(Though it all gets a little complicated, because part of what you want these little Pop 
Quizzes to do is to break the textual fourth wall and kind of address (or “interrogate”) the 
reader directly, which desire is somehow related to the old “meta”-device desire to 
puncture some sort of fourth wall of realist pretense, although it seems like the latter is 
less a puncturing of any sort of real wall and more a puncturing of the veil of 
impersonality or effacement around the writer himself, i.e. with the now-tired S.O.P. 
“meta”-stuff it’s more the dramatist himself coming onstage from the wings and 
reminding you that what’s going on is artificial and that the artificer is him (the 
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dramatist) and but that he’s at least respectful enough of you as reader/audience to be 
honest about the fact that he’s back there pulling the strings, an “honesty” which 
personally you’ve always had the feeling is actually a highly rhetorical sham-honesty 
that’s designed to get you to like him and approve of him (i.e., of the “meta”-type writer) 
and feel flattered that he apparently thinks you’re enough of a grownup to handle being 
reminded that what you’re in the middle of is artificial (like you didn’t know that already, 
like you needed to be reminded of it over and over again as if you were a myopic child 
who couldn’t see what was right in front of you), which more than anything seems to 
resemble the type of real-world person who tries to manipulate you into liking him by 
making a big deal of how open and honest and unmanipulative he’s being all the time, a 
type who’s even more irritating than the sort of person who tries to manipulate you by 
just flat-out lying to you, since at least the latter isn’t constantly congratulating himself 
for not doing precisely what the self-congratulation itself ends up doing, viz. not 
interrogating you or have any sort of interchange or even really talking to you but rather 
just performing in some highly self-conscious and manipulative sort of way. 
None of that was very clearly put and might well ought to get cut. It may be that 
none of this real-narrative-honesty-v.-sham-narrative-honesty stuff can even be talked 
about up front.)546 
This appears in a story whose stated goal from the outset is to “question” the reader by giving 
them little narrative “quizzes” which tend to be morally problematic or ambiguous. The writer, 
however, in the act of questioning, is forced to ask himself what it even means to be writing such 
meta-narrative inquiries, and hence these questions ultimately devolve into little obsessive 
monological exercises revolving around questioning the very possibility of dialogical 
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communication in fiction in the first place, etc., ad infinitum. Writing, through this action, hits a 
solipsistic impasse. The writer of “Octet” is painfully self-aware of the fictionality of his fiction, 
and no matter how “honest” or “sincere” he attempts to be, how selfless in his creation of an 
enjoyable aesthetic artifact, there is still perhaps something brutal, base, and manipulative in the 
act of writing.547 By the end, the text having been denuded of any “prearranged meaning,” 548 the 
writer threatens to become “just another manipulative pseudopomo bullshit artist who’s trying to 
salvage a fiasco by dropping back to a meta-dimension and commenting upon the fiasco 
itself,”549 and ultimately effectively gives up even trying, telling the reader, “so decide,”550 in the 
final line. 
The danger of the text resides not in literature’s possibilities for destruction, in either the 
material dissolution of the text nor in some sort of “lessening” of the reading subject, but rather 
that there is a sort of vicious and infinitely recursive loop within the very project of 
contemporary US metafiction. This results in text dangerously accumulating, sentences like the 
one above that, though they may only contain a single thought, perform this thought to such 
absurdly dizzying lengths that it is quite literally lost in the vicious loop of accumulation it 
creates. The danger of literature, for Wallace, is that metafictional recursivity has the potential to 
result in a kind of apocalyptically-solipsistic fugue-state, a wholly self-absorbed text which 
threatens to absorb the co-creator of that text as well, ultimately threatening the possibility of any 
subjectivity when confronted with a text. Nowhere is this formally recursive loop, this infinite 
possibility for the dangerous accumulation of text more evident than in Wallace’s early novella, 
“Westward the Course of Empire Takes its Way.”   
“Westward” quite unabashedly takes John Barth’s 1967 story, “Lost in the Funhouse,” as 
a model, reference, and polemical object. Less a story than a open-response letter at times, 
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“Westward,” rather than answering Barth’s question, “For whom is the funhouse fun?”551 asks a 
different question. Drew-Lynn Eberhardt, or D.L.—self-proclaimed “postmodernist” and student 
of Dr. Ambrose (who is clearly meant to be Barth himself), and newly and accidentally expectant 
wife of Mark Nechtr552 (the protagonist)—early in the novella scrawled the following limerick 
on the chalkboard of an MFA creative writing classroom before Ambrose arrived to conduct 
class:   
For lovers, the Funhouse is fun.   
For phonies, the Funhouse is love.   
But for whom, the proles grouse,  
Is the Funhouse a house?   
Who lives there, when push comes to shove?553 
D.L. is clearly meant to be read parodically within the space of the novella, oftentimes 
functioning as Wallace’s own superego, sublimating his fears about the act of composing 
“postmodern” writing. So when she writes the above “critique” of Ambrose’s (Barth’s) story 
“Lost in the Funhouse,”554 Wallace is simultaneously writing a critique of “Funhouse” (as well 
as “Westward” itself), while acknowledging that critique as fundamentally shallow, a result of a 
theoretical “fad,” and yet somehow no less serious in terms of its central question: “for whom is 
the Funhouse a house?” In other words, who lives there, who are we asking to inhabit this 
metafictional terrain? This question is of immense importance for Wallace, for asking who the 
text (the Funhouse) is not merely for, but built for, acknowledges that indeed no one may be able 
to feel comfortable within such a space, that it cannot actually function as a home at all, and the 
text only serves to continually upset its reader, to be an object whose goal is the production of 
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the uncanny and a sense of homelessness (or unheimlich). Consequently, as something built it 
always already threatens what it is built for.555 
 As most critics have argued, “Westward”’s project strives to overcome the dangers of 
solipsistic recursivity with a kind of hyper-meta-irony, an irony turned in on itself to the point of 
sincerity. The fact remains, however, that Wallace, like Barth, perhaps “wishes he had never 
entered the funhouse. But he has. Then he wishes he were dead. But he’s not. Therefore he will 
construct funhouses for others and be their secret operator—though he would rather be among 
the lovers for whom funhouses are designed.”556 The question that drives “Westward”—for 
whom is the Funhouse a house, who can actually dwell in the story itself?—forces us to 
reconsider the commonplace approach to Wallace’s relationship with irony. For it is crucial to 
understand that Wallace was aware of the hopelessness of “transcending” irony, of going 
somehow beyond Barth and other postmodern ironists—that his “prediction” or desire for a new 
sincerity was nothing more than a kind of hopeful non-transgressible limit imposed by the very 
historicity of irony itself. The house is built, if there is no one to inhabit it, unlivable as the 
postmodern condition might make it, there is no way to further critique it without participating in 
the very mode it suggests—i.e., taking it apart and putting it back together again in a different 
form. Perhaps more clearly than any US writer of his generation, Wallace understood that textual 
accumulation in all forms—commentary, influence, theoretical complexity, critical engagement, 
reading itself—was a danger, a threat, through the continual ironic treatment of there not only 
being no world “outside the text,” but any world in the text, any house where we could live in the 
text itself. 
Paul de Man’s essay “The Rhetoric of Temporality” (1969) is especially important for 
Wallace’s conception and construction of irony, not least because it affords us an insight into 
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Wallace’s own understanding and mobilization of de Manian deconstruction within his own 
work.557 For de Man, when discussing irony, one is faced immediately with the problem of 
defining the term, for “in the case of irony, one cannot so easily take refuge in the need for a 
historical de-mystification of the term. . . . [O]ne has to start out from the structure of the trope 
itself, taking one’s cue from the texts that are de-mystified and, to a large extent, themselves 
ironical.” 558 In “Westward” Wallace saw the problem with irony and his own relationship to the 
development of literary irony in historical terms, and with the full awareness of how the very 
way he was approaching irony depended upon that history. Even though he is only perhaps 
tangentially engaging US imperialism within the text of “Westward,” its title forces us to pause 
in terms of the directionality of the novella’s structure and its relationship to postmodern 
literature. Quite clearly he is suggesting that there is a deep and conflicted relationship between, 
say, Barth’s project, and the “project” of Empire.559 This relationship, to put it overly simply, is 
that postmodern metafiction capitulates to the homogenizing banality imposed by “the course of 
Empire,” following this course rather than attempting to subvert it. The destructive capacity 
housed in literature’s accumulation has itself been absorbed into the greater historical problem 
postmodern irony had strove to highlight. In other words, “[t]he target of [these texts’] irony is 
very often the claim to speak about humans as if they were facts of history. It is a historical fact 
that irony becomes increasingly conscious of itself in the course of demonstrating the 
impossibility of our being historical. In speaking of irony we are dealing not with the history of 
an error but with a problem that exists within the self.”560 For Wallace, this “problem that exists 
within the self” becomes literature’s apocalyptic site, an ahistorical space without the possibility 
for coherent communication with the other, a space by 1989 he increasingly saw US individuals 
inhabiting. 
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Wallace felt that postmodern irony had backfired, its intended targets merely absorbed 
into capitalism’s dominant aesthetic regime: advertising. In D.L.’s terms, metafiction could 
neither house the “proles” (proletariat), “lovers,” nor “phonies,” for its very operation had 
become one of control rather than providing a space for dwelling (a kind of penalization of the 
space of literature). But what to replace it? Wallace does perceive one specific answer coming 
from the culture at large, and consequently the direction “Westward” takes is toward the filming 
of a commercial so grandiose it not only borders on the apocalyptic, but attempts to achieve 
revelation (pure and simple). Wallace re-imagines the Funhouse as a McDonald’s-run night club 
whose grand opening will coincide with the filming of a reunion of everyone who has ever been 
in a McDonald’s commercial. The brains behind this operation, J.D. Steelritter—quite literally 
Barth commercialized—imagines the results  in quite lurid and apocalyptic terms: 
He will watch desire build to that red-and-gold pitch, that split-second shudder and 
sneeze of thirty year’s consumers, succumbing, as one. And this is the one secret of a 
public genius: it will be the Storm before the Calm. Gorged with flora and fauna their 
money’s killed and shipped frozen to serve billions, the alumni will give in, reveling, 
utterly. 
 And that, as they say, will be that. No one will ever leave the rose farm’s 
Reunion. The revelation of What They Want will be on them; and, in that revelation of 
Desire, they will Possess. They will all Pay the Price—without persuasion. It’s J.D.’s 
swan song. No more need for J.D. Steelritter Advertising or its helmsman’s genius. Life, 
the truth, will be its own commercial. Advertising will have finally arrived at the death 
that’s been its object all along. And, in Death, it will of course become Life. The last 
commercial. Popular culture, the U.S. of A.’s great lalated lullaby, the big remind-a-pad 
244 
 
on the refrigerator of belief, will, forever unsponsored, tumble into carefully salted soil. 
The public, one great need, will not miss being reminded of what they believe. They’ll 
doubt what they fear, believe what they wish; and, united, as Reunion, their wishes will 
make it so. Their wishes will, yes, come true. Fact will be fiction will be fact. Ambrose 
and his academic heirs will rule, without rules. Meatfiction.561, 562 
Wallace perceived that the reification of the subject in Western, and particularly in US culture, 
has caused subjective desire itself to become a manipulable object. No longer is labor, one’s 
time, one’s bodily energy, long understood as the object of capital’s violence, the horizon of 
control, but the process of desire itself—in Steelritter’s vision of desire being synonymous with 
living—becomes merely an object of capital emptied of any “real” or “true” subjective content. 
Consequently, Wallace forced himself to contend in “Westward” with the disturbing fact that 
intellectual labor and the avant garde—i.e. postmodern American metafiction—was not only 
complicit with the culture industry’s reification of the subject, but through popular culture’s 
appropriation of postmodern irony, may in fact have had a large hand in producing the very 
conditions that made this reification possible. 
That the limits of irony—both in terms of advertising and in terms of contemporary 
fiction, in other words, between “high” and “low” culture—are apocalyptic (and indeed 
revelatory), should not surprise us. Postmodernism has accomplished the emptying of presence 
out of pretty much everything for Wallace. Not only had the lessons of Roland Barthes’s “The 
Death of the Author” (1967) been learned exhaustively,563 but the prospect of proposing that any 
authenticity remained whatsoever appears somewhat comic, if not naïve. Rather than evoking the 
all-too familiar claims of the “death of the novel,” or the “end of literature,” Wallace’s work in 
“Westward” then becomes, in a kind of Arnoldian-reverse, a critic working in an artists’ time 
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(despite writing fiction, of course), someone for whom the aesthetic landscape is too full, too 
aware of itself as full, and he sees that landscape reveling in that fact to the point of destruction. 
This is the logic of Steelritter’s McDonald’s commercial to end all commercials. Consumer 
desire, taken to its ironic limit, achieves a kind of advertising-aesthetic-stasis; there ceases to be 
any lag-time between the instantiation of desire and its object-fulfillment. Any discord, any 
moment of doubt, will be resolved with the cultural unity afforded total solipsistic desire. 
Wallace’s great fear might simply be that his own fiction is contributing to such assemblages. 
 With this in mind, de Man is again useful for understanding Wallace:   
The moment the innocence or authenticity of our sense of being in the world is put into 
question, a far from harmless process gets underway. It may start as a casual bit of play 
with a stray loose end of the fabric, but before long the entire texture of the self is 
unraveled and comes apart. The whole process happens at unsettling speed. Irony 
possesses an inherent tendency to gain momentum and not stop until it has run its full 
course; from the small and apparently innocuous exposure of a small self-deception it 
soon reaches the dimensions of the absolute.564 
“Westward” takes us in the direction of the absolute, and this absolute is a kind of total-
unraveling, a subject so turned in on itself as to almost vanish entirely. By refusing to actually 
reach Collision, Illinois, the site of the commercial, nor to end “Westward” properly in any sense 
at all, but rather to begin another narrative about the problems (and real potential) for telling a 
narrative, Wallace simultaneously acknowledges the impossible task of forging a direction 
toward something else, away from the course of Empire, while holding out a (perhaps naïve) 
hope that perhaps directionality itself can be changed. 
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 One of the ways this occurs is through a “casual bit of play.” As noted above, in 
“Westward” Wallace “wanted to get the Armageddon-explosion, the goal metafiction’s always 
been about . . . over with.”565 To do so, however, he had to account for the fact that many of the 
modes of getting it “over with” had already acknowledged the fact of metafiction’s 
eschatological thrust with a fair amount of absurdity and irony. Consequently, he presents this 
fact fairly early on through the character of Dr. Ambrose:  
Speaking of speaking about shit: Dr. Ambrose, whom we all admire with a fierceness 
reserved for the charismatic, could at this point profitably engage in some wordplay 
around and about the similarities, phonological and etymological, between the words 
scatology and eschatology. Smooth allusions to Homeric horses pooping death-dealing 
Ithacans, Luther’s excremental vision, Swift’s incontinent Yahoos.566   
Dr. Ambrose, or rather John Barth’s possible (though unstated) ironic observation about the 
similarities between the words “scatology” and “eschatology” within the space of “Westward” 
are revealing with regard to Wallace’s anti-eschatological project as a whole in two ways.   
First, he begins from acknowledging that much of the veil-lifting of ironically treating the 
apocalypse has already been accomplished by postmodern metafiction. Significantly though, this 
accomplishment is posed as something Dr. Ambrose could do if he so chose, but has not. 
Ambrose’s possible wordplay occurs to Mark Nechtr while  
basically they’re just standing around, as people will, their luggage a vivid jumble at their 
feet, tired, with that so-near-and-yet type of tension, a sense of somewhere definite they 
must be at by a definite time, but no clear consensus on how to get there. Since they’re 
late. As Dr. Ambrose might venture to observe, they’re figuratively unsure about where 
to go from here.567  
247 
 
Wallace implies that his own relationship to eschatology is not only problematic, but slightly 
confused. Barth did not complete metafiction’s “Armageddon-explosion”-type goal, though 
Wallace is here imagining and playing with the idea that he could have by ironically treating the 
theme of the end of the world as nothing more than the study of, or obsession with, excrement, a 
theme that has been digested and reproduced (or excreted) since the beginning of Western 
literature. The surrounding situation accompanying Mark’s musing about the possibility of what 
Ambrose would say also displays this confusion. They are in the midst of traveling, having just 
disembarked from a plane at the Central Illinois Airport, and, being late and having missed the 
shuttles transporting people to Collision for the commercial, have no means of going further 
toward their destination. They are “unsure about where to go from here.” In other words, 
Wallace is perfectly aware of four things: 1) postmodern metafiction as a project has not been 
completed even though it could reach it goals through the imaginative extrapolation of its 
eschatological direction; 2) literature with any pretention of being “after” postmodernism, 
because of that, is unsure where to go; 3) anyone attempting to “go anywhere” is in a very 
difficult position because they are ultimately a kind of Nietzschean late-comer; and 4) a writer 
standing at this terminus is exhausted, an exhaustion produced by being a late-comer, as well as 
an exhaustion with teleological constructions themselves. 
Secondly, the “full course” of this casual bit of play is expressed near the end of the 
novella in fairly succinct terms as the teleological limit of advertising’s ability to turn anxiety 
into desire, and ultimately the anxiety par excellence—one’s fear of death—into a desire for 
death. It is nothing new that the end of the world as revelatory fulfillment, as a sublimation of the 
anxieties associated with inevitable subjective death is often presented as something to be 
desired, a goal toward which to strive. Wallace’s irony transforms this apocalyptic desire into, 
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not merely a cultural telos, but the goal of advertising itself. If postmodern advertising, as he is 
so aware, works first and foremost through the creation of anxieties that produce consumer 
desire to relieve those anxieties, then the “course of Empire,” or rather, the course of capital is 
the production of a desire for death. 
Steelritter understands how advertising functions. On the one hand, advertising has had to 
constantly reinvent itself, to acknowledge that its strategies for producing consumer desire 
through control and conditioning are only temporary solutions. Campaigns that were once 
effective, are now “tired image[s]. Hackneyed jingle[s]. . . . Conditioning has obsolescence built 
right in.”568 On the other hand, the more effective, aesthetically complex, and subtle the 
advertising, the more it comes to be indistinguishable from the very televisual entertainment it 
accompanies, and consequently the desire to actually “leave the couch” to go out and buy the 
advertised product becomes more difficult through sheer inertia and enjoyment of the 
entertaining advertisement. “Your adman’s basic challenge: how to get folks’ fannies out of 
chairs; how to turn millennial boredom around, get things back on track, back toward the finish 
line? How to turn stasis into movement, either flight or pursuit?”569 Steelritter’s solution to the 
adman’s problem cannot help but sound disturbingly familiar: 
“Turn your biggest fear into your one real desire?” 
“Sounds pretty damn political,” Sternberg suggests. 
  “Except what’s everybody’s biggest fear?” 
  “The Mormon researcher had whole lists of them.” 
  “Pop.”570 
 “No no no,” J.D. shakes his head impatiently, gesturing with a cigar he does not 
hold. “The one big on. The one everybody has. The one that binds us up, as a crowd.” 
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 “Death?” 
 “Dishonor?” 
 “I’d go with death, darling.” 
 [. . .] 
 “You gesture,” J.D says.  “You sell out the squeak of your own head’s blood. You 
sell out, but for selling-out’s own sake, without end or object . . . change the tired channel 
from life, honor, out of nothing but a desire to love what you fear: the whole huge 
historical Judeo-Christian campaign starts to spin in reverse, from inside.”571 
Steelritter hopes to turn scatology into eschatology, to leverage the ultimate form of cultural 
detritus, waste, and excrement—advertising—into a form that produces a desire for death, a love 
of death. For if the “huge historical Judeo-Christian campaign”’s goal is love of the neighbor, of 
the other, a desire for death is total solipsistic love, a love of that which is in the individual more-
than-herself, something no one can ever access or confront but the self: death. (And it should be 
clear here that this solipsistic desire is in-and-of-itself impossible, for neither can the subject 
access her death—i.e., death cannot be experienced.572) In this fashion, the historical formation 
of apocalyptic fear and desire, though clearly always an allegory for subjective death, is 
transformed, even if only slightly. If metafiction’s goal has always been an “Armageddon-
explosion,” it is important to understand that for Wallace this goal is ultimately not external, not 
an eschatology of the world, but of the subject. What is so threatening and dangerous about this 
desire for death is that it is produced by and within the apparatus of postmodernism par 
excellence (the “text itself”), and the ultimate object of this threat is the solipsistically absorbed 
individual confronting that text (whether it be advertising or metafiction). Furthermore, Wallace 
acknowledges that this desire for death, for the ultimate end, is produced by a system without a 
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goal, without a telos. Capitalism does not have any aim except to endlessly reproduce itself, to 
create more capital, in this case through advertising. Wallace’s conceives the postmodern 
condition through the lens of capital doing this through mobilizing narrative’s most basic feature: 
that it ends, that it is inherently eschatological. For any lines of flight to be available from this 
dominating logic, literary fiction, if it in any way hopes to go forward and present alternative 
possibilities, needs to divest itself of just such apocalypticism. 
 In these two ways—postmodernism’s self-awareness of always already treating the 
apocalypse ironically and its complicity with the culture industry’s destruction of subjectivity by 
producing a desire for death, for the subject’s reification produced by and within that subject—
Wallace’s project in “Westward the Course of Empire Takes its Way” should be understood less 
as him transcending irony, but rather—following Paul de Man reading Friedrich Schlegel’s 
“irony of irony” or meta-irony—as Wallace understanding that there is no end to irony 
whatsoever. If there is one thing to draw from Barth’s “literature of exhaustion,” it is that it is 
simultaneously a literature of accumulation, and as such, resists eschatological closure at every 
point: 
Our description seems to have reached a provisional conclusion. The act of irony, as we 
know [sic] understand it, reveals the existence of a temporality that is definitely not 
organic, in that it relates to its source only in terms of distance and difference and allows 
for no end, for no totality. Irony divides the flow of temporal experience into a past that is 
pure mystification and a future that remains harassed forever by a relapse with the 
inauthentic. It can know this inauthenticity but can never overcome it. It can only restate 
and repeat it on an increasingly conscious level, but it remains endlessly caught in the 
impossibility of making this knowledge applicable to the empirical world. It dissolves in 
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the narrowing spiral of a linguistic sign that becomes more and more remote from its 
meaning, and it can find no escape from this spiral.573 
Mobilizing de Man’s theory of irony and emphasizing Wallace’s own familiarity with de Man 
suggests that we should not wholly take Wallace at his word in “E Unibus Pluram.” The 
dominant mode of understanding Wallace’s relationship to irony up until this point has been to 
read him as meta-ironic, or else reads his work as a valiant effort to leave irony behind in favor 
of something resembling a “new sincerity.” “Westward”’s fictional project should instead be 
read as, if not as accomplishing, then at least pointing toward a relationship to irony that is anti-
eschatological, that acknowledges irony’s fundamental “temporality that is not organic,” and that 
it “allows for no end, for no totality.” In other words, Wallace’s mode of getting metafiction’s 
Armageddon-explosion “over with,” is based on an acknowledgment that not only can there not 
be such an explosion, but that the whole aesthetic approach which privileges such an eschatology 
is not only problematic, but threatening. “Westward” points toward how such an aesthetic project 
might be conceived. This project’s fruition can everywhere be seen in his major work, Infinite 
Jest, a work that not only confronts the more “real” apocalyptic limits of the world—nuclear 
war, environmental disaster, the catastrophe of capitalism, the tyranny of networked-being—but 
is everywhere engaged in proposing alternatives to the reifying dominance of apocalyptic 
discourse itself. 
 
4.4 THE INVERTED NUKE IN THE GARDEN: ARCHIVAL EMERGENCE AND ANTI-
ESCHATOLOGY IN INFINITE JEST 
 
 Only in extinction is the collector comprehended.  
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  —Walter Benjamin, “Unpacking My Library574 
 
Could annihilation occur to matter, this were the thing to do it.  
  —Herman Melville, Moby-Dick575 
 
Infinite Jest clearly and complexly engages with the continuing impact nuclear weapons had 
upon the cultural imagination of the US after the Cold War.576 This engagement, however, like 
the seeming disappearance of nuclear warfare as a topic of public discussion during the 1990s—
both in the corporate media and in popular representations—pervades the novel more 
atmospherically than it does explicitly. The eschatological limits of the novel, its various 
apocalyptic threats, though clearly defined, would not at first appear to be particularly nuclear in 
nature at all. Rather, they appear to turn instead toward exploring the extent to which US culture, 
having lost its Other with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, was turning meta-cannibalistically 
inward, consuming itself consuming itself, both on macro- and microscopic scales, thereby 
extending and complicating many of the motifs from “Westward the Course of Empire Takes its 
Way.” 
Following this, the apocalyptic threats faced by the US in the world of Infinite Jest take 
two explicit forms. The first threat is epidemical. A Quebecois separatist organization known as 
Les Assassins de Fauteuils Rollents (the AFR or “wheelchair assassins”) is attempting to acquire 
and “massively disseminate” the lethally entertaining Infinite Jest (V)577—a film so captivating it 
destroys any desire on the part of the viewer to do anything else except watch the film 
repeatedly—with the goal of rendering a significant portion of American adults completely 
catatonic, enjoying themselves to death. The second threat is ecological: the US has become so 
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overburdened with the waste its consumption produces that the government has to evacuate a 
significant portion of New England in order to create a gigantic toxic-waste dump.578 (Though 
the novel does not really extrapolate the implications of this, the logic of this action taken to its 
limit would quite clearly leave less and less room for actual human settlement until the entire US 
became a waste-disposal site.) Both of these apocalyptic scenarios involve, as N. Katherine 
Hayles has so perceptively noticed about the novel, a high level of formal recursivity, creating 
“cycles within cycles within cycles.”579   
Infinite Jest (V)’s recursive operation resembles “Westward”’s projected Funhouse and 
commercial to end all commercials: the gap (or “lag-time”) between the instantiation of a desire 
and its fulfillment, as it asymptotically approaches zero, creates a vicious loop of televisual 
consumption, desire and the fulfillment of that desire now being joined in a kind of aesthetic 
singularity. Epidemically, the Entertainment analogously resembles a kind of cancerous virus. It 
infects the very DNA of aesthetic enjoyment, causing it to uncontrollably grow and multiply 
until there is nothing left for the viewer except the addictive need to repetitively engage in 
watching the film. Disseminated to the culture at large, Infinite Jest (V) would metastasize this 
out of control subjective emergence, making the citizenry of the US the victims of this 
malignant, tumorous growth, expanding outward from individual reification toward a cultural 
apocalypse. 
In the Great Concavity, the region of evacuated New England into which toxic-waste is 
launched, a similar (though perhaps virtuous) recursive loop is traced in the form of “annular 
fusion,” a technology developed in the novel by J.O. Incandenza. Annular fusion is a process in 
which the toxic-waste produced by nuclear fusion580  is in turn converted into the very materials 
needed to produce nuclear energy in the first place. In essence, a kind of perpetual motion 
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machine is created, solving the country’s dependence on fossil fuels for energy production. The 
ecologically maltreated region of the Concavity serves as the perfect material for this process—
being massively toxic—because annular fusion works, according to the character Michael 
Pemulis, by “‘bombarding highly toxic particles with massive doses of stuff even more toxic 
than the radioactive particles. A fusion that feeds on poisons and produces relatively stable 
plutonium fluoride and uranium tetra-fluoride. All you turn out to need is access to mind-
staggering volumes of toxic material.’”581 The ecological effects of annular fusion, however, are 
catastrophically recursive: “‘the only kertwang582 in the whole process environmentally is that 
the resultant fusion turns out so greedily efficient that it sucks every last toxin and poison out of 
the surrounding ecosystem, all inhibitors to organic growth for hundreds of radial clicks in every 
direction,’” thereby causing the landscape of the Great Concavity to go “from overgrown to 
[Eliotic] wasteland to overgrown several times a month. With the first week of the month being 
especially barren and the last week being like nothing on earth.’”583 
 Curiously, critical assessments of Infinite Jest have relatively ignored Wallace’s overt 
apocalypticism in the novel. This may simply be a result of the novel’s staggering length (1,079 
pages), the fabulous richness of Wallace’s various explorations, the compelling multi-narrative 
structure, its encyclopedic construction, or its army of complex characters—all things which 
deserve rigorous critical attention. On the whole, however, most of the critical receptions of the 
novel have treated its apocalypticism tangentially at best. I would like to submit that at the heart 
of the novel, the prospective end of US culture (and potentially humanity) is the central driving 
force of its narrative.   
For instance, in his short study of Infinite Jest, Stephen Burn ends one of his chapters 
briefly mentioning that the novel has apocalyptic implications, but then fails to pursue this 
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subject at any length: “at the end of chapter one I suggested that, despite its differences, Infinite 
Jest possessed similarities to the earlier encyclopedic narratives that are strategically poised on 
the brink of apocalypse. [. . .] The narratives move toward an apocalyptic collision [. . .] and the 
hidden calendar of the novel suggests that, as in ‘all quality eschatologies,’ a feast of the dead is 
imminent.”584 In his otherwise impressive study Marshall Boswell, in the first monograph 
devoted to Wallace’s work, hardly touches the apocalyptic themes in Infinite Jest at all, instead 
emphasizing Wallace’s engagement with French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan. He reads the 
Entertainment as: “Wallace’s most visible emblem of his Lacanian program, for it both embodies 
and parodies Lacan’s ideas. For instance, the fundamental source of the Entertainment’s lethal 
appeal is its ability to give viewers what they think they have wanted all their lives: namely, a 
return to some state of maternal plentitude.”585 The cultural and global implications of Infinite 
Jest (V)’s lethality are almost completely ignored by Boswell, who instead focuses almost 
exclusively on the subjective implications of the film. Furthermore, his reading is based on an 
account of the content of the film, content we can never be absolutely sure of, for not only does 
one description of the film occur under clearly unreliable circumstances,586 but, quite literally, no 
one who has seen the film can return to tell us about it. Elizabeth Freudenthal’s insightful 
reading of subjective interiority mentions the apocalyptic nature of the novel frequently, but on 
the whole she has an agenda similar to Boswell: focusing on the subjectivity, or rather the lack of 
subjectivity of the characters in the novel.587 Since Wallace’s death, his work has received 
increased critical attention, but there has still not been any study devoted to the paramount 
importance of understanding the apocalyptic scope of his work. 
 The almost complete absence of attention devoted to the eschatological limits of Infinite 
Jest, a novel thoroughly marked on all sides by cultural, political, ecological, and aesthetic 
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crises, reflects a larger ahistorical trend in the emerging field of “Wallace Studies.” Both 
Boswell’s and Freudenthal’s approaches to Infinite Jest are paradigmatic of this trend, as is the 
dominant account of Wallace’s relationship to irony, as these critical approaches all privilege 
Wallace’s conflicted relationship to subjectivity above more explicitly historical or formal 
concerns. Boswell is particularly extreme in this sense, as he takes a historically specific account 
of subjectivity (Lacan’s), and universalizes it across the many diverse subject formations found 
throughout the novel. He fails to understand that, in a fashion, he is implicating himself in the 
same reification that the Entertainment produces. In privileging Lacan’s specific version of 
desire as based upon lack,588 and Infinite Jest (V) as a vehicle for providing a return to maternal 
plentitude, he takes what is a potential cultural disaster, one with broad political and historical 
implications in the world of the novel, and constructs the American subject as the site of this 
disaster. Not only does this imply a stable, universal subject, and participate in a certain brand of 
American exceptionalism, it also radically reduces the scope of Wallace’s (massive) novel. 
Boswell is surely correct in emphasizing that Wallace is both mobilizing and parodying Lacanian 
theory, but by arguing that an engagement with Lacan is the ground of Infinite Jest, he 
effectively reduces the novel to what Wallace was so clearly trying to avoid his entire career: a 
solipsistic, narcissistic, inwardly turned investigation of one’s own individual subjectivity 
without regard for one’s historical situatedness or the complex network of interlacing, multiple 
subject positions the contemporary subject inhabits. In a novel so clearly devoted at every turn to 
complicating commonly received notions of subjectivity, a novel so continually concerned with 
combating reification of all kinds, to ignore the historical markers and limits of the novel—
political, technological, and cultural—as well as to ignore the novel’s form, is not only to bar 
access to whatever concerns Wallace does have vis-à-vis subjectivity, but it is dismisses the 
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larger themes of cultural crisis and material disaster as nothing more than convenient fictional 
tropes rather than structures fundamentally grounding the novel’s construction and its aesthetic 
project. 
 Written primarily between 1991 and 1993,589 Infinite Jest’s composition is clearly 
inscribed by its historical proximity to the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union. Set in 2009,590 the political landscape of the novel is everywhere defined by the absence 
of the USSR. The 1990s of the novel were as similarly decadent and culturally solipsistic as the 
historical 1990s for the US (perhaps best noted by the fact that Rush Limbaugh was President, 
presumably from 1997-2001591). Like the need for the GOD in The Broom of the System, 
President Gentle, perceiving that the US needed an antagonist in the 2000s—something which to 
define itself against, an Other—campaigned on a platform against waste. His “Clean US Party” 
effectively mobilized the very lack of an external political threat by defining an internal threat. 
The ideological other of Infinite Jest is the very detritus expelled from the self: garbage and 
waste. US foreign policy throughout the novel consequently can be read as against abjection. 
Gentle is not only running on a platform to make America so clean one could quite literally eat 
off its soil, but, by absorbing its proximate others—Mexico and Canada—into an Organization 
of North American Nations (ONAN), the US could then excrete its waste, its other, into a site 
both geographically and politically “outside” of itself, the Great Concavity. In its simplest 
formation, Gentle has transformed Julia Kristeva’s insight into what constitutes the abject—
“[t]he abject has only one quality of the object—that of being opposed to I”592—into an explicit 
ideology and policy. This policy is cleverly and concisely summed up in Wallace’s neologism: 
experialism. Rather than absorbing and transforming the other through imperialist foreign policy 
258 
 
and the grand narrative of Manifest Destiny, Gentle’s program is, quite simply, to get rid of the 
exorbitant, excessive “not ‘I,’” the abject: to “gift” portions of the US to an other (Canada).593 
 The significance of this historico-political projection of US foreign policy goes beyond 
simply its massive impact upon the narrative. Yes, this central act of experialism lies at the heart 
of the narrative’s construction, motivating the AFR to attempt the massive dissemination of 
Infinite Jest (V). It is also of immense structural importance. Each and every character in the 
novel and virtually every plot point revolve around and are imbricated in the consequences of US 
foreign policy. More structurally important, however, is how the fundamental form of the novel 
is produced by an absence. In a very real sense, Infinite Jest is a direct aesthetic response to the 
(perceived) disappearance of the discourse of Mutually Assured Destruction. The presence of the 
Soviet Union and the threat of global nuclear war, when taken away, Wallace understands as 
also eschatological. Without the dominant narrative of the 20th century, new narratives would 
necessarily be invented, new threats, antagonisms, crises, and disasters.594 Wallace’s insight 
throughout Infinite Jest is that, even if MAD is absent, this absence, the absence of nuclear war, 
still fundamentally structures postmodern eschatological narratives as nuclear. Consequently, 
even though the apocalyptic limits of the text perhaps appear at first only tangentially nuclear, 
Wallace is everywhere structuring his epidemical and ecological eschatologies along nuclear 
lines with clear nuclear underpinnings. In this sense, not only is he anticipating eschatological 
constructions of all kinds during the 1990s and 2000s, where the nuclear bomb is still a dominant 
trope—the instantaneous apocalyptic event created by humans (or something else)—he is also 
visibly reconceiving and repurposing the nuclear imagination in the face of the bomb’s absence. 
There are two principal modes of how he does this. The first is through a clear nod to Derrida’s 
“Force and Signification” (1963), the second is through an unresolvable nuclear ambiguity. 
259 
 
 As I have attempted to stress repeatedly, Wallace’s familiarity with poststructuralism 
must be taken into account with regard to any reading of his work, but perhaps this is nowhere 
more the case than with Infinite Jest. Especially considering questions regarding structure and 
absence, it is difficult to understand some of the things the novel is engaged with without 
recalling Derrida’s famous critique of structuralism and considering how Wallace might be 
using, inverting, or recursively doubling this critique back onto Derrida himself in his own work. 
Describing what he calls “structural consciousness,” Derrida writes: 
[T]he relief and design of structures appears more clearly when content, which is the 
living energy of meaning, is neutralized. Somewhat like the architecture of an 
uninhabited or deserted city, reduced to its skeleton by some catastrophe of nature or art. 
A city no longer inhabited, not simply left behind, but haunted by meaning and culture. 
This state of being haunted, which keeps the city from returning to nature, is perhaps the 
general mode of the presence or absence of the thing itself in pure language. The pure 
language would be housed in pure literature, the object of pure literary criticism. Thus it 
is in no way paradoxical that the structuralist consciousness is a catastrophic 
consciousness, simultaneously destroyed and destructive, destructuring, as is all 
consciousness, or at least the moment of decadence, which is the period proper to all 
movement of consciousness. Structure is perceived through the incidence of menace, at 
the moment when imminent danger concentrates our vision on the keystone of an 
institution, the stone which encapsulates both the possibility and the fragility of its 
existence. Structure can then be methodically threatened in order to be comprehended 
more clearly and to reveal not only its supports but also that secret place in which it is 
neither construction nor ruin but lability. . . . It is during the epochs of historical 
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dislocation, when we are expelled from the site, that this structuralist passion, which is 
simultaneously a frenzy of experimentation and a proliferation of schematizations, 
develops for itself.595 
I would like to suggest that Wallace’s reading of Derrida in Infinite Jest, attempts to develop and 
explore and critique what might be called a “poststructuralist consciousness.” 
 Infinite Jest begins from a moment where content is neutralized. In the opening pages of 
the novel, Hal Incandenza, the novel’s “protagonist”596 in its first half, is being interviewed for a 
tennis scholarship at the University of Arizona. Not only is this section significant because it is 
chronologically the last scene in the novel, its end, but it is one of the few moments we can 
clearly perceive anything that might be labeled “consciousness” with regard to Hal.597 
Throughout Infinite Jest Hal is constructed as subjectively absent, lacking some basic internal 
self that would make him anything besides a reified production of the world he inhabits: 
Hal himself hasn’t had a bona fide intensity-of-interior-life-type emotion since he was 
tiny; he finds terms like joie and value to be so many variables in rarified equations, and 
he can manipulate them well enough to satisfy everyone but himself that he’s in there, 
inside his own hull, as a human being—but in fact he’s more robotic than John Wayne. 
One of the troubles with his Moms is the fact that Avril Incandenza believes she knows 
him inside and out as a human being, and an internally worthy one at that, when in fact 
inside Hal there’s pretty much nothing at all, he knows.598 
In this opening scene, however, Hal firmly declares that there is in fact a “self” in his body: 
 “I have an intricate history. Experiences and feelings. I’m complex. 
“I read,” I say, “I study and read. I bet I’ve read everything you’ve read. Don’t 
think I haven’t. I consume libraries. I wear out spines and ROM-drives. I do things like 
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get in a taxi and say, ‘The library, and step on it.’ My instincts concerning syntax and 
mechanics are better than your own, I can tell, with due respect. 
“But it transcends mechanics. I’m not a machine. I feel and believe. I have 
opinions. Some of them are interesting. I could, if you’d let me, talk and talk. Let’s talk 
about something. Let’s talk about anything. I believe the influence of Kierkegaard on 
Camus is underestimated. I believe Dennis Gabor might very well have been the 
Antichrist. I believe Hobbes is just Rousseau in a dark mirror. I believe, with Hegel, that 
transcendence is absorption. I could interface you guys right under the table,” I say, “I’m 
not just a creātus, manufactured, conditioned, bred for a function.” 
  [. . .] 
 “I am not what you see and hear.” 
[. . .] 
 “I am not,” I say.599 
In a moment of “content neutralization,” however, Hal’s interlocutors at this moment only hear 
“‘[s]ubanimalistic noises and sounds,’”600 accompanied by disturbing epileptic flailing, 
unreadable gestures, guttural moans, non-signification. Hal, though stressing he is saying 
something, and that his utterance is defined by a precocious and exhaustive practice of reading, 
not only is not being heard, the very act of attempting to communicate internal content is being 
viewed externally as the complete lack of meaningful content paired with a convulsive, sick 
body. The ambulance is called and Hal is committed. 
 From the very first pages of Infinite Jest Hal’s consciousness (if that is even the correct 
word to use) might be called, in a sense, poststructural. It is not clear how Hal developed this 
condition. Throughout the rest of the body of the novel, Hal’s major conflict is his own 
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subjectivity—i.e., whether he even has any or not, whether or not he is merely a product of his 
surroundings, an affective machine. Wallace, to his great credit, does not provide us with the 
events that would mark the transition between “reified Hal” or “Hal without content,” and the 
Hal in the beginning/end of the novel expressing fervently an internal self, even if only 
externally perceptible as a complete lack of communicative internal content. In this narrative gap 
occurs the progression from “content . . . neutralized” (structuralism) to content overfull with 
meaning despite its neutralization (poststructuralism). Infinite Jest can and should be read as 
Hal’s writing, as his answer to a “tired Cuban orderly” who asks “[s]o yo then man what’s your 
story,”601 but this initial chapter is the only one written in the first person. In terms of a 
poststructural consciousness, what the other characters in the novel perceive about Hal in the 
first person is an “uninhabited structure.” And, if they encountered Hal at any moment prior to 
his breakdown in the Arizona admissions office, they would be correct. Until this moment in the 
novel (again, coming at the beginning/ending), it is difficult to call Hal’s consciousness anything 
but a structural consciousness. He is a complete construct, both within the world of the novel as 
well as merely serving as a formal point—a character—around which the novel can produce 
itself. “Thus it is in no way paradoxical that the structuralist consciousness is a catastrophic 
consciousness, simultaneously destroyed and destructive, destructuring, as is all consciousness.” 
The destruction everywhere evident in the novel is there because Hal wrote it. It is not only a 
document of his consciousness, his structural consciousness, but the very uninhabited city which 
defines such a consciousness. Infinite Jest is his document, formed along the lines of his neutral 
content, everywhere breaking down, but it is ultimately labile. The first person of the 
opening/ending scene is the result of some change. (We cannot know what this change is.602) 
Infinite Jest is a novel of “historical dislocation” in many senses of the term, but the major 
263 
 
dislocation occurs in the first person at the beginning/ending. We have no idea, no access to how 
or why Hal becomes a subject, a first person narrator who is “in there,” and consequently, 
Wallace is very much asking us to read this transition—this lability from haunted city, from 
overly-schematized narrative form, from pure, precise, exhausting grammatology, to language 
we cannot hear/understand, to narrative unsatisfactorily beginning/ending, to city (body) 
unhaunted, too full—as his engagement with Derrida. Infinite Jest is a “frenzy of 
experimentation and a proliferation of schematization,”603 assuredly, but it is so always already 
with Derrida’s deconstruction of such frenzies and proliferations in mind. If Hal becomes a 
subject, and one incapable of addressing any other, it is through the very act of writing what 
comes before this moment of subject formation. To become a subject, to narrate the first chapter 
in the first person, requires the entire textual object behind it to understand how an “I” is even 
possible. That this “I” cannot be understood, that this “I” defines itself along the lines of what it 
has read, as text, as access to text, this should not surprise us in the least. It is not what we “see 
and hear,” it is what is absent—the transition from structuralism to poststructuralism—that 
defines Hal’s textual consciousness. 
 Perhaps an even more acute absence than this transition, however, is the absence of any 
ending whatsoever in the novel. The opening chapter, being a clear sort of “beginning,” produces 
the effect of almost completely evading narrative closure. This absence, consequently, forces us 
to think of the very form of the novel in Derrida’s terms as well: 
Only pure absence—not the absence of this or that, but the absence of everything in 
which all presence is announced—can inspire, in other words, can work, and then make 
one work. The pure book naturally turns toward the eastern edge of this absence which, 
beyond or within the prodigiousness of all wealth, is its first and proper content. The pure 
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book, the book itself, by virtue of what is most irreplaceable within it, must be the “book 
about nothing” that Flaubert dreamed of—a gray, negative dream, the origin of the total 
Book that haunted other imaginations. This emptiness as the situation of literature must 
be acknowledged by the critic as that which constitutes the specificity of his object, as 
that around which he always speaks. Or rather, his proper object—since nothing is not an 
object—is the way in which this nothing itself is determined by disappearing.604 
The “pure absence” at the “center” of Infinite Jest is the Entertainment. As opposed to 
Boswell’s reading of Infinite Jest (V), which is based (more-or-less) upon the content of the film, 
the novel neutralizes whatever this content might be. The Entertainment defines an absence. It is 
purely absent. We do not see it. It can only be talked about and written about, recounted by a 
narrator from other written forms. For example, Molly Notkin’s account of the “content” of the 
film not only occurs under the clearly unreliable circumstances of filmic cliché, but is clearly 
delivered by someone highly schooled in film studies themselves: 
Technical interviewers under Chief of Unspecified Services R. (‘the G.’) Tine really do 
do this, bring a portable high-watt lamp and plug it in and adjust its neck so the light 
shines down directly on the interview’s subject, whose homburg and shade-affording 
eyebrows had been removed by polite request. And it was this, the harsh light on her fully 
exposed post-Marxist face, more than any kind of tough noir-informed grilling from R. 
Tine Jr. and the other technical interviewer, that prompted M.I.T. A.B.D.-Ph.D. Molly 
Notkin [Massachusetts Institute of Technology All But Done-Doctor of Philosophy], 
fresh off the N.N.Y.C. [New New York City] high-speed rail, seated in the Sidney 
Peterson-shaped directorial chair amid dropped luggage in her co-op’s darkened and 
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lock-dickied living room, to spill her guts, roll over and eat cheese, sing like a canary, 
and tell everything she believed she knew [. . .] (and then some).605 
Whatever the content of Infinite Jest (V) might be, here, as everywhere else in the entire novel, it 
is so mediated by layers of textuality as to disappear entirely. First, whatever Molly said during 
this interrogation clearly cannot be wholly known, for it depends upon an intimate familiarity 
with what, one would assume, is a highly confidential transcript of her account of the film. The 
“text” of the Entertainment is being interpreted by Notkin, and is then interpreted by a narrator, 
assuming it is Hal, who could in no way know what she said. Second, the very conditions of 
formal interrogation by a semi-clandestine intelligence arm of the US government606 put into 
doubt whatever it is she says. She so “clearly” wishes to satisfy her interrogators that to take her 
account at face value would be to ignore the well documented unreliability of interrogation. 
Third, the very structure of the interrogation is so clearly textual, obviously marked by Wallace’s 
mobilization of noir film clichés: the lights, “spill her guts, roll over and eat cheese, sing like a 
canary,” etc. Exacerbating the filmic nature of how the interrogation is presented Molly herself is 
someone (overly-)familiar with the conventions of filmic analysis, since she is an “M.I.T. 
A.B.D.-Ph.D.,” this not only metacritically gestures toward the very type of analysis here being 
undertaken,607 parodying academia, critical theory, film studies, etc., but implies that Molly’s 
account of the film is highly mediated by her familiarity with the genre she is inhabiting, the 
filmic conditions of the interrogation, and the irony of such filmic interrogation about a film. The 
Entertainment is not only absent here, mediated, constructed, generic, and metacritical, but 
calling upon the critic to understand “this emptiness as the situation of literature must be 
acknowledged by the critic as that which constitutes the specificity of his object, as that around 
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which he always speaks. Or rather, his proper object—since nothing is not an object—is the way 
in which this nothing itself is determined by disappearing.” 
 As said above, if Infinite Jest (V) is clearly Wallace’s epidemically apocalyptic object 
around which the narrative is constructed, an object whose fate is clearly unknown and 
ambiguous,608 then its absence must be taken very seriously, and it is a kind of pure absence in 
the novel, an absence that makes work, but it is also “The pure book, the book itself, by virtue of 
what is most irreplaceable within it, must be the ‘book about nothing’ that Flaubert dreamed of—
a gray, negative dream, the origin of the total Book that haunted other imaginations.” The 
Entertainment is this negative dream, absorbing anyone who encounters it into its text, and it can 
only be “about nothing.” Joelle, more familiar with Incandenza’s work, emphasizes the lack of 
any narrative content in his other films when thinking about the Entertainment: 
The man’s Work was amateurish, she’d seen. . . . Was amateurish the right word? More 
like the work of a brilliant optician and technician who was an amateur at any kind of real 
communication. Technically gorgeous, the Work, with lighting and angles planned out to 
the frame. But oddly hollow, empty, no sense of dramatic towardness—no narrative 
movement toward a real story; no emotional movement toward an audience.609 
The telos of the world of Infinite Jest is an encounter with the Entertainment, a film that is 
potentially entirely formal, non-narrative, technical. Whatever is “in” it, is absent. Consequently, 
“if there are structures, they are possible only on the basis of the fundamental structure which 
permits totality to open and overflow itself such that it takes on meaning by anticipating a telos 
which here must be understood it is most indeterminate form.”610 Infinite Jest (V) is teleological 
through and through, it defines the novel’s end, but this end is never given. Being of 
“indeterminate form,” whatever meaning the film gives us overflows, determines, and creates the 
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text through this absence. It is the force that causes the imaginative irruption that is the novel. 
Recalling Derrida’s formulation of the textuality of nuclear warfare, how it can only be talked 
and written about, how it does not “exist” in any real sense of the term, Wallace is constructing 
the Entertainment in precisely the same fashion. It cannot be experienced, it can only be talked 
and written about, but any representation of it only exacerbates its textuality. Wallace 
ingeniously takes the “object” which produced the dominant apocalyptic rhetoric of the twentieth 
century—the nuclear bomb—and transforms it into something wholly textual that everywhere 
determines the eschatological limits of the novel. 
 The nuclear bomb as an actual, physical, present force in the novel, however, remains a 
narrative possibility (though still perhaps limited to the wholly textual). In yet another moment of 
highly mediated textual layering, Wallace gives the “history” of the novel’s political events in 
filmic form. Mario Incandenza, the middle-brother in the Incandenza family, an ambiguously 
damaged, stunted individual who is nonetheless capable of immense empathy (one of the few 
characters who is), is this untitled film’s auteur. Based upon “The ONANtiad, a four-hour piece 
of tendentiously anticonfluential political parody long since dismissed as minor Incandenza by 
his late father’s archivists, Mario’s piece isn’t really better than his father’s; it’s just different 
(plus of course way shorter).”611 Every Interdependence Day—the day commemorating the 
establishment of ONAN—the film is screened for everyone at the Enfield Tennis Academy 
(ETA). Mario’s film is a mixture of a puppet show, depicting President Gentle and other 
members of his staff, and “his late father’s parodic device of mixing real and fake news-
summary cartridges, magazines, articles, and historical headers from the last few great daily 
papers, all for a sort of time-lapse exposition of certain developments leading up to 
Interdependence and Subsidized Time and cartographic Reconfiguration and the renewal of a 
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tight and considerably tidier Experialist U.S. of A., under Gentle.”612 Though there are many 
clever moments of political parody in Mario’s film, and more than one reference to the effect the 
persistent presence of nuclear weapons had upon US foreign policy in the novel,613 one moment 
stands above all others in terms of actually physically present nuclear weaponry: 
President Gentle has isolated himself in a small private suite at Bethesda Naval Hospital 
with several thousand dollars’ worth of sound and sterilization equipment and is spending 
all day every day singing morose show-tunes in inappropriate keys to the U.S.M.C 
Colonel who stands near the Dermalatix Hypospectral sterilization appliance handcuffed 
to the Black Box of United States nuclear codes. Unspecified Services Office 
spokespersons have declined to comment on reports of such erratic Executive directives 
as: [. . .] instructing silo personnel at all S.A.C. installations north of 44° to remove their 
missiles from the silos and reinsert them upside down.614 
As so many other moments in the text remain ultimately ambiguous, the most explicitly nuclear 
moment, this moment where nuclear weapons are presented as potentially inverted in their silos, 
that they were perhaps launched (downward), and that this action is what, in effect, created the 
highly toxic conditions in the Great Concavity—whatever the facts are in the novel, they cannot 
be known, they are absent.615 
 The facts of detonation are unimportant for, more importantly, Wallace is quite literally 
inverting the nuclear trope. He is deliberately, and almost mockingly declaring that not only is 
the nuclear imagination “over,” but we need desperately to aesthetically invert it. At a 
fundamental level Wallace understood that the apocalypse has always been literary, that the 
nuclear bomb made this textuality explicitly and vitally material, and that we need to now focus 
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on what the nuclear bombs were pointed at. If the target of apocalyptic technology is the text, 
then it is also clearly code. But it is not only this.  
The bombs are pointed at the origins of the Anglo-Saxon inhabitation of North America. 
The bombs create a “concavity” that is spatial, metaphorical, geographical, and national (i.e., a 
piece either added to the cartographical US or subtracted from Canada). The bombs, in pointing 
at text, are pointing at landscape, at “the real,” and they are textual bombs, they are targeting the 
very ground of textuality itself. Wallace’s most obvious nod to postmodernism emerges through 
a textually absent inverted nuclear explosion that creates a physical hole in the country in order 
to dispose of its waste. There is a no more damning critique of the rhetorical extremes made 
possible by certain strands of the nuclear imagination, but this is also simultaneously a 
celebration of how vital that imagination has been. We cannot help but to think that the 
American pastoral—i.e. the machine in the garden—becomes the machine turned upside down 
and used against the garden. But the machine is no normal machine, it is a force, a dynamo. The 
very material of the world boiled down into the smallest particle we can destroy—geographically 
and otherwise, this ability is purposely turned against the “original” machine in the garden itself. 
May it not be appropriate to declare that “the inverted nuke in the garden” here is also an 
inverted machine in the machine? And the machine that Wallace is pointing to is, recursively, 
text itself. 
In one of the most compelling scenes in the novel, this inversion—the textual nuclear 
weapon pointed at a textual object and at representation (itself)—is made explicit during the 
Eschaton game young members of ETA play. Eschaton is a war game in the classically nuclear 
sense, simulating and then developing the conditions that would lead up to global nuclear war, 
and then further simulating how exactly such a conflict would transpire. It is a fabulously 
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complex game, with a dense rulebook, which “is about as long and interesting as J. Bunyan’s 
stupefying Pilgrim’s Progress [. . .], and a pretty tough nut to compress into anything lively 
(although every year a dozen more E.T.A. kids memorize the thing at such a fanatical depth that 
they sometimes report reciting mumbled passages under light dental or cosmetic anesthesia, 
years later).”616 The game is played on a “map” of four contiguous tennis courts representing the 
globe, and uses old tennis gear to represent various strategic targets. Nukes are “launched” by 
lobbing tennis balls at certain targets. How closely they hit their targets is entered into a complex 
mathematical rubric to assess damage to the area. “A given Eschaton’s winning team is simply 
that Combatant with the most favorable ratio of points for INDDIR—Infliction of Death, 
Destruction, and Incapacitation of Response—to SUFDDIR—self-evident.”617  
The narrator of Infinite Jest explains some of the attraction of the game for its 
participants as follows: 
Every year at E.T.A., maybe a dozen of the kids between maybe like twelve and fifteen—
children in the very earliest stages of puberty and really abstract-capable thought, when 
one’s allergy to the confining realities of the present is just starting to emerge as a weird 
kind of nostalgia for stuff you never even knew—maybe a dozen of these kids, mostly 
male, get fanatically devoted to a homemade Academy game called Eschaton. Eschaton 
is the most complicated children’s game anybody around E.T.A.’d ever heard of. [. . .] Its 
elegant complexity, combined with a dismissive-reenactment frisson and a complete 
disassociation from the realities of the present, composes most of its puerile appeal. Plus 
it’s almost addictively compelling, and shocks the tall.618 
Within the projected future of Infinite Jest, Eschaton evokes “a weird kind of nostalgia for stuff 
you never even knew.” The game’s participants, mostly children just on the verge of puberty, 
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would have been born in the late 1990s. The “stuff” they never knew is precisely the threat of 
global nuclear war. They have a nostalgia for such a conflict, for a world marked both politically 
and historically by such a grand narrative. The confining realities of the present, the 
conglomeration of the US, Mexico, and Canada into ONAN, the lack of any clear transnational 
political conflicts, the lack of a national narrative—all these things conspire to evoke a nostalgia 
in the pre-pubescent youngsters for a world where a narrative eschaton was clear: the possibility 
of total annihilation. It must be stressed, however, that the “stuff” these kids never knew, their 
nostalgia, is also a fantasy. In an endnote to the “stuff they never knew,” Wallace writes: “the 
basic phenomenon being what more abstraction-capable post-Hegelian adults call ‘Historical 
Consciousness.’”619 This “historical consciousness,” however, is a nostalgia for something that 
never happened. The political scenario of the game is a scenario that not only never occurred, but 
is completely fictional with regard to the political realities of the Cold War. (Here we cannot but 
help to hear Derrida’s claim that nuclear war is a fabulously textual phenomenon in that it has 
never occurred, that we can only talk and write about it.) The fictional combatants involved are 
all conglomerations of transnational interests, and are given acronyms signifying these 
conglomerations: AMNAT (American Nations and the North American Treaty Organization), 
SOVWAR (Soviet Union / Warsaw Pact), REDCHI (Red China), LIBSYR or IRLIBSYR (Libya 
and Syria, or Iran [or possibly Iraq], Libya and Syria), SOUTHAF (South Africa) and INDPAK 
(India and Pakistan).620 With these acronyms Eschaton effectively blurs its relationship to 
concrete political realities, thereby making it possible to run the simulation over and over again, 
as each of these markers of signification only roughly represent either the past, present, or future. 
The simulation constructs a narrative that is completely fictional. AMNAT is not ONAN here 
nor is SOVWAR Russia. The game effectively attempts to extend the narrative of the Cold War 
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around its central conflict (nuclear war), extending an essentially American narrative without the 
“corrupting influence” of Canada and Mexico, while still acknowledging that influence 
tangentially—i.e., it is AMNAT, the “nat” signifying nations or else NATO (Canada and Mexico 
are presumably included, but not in the contemporary ONANite configuration). These children’s 
nostalgia is for the nuclear trope itself. Even though the threat of global nuclear war is off the 
table in Infinite Jest, its absence is seen in the light of the “confining realities of the present,” and 
being on the verge of adulthood, becoming capable of abstract thought, they need and desire that 
this nuclear trope to persist.621 In terms of the persistence of the nuclear trope, in Eschaton it is 
wholly textual, something both structuring, affecting, and defining the limits of Infinite Jest as a 
whole. As this specific game of Eschaton is played out, the novel emphasizes this textuality in 
roughly three ways. 
 The first way the textuality of the nuclear is emphasized is simply how textual the game 
is itself. Eschaton requires high level mathematics not only to begin, but to decide who is the 
victor of the apocalypse. At the beginning of each game, the game master must establish who has 
how many nuclear warheads. This is done, according to Michael Pemulis’s reported speech, by 
“using the Mean-Value formula for dividing available megatonnage among Combatants whose 
GNP/Military // Military/Nuke ratios vary from Eschaton to Eschaton [which] keeps you from 
needing to crunch out a new ratio for each Combatant each time, plus lets you multi-regress the 
results so Combatants get rewarded for past thermonuclear largesse (occasional verbal flourishes 
Hal’s—HJI).”622 The entirety of Eschaton depends upon various informational algorithms, upon 
the functioning of code, but also depends upon recursively using itself as text. Each Eschaton is, 
in a sense, merely the development of various bits of random information put into an apocalypse 
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algorithm. Code here reproduces itself, reproducing a simulation of disaster, which is then 
repeated for different simulations of disaster.  
Not only does the game depend upon higher-level mathematics than twelve-to-fifteen-
year-olds are usually familiar with, but these mathematics are given to us in reported speech by 
Hal in an endnote, further recursively layering the textuality of Eschaton. This is complicated 
even more when Pemulis, who is relating the mathematical grounding for determining initial 
megatonnage, says, “It’s going to be interesting to see if (sic) Hal, who thinks he’s just too sly 
trying to outline Eschaton in the 3rd-person tense (sic) like some jowly old Eschatologist with 
leather patches on his elbows (sic), if Inc can transpose (sic?) the math here without help from 
the Mumster.”623 Hal’s “(sics)” here not only signal the textuality of the novel, of his 
“authorship” of the novel, but produce further recursive textuality. Pemulis’s mathematical 
expertise enabled him to develop the basic mathematical formulas for not only determining 
initial megatonnage in the game, but also for determining the victor (i.e. the game is thoroughly 
inscribed from beginning to end by the functioning of code). But to represent the mathematic 
textuality of the game requires Hal to transcribe Pemulis’s words, and furthermore Hal “can just 
sit there making a steeple out of his fingers and pressing it to his lip and not take notes and wait 
and like inscribe (sic) it anytime in the next week and get it verbatim, the smug turd.”624 Hal’s 
encyclopedic textual memory—for instance he had memorized the entire Oxford English 
Dictionary before age seventeen (!)—here emerges both in his verbal flourishes and editorial 
emendations. Hal, quite clearly, becomes a “professor of Eschaton” and “some jowly old 
Eschatologist with leather patches on his elbows” by editing the text which makes Eschaton 
possible. Recalling Hal’s absent subjectivity from above, his role both here and elsewhere 
becomes almost wholly archival. He is a scholar of textual apocalypse whose role is to clarify 
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and interpret Pemulis’s at times ambiguous or incorrect verbal formulations. To make the text of 
Eschaton clear in the space of the novel, in other words, requires someone thoroughly schooled 
in interpreting (apocalyptic) text. 
Furthermore, the basis of Eschaton in mathematical code highly influences how 
participants play the game. 
Uninitiated adults who [. . .] might naturally expect to see fuzzless green warheads 
getting whacked indiscriminately skyward all over the place as everybody gets blackly 
drunk with thanoptic fury in the crisp November air—these adults would more likely find 
an actual game of Eschaton strangely subdued, almost narcotized-looking. Your standard 
round of Eschaton moves at about the pace of chess between adepts. For these devotees 
become, on court, almost parodically adult—staid, sober, humane, and judicious twelve-
year-old world leaders, trying their best not to let the awesome weight of their 
responsibilities—responsibilities to nation, globe, rationality, ideology, conscience and 
history, to both the living and the unborn—not to let the terrible agony they feel at the 
arrival of this dark day—this dark day the leaders’ve prayed would never come and have 
taken every conceivable measure rationally consistent with national strategic interests to 
avoid, to prevent—not to let the agonizing weight of responsibility compromise their 
resolve to do what they must to preserve their people’s way of life. So they play, 
logically, cautiously, so earnest and deliberate in their calculations they appear 
thoroughly and queerly adult, almost Talmudic, from a distance.625 
The cold logic of mathematical algorithms, the precise code-based grounding to each and every 
game, rather than producing chaotic play—“everybody get[ting] blackly drunk with thanoptic 
fury”—further produces a kind of “calculated apocalypse.” In a novel without any discernibly 
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“earnest and deliberate” adult, when each “adult” character is so thoroughly damaged, neurotic, 
caricatured, and addicted (to something), this production of adulthood, this responsibility that is 
“staid, sober, humane, and judicious,” signals that such an approach to political and historical 
realities (i.e. one that is “adult”) is only possible in a textual simulation played by children. 
Furthermore, by children who have never known such a political and historical reality as adults. 
Opposed to Gentle’s ridiculous inversion of nuclear missiles in their silos, a “responsible” 
approach to nuclear warfare is only possible within the confines of the deep textuality the 
participants of Eschaton are engaged in. 
 This sobriety of play, however, breaks down and highlights the second mode in which the 
nuclear bomb is thoroughly textual. During this specific game of Eschaton Hal and his friends sit 
on bleachers, smoking marijuana, and observing the developments in the game. For a few pages 
Wallace gives us a fairly fascinating description of how the game progresses, despite the fact that 
“Eschaton’s tough to enliven, verbally, even for the [chemically] stimulated. Being generally too 
slow and cerebral.”626 Various combatants are taking turns making strategic nuclear strikes, 
“artfully avoid[ing] the escalation to SACPOP [Sacrifice of Population627] that often takes both 
super-Combatants [AMNAT and SOVWAR] right out of the game.”628 During the cessation of 
hostilities between AMNAT and SOVWAR—during which Otis P. Lord, the game’s 
appropriately named omniscient game-master or “God,” is busy and distracted by attempting to 
convey information between the two super-powers— 
REDCHI, itself quickly trying to rack up some unanswered INDDIR, sends a towering 
topspin lob into INDPAK’s quadrant, scoring what REDCHI claims is a direct hit on 
Karachi, and what warheadless INDPAK claims is only an indirect hit on Karachi. It’s an 
uneasy moment: a dispute such as this would never occur in the real God’s real world, 
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since the truth would be manifest in the actual size of the actual wienie roast in the actual 
Karachi.629 
Lord attempts to adjudicate the dispute between REDCHI and INDPAK by appealing to Pemulis. 
Further complicating the lines between the real and the virtual, between the actual and the 
simulated,  
Pemulis gravely shakes his white-hatted head, pointing out that Lord is God and either 
sees or doesn’t, in Eschaton, [when] Lord has an intense little crying fit that’s made 
abruptly worse now J.J. Penn of INDPAK all of a sudden gets the idea to start claiming 
that now that it’s snowing [in the space of the novel’s “real” world] the snow totally 
affects the blast area and fire area and pulse-intensity and maybe also has fallout 
implications, and he says Lord has to now completely redo everybody’s damage 
parameters before anybody can form realistic strategies form here on out.630 
Pemulis responds that “‘It’s snowing on the goddamn map, not the territory, you dick!” for he is 
“sensitive to any theater-boundary-puncturing threats to the map’s integrity—threats that’ve 
come up before, and that as Pemulis sees it threaten the game’s whole sense of animating realism 
(which realism depends on buying the artifice that 1300 m.2 of composition tennis court 
representing the whole rectangular projection of the planet earth).”631  
 The basic crisis in the Eschaton game, this moment of procedural dispute, occurs when 
the simulation is threatened by the real, and furthermore, when the “real(ism)” of the game is 
threatened by the real of the physical world. This is Pemulis’s point. For the integrity of the 
game to be maintained depends upon it remaining wholly within the realm of the simulated, of 
the referential. Eschaton is a model of the real. For its realism to be maintained, the map on 
which it is played must remain a mere representation of the underlying algorithmic code on 
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which the simulation’s outcome depends—it must remain completely simulated. But Pemulis, 
though correct at a structural level, ignores a more basic fact. The “real” world, with its physical 
laws and its contingent environmental factors, cannot be dismissed when considering the 
“whole” of the game. Yes, a large portion of the game is being run on a Yushityu computer, 
taking analog data from the “real” and making it digitally meaningful, but this data is dependent 
upon a host of real world factors that are neither digital, algorithmic, nor code-based, real world 
factors that are completely outside the parameters of the simulation. The snow, in other words, 
though not affecting the underlying mathematical and simulated textuality of the game, cannot 
but help to affect the game itself: the physical trajectory of the balls, the ability for its 
participants to lob effectively, the differences in spin and trajectory such November cold could 
produce, etc.632 The game, in other words, is an assemblage of the digital and the analog. The 
inseparability between the real and the simulated is clearly being presented by Wallace, but what 
is clear from this and the following events is that not only is Wallace metacritically questioning 
his own construction of nuclear war as an explicitly textual phenomenon by directly pointing to 
the thinking of Baudrillard regarding simulation, but that this very metacritical (or metafictional) 
recursive doubling of the question of nuclear textuality serves to produce more mediated layering 
of the larger text and narrative in Infinite Jest. 
Recall Baudrillard’s famous opening discussion of Jorge Luis Borges’s “On Exactitude in 
Science” (1960)633 regarding maps and territories in Simulacra and Simulation:  
today abstraction is no longer that of the map, the double, the mirror, or the concept. 
Simulation is no longer that of a territory, a referential being, or a substance. It is the 
generation by models of a real without origin or reality: a hyperreal. The territory no 
longer precedes the map, nor does it survive it. It is nevertheless the map that precedes 
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the territory—precession of simulacra—that engenders the territory, and if one must 
return to the fable, today it is the territory whose shreds slowly rot across the extent of the 
map.634 
For Baudrillard the point is clear. It is not that reality itself has become a simulation, that 
somehow postmodernity has become so highly mediated that there is no distinction between the 
real and the mimetic, but that the mimetic itself precedes the real, and furthermore, that it has no 
basis in the real—i.e., it ceases to be mimetic in any classic sense of the word. The models or the 
map have no origin, no reference point, they are simulacra: copies without an original. But these 
are not simulacra in the Platonic sense of the word, but rather they are simulacra that produce the 
real. Wallace’s (almost overly-)explicit reference to Baudrillard here is him at his most 
metafictional in Infinite Jest.635 For it is at this moment that he does not let us forget that the very 
debate which is occurring regarding simulation and the real, regarding the map and the territory, 
is occurring in a work of fiction; and the fact that this moment revolves so heavily around 
nuclear simulation is of the utmost importance. 
 Wallace is not merely aping Baudrillard, referencing some fashionable cultural theory, 
winking at the reader, letting them in on a joke regarding representation and simulation, saying: 
look, the very problem of locating the real against the simulated is here occurring in a simulation 
within a representational aesthetic object, recursively doubling and tripling the mediation 
between the text and the real.636 If this were all he were doing, then this moment of Infinite Jest 
would simply be reiterating Baudrillard’s point in what is now (perhaps) a fairly tired fashion. 
By making this crisis of representation occur in a nuclear simulation, occurring in a novel which 
is constantly referencing the crisis of maps—that the problem facing ONAN is ultimately a 
topographical one—i.e., whose map does the Concavity “belong” to?637—Wallace is pointing to 
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the unimpeachable textuality of the nuclear. Eschaton is a simulation of a nuclear war that not 
only did not happen in reality—indeed, perhaps could not happen in reality—but the basic 
parameters of the game are wholly fictional and simulated—i.e., it does not represent any “real” 
political reality that ever existed. In the world of Infinite Jest the nuclear threatens the map, the 
text, the simulation, and not the territory, not the real. The territory of ONAN is indeed shredding 
and slowly rotting, seen most clearly in Wallace’s (de)construction of the Great Concavity, and 
whether the nuclear produced this territory or not, the a concavity is a topographic and textual 
concavity. Whatever territory the concavity represents topographically, whether it belongs to 
Canada or the US, is unimportant, because the territory itself has more-or-less ceased to exist, it 
is functionally absent. As the nuclear itself becomes a simulacrum by threatening the very 
simulation which makes it possible (the text, the game), it consequently invades the narrative 
world of the novel. The fundamental crisis at the heart of the novel, both in its grand political 
narrative and in the world of ETA, its accompanying Eschaton, and Hal’s narrative, is the crisis 
of nuclear textuality. The novel is engaged in asking: what happens to the apocalyptic narrative 
when its primary mode, the nuclear, becomes wholly textual? 
 The resulting events produced by the map/territory debate in the game of Eschaton 
highlight a third moment of nuclear textuality and how these events ultimately structure the 
resulting narrative of the novel. The problem of real-world snow is set aside for the moment 
while AMNAT and SOVWAR attempt to come to terms to prevent SACPOP, meeting together 
in “Sierra Leone.” Hal, watching the IRLIBSYR combatant Evan Ingersoll, “can almost 
visualize a dark light bulb going on above [his] head”638 as Ingersoll realizes that the results of 
this summit will effectively eliminate him from the game as SOVWAR will go SACPOP against 
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him. In a radical, unprecedented move in the history of Eschaton, Ingersoll hits a tennis ball 
directly at SOVWAR’s Ann Kittenplan 
and then casually suggests that IRLIBSYR has just scored a direct 5-megaton contact-
burst against SOVWAR’s entire launch capacity [. . . ] plus also AMNAT’s own launch 
capacity, plus both Combatants’ ordnance and heads of state, all lie well within the 
blast’s kill radius—which by Ingersoll’s rough calculations extends from the Ivory Coast 
to the doubles alley’s Senegal. Unless of course that kill radius is somehow altered by the 
possible presence of climatic snow, he adds, beaming.639 
At this moment, the entire ordered, careful, algorithmic apocalypse breaks down. No one in the 
history of Eschaton has ever launched a strike against an actual physical combatant, as they are 
understood as representations of transnational nuclear capability rather than the actual “heads of 
state.” In terms of this particular game of Eschaton, nuclear textuality invades the real world, the 
representational nuclear weapons (tennis balls), being launched against the “real” (Ann 
Kittenplan), and this action consequently constitutes a crisis of the highest order within the game, 
causing Lord, “with near-ceremonial care [to exchange] the white-beanie on his head for the red 
beanie that signifies Utter Global Crisis.”640 Pemulis, of course, continues to rail against the lack 
of distinction between the map and the territory: “Eschaton gentlemen is about logic and axiom 
and mathematical probity and discipline and verity and order.” In his mind, Eschaton is not even 
possible, axiomatically, in its “icily elegant game-theoretical form” if players can be targets—
“players’ exemption from strikes goes without saying [. . .]; it’s like preaxiomatic.” Lord, 
however, consulting the rule-book, finds that there is no specific rule stating that players cannot 
become strategic targets if they are outside of their “defense-net.” As a result of Ingersoll’s 
action total chaos breaks loose, “a degenerative chaos so complex in its disorder that it’s hard to 
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tell whether it seems choreographed or simply chaotically disordered,”641 as players completely 
abandon the game to hit tennis balls willy-nilly at other players, as well as physically assault one 
another. Injuries requiring hospitalization occur, and Lord’s head ultimately goes through the 
screen of the Yushityu computer. 
 This event comes to be known as the Eschaton debacle and constitutes the primary crisis 
of the ETA narrative.642 The breakdown and the resulting fallout of this Eschaton constitutes the 
significant moment of change in this half of Infinite Jest’s narrative, or, in other words, the shift 
here occurs in the sense that Frank Kermode gives us to understand peripeteia in his work on 
apocalyptic narrative: “peripeteia [. . .] is a disconfirmation followed by a consonance; the 
interest of having our expectations falsified is obviously related to our wish to reach the 
discovery or recognition by an unexpected and instructive route.”643 After this moment, 
disciplinary action is taken against the older students who sat by and watched the events unfold 
without intervening. Pemulis is more-or-less expelled from the school. Drug-tests are required 
for all the “Big Brothers” sitting by. And all this throws Hal’s world into near-complete disarray, 
presumably resulting in the version of Hal that begins/ends the novel. Furthermore, Hal quits 
smoking marijuana in anticipation of the impending drug tests he will have to take—ETA 
students, like any athletes today, are subjected to frequent drug tests—and this forces him not 
only to withdraw from the drug physically and mentally, but to seek help from Narcotics 
Anonymous. Again, though we are not given many of the events between Hal’s moment of 
personal and subjective crisis (i.e., is anyone who is Hal “in there”?), he presumably encounters 
Don Gately through attending NA, an encounter that presumably leads them to go disinter 
Himself’s corpse, along with Helen/Hugh Steeply and John Wayne, in order to stave off the 
mass-dissemination of Infinite Jest (V) and its attending epidemical entertainment apocalypse. 
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 It should be emphasized, however, that the crisis of Eschaton, the narrative rupture it 
causes, and the “discovery or recognition by an unexpected and instructive route” toward an end, 
cannot be said to constitute or resemble a “proper” (or even a familiar) apocalyptic event in 
terms of Infinite Jest’s narrative. As has been detailed above, it is difficult to argue that the 
Eschaton debacle does not constitute the primary crisis of the ETA narrative, but the national 
fantasy of MAD here is miniaturized, simulated, and domesticated—i.e., made “safe” by being 
made into a game played by children. It takes this very simulation of a grand world-historical 
peripeteia to recursively become a crisis-moment in the “real” space of the narrative. In other 
words, more than simply domesticating global nuclear annihilation and structurally inscribing it 
into any moment of narrative crisis, consequently highlighting the fundamental nuclear structure 
narrative itself is dependent upon in Wallace’s projected world—more than this, Eschaton’s 
peripeteia marks a crisis in the very materiality of literature itself, and marks a crisis of 
textuality. When Pemulis rages against the transgression of the limits of the coldly logical and 
axiomatic apocalyptic text that is Eschaton, the subject of his rage might be said to be less the 
actions of J.J. Penn and Evan Ingersoll, than a fundamental realization on his part of how even 
such a formally logical and abstract system that Eschaton defines is incomplete, that there are 
things that this abstract system simply cannot represent or contain. Pemulis’s rule-book’s 
attendant mathematical axioms and conversion of nuclear textuality into the wholly logical 
attempt to lay the basic parameters, both analog and digital, for the nuclear apocalyptic text to 
become ordered, codified, and axiomatic, to become a mathematical text without “natural” 
language’s attendant ambiguities. The nuclear trope, at this moment, approaches throwing off the 
aporias of language and attempts to trace a direct relationship between signifier and signified. It 
no longer “throws a kind of light” in a Conradian sense; Pemulis understands the nuclear to be 
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both the light and what the light illuminates without there being any difference between the two. 
In this fashion, Pemulis desires the nuclear trope to approach (though asymptotically) a “pure 
text.” During Eschaton, however, this ordered, axiomatic, “pure,” elegant nuclear textuality 
generates (mathematical) peripeteia. Unexpectedly, the route taken by such a totalized nuclear 
textuality is an encounter with a kind of Gödelian incompleteness. Wallace implicitly 
understands that when the nuclear text becomes wholly formalized mathematically, that nuclear 
textuality then must face the fact 
that there really are true and significant theorems in math that can’t be proved/disproved. 
Which in turn means that even a maximally abstract, general, wholly formal mathematics 
is not going to be able to represent (or, depending on your metaphysical convictions, 
contain) all real-world mathematical truths. It’s this shattering of the belief that 100% 
abstraction = 100% truth that pure math has still not recovered from—nor is it yet even 
clear what “recovery” here would mean.644 
The crisis of Eschaton, then, becomes a crisis of textuality, how text, and through this 
information itself, no matter how defined, codified, materially embodied, or systematically 
archived, is not only always already incomplete, but that this very incompleteness, this very 
inability for the apocalyptic to be wholly contained within the text, can then spontaneously 
produce, out of nothing besides the very materiality of its systematicity, more text, more 
narrative, crisis, and the threat of apocalypse. This is precisely how we should understand the 
Entertainment. It is an emergent phenomenon of archived textuality. 
 Despite Boswell’s reading of the “content” of the Entertainment, it is important to note 
that Wallace gives us virtually no account of the origin of this film that is reliable (let alone of 
the content of the film). For example, near the end of the novel, Gately, recovering from an 
284 
 
infected gunshot wound, has a long (potentially hallucinated) conversation with a “wraith” that is 
clearly Himself’s ghost. Though there is surely evidence to suggest that this conversation in fact 
took place645 (and that furthermore this is one of the frequent references Wallace makes 
throughout Infinite Jest to Hamlet), this conversation that explicitly addresses the “intention” 
behind the Entertainment, is not only how it is ultimately unreliable, but it explicitly invokes the 
intentional fallacy. 
The wraith feels along his long jaw and says he spent the whole sober last ninety days of 
his animate life working tirelessly to contrive a medium via which he and the muted son 
could simply converse. To concoct something the gifted boy couldn’t simply master and 
move on from to a new plateau. Something the boy would love enough to induce him to 
open his mouth and come out—even if it was only to ask for more. Games hadn’t done it, 
professionals hadn’t done it, impersonation of professionals hadn’t done it. His last 
resort: entertainment. Make something so bloody compelling it would reverse thrust on a 
young self’s fall into the womb of solipsism, anhedonia, death in life. A magically 
entertaining toy to dangle at the infant still somewhere alive in the boy, to make its eyes 
light and toothless mouth open unconsciously, to laugh. To bring him “out of himself,” as 
they say. The womb could be used both ways. A way to say I AM SO VERY SORRY 
and have it heard. A life-long dream. The scholars and Foundations and disseminators 
never saw that his most serious wish was: to entertain.646 
The intentionally fallacious problems here regarding Himself as auteur of the Entertainment—if 
we do in fact take this projection of Gately’s consciousness as conversing with a deceased 
Himself—are many. First, early in the novel Himself is frequently under the delusion that Hal is 
not talking, which is clearly not the case, if only for the simple reason that he responds to what 
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Hal says when disguised as a “conversationalist.” Second, whatever account we have received of 
the film, it is clearly not “entertaining” in any classical sense of the word, and furthermore, we 
can never have any idea what the film might be “communicating” at all. Third, whatever 
Himself’s intentions may have been in making the Entertainment, clearly the film is a case study 
in the intentional fallacy—its effects, how it is treated, how it is “understood,” were so clearly 
unintended—not to mention the fact that it was potentially never even viewed by Hal. Lastly, the 
“intention” of this film to bring its viewer out of solipsism, not only clearly fails, but has the 
reverse effect: causing the viewer of the film to be unable to communicate with anyone. Infinite 
Jest (V) is an object that describes a vicious loop of an interpretive aporia. The problems of 
intentionality and unreliability recursively create an abyss around which interpretation fails. Not 
only is there no clear object that could be the site of a phenomenological encounter, let alone an 
interpretation, the very object itself is so mired in its own inability to ever come to a presence, 
that any critical assessment of the film—i.e. simply watching it—gets sucked into its abyssal 
space from which no viewer can return. In other words, we cannot read the film. 
 Consequently, rather than asking us to come to grips with the film by employing anything 
resembling a traditional hermeneutic mode of “reading a text” or “viewing a film,” whether that 
mode be New Critical, psychoanalytic, deconstructive, historical, biographical, or what have 
you, the novel very much asks us to approach thinking about this text within its own text quite 
differently.  
The most important aspect the world Infinite Jest projects with regard to textual 
interpretation is simply how technology has reached a point where virtually any piece of 
information is immediately available. Quite presciently foreseeing how advances in 
communication and information technology would make a nearly limitless supply of television, 
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films, texts, and other kinds of information accessible through the internet, Infinite Jest is a world 
thoroughly marked by information technology647:  
I.e. what if—according to InterLace—what if a viewer could more or less 100% choose 
what’s on at any given time? Choose and rent, over PC and modem and fiber-optic line, 
from tens of thousands of second-run films, documentaries, the occasional sport, old 
beloved non-“Happy Days” programs, wholly new programs, cultural stuff, and c., all 
prepared by the time-tested, newly lean Big Four’s [television network’s] mammoth 
vaults and production facilities and packaged and disseminated by InterLace TelEnt. [. . .] 
What if the viewer could become her/his own programming director; what if s/he could 
define the very entertainment-happiness it was her/his right to pursue? 648 
The myth imagined from these textual/technological underpinnings in Infinite Jest is, quite 
simply, the complete and total access, whenever one wants, to a “total” archive, a hyperarchive; 
and this is an archive that is nearly infinite in its capacity to accumulate. The novel imagines a 
fantasy of not only total and complete access to anything that has ever been made, but 
furthermore, an archive that is, for all intents and purposes, infinite. It is in the light of this 
formal (if fantasmatic) projection of an infinite archive with unlimited user access that the 
Entertainment should be understood, and it should be understood directly with regard to the 
system—the distributed network—that makes possible the fantasmatic projection of such an 
archive. 
 The most basic formal structure that Infinite Jest relies upon (more fundamentally than 
the Sierpinski Gasket I would argue649) is the distributed network. Galloway, in his book on how 
control functions in post-disciplinary societies, defines the distributed network as follows:  
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Each point in a distributed network is neither a central hub nor a satellite node—there are 
neither trunks nor leaves. The network contains nothing but “intelligent end-point 
systems that are self-deterministic, allowing each end-point system to communicate with 
any host it chooses.” Like the rhizome, each node in a distributed network may establish 
direct communication with another node, without having to appeal to a hierarchical 
intermediary. Yet in order to initiate communication, the two nodes must speak the same 
language.650 
Though Infinite Jest is paginated sequentially, has a linear sequence that one cannot ignore, and 
contains over one-hundred pages of end-matter or “Notes and Errata,” any foray into the novel 
cannot but help to agree with Hayles’s assessment of it: “For such a novel any starting point 
would be to some extent arbitrary, for no matter where one starts, everything eventually cycles 
together with everything else.”651 Wallace has constructed a narrative fabric, a narrative web, 
where each node in that narrative, each scene, character, setting, and time-period can be 
connected to any other through a minimum of steps. (Hal is only one step removed from Don 
Gately, two steps from Rodney Tine, two steps from the AFR, and only three steps from the 
President of the US, for example.) Part of Wallace’s ability to construct the novel in such a 
fashion is through its sheer archival bulkiness: in the best Borgesian sense, it attempts to be an 
encyclopedia for a world that does not exist. He uses snippets of letters, plagiarized reports on 
the origins of the AFR, film clips, a filmography, indirect and direct speech, first person and 
third person perspectives, calendars, multiple English (and other) dialects, etc., to achieve this. In 
a sense, the novel is a guide-book for narrative form. It attempts to encapsulate anything that will 
fit into the construction of a narrative (perhaps think of it as John Dos Passos’s USA Trilogy 
[1930-1936] for the information age). Every section of the novel attempts to communicate with 
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every other section. Many times the narrative conflicts that arise come from certain moments are 
simply a result of the novel’s inability to “speak the same language” to other parts of the novel. 
(Gately’s consciousness using words he could in no way have been familiar with in the wraith 
scene is a clear example of Infinite Jest’s network overcoming language differences.) 
 Consequently, to approach a discussion of the Entertainment, not only should the 
distributed, networked form of how texts are disseminated in the projected world be 
considered—how all texts within the world of Infinite Jest have the capability to be connected to 
any other text—but the very rhizomatic, networked fabric of the text itself should be emphasized 
in accounting for the appearance of the film. The novel, in this way, should be read as a kind of 
cybernetic machine. The Entertainment thereby represents a much longer history of apocalyptic 
fear associated with information technology and intelligent machines, a much more basic fear 
than an anxious projection of a US culture turned vapidly toward its television sets. 
 In his groundbreaking book Cybernetics (1948), Norbert Wiener already perceived the 
apocalyptic dangers of emerging computer technology. Though largely a book that serves to 
define a field, to think about how the science of cybernetics might be useful in a host of areas, 
Wiener is also constantly aware of the attendant “evil” uses information technology might be 
used for. He makes passing references to the atomic bomb, a potential third World War, and 
other potential disasters throughout the book, but a brief excerpt from the Introduction will serve 
to clearly highlight how information technology, even at this early stage of its development, is 
thoroughly inscribed by crisis and the possibility for disaster:  
Those of us who have contributed to the new science of cybernetics thus stand in a moral 
position which is, to say the least, not very comfortable. We have contributed to the 
initiation of a new science which, as I have said, embraces technical developments with 
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great possibilities for good and for evil. We can only hand it over into the world that 
exists about us, and this is the world of Belsen and Hiroshima. We do not even have the 
choice of suppressing these new technical developments.652 
Closer to our own moment, Steven Shaviro is equally disturbed by the disastrous potential within 
information and network technologies: “The threat of self-destruction is palpable to everyone, 
even if the event never materializes. The danger is part of the atmosphere. The apocalyptic 
prospect (however improbable) of Cultural Fugue seems to be—as much as the Web, or the 
information form itself—a defining condition of life in the network society.”653 Wiener and 
Shaviro highlight, on two sides of the historical spectrum that defines the development of what 
Shaviro (and others) call the “network society,” that, despite the utopian coloring information 
technology is often given, the democratic leveling that access to information claims to produce, 
there is a constant acknowledgment in information technology’s history of its potential to pose 
an apocalyptic threat. This is no mere paranoid projection of artificial intelligence getting out of 
control, or even the clear acknowledgment of how control exists within a network society. It 
depicts an anxiety that exists at a much more structural level, a level that understands this 
apocalyptic threat to be tied to the simple fact that  
a network is a self-generating, self-organizing, self-sustaining system. It works through 
multiple feedback loops. These loops allow the system to monitor and modulate its own 
performance continually and thereby maintain a state of homeostatic equilibrium. At the 
same time, these feedback loops induce effects of interference, amplification, and 
resonance. And such effects permit the system to grow, both in size and in complexity.654 
Wallace effectively explores throughout Infinite Jest how aesthetics function within such a self-
generating, self-organizing, self-sustaining system. The very networked system Wallace is 
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principally concerned with throughout the novel is a system of aesthetic dissemination. If 
networks, by their very definition, are self-generating, and if a significant amount of US cultural 
output, in fiction, television, film, and elsewhere, is obsessed with the end, with imagining the 
apocalypse, what role does the imagination play in such a network? How might we both think 
about the aesthetics of networks and the networks of aesthetics within the perspective of not just 
projected disaster, but a disaster that is perhaps desired? The Entertainment is the node in 
Wallace’s network that these questions are constantly revolving around. As such, rather than 
trying to discern any “origin” to this work of art, let alone an authorial node which brought it into 
being, the novel everywhere asks us to consider the structural conditions which made it possible, 
which allowed it to emerge.  
One of the most fascinating moments in the novel regarding how Infinite Jest (V) may 
have come about, especially for anyone with a scholarly bent, is the long endnote that gives us 
Himself’s filmography. Covering nine pages with 78 entries, this archive of Himself’s work is 
both exhaustingly detailed and maddeningly incomplete. For the entries on films that are readily 
available to the public and generally known, Wallace gives us exactingly precise detail on the 
production company, the film-size and -speed used, the length, color, and sound of each film, 
and in what format(s) it was disseminated. For many of the films, he also gives us captivating 
synopses of their content.655 For other films, however, very little to no information whatsoever is 
given. There are six films bearing titles that are “Unfinished. UNREALEASED.”656 There are 
four films that are all “Untitled. Unfinished. URELEASED.” There are also Found Dramas I-VI 
and IX-XI, which are “conceptual, conceptually unfilmable. UNRELEASED.”657 Himself’s films 
that do exist and whose content is clear also range across an incredibly wide spectrum of 
different filmic practices: technical experiments, public relations productions, documentaries, the 
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experimental “après-garde,” infomercials, genre-pieces, attempts at commercial film, and even 
The Joke, advertised as: “You Are Strongly Advised NOT To Shell Out Money to See This 
Film,”658 a film that “Film & Kartridge Kultcher’s Sperber credited [. . .] with ‘unwittingly 
sounding the death-knell of post-poststructural film in terms of sheer annoyance.’”659 Indeed, 
Infinite Jest invites scholarly attention toward Himself’s filmography. His work is so prodigious, 
multiplicitous, and theoretically complex that the novel practically begs for an academic article 
to be written on Himself’s work (and is itself such an article). 
Such an article, however, would have to confront the same interpretive aporia that the 
Entertainment presents. With the few exceptions when Hal is either viewing Himself’s films or 
Joelle is describing them, the majority of the aesthetic objects in this archive cannot be 
approached as objects. Whether exactingly described or simply unseen, unfinished, and 
unreleased, they only come to any kind of presence within the novel through their archivization, 
through this listing and cataloguing, through an overt textuality. Many of the films contain 
interesting hints about the narrative, Himself’s consciousness, the political and historical realities 
of the novel, the technology of the novel’s world, and other characters in the novel (Incandenza 
used many of the people around ETA and Joelle herself as actors). More than presenting a kind 
of puzzle or mystery to be solved vis-à-vis Himself’s archive and the space of Infinite Jest, 
however, what these hints serve to do is to highlight the network that exists between these texts. 
Not a single entry can really be considered without all of the others. Each little detail in each 
entry serves to point toward other entries and toward other moments in the novel. For example, 
Baby Pictures of Famous Dictators shows “children and adolescents play[ing] a near 
incomprehensible nuclear strategy game with tennis equipment against the real or holographic(?) 
backdrop of sabotaged ATHSCME 1900 atmospheric displacement towers exploding and 
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toppling during the New New England Chemical Emergency of Y.W. CELLULOID 
(UNRELEASED)”; or As of Yore: “a middle-aged tennis instructor, preparing to instruct his son 
in tennis, becomes intoxicated in the family’s garage and subjects his son to a rambling 
monologue while the son weeps and perspires.”660 This catalogue of films emphasizes itself, the 
list, the archive, the accumulation of texts, and an accumulation of texts by someone (Himself) 
who ultimately remains a filmic amateur, someone who started making films as more-or-less a 
hobby after a fabulously successful career as an optical engineer and the Headmaster of an elite 
tennis academy. 
Wallace walks the line between what Umberto Eco calls the list of “coherent excess” and 
the list of “chaotic enumeration” with this filmography. The list of coherent excess, though 
“made impracticable by superabundance,” nevertheless, “no matter how excessive [the] list may 
be it is not chaotic.”661 The list of chaotic enumeration, on the other hand, “delight[s] in 
introducing the absolutely heterogeneous [. . .] in order to bring out new relationships between 
distant things.”662 Both of these poles must be kept in mind when thinking not only about how 
Wallace’s list functions, but the Entertainment’s relationship to that list. Himself’s filmography 
is, for the most part, excessively coherent, detailed, academic, careful, and each entry so clearly 
engages with the novel in some fashion that we cannot accuse Wallace of mere onanistic textual 
accumulation here—i.e., it is not chaotic. On the other hand, there is a marked heterogeneity to 
the list, nowhere highlighted better than by the information we do not get. The archive is 
presented as an entry in the “ONANite Film and Cartridge Studies Annual.”663 This list has all 
the authority of intense scholarly attention and care, and yet none of the authority and (at times) 
omniscience of the narrator of the majority of Infinite Jest. This is not an archive produced by 
omniscience. It is incomplete, fractured, unknown, unseen, unreleased. It may be the best that is 
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available, but it is not the “whole.” There is a chaotic “real” either within or outside the archive 
that cannot be captured by that archivization, by that listing. All we get is black and white, silent 
markers on a page that can merely point toward complex chaos, a swirling disorder of how these 
films form a network. 
In this list, Himself’s attempts at Infinite Jest (the film) form the central nodes between 
the order and chaos of the list, between its excess and enumeration. Significantly, Infinite Jest (I) 
is “black and white; silent. Incandenza’s first attempt at commercial entertainment. 
UNRELEASED.”664 This first attempt at Infinite Jest is clearly textual: black and white and 
silent. It is a poststructural textual-object that highlights its textuality while being wholly absent. 
Infinite Jest (II), the attempted remake of the first film, is also “black and white; silent.”665 
Infinite Jest (III) adds color and sound, but remains unfinished, unseen, and unreleased. Infinite 
Jest (IV) lists two actors, “Pam Heath (?) [and] Madame Psychosis (?),”666 but not only do the 
question marks in the text highlight the speculative nature of claiming there are known actors in 
this film, but they constitute acts of textual erasure, making it impossible to “know” anything 
about the film; and of course it is also unfinished, unseen, and unreleased. Each attempt at 
Infinite Jest appears in this archive as wholly outside the capacity for the archive to capture it in 
any way. Even when little details may be known about the production of each film, they retreat 
from the attempt to exhaustively accumulate, and provide unlimited access to, the archive. In this 
way, not only is InterLace TelEntertainment’s dream of total access to an entertainment archive 
clearly a fantasy, but the very inability for the network to capture the unknown, self-generating 
parts of that network, lay the very foundations for that network’s dissolution through that 
network. 
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 The Entertainment or Infinite Jest (V) is precisely the piece of that archive that threatens 
not only the network, but the entire world in which that network exists, and as such its 
description deserves lengthy quotation: 
Infinite Jest (V?). Year of the Trial-Size Dove Bar. Poor Yorick Entertainment Unlimited. 
“Madame Psychosis”; no other definitive data. Thorny problem for archivists. 
Incandenza’s last film, Incandenza’s death occurring during its post-production. Most 
archival authorities list as unfinished, unseen. Some list as completion of Infinite Jest 
(IV), for which Incandenza also used “Psychosis,” thus list the film under Incandenza’s 
output for Y.T.M.P. Though no scholarly synopsis or report of viewing exists, two short 
essays in different issues of Cartridge Quarterly East refer to the film as “extraordinary” 
and “far and away (James O. Incandenza’s) most entertaining and compelling work.” 
West Coast archivists list the film’s gauge as “16 . . . 78 . . . n mm.,” basing the gauge on 
critical allusions to “radical experiments in viewers optical perspective and context” as IJ 
(V?)’s distinctive feature. Though Canadian archivist Tête-Bêche lists the film as 
completed privately and distributed by P.Y.E.U through posthumous provisions in the 
filmmaker’s will, all other comprehensive filmographies have the film either unfinished 
or UNRELEASED, its Master cartridge either destroyed or vaulted sui testator.667 
What this entry on the Entertainment reveals, perhaps more than any other place in the novel, is 
the absolute inability for it to be incorporated not only into the archive, but into the network. We 
can more-or-less be sure that Joelle/Madame Psychosis appeared in the film, that it was 
Himself’s last film, and that it definitely exists, but that is about it. The scholars who are writing 
about this film in Cartridge Quarterly East clearly could not have seen the film, for they are still 
upright, non-catatonic, and writing. Scholarly, archival, interpretive attention to the work is 
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impossible, even though the “West Coast archivists” claim that its film gauge approaches the 
infinite. We cannot even really be sure what the film is called, whether Infinite Jest (IV), (V), or 
(perhaps) (VI). It is both the obscene supplement to this archive, what excessively and 
chaotically overflows the attempt to capture it as an aesthetic object, while simultaneously being 
wholly absent. It is defined by a highly developed desire for order while being chaotic, 
unapproachable, unknowable, incomplete. Whatever the Entertainment is, whatever it is “about” 
cannot only not be known, the basic structures that permit such a knowledge (the archive) also 
prevent such knowledge. 
 So rather than attempt to “understand” the Entertainment, Wallace is constantly asking us 
to consider its impossible textuality, to consider it as something that not only we cannot know, 
but something that defines a highly complex level of aesthetic order—a level we cannot 
understand—in that the film has achieved a kind of “pure” or “perfect” level of aesthetics. It 
represents the ultimate desire on the part of any artist: to make something so captivating no one 
can look away. In this way, it achieves “what we really want, when we think that we love a work 
of art [. . .] for it to overwhelm us, trample us, crush us into bits. We hate and resent creators, 
above all, because they see right through us: they understand our secret lust for annihilation, and 
they offer to fulfill it.”668 The Entertainment fulfills the “secret lust for annihilation” everywhere 
marking the world of Infinite Jest, and it does so by achieving a kind of pure aesthetic mode. 
Through archivization, through the complexly ordered and chaotically enumerated network of 
Himself’s films, grounded upon the network of entertainment within the novel’s world, it is able 
to achieve this mode. 
 Infinite Jest (V) or the Entertainment in the world of Infinite Jest is a phenomenon of 
aesthetic emergence. No intentionality, no recourse to the auteur’s oeuvre, no hermeneutic 
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practice can explain it. Its perfection of aesthetics, its complete fulfillment of aesthetic desire, is 
clearly a fantasmatic limit, but a limit that, if we take away the idea of the film being an 
individual expression of Himself, is one that can be reached emergently. The film is an aesthetic 
object that has reached a higher level of aesthetic order than any single node in the entertainment 
network of the novel. Yes, the network, taken as a whole, may almost totally absorb the US 
citizenry who is engaging with it, but viewers of TV can still choose to turn their teleputers off. 
The Entertainment cannot be turned off. Grounded in the network, Infinite Jest (V) is a moment 
of aesthetic self-organization, of morphogenesis, of autopoesis. The Entertainment is an 
emergent phenomenon. 
 Steven Johnson, writing on the science of studying self-organization, defines emergence 
quite simply: “the movement from low-level rules to higher-level sophistication.”669 Emergent 
systems are everywhere, from the patterns formed out of chaotic “inert” matter, to the high level 
of intelligence shown by ant colonies and slime molds, to cities, to specific formations in 
communications networks themselves. These systems, 
in the simplest terms [. . .] solve problems by drawing on masses of relatively stupid 
elements, rather than a single, intelligent “executive branch.” They are bottom-up 
systems, not top down. They get their smarts from below. In more technical language, 
they are complex adaptive systems that display emergent behavior. In these systems, 
agents residing on one scale start producing behavior that lies one scale above them: ants 
create colonies; urbanites create neighborhoods; simple pattern-recognition software 
learns how to recommend new books.670 
Johnson defines three levels of emergence: complex: “with multiple agents dynamically 
interacting in multiple ways”671; dynamic: systems that “rarely settle in on a single, frozen shape; 
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they form patterns in time as well as space”672; and artificial. It is artificial emergence that 
mainly that concerns Johnson, and this is also the mode of emergence that can account for the 
Entertainment. Artificial emergence, “one that began sometime in the past decade [the 1990s],” 
occurred when  
we stopped analyzing emergence and started creating it. We began building self-
organizing systems into our software applications, our video games, our art, our music. [. 
. .] For as long as complex organisms have been alive, they have lived under the laws of 
self-organization, but in recent years our day-to-day life has become overrun with 
artificial emergence: systems built with a conscious understanding of what emergence is, 
systems to exploit those laws the same way our nuclear reactors exploit the laws of 
atomic physics. Up to now, the philosophers of emergence have struggled to interpret the 
world. But they are now starting to change it.673 
In Emergence Johnson speculates how systems of artificial emergence will develop as the 
science of emergence becomes self-aware. And for the purposes of thinking about the 
Entertainment, it is highly significant that he focuses on media-emergence near the end of his 
book. Such media emergence occurs when  
suddenly, every miniseries, every dance remix, every thriller, every music video ever 
made, is available from anywhere, anytime. The grid shatters into a million free-floating 
agents, roaming aimlessly across the landscape like those original slime mold cells. All 
chaos, no order. And then, slowly, clusters begin to form, shapes emerging out of the 
shapelessness. [. . .] The Web will contribute the metadata that enables these clusters to 
self-organize.674 
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With the concept of artificial self-organization in mind, it is nearly impossible to not understand 
the Entertainment as just such a cluster emerging out of the chaos of both Himself’s archived 
network of texts/films, as well an emergence from the greater chaos of InterLace 
TelEntertainment. What appears shapeless and chaotic—the archive of Himself’s filmic output—
becomes ordered not by Wallace’s highly ordered, academic list, but by the final, emergent entry 
into that list, Infinite Jest (V). And, like distributed networks themselves, “emergent systems can 
work toward different types of goals: some of them admirable, some of them destructive.”675 
 And nowhere let it be claimed that the Entertainment is not destructive. Its emergent 
properties threaten the world with an absolute, textual, entertainment apocalypse. It takes what 
Shaviro says about why film is attractive to the nth degree: 
What film offers its viewers is something far more compelling and disturbing: a 
Bataillean ecstasy of expenditure, of automutilation and self-abandonment [. . .] the 
blinding contact with the real. In affirming raw sensation, in communicating the violent 
contents of visual excitation apart from its pacifying forms, and in provoking visceral 
excitation, film hyperbolically aggravates vision, pushing it to an extreme point of 
implosion and self-annihilation.676 
In a very real sense, the “self-annihilation” that Himself spent most of his career working on—
nuclear weaponry, annular fusion, a tennis academy who gets its kicks from Eschaton—
aesthetically emerges from the Entertainment. Here, the nuclear trope, having become wholly 
textual through the Eschaton scene, textually emerges, ordering the incompleteness inherent in 
such a mathematical apocalyptic simulation. Text itself becomes nuclear, apocalyptic, disastrous, 
a point of “real world” crisis. The Entertainment is the crisis and peripeteia of Eschaton writ 
large. It is the emergence of the nuclear, not as an “event,” a moment where the bomb explodes, 
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a moment of destruction, of indetermination, of a nothingness violently introduced into the real, 
but rather of an accumulation, semiotic ordering, network distribution, and rhizomatic 
assemblage of the real itself, of materiality and the materiality of text becoming apocalyptic. 
Infinite Jest (V), perhaps more than any other construction in the American nuclear imagination, 
emphasizes the destructive capacity of what happens when the archive becomes a hyperarchive, 
accumulating toward infinity, every entry connected at every moment to every other entry. If the 
American eschatological anxiety and desire is for total annihilation, Infinite Jest highlights that 
even without the “presence” of the nuclear bomb, or indeed even without the teleological end to 
America’s Cold War narrative, annihilation—even in “progress”—remains a dominant form in 
the cultural imagination. 
 And it is precisely such formations of the imagination which Wallace was engaged in 
combating throughout his entire oeuvre, and most explicitly in Infinite Jest. With the 
Entertainment he pushes the Armageddon-type explosion meta-fiction has always been about to 
its ridiculous, hyperbolic end: a postmodern, metafictional (or metafilmic) text capable of 
producing the apocalypse. At a few curious moments in the novel,677 Wallace even gives us the 
possibility that an “anti-samizdat,” an “anti-Entertainment” exists. Whether it exists or not, 
however, is wholly besides the point, for it is clear that Infinite Jest itself endeavors to be such an 
“anti-Entertainment.” Though I have not discussed the other major half of the novel that follows 
Don Gately and the residents of the Ennet (Halfway) House, this half of the novel is not only 
“non-eschatological,” but is “anti-eschatological.” The possibilities for empathy, human 
connection, communication, fighting the addictions attendant to postmodern living, and the 
liberatory potential of sincerity—all of these Wallace explores with such exacting care, 
complexity, and hope, that it is difficult to not think that Wallace’s ultimate goal with the novel 
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was, like Himself’s goal with Infinite Jest (V), to communicate with a silent reader, to make that 
reader speak to the author, and to somehow provide a balm for what Wallace always saw as the 
principle problem of individuation: loneliness; Infinite Jest succeeds where Infinite Jest (V) fails. 
 But this has already been fairly well-understood about Wallace’s larger goals as a writer 
and his specific goals in Infinite Jest. What makes the novel so remarkable within the apocalyptic 
tradition it is part of, is that it constructs an anti-eschatological aesthetic, a narrative mode that 
not only does not need the ideologically abused rhetoric of ends, crises, and catastrophes, but 
constructs a mode that attempts to do away with such discourse once and for all by pushing 
hyperbolically past its own end. Wallace so thoroughly uses (and abuses) the nuclear trope, that 
throughout the rest of his work it becomes unnecessary. Nowhere is his writing after Infinite Jest 
marked by any apocalyptic fear or desire, but rather points forward to a present that does not end, 
and how the American imagination might continue without a telos, without a narrative. If the 
Entertainment traces the destructive capacities for aesthetic emergence, then Wallace’s own 
entertainment materially traces emergent possibility, creation, potential, and ultimately, hope. 
 
4.5 “DATUM CENTURIO”: AT THE END OF ENDS, TOWARD A HYPERARCHIVAL 
REALISM 
 
And when he came back to, he was flat on his back on the beach in the freezing sand, and 
it was raining out of a low sky, and the tide was way out. 
  —David Foster Wallace, Infinite Jest678 
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It is nearly impossible to read the above epigraph, the final sentence of Infinite Jest, without 
hearing the echoes of other important endings within the American and nuclear traditions, 
particularly (but of course not limited to) the final scenes in Herman Melville’s Moby-Dick 
(1851), F. Scott Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby (1925), and Nevil Shute’s On the Beach (1957). 
Wallace, like these writers, ends his novel with a contemplation of what Sigmund Freud’s friend 
once called “a feeling which he would like to call a sensation of ‘eternity,’ a feeling as of 
something limitless, unbounded—as it were, ‘oceanic.’”679 Consider, for instance, Melville’s 
sense of the “oceanic” at the end of Moby-Dick when Ishmael, the Pequod having just sunk, is 
stranded at sea, not yet floating on his life-preserving coffin: “Now small fowls flew screaming 
over the yet yawning gulf; a sullen white surf beat against its steep sides; then all collapsed, and 
the great shroud of the sea rolled on as it rolled five thousand years ago.”680 Or else the end of 
The Great Gatsby when Nick, having  
wandered down to the beach and sprawled out on the sand [. . .] became aware of the old 
island here that flowered once for Dutch sailors’ eyes—a fresh, green breast of the new 
world. Its vanished trees, the trees that had made way for Gatsby’s house, had once 
pandered in whispers to the last and greatest of all human dreams; for a transitory 
enchanted moment man must have held his breath in the presence of this continent, 
compelled into an aesthetic contemplation he neither understood nor desired, face to face 
for the last time in history with something commensurate to his capacity for wonder.681 
And Shute’s novel, one of the first novels to explicitly explore a nuclear apocalypse, ends with 
Mary quite literally “on the beach”: “The sea lay before her, grey and rough with great rollers 
coming in from the south on to the rocky beach below. The ocean was empty and grey beneath 
the overcast, but away to the east there was a break in the clouds and a shaft of light striking 
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down on to the waters. [. . .] She sat there dumbly watching as the low grey shape went forward 
to the mist on the horizon, holding the bottle on her knee. This was the end of it, the very, very 
end.”682 
 We can safely assume here that Wallace is drawing from all of these moments, from a 
long tradition of ending novels—American, nuclear, or otherwise—“on the beach,” a tradition of 
ending novels by confronting the oceanic and the eternal by emphasizing human finitude when 
considered in the face of the gaping, abyssal maw of the infinite. Significantly, however, unlike 
Melville, Fitzgerald, or Shute’s novels, this moment of the novel is not actually the end. In fact, 
it is not even “the beginning,” nor anything in between; for what we are given in this scene is a 
(perhaps drug-induced) flashback Don Gately has while recovering from an infected gunshot 
wound in the hospital, recalling a scene that took place before the events of the novel proper. In 
this flashback Gately does not “make his way to the beach,” or follow some teleological quest to 
its fatal, unavoidable culmination like Ishmael. He is placed there. The sentence before this he is 
in an apartment, about to witness the murder of his friend before slipping into drug-induced 
unconsciousness, “with his eyes closing as the floor finally pounced.”683 Wallace not only does 
not give us the linear, narrative line that would connect this moment to Gately’s oceanic 
moment, but, in fact, he gives us no other sequence that would get us to this final sentence either. 
 Considered simply in the terms of fulfilling narrative expectations, this final scene, as has 
been commented upon by virtually anyone who has read the novel, is unsatisfactory. It does not 
have the sense of fleeting human endeavor in the face of the eternal, unchanging ocean that 
Moby-Dick has, nor the final complex temporal image of Gatsby—“so we beat on, boats against 
the current, borne back ceaselessly into the past”684—nor the utter hopelessness of simply 
waiting for the radiation cloud—the very, very end—in On the Beach. For, as has been 
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mentioned above, Infinite Jest’s end is its beginning, its “actual” end takes place before the 
beginning, and the Entertainment apocalypse, the eschaton of the projected world, is withheld. 
(In the American tradition, Wallace is much closer in terms of temporality, eschatology, and 
teleology to the Whitman of “Song of Myself”: “I have heard what the talkers were talking, the 
talk of the beginning and the end, / But I do not talk of the beginning or the end.”685) 
 What Wallace achieves in this final line is the culmination of his anti-eschatological 
project. No path through Infinite Jest—linear, non-linear, or otherwise—can get us to this final 
sentence. We cannot follow Gately’s (or anyone else’s) consciousness toward this line (for he is 
unconscious). There is no coherent narrative sequence that will take us to it. As it takes place 
before the events of the novel, there is also absolutely no reference to this moment anywhere else 
that would be temporally after it. The line, like Gately himself, is literally placed at an end which 
has no relationship to the narrative. But it does not come out of nowhere. More than even 
placing Gately in this classic position of an oceanic end, he is placing Melville, Fitzgerald, and 
Shute at the end of the novel. He is taking the oceanic narrative trope itself, and ending with that, 
and in a sense, ending that ending. 
 If Melville forces us to think of the biblical (and apocalyptic) past of the flood, Fitzgerald 
to inhabit a present constantly bombarded by our own difficult and violent history as we struggle 
into the future, and Shute a future where the human has disappeared, Wallace, in one fell swoop, 
achieves a narrative mode that not only inhabits a kind of Whitmanian perpetual present, but 
takes the discourse of the apocalypse off the table completely. The final sentence of Infinite Jest 
is merely its final sentence, not its end, not its beginning, not its middest, just a moment, a 
moment like any other, but a moment freed of the ends it invokes and concludes. If it is the end 
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of anything, in any sense of the term, it is the end of the Armageddon-type explosion fiction has 
always been about. 
 It is fitting, then, that Wallace’s work following Infinite Jest never again returns to the 
apocalyptic mode that has been so exhaustively explored here; nor does he ever again project a 
(dystopian) future as he does in The Broom of the System or Infinite Jest, except in one 
significant story which, to my knowledge, remains mostly untouched in terms of critical 
engagement.686 
 “Datum Centurio” is a unique and curious story considered against the rest of Wallace’s 
oeuvre. Collected in Brief Interview with Hideous Men, it is the only story of his that might 
properly be called “science fiction” and, indeed, “posthuman.” It is also hardly a story at all—
especially in Wallace’s terms—in that “Datum Centurio” is ostensibly a four-and-a-half page 
dictionary entry on the word “date.” This entry is imaginatively said to come “from Leckie & 
Webster’s Connotationally Gender-Specific Lexicon of Contemporary Usage,”687 published in 
the year 2096. In short, this “story” gives us the different definitions of a particular sense of the 
word “date” as understood in 2096, not in terms of the sense that designates a particular day in 
history, nor in the sense that something old is “dated.” Rather the entry endeavors to give a 
specific account of the evolution of the word date from the “univocal 20C definition of date3: 
‘(a) social engagement(s) with (a) member(s) of the opposite sex (Webster’s V, 1999, 
ROM/print).”688  
 Given the context of the entire story, Wallace’s goal with this piece is to imagine a future 
in which “dating” is completely mechanized, consisting of either a “soft date”: “the process of 
voluntarily submitting one’s nucleotide configurations and other Procreativity Designators to an 
agency empowered by law to identify an optimal female neurogenetic complement for the 
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purposes of Procreative Genital Interface”; or else a “hard date”: “the creation and/or use of a 
Virtual Female Sensory Array [. . .] for the purposes of Simulated Genital Interface.”689 
Considering how the majority of Brief Interviews with Hideous Men is devoted to exploring 
sexual relationships generally, and the various permutations relationships between men and 
women may undergo specifically, “Datum Centurio” is engaged with questioning and 
problematizing contemporary sexual practices taken to their functional and masturbatory 
extreme. And, like much of the rest of the collection in which it appears, the story is massively 
successful in simply raising questions regarding the mere possibility (or impossibility) of 
authentic, intimate, human connection. 
 For my purposes here, however, I am more interested in simply the form through which 
Wallace frames and produces these questions, a form that deserves a lengthy quotation to 
highlight the archival textuality of this story. This future dictionary defines dating in the 20th 
century as follows: 
Nash & Leckie’s Condensed DVD2 History of Male Sexuality notes that for 20C males, 
date as intergender “social engagement” could connote either of two highly distinct 
endeavors: (A) the mutual exploration of possibilities for neurogenetic compatibility 
(KEY at Historical Note (5) for RELATIONSHIP), leading to legally codified 
intergender union and P.G.I. and soft offspring; or (B) the unilateral pursuit of an 
immediate, vigorous, and uncodified episode of genital interface without regard to 
neurogenetic compatibility or soft offspring or even a telephone call the next day. 
Because—according to R. and F. Leckie, eds., DFX Lattice of Monochromosomatic 
Psyche—the connotational range of date3 as “social engagement” for 20C females was 
almost exclusively (A), whereas an implicit but often unspoken and just as often 
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fraudulent interest in connotation (A) was often employed by 20C males for purposes 
related exclusively to connotation (B) (KEY at LOTHARIONISM; at 
SPORTFUCKING‡ [‡=Of idiomatic origin]; at MISOGAMY; at LIZARDY, LOUNGE-
‡; at OEDIPAL, PRE-), the result of an estimated 86.5% of 20C dates was a state of 
severe emotional dissonance between the date’s participants, a dissonance attributed by 
most sources to basic psychosemantic miscodings (KEY at MISCODINGS, 
INTERGENDER; Secondary KEYS at Historical Notes for MISOGAMY, 
OSTENSIBLE PROJECTED FORMS OF; for VICTIMIZATION, CULTURE OF; for 
FEMINISM, MALEVOLENT SEPARATIST OF EARLY U.S. 21C; for SEXUAL 
REVOLUTION OF LATE 20C, PATHETIC DELUSIONS OF).690 
With “Datum Centurio” Wallace produces what I have called hyperarchival realism. The 
“story” or “entry” is only a incredibly miniscule fragment of what can only be a massive 
dictionary, a digital “DVD3” that presumably puts the Oxford English Dictionary to shame. But 
even given merely this small fragment, an entire world is projected archivally, a world with a 
complex social, political, and technological reality, a world with not only a complicated history, 
but a history that endeavors to read its own past (our present) through what texts are available, 
through what remains of the archive. Furthermore, this is a textuality that not only makes a 
gesture to digital texts’ ability to be hyperlinked, but to even read the story requires imagining 
what these other texts being “keyed” to are. The language of the entry absolutely depends upon 
smashing together an imagined future lexicon with contemporary idiomatic usage, creating a 
mélange of disturbing, clever, funny, and weighty signification that both highlights the perennial 
narrative fascination with human sexual relationships as well as emphasizing the banality and 
cliché of such narratives. Furthermore, the complex array of signification produced by “Datum 
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Centurio” is produced emergently in the same fashion that the Entertainment emerges from the 
archive of Himself’s work in Infinite Jest. Through the complex interaction of many layers of 
textual and archival practices—dictionary definitions, particular historical idioms (i.e. “lounge 
lizard”), neologisms (“psychosemantic”), political history, quantified data, imagined 
authoritative texts, technical language, gender difference, etc.—Wallace achieves a level of 
realism that is wholly dependent upon archival form. The recursive production of text, of 
archival textuality, rather than removing itself from the real through an endless layering of 
mediation, forces an encounter with one of the most basic facts of any experience of reality: the 
impossibility for any subject to ever connect with or understand an other. 
In the long narrative of nuclear textuality I have been exploring through Wallace, “Datum 
Centurio” points to an imagination that is post-nuclear. The obsessions and anxieties pervading 
this short story are not those of archival destruction, nor those of archival accumulation. Both of 
these are a given part of the reality of the text. Projecting this dictionary definition into the year 
2096, the disappearance of text, the inability for even this massive dictionary and archive to 
access texts, is a given. The above definition of “date” is wholly dependent upon the 
disappearance, destruction, and deletion of texts in its oversimplification of our own present 
reality with regard to dating “dating”; but it is simultaneously dependent upon the codification, 
interpretation, and simplification of what exists in the archive—i.e., it can boil down the entire 
minefield of late 20th century sexual relations to this brief definition. On the other hand, it 
simultaneously takes archival accumulation and its potential destructive capacity as a given as 
well. The definition of date is weighed down by a massive archival textuality that, though we do 
not have access to it—let alone to the other definitions of “date”—cannot help but be felt; there 
is an infinite (and inaccessible) world history here, and not in an abstract Borgesian sense, but in 
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the specific, concrete experience of a totality that this fragment projects. “Datum Centurio” 
functions as a world projecting hologram. But this archival textuality, rather than bordering on or 
producing an absolute destruction of meaning—as with Infinite Jest (V)—is a simple reality 
given the projected advances in information technology. Furthermore, though the dystopian 
nature of “Datum Centurio” cannot help but to be felt by our own experience of contemporary 
dating practices, it does not necessarily present the historical change in human relationships as 
necessarily a negative thing, but rather merely presents a (more-or-less) objective account of this 
change. In other words, the clearly techno-futuristic world of the story is not marked by any 
apocalyptic type of change or end, let alone any clear sense of crisis; it just is. With “Datum 
Centurio” Wallace cannot be said to be participating in any eschatological, paranoid, anxious, 
and doom-speaking discourse. The future here for Wallace, so unlike The Broom of the System, 
“Westward the Course of Empire Takes Its Way,” and Infinite Jest, is not one marked by 
catastrophe, disaster, and annihilation. The world of “Datum Centurio” is not utopian by any 
means, but it is a world of human continuity and change, a world that—though perhaps slightly 
ridiculous—is nevertheless anti-eschatological. This hyperarchival realism that Wallace 
produces in “Datum Centurio” is a narrative mode not dependent upon crises or ends, but rather 
emphasizes the connections between texts with all the attendant destruction and accumulation 
accompanying such connections—the inherently temporal, fluid, dynamic, and vitally material 
nature of any textuality whatsoever. 
This is not to suggest that Wallace somehow, in a teleological manner, concludes the 
nuclear imagination, that he somehow completes a twentieth century American or postmodern 
project, but that, like so many other places in his work, he takes up the very real problems of this 
imagination and, by pushing its form past where it had previously been willing to go, punctures 
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through this imagination to arrive somewhere else. Obviously one need not look very far at the 
present moment to see the continued persistence of the nuclear imagination—the recent 
earthquake in Japan and the accompanying nuclear meltdowns being perhaps the most obvious 
case—but with Wallace the potential for new formulations of this imagination are not only 
clearly possible, but we can see how such formulations can take up the anxieties marked by 
technologies of destruction and accumulation, between nuclear and information technology, 
between the apocalypse and the digital dystopia, and point toward directions that need not be 
obsessively marked and over-determined by these technologies nor visions of the apocalypse. 
With the work of David Foster Wallace we can see a clear example of the potential for 
articulating a non-apocalyptic American and indeed global imagination, an imagination that, 
post-11 September 2001 and after what Alain Badiou calls the twentieth century’s “passion for 
the real,” desperately needs to be explored further if the cultural thanoptic fantasy of annihilation 
is not to become a reality. 
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 5.0 CODA: APOCALYPSE NETWORKS: REPRESENTING THE NUCLEAR ARCHIVE 
 
I considered fire, but I feared that the burning of an infinite book might be similarly 
infinite, and suffocate the planet in smoke. 
 —Jorge Luis Borges, “The Book of Sand”691 
 
5.1 THE BIG RED BUTTON AND THE KILL SWITCH 
 
During the summer of 2010 Senator Joseph Lieberman proposed a bill for an Internet “kill 
switch,” a bill that would grant the President of the United States the “far-reaching emergency 
powers to seize control of or even shut down portions of the Internet.”692 Though Lieberman 
quickly qualified the reach of his Protecting Cyberspace as a National Asset Act (PCNAA), 
stressing the relatively limited control it would grant the President,693 the idea of an Internet kill 
switch should give one significant pause in terms of the nuclear imagination of the twentieth 
century. The metaphor of the kill switch, a singular button or device that gives the President of 
the United States instantaneous control over a significant portion of a vast and powerful network 
is a trope whose origins clearly reside in the Cold War’s semi-mythical “Big Red Button.” The 
prospect of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), the dominant US national fantasy of the mid-
twentieth century, was often understood in the popular imagination as potentially resulting from 
a single action. And indeed, the instantaneity and abstraction of global nuclear war necessitated 
such a singular metaphor in order for the massive systemic complexity of the North American 
Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and its global capabilities to be comprehended. But the 
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technological, political, and economic realities surrounding nuclear capability are simply too 
complex to be captured by The Button in precisely the same way that Lieberman’s bill is a 
fantasmatic and reactionary attempt to explain and control an even more complex system than 
NORAD. The Internet, like the international capability of waging nuclear war, is simply too 
systemically and asymmetrically massive to be controlled in such a singular fashion.  
Among other things, the metaphors of the Big Red Button and the Internet kill switch 
emerge from an encounter with what Fredric Jameson famously calls the postmodern sublime. 
These two metaphors should be seen as “degraded attempts—through the figuration of advanced 
technology—to think the impossible totality of the contemporary world system.”694 The button 
and the switch stand in for totalities, for the vast networks of communication they control and the 
catastrophic potential destruction they represent. These systems are too large and complex to be 
“cognitively mapped.” Consequently, they are often represented in popular expression as 
singular metaphors that only vaguely correspond to the reality they represent, reifying the 
totalities that they stand in for, while their symbolic value and speculative projection have 
serious consequences in the world risk society. Even though Lieberman’s bill died fairly quickly 
on the floor of Congress, it is representative of the power and persistence of the nuclear referent 
to shape juridical practice and political discourse (even in the perceived absence of that referent). 
Thus the PCNAA, like the other twenty-first century speculative projections of archival 
destruction that I will be exploring in this coda, should be read as a significant and telling 
manifestation of the nuclear imagination of the present age. The speculative eschatological 
narrative of the United States’ power over instantaneous material destruction on a nearly 
unimaginable, species-wide scale has transformed in the wake of the Cold War, the attacks of 11 
September 2001, the subsequent War on Terror, the global emergence of Internet 2.0, the global 
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financial crisis, and observable climate change into a fantasmatic projection of informational 
control and ecological catastrophe. Like MAD, the material consequences of deploying an 
Internet kill switch, with even a slight amount of imaginative extrapolation, would clearly be 
disastrous considering the global reliance on the Internet for a great many of the species’ 
economic, political, social, biological, and ecological activities. 
 Further, there are interesting parallels to be drawn between the speculative narratives 
implicit in the PCNAA and the nuclear imagination. Recall that the Internet itself was largely an 
outgrowth of the perceived threat of MAD and the Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(ARPAnet). As media theorist Alexander Galloway notes in Protocol: “While many have 
debated the origins of the Internet, it’s clear that in many ways it was built to withstand nuclear 
attack. The Net was designed as a solution to the vulnerability of the military’s centralized 
system of command and control during the late 1950s and beyond. For, the argument goes, if 
there are no central command centers, then there can be no central targets and overall damage is 
reduced.”695 The irony of Lieberman’s bill is considerable. By making one system more 
structurally complex in order to stave off an imagined disaster, a system has emerged that is too 
complex to control and politicians are now attempting to legislate the capability to destroy or 
disable that original system in case of disaster, terrorism, or political unrest. Though a gross 
oversimplification, this, along with other reasons, is why Galloway further suggests that, “If one 
can consider nuclear attacks the most highly energetic, dominating, and centralized force that 
one knows—an archetype of the modern era—then the Net is at once the solution to and the 
inversion of this massive material threat, for it is precisely noncentralized, nondominating, and 
nonhostile.”696 Cybernetic and nuclear technologies, which share their origins in significant 
American and British military efforts during the Second World War,697 should thus be read as 
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structurally and historically intertwined. A nuclear criticism following the Cold War cannot 
ignore the imaginative and historical forces produced by the continued dialogue between 
information and military technologies, between the archive and the bomb, between the 
decentralization of the first nuclear age and the networked distribution of the second age in 
which the nuclear referent has dispersed in a variety of ways, some of which I will be attending 
to here. 
Among the many crucial insights of Derrida’s “No Apocalypse, Not Now” is his 
emphasis that fantasies of nuclear destruction should primarily be understood as projections of 
archival destruction:  
Now, what the uniqueness of nuclear war, its being-for-the-first-time-and-perhaps-for-
the-last-time, its absolute inventiveness gives us to think, even if it remains a decoy, a 
belief, a [f]antasmatic projection, is obviously the possibility of an irreversible 
destruction, leaving no traces, of the juridico-literary archive and therefore of the basis of 
literature and criticism. [. . .] The hypothesis we are considering here is that of a total and 
remainderless destruction of the archive.698  
Lieberman’s PCNAA, which at the time of this writing remains a fantasy, follows from this 
nuclear critical hypothesis and defines the eschatological limit of the archive along a different, 
yet parallel line; the contemporary archive par excellence, the Internet, here becomes capable of 
destroying itself, a capability that depends upon its underlying nuclear logic. And its 
disappearance would accompany some catastrophe or else would be catastrophic itself. During 
the second nuclear age the hypothesis of total archival destruction, though initially given to 
thought by the possibility of nuclear war, sheds its initial nuclear trappings and the destruction of 
the archive is given to thought by nothing outside of archival processes themselves.699 
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 To map this transformation from the archive threatened by global thermonuclear war to 
the archive’s threat to itself deserves a significant amount of attention, as the frequent 
juxtaposition of nuclear war and archival destruction in literary texts during the twentieth century 
more than demonstrate. Literature has long been fascinated by and anxious about its material 
disappearance and erasure. And yet, as Fernando Báez asks, “There are hundreds of studies on 
the origin of books and libraries, but there is not a single history of their destruction. Isn’t that a 
suspicious absence?”700 During the middle of the twentieth century these histories did in fact 
proliferate, but they were often set in the future and they were mostly fictional. The bomb’s 
imaginary, its relationship to history, and its non-event allowed (and for many writers required) 
narratives to project not only material destruction on an unprecedented scale, but, as Derrida 
suggests, archival destruction that “lack[s] any common proportion with, for example, the 
burning of a library, even that of Alexandria, which occasioned so many written accounts and 
nourished so many literatures.”701  
In this coda I will sketch a history of what I call the tale of archival crisis and examine a 
few examples of its current expression. Cultural artifacts that write the disaster have proliferated 
in the last sixty years, and so for this reason I can only trace a rough outline of the nuked archive, 
and my examples are less exhaustive than particular. But even this archival accumulation and our 
inability to access all of it proves my thesis. If during the first nuclear age, following Derrida, the 
total and remainderless destruction of the archive represented the disastrous asymptotic limit of 
global nuclear war, the second nuclear age’s eschatological limit, both in reality and literature, 
can be defined by the threat posed by the bomb and the archive. The archival imagination of the 
second nuclear age not only understands the archive as system with the capability of destroying 
itself, a haunting possibility that would have far reaching and disastrous effects upon the world, 
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but we can now perceive that archival accumulation, the underlying logic of the contemporary 
archival impulse to collect, store, and document everything, has the potential to be 
eschatologically threatening. 
 
5.2 TALES OF ARCHIVAL CRISIS IN THE FIRST NUCLEAR AGE 
 
Though the representation of archival destruction has an obviously rich literary tradition, and 
Paul K. Saint-Amour has demonstrated the presence of the nuclear referent in texts written 
before 1945,702 three notable early Cold War novels—George R. Stewart’s Earth Abides (1949), 
Walter M. Miller Jr.’s A Canticle for Leibowitz (1959), and Nevil Shute’s On the Beach 
(1957)—readily suggest themselves as points of departure. These novels are particularly 
representative of the early nuclear imagination, having long been understood as important 
manifestations of Cold War nuclear anxieties. Further, they are exemplary sketches of three 
distinct and important archival limits. These limits provide a structure to what we can 
(retroactively) see as aspects of the first nuclear age’s relationship to the archive. 
 Though the apocalypse it imagines is epidemiological rather than nuclear, it is impossible 
to read Stewart’s Earth Abides without a sense of the historical fallout from the bombing of 
Hiroshima, which occurred only four years previous to the novel’s publication. Earth Abides 
tells the story of a small group of survivors on the West Coast of the United States. One of the 
central threads of the novel follows Ish, the protagonist, and his urge to save an old library from 
destruction. When his son Joey shows a similar interest in knowledge, Ish begins taking him to 
the library. Joey’s tragic death ultimately ends Ish’s desire to protect the library, it falls into ruin, 
and the novel ends in a future where the species is unable to read its own past. The archive may 
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exist in some form at this particular limit of the eschatological archive, but it is illegible in 
Stewart’s speculation.  
Shute’s On the Beach similarly ends with the archive’s preservation (though this occurs 
tangentially). In the wake of a global nuclear war, extreme enough to poison the entire planet 
with radiation but not extreme enough to destroy everything (e.g. there is a moving scene in 
which the characters encounter a preserved yet irradiated Seattle), the novel narrates a humanity 
awaiting its inevitable end. Here the archive is preserved but there is no one around to read it.  
Miller, in A Canticle for Leibowitz, traces a slightly different path. Set in a monastery in a 
post-apocalyptic Southwestern United States, the first part of the novel concerns a scribe’s effort 
to preserve and illuminate a pre-nuclear manuscript. This manuscript, the “blessed 
documents”703 whose illumination is of great importance to Brother Francis, ironically turns out 
to be nothing more than mundane blueprints. This realization and the action of the rest of the 
novel emphasize the archive as a site of misreading, stressing that a hermeneutics of the archive, 
particularly a post-nuclear archive, will necessarily involve immoral misinterpretation.704 
 These three limits roughly encapsulate the boundaries of the archival imagination 
produced by the projection of nuclear war as it was expressed during the first nuclear age. In the 
speculated wake of MAD there will either be no one around to read the archive, literacy will be 
lost, or else the past will be quite difficult to decipher. And in a sense, these limits are not unique 
in the historical literary imagination.705 For, as in earlier texts like Nathaniel Hawthorne’s 
“Earth’s Holocaust” (1844) or William Carlos Williams’s Spring and All, in each of these 
scenarios, something remains. Historian Carolyn Steedman usefully calls this remainder “dust”: 
“[Dust] is not about rubbish, nor about the discarded; it is not about a surplus, left over from 
something else: it is not about Waste. Indeed, Dust is the opposite thing to Waste, or at least, the 
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opposite principle of Waste. It is about circularity, the impossibility of things disappearing, or 
going away, or being gone. Nothing can be destroyed.”706 The archive in each novel is not 
totally destroyed but remains in some form or another after the narrative has ended as dust.  
Obviously then, there is a fourth limit that is clearly absent here: Derrida’s total and 
remainderless destruction of the archive. If the nuclear referent for the first time provides the 
specter of total bibliocaust, we must realize simultaneously that the success of projecting such an 
abyssal proposition through mimesis is doomed.707 For there to be anything constructed or 
expressed in the face of archival destruction of this magnitude, even some irradiated dust must 
remain, something to ground, however shakily, the act of representation. As literary critic James 
Berger in his compelling study of twentieth century post-apocalyptic narrative and discourse 
suggests, “in nearly every apocalyptic presentation, something remains after the end,”708 and 
indeed, there is “a pervasive post-apocalyptic sensibility in recent American culture. It seems 
significant that in the late twentieth century we have had the opportunity [. . .] to see after the end 
of our civilization—to see in a strange prospective retrospect what the end would actually look 
like: it would look like a Nazi death camp, or an atomic explosion, or an ecological or urban 
wasteland.”709 And a great deal of modern and postmodern cultural production, perhaps nowhere 
more evident than in twentieth century nuclear narratives, has expanded our perspective on this 
post-apocalyptic present. 
The nuclear archives of Stewart, Shute, and Miller are born from the trauma of a post-
apocalyptic archive fever: a desire to preserve the present after the end coupled with a despair 
that one could never hope to read, interpret, or decipher the post-nuclear archive. To put it 
broadly, projecting archives of disaster fundamentally shaped our conception of archives of all 
kinds during the first nuclear age, and we quite quickly imagined archival processes as defense 
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mechanisms against future devastation. The nuclear bomb also provided the archive with a 
definite telos, a reason for existing that it previously lacked in such stark terms. The intentional 
archive as imagined in Arthur C. Clarke’s Rendezvous with Rama (1973), and Larry Niven and 
Jerry Pournelle’s The Mote in God’s Eye (1974), for example, becomes an archive whose explicit 
goal is to preserve aspects of civilization in the wake of its collapse. Archives have always been 
about preservation, about cataloging and organizing past documents for future users, but the 
archive’s raison d’être was historical, progressive, self-justifying, and tautological (i.e. 
preserving the past for future historians was unquestionably important; the archive should be 
preserved because the archive should be preserved). In the nuclear imagination the archive 
becomes a site that anticipates its own remainderless destruction and often plans for it.710 
Nuclear archives, whether real or fictional, produce a kind of dust avant la lettre. With 
this in mind I think it is appropriate to modify slightly Walter Benjamin’s famous dictum to 
describe such an archive: “There is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a 
document of [future] barbarism.”711 The power over the nuclear archive is not only over history 
and the present, but over “post-history,” an imagined future whose only tie to the past is through 
the post-nuclear archive. Quite simply, how we imagine this type of future directly shapes the 
archival constructions of the present. Both conservative and progressive senses of history are 
complicated in this post-nuclear archive while in no way diminishing it as a site of power and 
knowledge, a system whose critical evaluation is then obviously paramount. Consequently, one 
of the goals of a revitalized nuclear criticism should be to realize that one of the central debates 
during its brief vogue in the late-1980s to the early-1990s, the disagreements about the “real” 
versus the “textual” nature of nuclear war, should be reframed. The first nuclear age, which came 
to a close with the end of the Cold War, can now be characterized by this complex interplay 
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between history, the archive, and speculative destruction, a temporality produced by the specter 
of global thermonuclear war that was, as Derrida puts it, “a phenomenon whose essential feature 
is that it is fabulously textual, through and through,”712 and quite real in the sense that MAD 
failed to occur alongside, and in a certain sense because of, the nuclear archival imagination of 
this period. By imagining the various limits of archival destruction, the limit beyond which such 
destruction could not pass, the total and remainderless destruction of the archive has remained 
unrealized. Stewart, Shute, and Miller, by projecting their various archival limits into the future, 
by letting post-nuclear dust drift from the future into the present, can now be read as inscribing 
the non-event of global nuclear war into the past. In other words, the hindsight provided by the 
second nuclear age is one in which MAD has moved into the archive of the past; nuclear 
apocalypse has become historical even though it failed to occur. Consequently, one of the many 
tasks given to nuclear critics of the second nuclear age should be to endeavor to understand the 
post-nuclear dust that remains, the archival inscriptions of nuclear war that continue to inflect 
and inform the textuality and reality of contemporaneity, disaster, and the world risk society. 
 
5.3 TALES OF ARCHIVAL CRISIS IN THE SECOND NUCLEAR AGE 
 
In the remainder of this coda I will focus on three recent works of fiction that I believe nicely 
capture and complicate the archival imagination of the present: David Mamet’s Wilson: A 
Consideration of the Sources (2000), Neal Stephenson’s Anathem (2008), and Charles Stross’s 
novella-length, “Palimpsest” (2009). These three texts all demonstrate that the technological 
fantasy of the twentieth century, nuclear annihilation, in certain ways has been transmogrified 
into an informational sublime—an encounter with a massive amount of information that cannot 
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ever be accessed in its entirety, let alone understood. Each novel explicitly posits the archive in 
relationship to disaster, but in a much more complicated sense than, say, artificial intelligence 
getting out of control. Rather, these fictions all realize that in the second nuclear age archives 
trace complex relationships to history, temporality, and politics that cannot be easily mapped 
along an eschatological, linear trajectory. Nonetheless, the archive in each text remains a site of 
crisis in terms of archival destruction, of anticipating or reacting to nuclear war, and as an agent 
of disaster, clearly displaying a relationship with the tradition of archival crisis during the first 
nuclear age as explored in Stewart, Shute, and Miller, while considerably reconfiguring the 
temporality of archival crisis. The singular and dramatic narrative event of global nuclear war, 
even if present at some moment in the texts’ narrative history, in each of these texts is dispersed, 
both spatially and temporally. The threats Mamet, Stephenson, and Stross imagine for their 
archives are no longer singular, causing “irreversible destruction, leaving no traces,”713 but have 
fluidly multiplied in archives that are themselves multiple, fluid, rhizomatic, and nonlinear. The 
singular destruction that marked the tale of archival crisis during the first nuclear age disperses 
throughout these texts’ archives to the point that multiplicitous crisis becomes a fundamental 
principle of the archives’ construction of themselves. 
Though Wilson, a highly idiosyncratic novel for David Mamet,714 is a fragmentary, 
experimental pastiche of text supposedly recovered hundreds of years after the Internet’s 
destruction, it functions as an exemplary transitional text of the tale of archival crisis as it moves 
into the second nuclear age. Wilson is presented as a critical edition of an important historical 
text, with all the attendant scholarly notes, emendations, and commentary one would expect from 
such a volume. Mamet, however, is clearly parodying this mode of textual production and 
preservation, calling attention to the absurdity of post-archival work, the vacuity of present forms 
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of scholarship, and the relative fragility of the institutions of twentieth century literary and 
cultural production.715 Further, the speculative future it imagines is eerily similar to the one 
projected by Lieberman’s PCNAA; the destruction of the Internet in Wilson leads to the collapse 
of civilization in a fashion hardly distinguishable from narratives of nuclear annihilation. 
The novel constantly calls attention to its own act of narrating and its mode of critical 
analysis while simultaneously obscuring most of the relevant information necessary to 
understand its narrative scope. For instance, there is nothing explicit in the text of Wilson that 
informs us what purpose the fragments we have chaotically gathered in front of us serve, nor 
where they come from. One has to read the back cover of the book for this information: “When 
the Internet—and the collective memory of the twenty-first century—crashes, the past is 
reassembled from the downloaded memories of Ginger, wife of ex-President Wilson.”716 The 
novel attempts and dramatically fails to represent the “‘Time of the Destruction of All 
Knowledge.’”717 The late-twentieth and early twenty-first centuries in Wilson become a fairly 
brief and unrecorded period of human history: “For, dating [. . .] the Crash of the Internet in 
2021, we have had a period of eighty [. . .] years of the reign of that commodity understood as 
‘information,’ we have a scant nineteen years, the ‘time of the Troubles,’ before the Revelation, 
and the Riots.”718 The irony should be clear: for an age that worshipped the commodity of 
information, Wilson’s narrator/scholar has surprisingly little information from this period. 
 Wilson shares with the earlier nuclear texts I discussed above a sense of archival dust’s 
persistence even in a world where the Internet has accidentally deleted itself for an absurd reason 
(a kind of Dr. Strangelove [1964] for the information age). Its wide use of fragmentation and 
historical distortion repeatedly emphasize the futility of archival reconstruction and the mimetic 
and hermeneutic challenges of narrating (a post-infocaust) history. At once hypertextual and 
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retro-modernist, the result of the word processor and a post-Cold War literature of exhaustion, 
the novel materially enacts its own metafictional reconstruction of history in the wake of archival 
disaster.  
That it does this without a nuclear explosion should be emphasized. A major difference 
between Mamet’s novel and, say, A Canticle for Leibowitz, perhaps even more than the formal 
differences, is the apparent absence of the nuclear referent. Yet even so, the nuclear persists as an 
instantaneous technological disaster with wide-reaching global consequences here, much as 
instantaneous disaster remains a common feature of contemporary ecological disaster narratives 
(e.g., the films of Roland Emmerich, which depend upon instantaneous disaster for their 
narrative tension). The anxiety Mamet highlights, then, is the reverse of what it appears to be. 
Rather than worry about what might be lost or destroyed (indeed the novel contains a preface 
with the clear, if disingenuous acknowledgment that “all knowledge, of course, was not lost”719), 
Wilson paints in broad strokes the anxiety accompanying archival accumulation. Everywhere 
pointing to the absurdities of postmodern media-culture, contemporary archive fever, and the 
jargon filled minutiae of historical and literary scholarship, the novel ultimately asks not only 
how future historians will begin to engage with a period during which so much, perhaps too 
much, was saved (i.e., how does one begin to choose what to study?), but how this very approach 
to something like the asymptotic limit of “total knowledge” leads toward disaster. The urge to 
preserve the documents of the past in the face of an uncertain though eschatological nuclear 
future transforms into the very thing threatening that future. Wilson understands the present’s 
hyper-connectivity and its encyclopedic drive as absurd, dangerous, and inevitably disastrous as 
the totality of this information amounts to nothing short of an absence of information. 
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Neal Stephenson’s Anathem shares Wilson’s sense of inevitable destruction if not its 
formal experimentation. Following four doorstops of encyclopedic historical fiction from 
Stephenson, the equally voluminous Anathem is set in an alternate universe on the planet Arbre 
in the far future, but it is understood that this world’s history very much mirrors the history of 
our own. Arbre’s most distinct feature is that throughout the world are large monasteries called 
concents. These concents were originally established after the end of the “Praxic Age” (when 
theory and practice were partners), an epoch that very much resembles our own present, at which 
point some global nuclear catastrophe occurred. After the destruction of civilization people 
decided to establish these concents for two reasons: to preserve both knowledge and the 
academic environment in which to pursue philosophy, math, and science unimpeded, and to 
organize these concents in such a manner that they would not be jeopardized by the vicissitudes 
of—nor would they affect—the outside world. By establishing strict rules regarding the 
technological advancement allowed to the monastic secular intellectuals inhabiting these 
concents, while severely restricting communication with the Praxic world, these monastery-
archives were established to ensure that no matter what was happening outside, or “extramuros,” 
they could preserve a degree of stability and continuity inside the archive itself while 
simultaneously restricting the knowledge and learning thought to have caused the ancient 
“Terrible Events” from practical application in the world. In other words, these archives are an 
attempt to de-realize the remainderless archival destruction of total nuclear war through both the 
preservation and segregation of the knowledge contained in the archive. Further, each concent 
contains multiple barriers between different areas of the archive, called “maths,” and these 
barriers are rigidly defined while being spatially porous at certain sanctioned times. Each section 
or math of each concent is divided by a wall with a gate that opens every one, ten, hundred, or 
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thousand years to communicate extramuros, the idea being that each successive level of the 
concent is more purely devoted to theory-as-such by being further removed from the outside 
world and the practical application of the knowledge stored in the archive. 
Anathem’s archive is thus located at a complex spatial and temporal frontier. Rather than 
residing in a deserted post-apocalyptic wasteland, as in A Canticle for Leibowitz, it is 
simultaneously at the center of the world and wholly outside of it. Likewise, for the avouts 
residing in the maths, the outside world constitutes a similar frontier, simultaneously outside 
their possible experience while limning their temporal and spatial existence inside, depending 
upon which section of the concent the avouts reside in. This radically shifts the “normative” 
post-apocalyptic narrative’s representation of space as a liminal frontier (e.g., Mad Max [1979] 
or Cormac McCarthy’s The Road [2006]). Rather than presenting post-apocalyptic space as 
simply something outside, distant, foreign, or other, something that the nuclear introduces 
through its transgressive destruction, in Anathem it also constitutes a center, ground, foundation, 
and core. Furthermore, rather than present contemporary civilization’s collapse as temporally 
bounded, as eschatological or teleological, the civilization outside of Anathem’s concents, 
“[d]uring some eras [. . .] would grow and engulf our walls, and office workers in skyscrapers 
would gaze down on the tops of our bastions. At other times it would ebb and recede to a tiny 
fueling-station or gun emplacement at the river crossing”720; or as Erasmas—the protagonist of 
the novel—notes regarding the concent’s honey production: “[w]hen there was an economy 
extramuros, we could sell the honey to burgers in the market stall before the Day Gate, and use 
the money to buy things that were difficult to make inside the concent. When conditions outside 
were post-apocalyptic, we could eat it.”721 These moments, along with much of the rest of the 
novel, display a concrete awareness that complex and inextricable relationships between 
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technologies of information and destruction are further complicated and, in a way, reversed from 
traditional archival modes. The archive in Anathem becomes temporally teleological, and it is 
disaster that becomes a site of constant change, reversal, cyclicality, difference, and repetition. 
Indeed, in his off-handed observation of the inconsequentiality of whether the outside world was 
post-apocalyptic or not, Erasmas takes this archival reversal as a given. 
 As Erasmas’s narrative moves forward it is revealed that a starship orbiting the planet 
contains humans from a different though parallel universe who have found a way to enter Arbre. 
Stephenson justifies the multiple universes within Anathem not only in terms of physics, but in 
terms of narrative. Each universe, or “worldtrack,” has seen different historical narratives play 
out based on choices individuals have made, as well as attempts to violate the causal, linear 
nature of time itself: “‘This is how the universe protects herself—prevents violations of 
causality. If you attempt to do anything that would give you the power of violating the laws of 
cause-and-effect—to go back in time and kill your grandfather,’” one finds themselves “‘in a 
different and separate causal domain? How extraordinary! [. . .] One is shunted into an altogether 
different narrative [. . .] and thus causality is preserved.’” 722 In Anathem, not only notions of 
temporal and spatial liminality are upset by the crises of archivization—the relationship between 
the rise and fall of civilization and the archive’s approach to knowledge preservation—like the 
fragmented, unreliable, and fabricated text of Wilson, narrative itself is subject to archival crisis. 
The archive in Anathem is able to project a world, and that ability is multiplied infinitely in 
Stephenson’s invocation of alternate universes, conceiving space-time like some kind of hyper-
Borgesian library. The universes of Anathem’s possible narratives are archives themselves, 
entries into the infinite, total set of all possible universes. In this way, this archive repeats, in a 
kind of vicious circle, its own grounding in the archival crises everywhere punctuating the novel. 
326 
 
 Situating the archive within a fluid, multiplicitous, synchronic, and recursive temporality 
is even more explicitly imagined in Charles Stross’s “Palimpsest,” which grounds itself in the 
understanding that, without major leaps in technology, leaps that appear at this point to be all but 
magic, humanity’s future is indeed quite finite. As the short story repeatedly emphasizes, the 
universe cannot even indefinitely support itself. One can try to extend human existence as far and 
as long as the universe allows, but the extinction of humanity is inevitable no matter the extent of 
human technological prowess. The powers that be in the world of “Palimpsest,” an organization 
known as Stasis, have one goal: to combat humanity’s extinction for as long as it can. Having 
achieved the ability to send bodies and information forward and backward through time, Stasis 
seeds and reseeds the universe with humans over trillions of years. The limits of “Palimpsest”’s 
narrative correspond to the limits of the universe as such, much in the cosmic tradition of H.G. 
Wells or Olaf Stapledon.  
 Perched at the edge of a small crunch—in “Fimbulwinter: the winter at the end of the 
world, after the last fuel for the necrosun’s accretion disk had been consumed, leaving Earth 
adrift in orbit around a cold black hole, billions of light-years from anything else”723—is an 
archive, “The Library at the End of Time,”724 in which all of recorded human history resides. To 
accomplish their at times brutally preservationist goal, Stasis has constructed this immeasurably 
vast hyperarchive725 to gather together all the data from the “fully ninety-six percent of humanity 
[that] lives in eras where the ubiquitous surveillance or personal life-logging technologies have 
made the recording of absolute history possible.”726 Collected during the collapse of whatever 
civilization produced it, the information is then sent forward to the archive, sent from a humanity 
who number “nearly twenty billion billion of us. We are not merely legion—we rival in our 
numbers the stars of the observable universe in the current epoch.”727 The Library then 
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reconfigures and re-communicates the relevant information it contains to important points in the 
past, its teleological goal being to extend and preserve all historical timelines or “worldtracks” in 
which it exists. Archival preservation creates the history of archival preservation. This ur-library 
is not only a representation and agent of history, in a sense, it is history. 
 “Palimpsest” turns on the realization that the only way humanity could extend itself is 
temporally rather than spatially. The stars are too far to reach, the Kurzweilian fever of 
artificially extended posthuman life is not necessarily a desirable goal, and aliens, whether they 
exist or not, cannot reach us. The only hope for the survival of the species is through time, 
through the careful preservation, re-inscription, and reinterpretation of the archive so that it can 
communicate with the past and reconstruct a more desirable history. As such, any distinction 
between archival processes and history breaks down. The protagonist, Pierce, is a member of a 
select group of temporal policeman, known as librarians, who “are the eternal guardians of 
historicity, the arbiters of what really happened [. . .] sworn to serve our great cause—the total 
history of the human species.”728 This total history is, however, multiple. As is so often the case 
in time travel narratives, temporal paradoxes proliferate in Stross’s world in the form of alternate 
timelines, but it is the librarian’s job to shore up these paradoxes, to remove the moments of 
“palimpsest” when history threatens to become “an entire talmud of rewrites and commentaries [. 
. .] in a threatening tsunami of unhistory.”729 Consequently, “not only does the Library document 
all of recorded human history—and there is a lot of it [. . .]—it documents all the possible routes 
through history that end in the creation of the Final Library.”730 This Library is a kind of vast 
mystic writing pad; ninety-percent of it records events that did not actually “happen” and yet the 
entirety of the histories and “unhistories” it contains constitute the library’s own meta-narrative. 
The hyperarchival processes of this Library gather together everything, even the many alternate 
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histories—ultimately, fictions—that did not transpire, and yet nonetheless all of it directly shapes 
the Library’s writing of (its own) ur-history. 
Taken together, these three highly speculative fictions repeatedly demonstrate the 
systemic complexities available to the contemporary archival and eschatological imagination. 
Unlike Earth Abides, On the Beach, and A Canticle for Leibowitz, the archives of Mamet, 
Stephenson, and Stross are multiple and rhizomatic, fluidly situated in both space and time, and 
communicate history synchronically through multiple narrative modes that, though 
acknowledging various senses of an ending, articulate an eschatology that is quite different than 
either the utter destruction of the species through nuclear war or the complete deletion of the 
archive. Just as Stewart, Shute, and Miller rigorously channeled their speculations from the 
dominant anxieties and fantasies of the Cold War, Wilson, Anathem, and “Palimpsest” (like 
Lieberman’s PCNAA), clearly emerge from the complex anxieties attending the global digital 
information culture. Rather than worry over the disappearance or destruction of information, 
each text, in its own way, frets about archival accumulation. Whether it is conceived as a tool to 
stave off the end of the world, or a system whose inevitable trajectory leads to destruction, the 
archive in each narrative is situated as a site of multiple and complex spatiotemporal crisis.  
 These tales of archival crisis dramatize and capture the relationship between today’s 
increasingly totalizing and ubiquitous archival technologies, and the imaginative legacy of 
nuclear mass-destruction. The archive in each text is always already a site of crisis, not having to 
await some global nuclear conflagration that would introduce a crisis into the text’s narrative 
sweep. Further, it should be noted that “crisis” is derived from the Ancient Greek word krisis, 
meaning “decision,” and its root verb krinein, meaning “to decide.” (The Greek krisis could also 
mean “judgment” and “separation.”) Drawing upon this etymology, these contemporary tales of 
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archival crisis present moments of conflict not merely as windows onto material scenes of 
intense difficulty or danger, turning points or peripeteia; archival crises instead require some 
kind of decision, and this decision is an archival decision. To put it another way, we might look 
at the tale of archival crisis in terms of material emergence—i.e. a mass of chaotic material 
organizing into a higher level of order seemingly spontaneously in order to respond to the crisis. 
In this fashion, each of these twenty-first century tales of archival crisis should be understood as 
engaging (hyperbolically) with how digital archival systems write and rewrite themselves, 
creating social and technological nodes that respond to and dictate history. Each text attributes 
certain properties to the archive in which different historical, political, and discursive forces 
emerge, often in the absence of human intervention. Consequently, not only can apocalyptic 
levels of destruction emerge from the hypothetical archives imagined in these texts, but so can 
another fantasmatic limit: the creation of a world. 
 
5.4 CONCLUSION: THE ARCHIVE TO COME, OR, THE TASK(S) OF NUCLEAR 
CRITICISM AT THE PRESENT TIME 
 
In light of the emergence of these tales of archival crisis of the second nuclear age, it should now 
be clear that a post-Cold War nuclear critical practice would greatly benefit from returning to a 
moment from Derrida in which he should be read as slightly revising his earlier hypothesis of the 
total and remainderless destruction of the archive. In a talk given prior to a discussion with book 
historian Roger Chartier and philosopher Bernard Stiegler in 1997, Derrida proposed another 
archival limit and hypothesis that deserves to be quoted at length (again): 
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Now what is happening today [. . .] of the book’s to-come, still as the book, is on the one 
hand, beyond the closure of the book, the disruption, the dislocation, the disjunction, the 
dissemination with no possible gathering, the irreversible dispersion of this total codex [. 
. .]; but simultaneously, on the other hand, a constant reinvestment in the book project, in 
the book of the world or the world book, in the absolute book. [. . .] It re-creates the 
temptation that is figured by the World Wide Web as the ubiquitous Book finally 
reconstituted, the book of God, the great book of Nature, or the World Book finally 
achieved in its onto-theological dream, even though what it does is repeat the end of the 
book as to-come. 
There are two fantasmatic limits of the book to come, two extreme, final, eschatic 
figures of the end of the book, the end as death, or the end as telos or achievement. We 
must take seriously these two fantasies; what’s more they are what makes [sic] writing 
and reading happen. [. . .] But we should also perhaps wake up to the necessity that goes 
along with these fantasies.731 
The necessity that goes along with these fantasies, which Derrida develops as four interminable 
“vanishing points,” is what the post-Cold War nuclear archive gives to thought: the archiving of 
the world, the hypothesis of a total and remainderless documentation or creation of a world. If 
the first nuclear age, according to Derrida, introduced total archival destruction to thought, the 
second nuclear age has given it (or made it remember) total archival creation. And these are 
equally threatening. “The truth of the book, if I may put it like that, at any rate its necessity, 
resists—and dictates to us (this is also the seriousness of a ‘must’) that we should resist both 
these fantasies, which are only the flipside of each other.”732 As he once suggested that “[t]he 
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hypothesis of this total destruction watches over deconstruction,”733 today the hypothesis of total 
capture must watch over a revived nuclear criticism. 
 Regardless of their obvious differences, Mamet, Stross, and Stephenson’s texts are born 
out of and respond to the ubiquitous archival surveillance of the present age, the urge—as 
Microsoft’s MyLifeBits project734 and the basic logic of Google demonstrate—to capture, record, 
document, and store everything. Obviously this is a fantasmatic limit, but it is a fantasy we 
should take seriously. We must be aware of the relative inhumanity that drives and results from 
the hyperarchival impulse. As Alexander Galloway and philosopher Eugene Thacker 
convincingly argue, when we start exploring network science and its relationship to archival 
processes, something emerges which “is that of network being, a Dasein specific to network 
phenomena.”735 Today, as Lieberman’s PCNAA limply gestures toward, yesterday’s archives 
have grown out of our control to understand, map, or destroy them. Like the force Henry Adams 
symbolized with the dynamo, and most assuredly the cultural effects created by perceptions of 
the nuclear bomb, the archive both is, and should be considered a symbol for, a material and 
historical force, one with great creative as well as destructive potential. 
 In this fashion, we would do well to read the fate of the nuclear referent after the Cold 
War as a dispersal rather than a disappearance. One could argue that the US cultural sense of an 
ending, its ability to imagine itself at the brink of some disaster, actually increased and 
diversified during the 1990s and 2000s.736 The sheer proliferation of apocalyptic fantasies in the 
popular imagination, whether they imagine ecological, religious, viral, natural, or technological 
disaster, combined with how many disasters have really occurred, often instantly communicated 
around the globe, can be existentially overwhelming if dwelt upon for too long. To circle back to 
the beginning, recall Jameson: “Someone once said that it is easier to imagine the end of the 
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world than to imagine the end of capitalism. We can now revise that and witness the attempt to 
imagine capitalism by way of imagining the end of the world.”737 
Along with this contemporary archive of disaster, we should also emphasize the 
hyperarchival nature of emerging texts themselves. With the increasing space made available by 
improvements in information technology, texts are now being created that are simply massive, 
unthinkably large in terms of most recording technologies’ capacity during the twentieth century. 
Take, for example, Richard Grossman’s forthcoming Breeze Avenue (2014), a three-million page 
mega-text, that according to Grossman’s website will “[manifest] itself most significantly as a set 
of 5,000 volumes, each containing 600 pages that are installed in a reading room. Although 
available in digital formats, in its massive printed version it stands as a bulwark against 
predigested and inane communication and as symbol and dirge for the global extinction of 
culture now in progress.”738 The term “encyclopedic” does no justice to the size of such a text, 
which will be installed literally as an archive. The contemporary mega-text, and the mega-
narratives now proliferating, both in video games and more “traditional” cultural forms like 
television and the novel,739 materialize one limit of Derrida’s absolute-book-to-come through 
their sheer unreadable size, while also constantly drawing attention to their own archive fever, 
their own (futile) resistance to decay, destruction, disappearance, and rewriting. 
So we should ask, given the atmosphere of this global network of doom, both real and 
imagined, what role should nuclear criticism play going forward? To imagine the task of nuclear 
criticism at the present time we should begin by remembering that in certain ways it perhaps 
became unnecessary in the immediate wake of the Cold War. Whether this statement is read as 
overly modest or hubristically grandiose, certain real effects have been achieved by the 
continued critique of nuclear power, not the least of which is the simple fact that there has been 
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no nuclear war since Hiroshima. The nuclear critic is now in the strange position in which her 
object of study has seemed to disappear and this is something to be celebrated. And yet the 
global imaginary churns out post-apocalyptic images on a daily basis. As some have 
convincingly suggested, perhaps a risk criticism or a disaster criticism would be a more 
appropriate endeavor than nuclear criticism at the moment. To my mind, however, it is the 
nuclear that continues to define the background of the contemporary eschatological imagination, 
remaining in a variety of forms as a kind of nuclear dust. The sense of an ending that the 
thermonuclear bomb introduced to the species (and the archive) has become multiple (revealing 
in hindsight that it always was). From ecological, economic, and epidemiological catastrophes, to 
the emerging informational, networked, and posthuman eschatologies, the nuclear bomb’s 
continued and diverse representation and expression across a range of media is frankly 
staggering, disturbing, and fascinating. This alone should continue to pose a rich and vital task 
for the continued practice of nuclear criticism.  
Further, there is a marked anxiety in literature, criticism, publishing, and the university 
over the effects of increased digital archivization, an anxiety which ranges from fears about the 
death of print, the end of libraries, and the foreclosure of the humanities, to fears that extend to 
the posthuman extinction (or transformation) of the species. These anxieties reveal that, even if 
overtly specific representations of nuclear war have largely disappeared from the US imaginary, 
there remains a marked dialectical and structural tension between the representation of 
technologies of destruction and accumulation, between information and nuclear technologies, 
between crisis and possibility. Revisiting nuclear criticism, especially as I have framed it here, 
can enhance the methods and perspectives from which critics can continue the very necessary 
task of accounting for cultural production in the information age, a criticism that is capable of 
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rigorously attending to the materiality of texts, the technologies through which information 
flows, accumulates, and disappears, and the networked, distributed nature of the contemporary 
apocalyptic imagination. Even more so, nuclear criticism may ultimately prove to offer a mode 
of confronting our own sense of the textual, disciplinary, and discursive crises that characterize 
so many aspects of the world today. By revisiting nuclear criticism we might find some quite 
useful tools to account for the persistent rhetoric of crisis that the network society appears 
incapable of escaping and radically change the conversation. 
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 NOTES 
 
1.0 MUTUALLY ASSURED DECONSTRUCTION: NUCLEAR CRITICISM AND 
AMERICAN APOCALYPTICS, PP. 1-53 
 
1 Don DeLillo, End Zone (New York: Penguin, 1986 [1972]), 240. 
2 Slavoj Žižek, Welcome to the Desert of the Real! Five Essays on September 11 and Related 
Dates (New York: Verso, 2002), 17. 
3 Fredric Jameson, “Future City” (2003), in The Ideologies of Theory (New York: Verso, 2008), 
573. The “someone” that Jameson is talking about here is of course himself, and he is referring 
to an oft-quoted quip from the introduction to a volume collecting his Wellek Library Lecture, 
given at the University of California, Irvine in 1991: “It seems to be easier for us today to 
imagine the thoroughgoing deterioration of the earth and of nature than the breakdown of late 
capitalism; perhaps that is due to some weakness in our imaginations. [. . .] I have come to think 
that the word postmodern ought to be reserved for thoughts of this kind” (The Seeds of Time 
[New York: Columbia University Press, 1994], xii, emphasis in original). 
4 Slavoj Žižek, First as Tragedy, Then as Farce (New York: Verso, 2009), 92. 
5 See, for example, Sarah Wheaton’s discussion of the recent etymological history of 
“snowpocalypse,” a term she finds originally used in 2006, but popularized during the winter 
storm of 2009, in “Snowpocalypse Now, and Then,” The New York Times (19 Dec. 2009), 
http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/12/19/snowpocalypse-now-and-then/. 
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6 Both of these events occurred in the week prior to this writing. On North Korea’s nuclear test 
on 12 February 2013, see Justin McCurry and Tania Branigan, “North Korea Stages Nuclear Test 
in Defiance of Bans,” The Guardian (12 Feb. 2013), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/feb/ 
12/north-korea-nuclear-test-earthquake. On the meteor that disintegrated over Siberia on 15 
February 2013, see Ellen Barry and Andrew E. Kramer, “Shock Wave of Fireball Meteor Rattles 
Siberia, Injuring 1,200,” The New York Times (15 Feb. 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/ 
16/world/europe/meteorite-fragments-are-said-to-rain-down-on-siberia.html?_r=1&. 
7 In using the term “constellation” here I hope to signal my indebtedness to the methodology 
employed by Jonathan Arac in Critical Genealogies: Historical Situations for Postmodern 
Literary Studies (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989) and elsewhere, who masterfully 
takes up Walter Benjamin’s notion of the constellation to considerable effect. Any ineffective 
departures from this method, or other conceptual mistakes, however, remain mine alone. As the 
corpus of nuclear literature is simply too large to hope for anything resembling completeness, I 
have gathered together what I hope is an interesting constellation of writers that, though they 
may not immediately suggest themselves as in conversation with one another, I think that 
gathering them together can challenge our (nuclear) present, and inform the sense of the future I 
would like to open up that would be against apocalypse, a sense of time that would be anti-
eschatological. For Benjamin’s notion of the “constellation” see the “Epistemo-Critical 
Prologue” to The Origin of German Tragic Drama (1963), trans. John Osborne (New York: 
Verso, 1998), where he writes: “Ideas are to objects as constellations are to stars. This means, in 
the first place, that they are neither their concepts nor their laws. They do not contribute to the 
knowledge of phenomena, and in no way can the latter be criteria with which to judge the 
existence of ideas” (34). Benjamin further developed this notion in letters exchanged with 
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Theodor W. Adorno. See Adorno and Gretel Karplus to Benjamin, 2-4 August 1935, and 
Benjamin to Karplus and Adorno, 16 August 1935, in Theodor W. Adorno and Walter Benjamin, 
The Complete Correspondence 1928-1940, trans. Nicholas Walker, ed. Henri Lonitz 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001 [1999]), 106, 119. 
8 This essay was originally published in the French periodical, Liberation, on 29 March 1991, 
and has been collected with Baudrillard’s two previous essays about the first Iraq war, “The Gulf 
War Will Not Take Place” and “The Gulf War: Is it Really Taking Place?” to make up the 
volume, The Gulf War Did Not Take Place, trans. by Paul Patton (Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
University Press, 1995). 
9 Christopher Norris, Uncritical Theory: Postmodernism, Intellectuals, and the Gulf War 
(Amherst, MA: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1992), 15. It is also curious to note that 
today’s “intellectual fashion” is, at least from my perspective, much less clear, especially given 
the craze of “digital humanities.” I avoid this term because I feel none of this project would have 
been evenly remotely possible without the “digital,” as will hopefully become clear. For a variety 
of reasons, this dissertation frequently gestures toward journalism and popular culture, among 
other texts, and especially events that occurred during the period it was written. I believe that to 
separate the gross symmetry of disaster since 2010 and March 2013 from the writing of the 
disaster this dissertation undertakes would have been short-sighted, and really just impossible 
given my subject matter. If my thesis regards nuclear and communications technologies as 
inseparable, then some of the most clear examples proving the continuing relevance of this type 
of intervention have occurred recently, and continue to occur with uncanny frequency. If there is 
one thing I have learned during my writing, it was that I picked a topic that would never fail me. 
Crisis is simply the mode of contemporaneity. And really, with certain things—like the US plans 
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to nuke the moon (more on this below)—the serendipity was simply too much to resist. This is 
also why I draw upon actual legislation that has recently appeared. Senator Joseph Lieberman’s 
Internet “kill switch,” which I address in my coda, is only one example of the state’s recent 
efforts to control the imaginary and the real. It is my hope that my departures into the 
contemporary disaster imagination do not distract from my scholarship. Toward this end, I would 
also refer the reader to The Hyperarchival Parallax, http://bradfest.wordpress.com. Necessarily 
less formal in medium and message, my blog could easily be read as a digital companion piece to 
this dissertation.  
10 See Terry Smith, What is Contemporary Art? (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 
2009) and The Architecture of Aftermath (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2006). 
11 And this is not to overly disparage Baudrillard. For a younger scholar encountering him in the 
wake of 11 September 2001, such texts as Simulacra and Simulation (1981), trans. Sheila Faria 
Glaser (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1994), America (1986), trans. Chris 
Turner (New York: Verso, 1988), and The Conspiracy of Art: Manifestos, Interview, Essays, 
trans. Ames Hodges, ed. Sylvère Lotringer (New York: Semiotext(e), 2005) were formative. 
12 I think quite tellingly, the question of whether or not we are living in a simulation has moved 
from being asked within the province of poststructural theory to being asked in the fields of 
analytic philosophy, computer science, and physics. For the initial formulation of the question 
about whether we live in a simulation or not in these latter fields see Nick Bostrom, “Are You 
Living in a Computer Simulation?” Philosophical Quarterly 53, no. 211 (2003): 243-55. Bob 
Yirka recently reported about physicists seriously pursuing this question in, “Is it Real? 
Physicists Propose Method to Determine if the Universe is a Simulation,” Phys.org (12 Oct. 
2012), http://phys.org/news/2012-10-real-physicists-method-universe-simulation.html. For the 
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study Yirka discusses, see Silas R. Beane, Zohreh Davoudi, and Martin J. Savage, “Constraints 
on the Universe as a Numerical Simulation,” arXiv.org (4 Oct. 2012), http://arxiv.org/pdf/1210. 
1847v2.pdf. I am also, of course, referencing the film The Matrix (1999), directed by siblings 
Andy and Lana Wachowski, above. 
13 The original French is “il n’y a pas de hors-texte,” which Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak 
translates as both “There is nothing outside the text [and] there is no outside-text” (Jacques 
Derrida, Of Grammatology [1967], Corrected Edition, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak 
[Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997 (1976)], 158, emphases in original). 
14 Molly Wallace’s “Will the Apocalypse Have Been Now? Literary Criticism in an Age of 
Global Risk,” in Criticism, Crisis, and Contemporary Narrative, ed. Paul Crosthwaite (New 
York: Routledge, 2011), suggests that we should distinguish between a first and second nuclear 
age, whose transitionary period coincides with the end of the Cold War, roughly 1989-1991. 
Wallace then goes on to argue, quite convincingly, that we should combine ecological criticism 
with nuclear criticism, and throw them through a blender of digital humanities, in order to 
develop something like a risk criticism. I regret tying my wagon so firmly to the nuclear critical 
wagon before this essay appeared, as I wholly agree with Wallace. So it would not be 
inappropriate to read “nuclear criticism” for “risk criticism” in a number of places in this 
dissertation, but as I hope to demonstrate through my reading of David Foster Wallace and 
Thomas Pynchon, there are further avenues for nuclear criticism to pursue. On the concept of 
global risk and its relationship to criticism, the other essays in Crosthwaite’s collection are also 
worthy of attention.  
15 Even if this is largely a fable, which I discuss at length in my reading of Thomas Pynchon’s 
Inherent Vice (2009). 
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16 Ulrich Beck, World at Risk (2007), trans. Ciaran Cronin (Malden, MA: Polity, 2009), 15. 
17 Paul de Man, “The Rhetoric of Temporality” (1961) in Blindness and Insight: Essays in the 
Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism, 2nd ed. (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 
1983 [1971]), 215. 
18 Ibid., 11, emphasis in original. 
19 Ibid., 10, emphasis in original. 
20 For a broad perspective on literary studies and risk theory, see Susan Mizruchi, “Risk Theory 
and the Contemporary Novel,” American Literary History 22, no. 1 (Spring 2010): 109-135; 
Ursula K. Heise, “Toxins, Drugs, and Global Systems: Risk and Narrative in the Contemporary 
Novel,” American Literature 74, no. 4 (December 2002): 747-778; Daniel Grausam, “History, 
Community, Spirituality: Keywords for Rethinking Postmodernism?” Contemporary Literature, 
51, no. 2 (Summer 2010): 398-411, and especially his interesting nuclear critical take on 
postmodern American metafiction, which I refer to regularly: On Endings: American 
Postmodern Fiction and the Cold War (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2011); 
and Marc McGurl, “Ordinary Doom: Literary Studies in the Waste Land of the Present,” New 
Literary History 41, no. 2 (Spring 2010): 329-349. Mcgurl’s recent book, The Program Era: 
Postwar Fiction and the Rise of Creative Writing (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2009), has received considerable and well-deserved attention. The influence of the institution of 
Creative Writing Programs on post-World War II American fiction has been considerable, and 
McGurl tells a fascinating and timely history of this institution. For a very productive 
engagement with McGurl’s work, see Adam Kelly, “Beginning with Postmodernism,” Twentieth 
Century Literature 57, nos. 3-4 (Fall/Winter 2011): 391-422. It is also important to note that 
Beck begins his discussion of risk in World Risk Society by discussing the origins of the novel: 
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“In the figure of Don Quixote, human life, whose future no longer bows down before the power 
of the gods or before God’s wisdom, has become a never-ending adventure. For, in God’s 
absence, risk unfolds its fateful and terrible, inscrutable ambiguity. The world is not as it is; 
rather it existence and its future depend on decisions, decisions which play off positive and 
negative aspects against one another, which connect progress and decline and which like all 
things human, are bearers of error, ignorance, hubris, the promise of control and, ultimately, even 
the seed of possible self-destruction” (4). 
21 Beck, 14, emphasis in original. 
22 Ibid., 9-10. 
23 Donald E. Pease, The New American Exceptionalism (Minneapolis, MN: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2009), 20. 
24 And this is not “only” a result of the relationship between disaster, or perhaps more accurately, 
crisis, late capitalism, and the economic policies of Milton Friedman and the Chicago School of 
economics that Naomi Klein plots in The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism (New 
York: Picador, 2007). 
25 Pease,16-17. 
26 Ibid., 51. 
27 As Google CEO Eric Schmidt has said, “There was 5 exabytes of information created between 
the dawn of civilization through 2003, but that much information is now created every 2 days, 
and the pace is increasing [. . .] people aren’t ready for the technology revolution that’s going to 
happen to them” (qtd. in Marshall Kirkpatrick, “Google CEO Schmidt: ‘People Aren’t Ready for 
the Technology Revolution,” readwrite [4 Aug. 2010], http://readwrite.com/2010/08/04/google 
_ceo_schmidt_people_arent_ready_for_the_tech). 
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28 On the prevalence of contemporary hyperarchival novels, or what he calls the “big, ambitious 
novel,” see Mark Greif’s essay, “‘The Death of the Novel’ and Its Afterlives: Toward a History 
of the ‘Big, Ambitious Novel,’” boundary 2 36, no. 2 (Summer 2009): 11-30. 
29 Theodor Adorno, “Cultural Criticism and Society” (1951), trans. Samuel Weber and Shierry 
Weber Nicholsen, in Can One Live After Auschwitz? A Philosophical Reader, ed. Rolf 
Tiedemann (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 152. 
30 Of all the different ways of referring to the WTC attacks and the events transcribed within the 
orbit of 11 September 2001, I prefer Terry Smith’s “9.11.01.” In The Architecture of Aftermath, 
he writes: “In a climate of actual and impending war, of insidious misinformation and sudden 
violence—in a word, of permanent aftermath—keeping a broad, critical perspective is crucial. I 
prefer ‘9.11.01’ as the name for what is really at stake here. The year of occurrence will remain, I 
believe, of more significance that its anniversary” (14). The years since Smith published these 
words have, I also believe, proved him correct. He goes on to write that “While I believe that 
9.11.01 was, for a number of quite concrete reasons, an important event—particularly within the 
polity of the United States and the Middle East—it was not the epochal, millennial, apocalyptic 
Event That Changed The Entire World Forever” (14). This is a perspective I firmly share. 
31 Even The Christian Science Monitor concurs with this assessment. See Yvonne Zipp, “Still no 
Great 9/11 Novel?” The Christian Science Monitor (8 Sep. 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/ 
Books/chapter-and-verse/2011/0908/Still-no-great-9-11-novel. D.G. Myers, writing for the 
staunchly neoconservative publication, Commentary, also makes a similar point in his “Complete 
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baroque knows no eschatology; and for that very reason it possesses no mechanism by which all 
earthly things are gathered in together and exalted before being consigned to their end. The 
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University Press, 2005). 
361 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
134 On the nuclear sublime, see Frances Ferguson, “The Nuclear Sublime,” Diacritics 14, no. 2, 
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throughout this dissertation. 
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143 Len Giovannitti and Fred Free, The Decision to Drop the Bomb (New York: Coward-
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the biographical documentary, The Day After Trinity: J. Robert Oppenheimer and the Atomic 
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result of the convolution of quotation and reference involved: “Oppenheimer’s quotation of the 
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meaning of nuclear weapons. Yet Vishnu’s words—‘Now I am become Death, the destroyer of 
worlds’—are most often cited out of context of Oppenheimer’s ‘own’ words, to the extent that 
they are quoted in translations that differ from Oppenheimer’s. [“Destroyer” is often translated as 
“shatterer.”] This serves to dislocate them even further from their original historical context, 
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sense of the significance of nuclear weapons. But is it possible to avoid this appropriation 
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The Making of the Atomic Bomb quoting The Decision to Drop the Bomb quoting a documentary 
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constituted by the act of archivization” (400). 
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climate change, particularly in the wake of Hurricane Sandy and 2012, the hottest year on record. 
See Jill Fitzsimmons, “Study: The Warmest Year on Record Received Cool Climate Coverage,” 
Media Matters for America [8 Jan. 2013], http://mediamatters.org/research/2013/01/08/study-
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151 Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1852), ed. C.P. Dutt (New York: 
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to the 2008 global financial crisis, see Žižek, First as Tragedy, Then as Farce. 
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descended from the dagger, and the steel saber, descended from the knife. Each phylum has its 
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referred to as ‘singular’ because they are rare and special” (15). A singularity occurs in this line 
of thinking when a threshold in matter is reached, and a different (and higher) level of order 
emerges. The thing that emerges is a singularity. 
155 For De Landa, “[i]t is as if the principles that guide the self-assembly of these ‘machines’ 
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159 Ibid. 
160 Ibid., 305, emphasis mine. 
161 Ibid., emphases mine. 
162 Lawrence, Studies, 172. 
367 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
163 On the notion of the “rhizome” see Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 
particularly the opening chapter, “Introduction: Rhizome” (3-25). As Deleuze puts it elsewhere, 
“[t]he object of American literature,” which Whitman embodies for Deleuze, “is to establish 
relations between the most diverse aspects of the United States’ geography—the Mississippi, the 
Rockies, the Prairies—as well as its history, struggles, loves, and evolution” (“Whitman” [1993], 
in Essays Critical and Clinical, trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco [Minneapolis, 
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172 William Blake, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, in The Complete Poetry and Prose of 
William Blake, Newly Revised Ed., ed. David V. Erdman (New York: Anchor Books, 1988), 39.  
368 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
173 Blake, “Auguries of Innocence” (1863), in The Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake, 
490. 
174 Frye, Fearful Symmetry, 45. 
175 Lawrence, Studies, 179. Translation mine. This phrase is often attributed to King Louis XV 
(1710-1774) of France or else his mistress, Madame de Pompadour (1721-1764). 
176 Whitman, 32, ll. 117-119. 
177 Ibid., 66, ll. 811. 
178 Ibid., ll. 810, 813-825. 
179 Ibid., 63, l. 796. 
180 On poetic absorption, see Charles Bernstein, “Artifice of Absorption,” in A Poetics 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 9-89. 
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probably most famously in Williams’s long poem, Paterson (1963), in Book I (1946), with quite 
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goes on to develop a tactical approach—albeit tinged with Romanticism—wherein he occupies 
no position of his own, no depth, but expresses himself and asserts his existence by temporarily 
appropriating the appearances, the surfaces, that surround him, whether they be physical or 
discursive” (Comens 89, emphases mine). 
203 Hart Crane, “Cape Hatteras,” in The Complete Poems of Hart Crane, Centennial ed., ed. Marc 
Simon (New York: Liverwright, 2001), 83, l. 209. 
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nuclear terror had slightly abated in the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1963, the threat of 
MAD in 1966 is obviously still very much on the table. Further, Williams’s passing in 1963—
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have given a satisfactory illustration of just how pitiful, how insubstantial and transitory, how 
purposeless and arbitrary the human intellect looks within nature; there were eternities during 
which it did not exist; and when it has disappeared again, nothing will have happened. For this 
intellect has no further mission that might extend beyond the bounds of human life” (Friedrich 
Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense,” in The Birth of Tragedy and Other 
Writings, trans. and ed. Ronald Speirs, ed. Raymond Geuss [New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999], 141). 
239 Williams, Collected Poems, Vol. 1, 207. 
240 Ibid., 215. 
241 Ibid., 179. The passage continues here: “But why, since we are ourselves doomed to suffer the 
same annihilation?” 
242 Ibid., 179-180. 
243 See especially my discussion of Wallace and his engagement with Paul de Man’s notion of 
irony in Chapter 4. 
244 Comens, 88, emphasis in original. 
245 Williams, Collected Poems, Vol. 1, 235. 
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248 Williams, “The Late Singer,” in Sour Grapes (1921), in Collected Poems, Vol. 1, 137, ll. 1-2. 
249 Abrams discusses the romantic notion of a “spiral movement of history” as it appears in Karl 
Marx, Nietzsche, Eliot, and Lawrence. See Natural Supernaturalism, 313-324. 
250 Whitman, “Song of Myself,” 82, ll. 1190-1193 
251 Ibid., ll. 1194-1197. 
252 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 2, 5. 
253 Williams, Collected Poems, Vol. 1, 181. 
254 Ibid., 182. 
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257 Ibid., 198, 215 
258 Ibid., 235. 
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260 Ibid., 235. 
261 Williams, “Catastrophic Birth,” in The Wedge (1944), in Collected Poems, Vol. 2, 56. 
262 Williams, “The Old House,” in The Clouds (1948), in Collected Poems, Vol. 2, 167. 
263 Williams, Paterson, 175. One page later Williams writes: “Uranium, the complex atom, 
breaking / down, a city in itself, that complex / atom, always breaking down / to lead” (177). 
264 Williams, “Asphodel, that Greeny Flower” (1955), in Collected Poems, Vol. 2, 321. 
265 Ibid., 334. 
266 Ibid. 
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3.0 CRYSTALLIZING NUCLEAR TEMPORALITY: THOMAS PYNCHON AND 
ARCHIVAL HISTORY, PP. 114-204 
 
274 Martin Heidegger, “The Thing” (1950), in Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert 
Hofstadter (New York: Perennial Classics, 2001 [1971]), 164. 
275 Vicki Kirby, Quantum Anthropologies: Life at Large (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
2011), 48. 
276 Thomas Pynchon, “The Deadly Sins/Sloth; Nearer, My Couch, to Thee,” The New York Times 
Book Review (6 June 1993), http://www.nytimes.com/books/97/05/18/reviews/pynchon-
sloth.html?_r=1. 
277 For a brief overview of Pynchon’s notorious avoidance of the public eye, see Tony Tanner, 
Thomas Pynchon (New York: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1982), 11-19. As Paul Bové has pointed out, 
Tanner’s short introduction to Pynchon of not even 100 pages “succeeded so remarkably that a 
great deal of Pynchon criticism has, in the last fifteen years, merely elaborated on Tanner’s 
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readings” (Paul Bové, “History and Fiction: The Narrative Voices of Pynchon’s Gravity’s 
Rainbow,” Modern Fiction Studies 50, no. 3 [Fall 2004], 657). 
278 For the most explicitly nuclear critical, if brief, approach to Pynchon, see Peter Schwenger, 
Letter Bomb: Nuclear Holocaust and the Exploding Word (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1992), 57-67. Though I am indebted to Schwenger’s work here, my approach 
to Pynchon and my understanding of how the nuclear referent functions in his work differs from 
Schwenger’s considerably. 
279 Thomas Pynchon, Slow Learner: Early Stories (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 
1984), 13. 
280 It must be noted, however, that though the “theme” of entropy has been discussed at length in 
Pynchon criticism, Pynchon himself is not fully satisfied with his understanding of the term: 
“Since I wrote [“Entropy”] I have kept trying to understand entropy, but my grasp becomes less 
sure the more I read. I’ve been able to follow the OED definitions, and the way Isaac Asimov 
explains it, and even some of the math. But the qualities and quantities will not come together to 
form a unified notion in my head. It is cold comfort to find out that [Willard] Gibbs himself 
anticipated the problem, when he described entropy in its written form as ‘far-fetched . . . 
obscure and difficult of comprehension’” (Slow Learner, 14). For example, David Seed, an 
accomplished critic in his own right, misreads the presence of Adams in Pynchon’s work: “like 
Henry Adams, Callisto is obsessed with energy running down and—perhaps for posterity, but 
more likely as a solipsistic exercise—he is dictating his memoirs” (David Seed, The Fictional 
Labyrinths of Thomas Pynchon [Iowa City, IA: University of Iowa Press, 1988], 36). From even 
a cursory perusal of The Education of Henry Adams one should note that Adams is thinking 
about the very opposite problem near the end of his book. Adams does discuss a kind of entropic 
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inertia present in human activity, and discusses historical decline at length in his 1910 “A Letter 
to American Teachers of History,” in The Degradation of the Democratic Dogma, ed. Brooks 
Adams (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1920), 137-263. In The Education, however, he 
emphasizes that “an immense force, doubling every few years, was working irresistibly to 
overcome it” (Adams, The Education, 1129). As The Education concludes, Adams appears to be 
more concerned with the unlimited energy and force that the dynamo symbolizes. It is clear from 
the quotation above that this is the aspect of The Education that concerned the young Pynchon: 
“Adams’s sense of power out of control.” Noting Seed’s misreading of Adams is simply meant 
to highlight that, as Pynchon notes, entropy is difficult concept to fully grasp through language, 
even for someone like Seed who does an admirable job of clearly presenting it otherwise. For a 
discussion of entropy’s relationship to apocalyptic structures in Pynchon’s fiction, and a reading 
significantly different from my own, see Lois Parkinson Zamora, Writing the Apocalypse: 
Historical Vision in Contemporary U.S. and Latin American Fiction (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), 52-75. 
281 Pynchon, Slow Learner, 18, emphasis mine. Pynchon develops World War I as an apocalypse 
for Europe in his story, “Under the Rose” (1961): “Moldweorp’s chief amusement, Porpentine 
reflected, had always been to harass. All he asked was that eventually there be a war. Not just a 
small incidental skirmish in the race to carve up Africa, but one pip-pip, jolly-ho, up-goes-the-
balloon Armageddon for Europe. Once Porpentine might have been puzzled that his opposite 
number should desire to go to war so passionately. Now he took it for granted that at some point 
in these fifteen years of hare-and-hounds he himself had conceived the private mission of 
keeping off Armageddon. An alignment like this, he felt, could only have taken place in the 
Western World where spying was becoming less an individual than a group enterprise, where the 
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events of 1848 and the activities of the anarchists and radicals all over the Continent seemed to 
proclaim that history was being made no longer through the virtù of single princes but rather by 
man in the mass; by trends and tendencies and impersonal curves on a lattice of pale blue lines” 
(Slow Learner, 106-107, emphases mine). “Under the Rose” was later revised and included as 
chapter three of V. (New York: Perennial Classics, 1999 [1961]), 57-94. 
282 Tanner, 75. 
283 See Carl Freedman, The Age of Nixon: A Study in Cultural Power (Winchester, UK: Zer0 
Books, 2012). 
284 Pynchon, Slow Learner, 98. 
285 Ibid., 18-19, emphases mine. 
286 Following Pynchon’s capitalization of this term, I will retain this capitalization throughout 
this chapter. 
287 This statement clearly could be argued with, if for no other reason than The Bomb falling is 
the semi-mythical V-2 mark 00000 rocket and not a nuclear warhead. This is also to note, as 
Daniel Grausam has, that “although most critics note the ICBM [Intercontinental Ballistic 
Missile] at the end of the novel, far fewer have made the case that the nuclear content of the 
novel should significantly impact our critical readings of it, and fewer still have made the bomb 
central to their analysis of Pynchon’s long career” (Grausam, On Endings, 48). This is an 
oversight this chapter attempt to rectify in part. 
288 Thomas Pynchon, Gravity’s Rainbow (New York: Viking, 1973), 760. As Pynchon makes 
extensive use of ellipses in his fiction, any ellipses in his work that I insert will be bracketed. 
289 In Remnants of Auschwitz (1998), Giorgio Agamben makes much the same point about the 
impossibility for the victim of Auschwitz to bear witness to the event: “This means that 
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testimony is the disjunction between two impossibilities of bearing witness; it means that 
language, in order to bear witness, must give way to a non-language in order to show the 
impossibility of bearing witness. The language of testimony is a language that no longer signifies 
and that, in not signifying, advances into what is without language, to the point of taking on a 
different insignificance—that of the complete witness, that of he who by definition cannot bear 
witness. To bear witness, it is therefore not enough to bring language to its own non-sense, to the 
pure undecidability of letters (m-a-s-s-k-l-o, m-a-t-i-s-k-l-o). It is necessary that this senseless 
sound be, in turn, the voice of something or someone that, for entirely other reasons, cannot bear 
witness, the ‘lacuna’ that constitutes human language, collapses, giving way to a different 
impossibility of bearing witness—that which does not have a language” (Giorgio Agamben, 
Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive (1998), trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen [New 
York: Zone Books, 2002], 39). 
290 Pynchon, Gravity’s Rainbow, 7. 
291 For a slightly different reading of this scene as it pertains to history and the apocalyptic, 
Gabrielle Schwab writes: “In the context of the two juxtaposed historical stages [‘secular’ and 
‘other’ history], the novel about the apocalyptic Rocket turns into an ‘experimental’ or ‘second 
degree mythology’ as defined by Roland Barthes, a mythology that demystifies because it is 
transplanted into a self-reflexive context. That is why Gravity’s Rainbow is not an apocalyptic 
fiction, but an apocalyptic metafiction. And, as we are never to forget, it is a carnivalistic show 
subversive of its own totalizing tendencies. Its end is a ‘descent,’ a ‘final countdown’ in San 
Francisco’s [sic] Orpheus Theater, initiated by the audience’s rhythmical chant ‘Come on! Start 
the show!’ But the show is the silent fall of the apocalyptic Rocket on the imaginary world as 
stage whose end is to be invented by the reader. And yet: the end of history is beyond the reader” 
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(Gabrielle Schwab, “Creative Paranoia and Frost Patterns of White Words” in Thomas 
Pynchon’s Gravity’s Rainbow, ed. Harold Bloom [New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1986], 
110). 
292 Pynchon, Gravity’s Rainbow, 3. 
293 Ibid. 
294 See H.G. Wells, The Time Machine (1895), in Three Prophetic Science Fiction Novels of 
H.G. Wells, ed. E.F. Bleiler (New York: Dover, 1960), 263-335. 
295 My use of the term “vital matter” here is indebted to Jane Bennet’s thought provoking sketch 
about the possibilities for a politics that considered matter as vibrant and vital. See Jane Bennet, 
Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010). 
296 Schwenger, 65. 
297 Pynchon, Gravity’s Rainbow, 3. 
298 Ibid., 471. 
299 Ibid., 712. 
300 Ibid., 693-4. 
301 See Steven C. Weisenburger, A Gravity’s Rainbow Companion: Sources and Contexts for 
Pynchon’s Novel, Revised and Expanded 2nd ed. (Athens, GA: The University of Georgia Press, 
2006). 
302 The New York Times (7 Aug. 1945), 1. 
303 “Smoke and Fire Reach Toward the Sky as Atomic Bombs Are Dropped on Japanese Cities,” 
The New York Times (12 Aug. 1945), 28. Indeed, on 10 August 1945 The New York Times 
reported that the publication of images from Hiroshima and Nagasaki would be delayed (“Bomb 
Pictures Delayed,” The New York Times [10 Aug. 1945], 4). Vincent Leo has argued that this 
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delay was largely ideological: by delaying the photographs until after Japan had surrendered on 
11 August 1945, they would be interpreted as an images of victory rather than destruction (see 
“The Mushroom Cloud Photograph: From Fact to Symbol,” After-image 13, nos. 1-2 [Summer 
1985]: 6-12). For an extended discussion of how the initial photographs were received and used, 
see Barbie Zelizer, About to Die: How News Images Move the Public (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2010). 
304 It is important to remember that the events of World War II were occuring at a remarkable 
speed during early August 1945. Hiroshima occurred on 6 August and was reported on 7 August. 
By 8 August, the Soviet Union had declared war on Japan. The second bomb was dropped on 9 
August, and Japan surrendered on 11 August. On 12 August, Douglas MacArthur was declared 
commander of the occupation, the same day the photographs were finally released. 
305 Pynchon, Gravity’s Rainbow, 692. 
306 Ibid. 
307 Ibid., 694. 
308 See Marshall McLuhan, The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man (Buffalo, 
NY: The University of Toronto Press, 1962). 
309 Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” (1936), in 
Illuminations: Essays and Reflections, trans. Harry Zohn, ed. Hannah Arendt (New York: 
Schocken Books, 1968), 222-223. 
310 Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, 164. 
311 Slavoj Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology (New York: Verso, 1989), 193. Žižek directly 
addresses Heidegger’s horror of the distanceless elsewhere: “For Heidegger, the true problem is 
not ecological crisis in its ontic dimension, including a possible global catastrophe (hole in the 
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ozone layer, melting of the ice caps, etc.), but the technological mode of relating to entities 
around us—this true crisis will confront us even more radically if the expected catastrophe does 
not occur; that is, if humankind does succeed in technologically ‘mastering’ the critical situation. 
. .” (Slavoj Žižek, The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology [New York: 
Verso, 1999], 12). 
312 Pynchon, Gravity’s Rainbow, 703. 
313 Ibid., 588. 
314 Ibid., 694. 
315 Harold Bloom, “Introduction,” in Thomas Pynchon’s Gravity’s Rainbow, ed. Harold Bloom 
(New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1986), 8. 
316 I will address post-nuclear subjectivity and Gravity’s Rainbow at further length in the 
conclusion to this chapter. 
317 Thomas Pynchon, Mason & Dixon (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1997), 45. 
318 “Madness has not impair’d your memory. Good. Keep away from harmful substances, in 
particular Coffee, Tobacco and Indian Hemp. If you must use the latter, do not inhale” (Mason & 
Dixon, 10, emphases mine). 
319 Shawn Smith, Pynchon and History: Metahistorical Rhetoric and Postmodern Narrative 
Form in the Novels of Thomas Pynchon (New York: Routledge, 2005), 140. 
320 Pynchon, Mason & Dixon, 152. 
321 This break can also be understood in terms of a break with non-Euclidean geometry. 
322 Pynchon, Mason & Dixon, 5. 
323 This first line also obviously follows form the first sentence of Gravity’s Rainbow: “A 
screaming comes across the sky” (3). 
385 
324 It is also significant that, like in Infinite Jest, The Bomb is sublimated through children’s 
games. 
325 Pynchon, Mason & Dixon, 59. 
326 Ibid., 350. As Erik Ketzan says, “Although one should never rashly equate a narrator with its 
creator, we can clearly see Pynchon’s own philosophy of presenting history here clearly 
elaborated” (“Mason & Dixon and the Enlightenment,” at The Modern World: Thomas Ruggles 
Pynchon Jr.: Spermatikos Logos, http://www.themodernworld.com/pynchon/papers_ketzan2. 
html). 
327 Benjamin, Illuminations, 257. 
328 Pynchon, Mason & Dixon, 349-50. Each of these figures, of course, was a subject of 
controversy for their manipulation and fabrication of events. It should also be noted that 
Cherrycoke changes the tone and content of his story depending upon his audience. 
329 Further, immediately following Ethelmer’s formulation of a fabulistic history, Ives LeSpark, 
brother of the host Wade LeSpark, “announces, ‘I cannot, damme I cannot I say, energetically 
enough insist upon the danger of reading these storybooks,— in particular those known as 
“Novel.” Let she who hears, heed. Britain’s bedlam even as the French Salpêtrière being 
populated by an alarming number of young persons, most of them female, seduced across the sill 
of madness by these irresponsible narratives, that will not distinguish between fact and fancy. 
How are those frail Minds to judge? Alas, every reader of “Novel” must be reckoned a soul in 
peril,— for she hath made a D—l’s bargain, squandering her most precious time, for nothing in 
return but the meanest and shabbiest kinds of mental excitement. “Romance,” pernicious enough 
in its day, seems in Comparison wholesome’” (Mason & Dixon 350-1). One of the most clearly 
metafictional moments in the novel, Pynchon presents the argument against his fabulistic history 
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as an argument against novelistic discourse itself as “irresponsible.” In parodying the 
conservative and misogynistic Ives, who holds to the “truth” against the “sill of madness” found 
in novels, Pynchon makes it quite clear he conceives the novel as particularly well-suited to 
approach the madness of history. 
330 Pynchon, Mason & Dixon, 349. 
331 Indeed, reading the landscape is one mode accessing the secret histories (of the elect) in the 
novel: “Howbeit,— the Secret was safe until the choice be made to reveal it. It has been denied 
to all who came to America, for Wealth, for Refuge, for Adventure. This ‘New World’ was ever 
a secret Body of Knowledge,—meant to be studied with the same dedication as the Hebrew 
Kabbala would demand. Forms of the Land, the flow of water, the occurrence of what us’d to be 
call’d Miracles, all are Text,— to be attended to, manipulated, read, remember’d” (Mason & 
Dixon 487). 
332 Derrida, Psyche, 400. 
333 For instance, “[t]he Vroom Girls and their counterparts all over town are Daughters of the 
End of the World [. . .] alert to each instant of the long Day as likely as next to hold a chance of 
Ruin” (Mason & Dixon 487). And there is a posthuman artificial intelligence in the form of a 
mechanical Duck who also has the power of an ICBM: “‘its Beak being of the finest Swedish 
Steel [. . . can] penetrate all known Fortification, solid walls being as paper to this Juggernaut. . . 
. One may cower within, but one cannot avoid,— le Bec de la Mort, the . . .‘Beak of Death’” 
(Mason & Dixon 374). 
334 Derrida, Psyche, 403. 
335 Ibid., 391. 
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336 Paul K. Saint-Amour, “Bombing and the Symptom: Traumatic Earliness and the Nuclear 
Uncanny,” Diacritcs 30, no. 4 (Winter 2000): 69. 
337 “[B]ukimi—also meaning ‘ominous’ or ‘uncanny’—spoke to the suspended question of 
whether Hiroshima and its inhabitants had been singled out for preservation or for annihilation” 
(Saint-Amour 60). 
338 Saint-Amour, 79. 
339 Harry Blamires, The New Bloomsday Book: A Guide Through Ulysses, 3rd ed. (New York: 
Routledge, 1996), 133. 
340 James Joyce, Ulysses (New York: Vintage International, 1990 [1922]), 344. The passage 
continues: “The work of salvage, removal of debris human remains etc has been entrusted to 
Messrs Michael Meade and Son, 159, Great Brunswick Street and Messrs T.C. Martin, 77, 78, 79 
and 80, North Wall, assisted by the men and officers of the Duke of Cornwall’s light infantry 
under the general supervision of H.R.H, rear admiral the right honourable sir Hercules Hannibal 
Habeas Corpus Anderson K.G., K.P., P.C., K.C.B., M.P., J.P., M.B., D.S.O., S.O.D., M.F.H., 
M.R.I.A., B.L., Mus. Doc., P.L.G., F.T.C.D., F.R.U.I., F.R.C.P.I. and F.R.C.S.I. . . . When, lo, 
there came about them all a great brightness and they beheld the chariot wherein He stood ascend 
to heaven. And they beheld Him in the chariot, clothed upon in the glory of brightness, having 
raiment as of the sun, fair as the moon and terrible that for awe they durst not look upon Him. 
And there came a voice out of heaven, calling: Elijah! Elijah! And he answered with a main cry: 
Abba! Adonai! And they beheld Him even Him, ben Bloom Elijah, amid clouds of angels ascend 
to the glory of the brightness at an angle of fortyfive degrees over Donohoe’s in Little Green 
Street like a shot off a shovel” (344-45). 
388 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
341 My reading of the above passage differs slightly from Saint-Amour’s, as he primarily reads it 
through the lens of the destructive effects the Easter 1916 Rising had upon Dublin and how the 
constant threat of aerial bombardment faced by the city dweller after World War I prefigures the 
nuclear threat: “If Ulysses is at once an epic and comic celebration of the quotidian, it also attests 
to the more frequent and extreme outbreaks of traumatic violence in everyday urban life and to 
the fact that in the early-twentieth-century imaginary, the city had begun to host new forms of 
sudden mass death and severe physical destruction” (73). 
342 Derrida, Psyche, 400. 
343 Ibid., 401. 
344 Much later in Ulysses Bloom engages with some quite precarious and fabulistic mathematics 
in an attempt to understand the generational gap between himself and Stephen Dedalus, coming 
to the conclusion that “if Stephen would continue to live until he would attain that age [the age of 
Methusalah, 969 years old] in the year 3072 A.D., Bloom would have been obliged to have been 
alive 83,300 years, having been obliged to have been born in the year 81,396 B.C. What events 
might nullify these calculations? The cessation of existence of both or either, the inauguration of 
a new era or calendar, the annihilation of the world and consequent extermination of the human 
species, inevitable but impredictable” (679-80). Here history and calendrical time—i.e. how 
humans make meaning of their brief life on earth—is destroyed, made meaningless, and nullified 
by the inevitable extermination of the species. The inevitable horizon of a non-revelatory 
extermination of humanity, at this moment of Joyce’s novel, nullifies any attempt to 
communicate between generations and historical epochs. 
345 Joyce, 689. 
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346 Thomas Pynchon, “Is it O.K. to be a Luddite?” The New York Times Book Review (28 Oct. 
1984): 41, http://www.themodernworld.com/Pynchon/Pynchon_essays_luddite.html. It is also 
important to note how Pynchon felt the threat of The Bomb influenced the science fiction of the 
1950s: “To people who were writing science fiction in the 50’s, none of this was much of a 
surprise, though modern Luddite imaginations have yet to come up with any countercritter Bad 
and Big enough, even in the most irresponsible of fictions, to begin to compare with what would 
happen in a nuclear war. So, in the science fiction of the Atomic Age and the cold war, we see 
the Luddite impulse to deny the machine taking a different direction. The hardware angle got de-
emphasized in favor of more humanistic concerns—exotic cultural evolutions and social 
scenarios, paradoxes and games with space/time, wild philosophical questions—most of it 
sharing, as the critical literature has amply discussed, a definition of ‘human’ as particularly 
distinguished from ‘machine.’ Like their earlier counterparts, [twentieth] century Luddites 
looked back yearningly to another age—curiously, the same Age of Reason which had forced the 
first Luddites into nostalgia for the Age of Miracles” (41). Obviously it should be mentioned that 
Mason & Dixon often complexly parallels how Pynchon describes 1950s science fiction’s 
treatment of The Bomb. 
347 Pynchon, Mason & Dixon, 485. 
348 Ibid., 487. 
349 Ibid. 
350 Benjamin Franklin, Benjamin Franklin’s Autobiography (Norton Critical Edition) (1793), 
eds. J.A. Leo Lemay & P.M. Zall (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1986), 68. 
351 Pynchon has elsewhere voiced his opinions of a Franklinian notion of an efficient, linear 
temporality: “In the idea of the time that had begun to rule [Philadelphia] city life in Poor 
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Richard’s day, where every second was of equal length and irrevocable, not much in the course 
of its flow could have been called nonlinear, unless you counted the ungovernable warp of 
dreams, for which Poor Richard had scant use” (Pynchon, “The Deadly Sins”). Gravity’s 
Rainbow also contains a nod to Franklin with its cult of the “lightning-struck” (664). 
352 I think it worthy to note here that Pynchon’s citizens fight “in,” rather than “on,” the 
emerging nation’s behalf, clearly signaling the fighting that will happen “in” America during the 
coming revolution, the War of 1812, and the Civil War. 
353 Pynchon, Mason & Dixon, 487-8. 
354 Ibid., 125. 
355 Ibid., 488. 
356 In addition, my reading of Against the Day will more fully address the complex manner 
Pynchon engages with the physics of light. 
357 Pynchon, Mason & Dixon, 772, final emphases mine. 
358 Albert Einstein, Relativity: The Special and General Theory (1916), trans. Robert W. Lawson 
(New York: Routledge, 2001), 115. 
359 Pynchon, Mason & Dixon, 772. The passage continues: “Like, ‘One minute you’re in a 
horrible high-bourgeois New York parlor, the next out on the Asian desert, on top of a Bactrian 
camel, searching for a lost subterranean city.’” 
360 Thomas Pynchon, Against the Day (New York: Penguin, 2006), 431. 
361 For a comprehensive discussion of time travel in the novel, see Inger H. Dalsgaard, “Readers 
and Trespassers: Time Travel, Orthogonal Time, and Alternative Figurations of Time in Against 
the Day,” in Pynchon’s Against the Day: A Corrupted Pilgrims Guide, eds. Jeffrey Severs and 
Christopher Leise (Newark, DE: University of Delaware Press, 2011), 115-38. My reading 
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differs from Dalsgaard’s nuanced analysis for the simple reason that I do not think anything like 
“time” as we usually understand it is functioning in Against the Day. 
362 As one critic has noted, “the creation of double- and counterworlds via the double refraction 
in Iceland spar is a central metaphor in Against the Day since it points not only to the doubling of 
the world in the moving images of film and television but also, in metafictional reference, to the 
doubling power of fiction in general and to the intertwining of the apparently real with its 
double- or counterimage which makes for the multidimensional world of [the narrative]” (Heinz 
Ickstadt, “History, Utopia and Transcendence in the Space-Time of Against the Day,” Pynchon 
Notes 54-55 [Spring-Fall 2008]: 225). I would argue, however, that Ickstadt does not go far 
enough in his analysis of the Iceland spar, as there is more going on than merely the doubling of 
the world. 
363 Pynchon, Against the Day, 431. For an extended, although considerably different discussion 
of how light functions in Against the Day, see Fabienne Collignon, “A Glimpse of Light,” 
Textual Practice 22, no. 3 (2008): 547-62. 
364 For a discussion of Against the Day the privileges its engagement with space, specifically 
through its complex representation of maps, see Krzysztof Piekarski, Martin Kevorkian, and 
Elisabeth McKetta, “Mapping, the Unmappable, and Pynchon’s Antitragic Vision,” in Pynchon’s 
Against the Day: A Corrupted Pilgrims Guide, eds. Jeffrey Severs and Christopher Leise 
(Newark, DE: University of Delaware Press, 2011), 47-66. 
365 And of course it need hardly be noted that Einstein’s formulation of special and general 
relativity (1905 and 1916 respectively) occurs within the period of time represented in Against 
the Day. 
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366 Brian McHale, “Genre as History: Pynchon’s Genre Poaching” in Pynchon’s Against the 
Day: A Corrupted Pilgrims Guide, eds. Jeffrey Severs and Christopher Leise (Newark, DE: 
University of Delaware Press, 2011), 18, 25. 
367 On the term “remediation” see Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin, Remediation: 
Understanding New Media (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1999). Justin St. Clair reads how 
Pynchon remediates the panorama for the novel in “Binocular Disparity and Pynchon’s 
Panoramic Paradigm” in Pynchon’s Against the Day: A Corrupted Pilgrims Guide, eds. Jeffrey 
Severs and Christopher Leise (Newark, DE: University of Delaware Press, 2011), 67-88. 
368 The primary three genres he borrows heavily from are the “juvenile adventure of the ‘Tom 
Swift’ type, the dime-novel western, and the ‘shocker’ or spy novel [. . . but also ] Edwardian 
detective fiction on the model of Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes; scientific romance, on the 
model of H.G. Wells; other subgenres of imperial romance, including African adventure and 
polar adventure; collegiate novels, both the American dime-novel type associated with the 
generic college-boy hero, Frank Merriwell, and the comic Oxbridge type; and, more fleetingly, 
various theatrical genres, including melodrama and operetta” (McHale 18). 
369 Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative (1983), Vol. 1, trans. Kathleen McLaughlin and David 
Pellauer (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1984), 6. 
370 Late-nineteenth century / early-twentieth century European imperialism is a consistent object 
of critique throughout Pynchon’s novels, perhaps best captured in “Mondaugen’s story,” chapter 
nine of V., 242-297. Though Pynchon’s novel always ostensibly concern US history, as Ickstadt 
argues: “Of all American contemporary writers, Thomas Pynchon has been the most consistently 
cosmopolitan” (216). 
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371 It is perhaps not accidental on Pynchon’s part either that Against the Day’s chronology ends 
in 1923—i.e., just late enough to include T.S. Eliot’s The Wasteland (1922) and Joyce’s Ulysses 
(1922), but too early to include Mrs. Dalloway and Der Zauberberg. This is not to suggest that I 
am aware of whether or not Pynchon has read Ricoeur, or if Against the Day engages explicitly 
with Time and Narrative, but Pynchon’s encyclopedic reading practices suggest the possibility 
that he might be familiar with Ricoeur. (E.g., he clearly has some familiarity with, say, Gilles 
Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus [1972]: “Fortunately Ralph Wayvone’s library 
happened to include a copy of the indispensable Italian Wedding Fake Book, by Deleuze & 
Guattari” [Vineland (New York: Penguin, 1997 [1990]), 97]. For a brief discussion of the 
presence of Deleuze and Guattari in Pynchon, see Judith Ryan, The Novel After Theory [New 
York: Columbian University Press, 2012], 184-92. For a more thorough Deleuzian reading of 
Pynchon, see Stefan Mattesich, Lines of Flight: Discursive Time and Countercultural Desire in 
the Work of Thomas Pynchon [Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002].) 
372 Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, Vol. 2, trans. Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer 
(Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1985), 23. 
373 Ibid., 76, emphases mine. Though perhaps unintentional, I cannot help but think that the 
translators’ use of “project a world” gestures toward The Crying of Lot 49. I also hope this 
connection resonates with Ulrich Beck’s sense of “risk projection” here. 
374 Ibid., 98. 
375 Ricoeur designates three modes of mimesis in the first volume of Time and Narrative, which 
he names mimesis1, mimesis2, and mimesis3. Mimesis1 concerns itself with the imitation or 
representation of action: “To imitate or represent action is first to preunderstand what human 
acting is, in its semantics, its symbolic system, its temporality. Upon this preunderstanding, 
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common to both poets and their readers, emplotment is constructed, and, with it, textual and 
literary mimetics” (64, emphasis mine). Mimesis2 links mimesis1 and mimesis3, in that it is 
concerned with the successive episodes in a narrative which move toward an endpoint. Mimesis2 
is the whole of the action represented, considered along a temporal sequence, inevitably leading 
toward an end. “To follow a story is to move forward in the midst of contingencies and 
peripeteia under the guidance of an expectation that finds its fulfillment in the “conclusion” of 
the story” (66), and “to follow a story is not so much to enclose its surprises or discoveries 
within our recognition of the meaning attached to the story, as to apprehend the episodes which 
are themselves well known as leading to this end. A new quality of time emerges from this 
understanding” (67, emphases mine). Mimesis3 consequently “marks the intersection of the 
world of the text and the world of the hearer or reader; the intersection, therefore, of the world 
configured by the poem and the world wherein real action occurs and unfolds its specific 
temporality” (71). Consequently, every narrative operates at each of these levels of mimesis, and 
to understand the interrelationship between time and narrative, is to understand how mimesis1 
and mimesis3 connect through mimesis2. 
376 See chapter 4, “Between Lived Time and Universal Time: Historical Time,” of Paul Ricoeur’s 
Time and Narrative (1985), Vol. 3, trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago, IL: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1988), 104-26. 
377 Jameson, Postmodernism, 44. 
378 Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, Vol. 1, 7. 
379 Ibid., 52, emphases in original. 
380 Volume 3 of Time and Narrative offers a particularly complex engagement with Immanuel 
Kant, Edmund Husserl, and Heidegger, and what Ricoeur calls the “aporetics” of time. In other 
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words, I feel the need to emphasize that I am in no way critiquing or arguing with Ricoeur, but 
simply pointing out a much different temporal aporia whose consideration was not really 
appropriate to his project anyway. 
381 And of course, if one responds to the aporia of time in Augustine with the simple answer: 
time does not exist, time ceases to be aporetic. 
382 Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, Vol. 3, 272. 
383 Palle Yourgrau, A World Without Time: The Forgotten Legacy of Gödel and Einstein (New 
York: Basic Books, 2005), 129, emphases mine. Also See Kurt Gödel, “A Remark about the 
Relationship Between Relativity Theory and Idealistic Philosophy,” in Albert Einstein: 
Philosopher-Scientist, ed. Paul Arthur Schlipp (LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 1949), 557-62. 
384 Ibid., 121-2, emphases mine. 
385 Ibid., 131. 
386 Pynchon, Against the Day, 3. It should also be mentioned that the first line of Against the Day 
makes a previous appearance in The Crying of Log 49. In Cashiered, the film Oedipa watches 
with Metzger in her hotel room, the small submarine “Justine” is depicted “at the quai, singling 
up the lines” (20) right before it attempts, and fails, to make it under the Kephez minefields and 
the underwater net on its way to the battle of Gallipoli. This phrase is repeated in Inherent Vice 
when Sauncho is describing to Doc the Golden Fang’s insurance policy (119-120). 
387 McHale, 22. 
388 Transnoctial, though it does not have its own entry in the OED, can be parsed as “across the 
night”—“trans” being the Latin for over or across and “nocti” the Latin for night. I am indebted 
to the Against the Day wiki for this reading, which cites the 1913 edition of Webster’s 
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Dictionary as its source. See http://against-the-day.pynchonwiki.com/wiki/index.php?title= 
ATD_119-148 (accessed 3 May 2012). 
389 Pynchon, Againt the Day, 131, 132. 
390 Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History” (1940), in Illuminations, 257. 
391 Pynchon, Against the Day, 133. 
392 Ibid. 
393 Ibid., 456. 
394 Ibid. 
395 Andrew Blum’s recent popular study, Tubes: A Journey to the Center of the Internet (New 
York: Ecco, 2012), presents a convincing argument for systematically, locally, and globally 
emphasizing the spatiality of the internet. He suggests that, among the other important 
technologies that make the internet possible, the tubes, the fiber-optic cable that connect 
everything together are of primary concern for anyone interested in the materiality of the 
Internet. 
396 This fact is not lost on Wallace in Infinite Jest, as Himself is both an avant garde film director 
and an optical physicist who worked on the Hydrogen Bomb. 
397 See Gilles Deleuze, “Control and Becoming” (1990) and “Postscript on Control Societies” 
(1990), in Negotiations: 1972-1990, trans. Martin Joughlin (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1995), 169-76, 177-82. 
398 See Steven Shaviro, Connected; or What it Means to Live in the Network Society 
(Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2003). 
399 Pynchon, Against the Day, 456-7. 
400 Ibid., 555. 
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401 Ibid., 1084, 1085. It should also be noted that this ship is not completely fantasmatic within 
the world of Against the Day. Pynchon explains its technological underpinnings as such: 
“Inconvenience herself is constantly having her engineering updated. As a result of advances in 
relativity theory, light is incorporated as a source of motive power—though not exactly fuel—as 
a carrying medium—though not exactly a vehicle—occupying, rather, a relationship to the 
skyship much like that of the ocean to a surfer on a surfboard—a design principle borrowed from 
the Æther units that carry the girls to and fro on missions whose details they do not always share 
with ‘High Command’” (1084). 
402 Baudrillard, The Illusion of the End, 9. 
403 See, for instance, Tanner, 56-73 and Robert Gibb, “Ideas of Order: The Shapes of Art in The 
Crying of Lot 49,” Journal of Modern Literature 17, no. 1 (Summer, 1990): 97-116.  
404 Though never explicitly named, Pynchon’s engagement with popular culture reveals that the 
novel most likely takes place during the summer of 1970, and, going by what is happening in the 
frequently referenced National Basketball Association Playoffs (Doc is an avid Los Angeles 
Lakers fan), one could easily draw a fairly clear timeline throughout the novel corresponding to 
the events in the playoffs that year. That said, as so often happens in Pynchon novels, the famous 
center for Milwaukee Bucks, Lou Alcindor, has anachronistically already taken the name 
Kareem Abdul-Jabbar in Pynchon’s world, a change he did not make until the summer of 1971 
immediately following the Bucks’ title run. It has been suggested that Pynchon may also be an 
avid Lakers fan himself (a team for which Abdul-Jabbar later played), and Pynchon includes in 
Vineland a vivid description of a fictionalized film about the famous game seven of the 1984 
NBA Finals that pitted the Lakers against the Boston Celtics: “Besides Sidney Poitier as K.C. 
Jones, there was Paul McCartney, in his first acting role, as Kevin McHale, with Sean Penn as 
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Larry Bird. On the Laker side were Lou Gosset, Jr., as Kareem Abdul-Jabbar, Michael Douglas 
as Pat Riley, and Jack Nicholson as himself” (Vineland 378). It should also be noted that the 
promotional video for Inherent Vice, produced by Meerkatmedia (2009), explicitly mentions that 
it is set in 1970. According to Tracy Locke of Penguin Press, this video is narrated by Pynchon 
himself (see Thom Geier, “Thomas Pynchon Speaks! Author Lends his Voice to Inherent Vice 
Trailer,” Entertainment Weekly [11 Aug. 2009], http://shelf-life.ew.com/2009/08/11/thomas-
pynchon-speaks-inherent-vice-trailer/).  
405 Thomas Pynchon, Inherent Vice (New York: Penguin, 2009), 150. 
406 Ibid., 251. 
407 One of the principal villains of Inherent Vice, Adrian Prussia works in the service of the Los 
Angeles Police Department as a hitman, dispatching undesirable characters for the cops. 
Adrian’s first victim was “a certain pornographer and pimp at the fringes [. . .]. As it turned out, 
he had also kept lengthy and detailed files on a sex ring based in Sacramento, and he was 
threatening to blow the whistle unless he got paid a sum he was too small-time to understand was 
out of the question, though even the minor allegations in his story, proven or not, would be 
enough to bring down the administration of Governor Reagan. ‘The Governor has some great 
momentum right now, the future of America belongs to him, somebody can be doing American 
history a big favor here, Adrian’” (321). 
408 Which at one point he wears along with a tie that was supposedly Liberace’s (344). 
409 Pynchon, Inherent Vice, 254-5. 
410 Indeed, the novel’s epigraph reads: “‘Under the paving stones, the beach!’ Graffito, Paris, 
May 1968” (ix). 
411 Pynchon, Inherent Vice, 240. 
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412 Ibid., 251. 
413 Thomas Pynchon, The Crying of Lot 49 (New York: Perennial Classics, 1999 [1966]), 14. 
Pynchon is also obviously nodding to the final line of Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man here: “Who 
knows but that, on the lower frequencies, I speak for you?” (New York: Vintage, 1995 [1952]), 
581). 
414 Alexander R. Galloway and Eugene Thacker, The Exploit: A Theory of Networks 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007). They define “the exploit” as follows: “The 
modern period is characterized by both symmetrical political conflicts waged by centralized 
power blocs, and also asymmetrical political conflicts in which networked actors struggle 
against centralized powers. Many have further suggested that asymmetric conflict is in fact a 
historical response to the centralization of power. This type of asymmetric intervention, a 
political form bred into existence as the negative likeness of its antagonist, is the inspiration for 
the concept of ‘the exploit,’ a resonant flaw designed to resist, threaten, and ultimately desert the 
dominant political diagram. Examples include the suicide bomber (versus the police), peer-to-
peer protocols (versus the music conglomerates), guerillas (versus the army), netwar (versus 
cyber war), subcultures (versus the family), and so on” (21-22, emphases in original). 
415 Pynchon, The Crying of Lot 49, 150. 
416 Pynchon, Inherent Vice, 53. 
417 ARPA is an agency of the US Defense Department responsible for the development of new 
military technology and was later renamed the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency or 
DARPA in 1972. It reverted to ARPA in 1993, and back to DARPA in 1996. 
418 It should also be noted that though ARPAnet was clearly funded by the US Department of 
Defense, in the Internet Society’s “Brief History of the Internet,” they note that “It was from the 
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[1964] RAND study that the false rumor started claiming that the ARPAnet was somehow 
related to building a network resistant to nuclear war. This was never true of the ARPAnet, only 
the unrelated RAND study on secure voice considered nuclear war. However, the later work on 
Internetting did emphasize robustness and survivability, including the capability to withstand 
losses of large portions of the underlying networks” (Barry M. Leiner, Vinton G. Cerf, David D. 
Clark, Robert E. Kahn, Leonard Kleinrock, Daniel C. Lynch, Jon Postel, Larry G. Roberts, and 
Stephen Wolff, “Brief History of the Internet,” fn. 5, http://www.internetsociety.org/internet/ 
internet-51/history-internet/brief-history-internet). Associating the origins of ARPAnet with a 
network designed to resist a nuclear war that targeted population centers, however, should not be 
ignored even if the actuality of the relationship between ARPAnet and an imagined nuclear war 
was more complex than the popular narrative that usually accounts for the origins of the internet. 
In other words, the US Department of Defense, in funding ARPAnet, had a clear conception of it 
as a Cold War military asset even if it was primarily developed at US universities for relatively 
non-military ends. The persistence in the popular imagination of associating the origins of the 
internet with resistance to nuclear war justifies continuing to invoke this fiction, especially for a 
writer who is so obviously interested in the impact of nuclear weapons upon the United States as 
Pynchon is. Further, as Alexander Galloway points out in Protocol (2004), there have been many 
debates about the origins of the internet, and not everyone agrees with the detachment between 
nuclear war and ARPAnet the Internet Society attempts to stress. Galloway, an excellent Marxist 
cultural critic, is perhaps more attuned to the structural and military imaginary that made the 
funding of ARPAnet possible in the first place, clearly disagreeing with the Internet Society, and 
suggests quite blatantly that “it’s clear that in many ways [the Internet] was built to withstand 
nuclear attack. The Net was designed as a solution to the vulnerability of the military’s 
401 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
centralized system of command and control during the 1950s and beyond. For, the argument 
goes, if there are no central command centers, then there can be no central targets and overall 
damage is reduced. [. . .] In fact, the reason why the Internet would withstand nuclear attack is 
precisely because its internal protocols are the enemy of bureaucracy, of rigid hierarchy, and of 
centralization” (Alexander R. Galloway, Protocol: How Control Exists After Decentralization 
[Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2004], 29), which is something Pynchon is clearly thinking 
about in Inherent Vice. 
419 I also address ARPAnet and Galloway with regard to Infinite Jest and InterLace 
Telentertainment in Chapter 4. 
420 Pynchon, Inherent Vice, 53. 
421 Ibid., 195. 
422 Ibid. 
423 Galloway and Thacker, 4. 
424 Pynchon, Inherent Vice, 365. 
425 Pynchon, The Crying of Lot 49, 150. 
426 Ibid. 
427 Pynchon, Inherent Vice, 54. 
428 Ibid., 195. 
429 Ibid., 54. 
430 Ibid., 258. 
431 Ibid., 365. 
432 Pynchon, The Crying of Lot 49, 14. 
433 Pynchon, Inherent Vice, 365. 
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434 Ibid. 108. 
435 Mike Davis, The Ecology of Fear: Los Angeles and the Imagination of Disaster (New York: 
Vintage, 1999), 18. 
436 Pynchon, Inherent Vice, 109. 
437 Ibid., 366. 
438 Ibid., 367, 368. 
439 Which I address further in Chapter 4. 
440 And I think Paul Ricoeur means something like this when defines archives as: “Archives 
constitute the documentary stock of an institution. It is a specific activity of this institution that 
produced them, gathers them, and conserves them. And the deposit thereby constituted is an 
authorized deposit through some stipulation added to the one that sets up the entity for which the 
archives are ‘archives’” (Time and Narrative, Vol. 3, 177). 
441 As Galloway and Thacker put it, Doc is a hero who emerges from a contradiction in the 
network/optical society: “Hence a contraction: the self-regulating and self-organizing qualities of 
emergent networked phenomena appear to engender and supplement the very thing that makes us 
human, yet one’s ability to superimpose top-down control on that emergent structure evaporates 
in the blossoming of the network form, itself bent on eradicating the importance of any distinct 
or isolated node. This dissonance is most evident in network accidents or networks that appear to 
spiral out of control—Internet worms and disease epidemics, for instance. But calling such 
instances ‘accidents’ or ‘networks out of control’ is a misnomer. They are not networks that are 
somehow broken but networks that work too well. They are networks beyond one’s capacity to 
control them, or even to comprehend them. At one moment the network appears far too large, as 
in the global dynamic of climate changes, but at another moment it appears too small, as with 
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binary code or DNA. This is why we suggest that even while networks are entirely coincident 
with social life, networks also carry with them the most nonhuman and misanthropic tendencies” 
(The Exploit, 5-6). I think that the Golden Fang can be understood as a network that works too 
well, an entity that has nonhuman and misanthropic tendencies. 
442 Pynchon, Inherent Vice, 369. 
443 Qtd. in Frank Budgen, James Joyce and the Making of Ulysses (Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
University Press, 1960), 67-8. 
444 Blanchot, The Writing of the Disaster, 21. 
445 By “mega-narrative” I mean a narrative that is simply too big to traverse without incredibly 
non-trivial effort. Not infinite of course, but prohibitively large. The temporal aspect of reading a 
mega-narrative should also be emphasized, for often the changes in subject formation attending 
the duration of a reading are not insignificant. 
446 For example, I think one way of reading Inherent Vice is as a somewhat more accessible 
rewriting of The Crying of Lot 49 (his only novel truly set in the “contemporary”), especially in 
light of his public disavowal of the novel in the introduction to Slow Learner and elsewhere. 
Inherent Vice, even though it may very well be his final novel at the moment, is a kind of 
entrance point to his work. 
447 See Julie Bosman, “Periodic Novel, Coming Soon,” The New York Times (20 Nov. 2011), 
http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/20/periodic-novel-coming-soon/. 
448 I discuss Grossman’s project more in the Coda. 
449 There is some evidence, although second-hand, that Pynchon conceived of his novels as one 
“endless text.” According to Andrew Gordon’s account of his brief encounter with Thomas 
Pynchon and his friendship with an unnamed ex-lover of Pynchon’s, “From time to time, she 
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dropped convincing-sounding details about Pynchon. She said he picked his friends carefully and 
that they guarded his privacy. She said he had written a second novel in haste and for money and 
that he was not too proud of it; that would be the just published Crying of Lot 49. She claimed 
that he had people help him with research and that he was working on an endless novel in which 
all his friends would appear, including her” (Andrew Gordon, “Smoking Dope with Thomas 
Pynchon: A Sixties Memoir,” in The Vineland Papers: Critical Takes on Pynchon’s Novel, eds. 
Geoffrey Green, Donald J. Greiner, and Larry McCaffery [Normal, IL: Dalkey Archive Press, 
1994], 171, emphases mine). 
450 This is Ann M. Blair’s point in Too Much to Know: Managing Scholarly Information before 
the Modern Age (New Haven: Yale Press, 2010), in which she studies “information overload” in 
the pre- and early-modern periods. “But the feeling of overload is often lived by those who 
experience it as if it were an utterly new phenomenon, as is perhaps characteristic of feelings 
more generally or of self-perception in the modern or postmodern especially. [. . .] Neither the 
perception of overabundance nor the basic methods of text management were new or unique to 
the Renaissance” (3, 5).  
451 Harold Bloom, “Introduction,” in Thomas Pynchon’s Gravity’s Rainbow, ed. Harold Bloom 
(New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1986), 1. 
452 Ibid. 
453 Pynchon Gravity’s Rainbow, 647. 
454 Bloom, Thomas Pynchon’s Gravity’s Rainbow, 3. 
455 Pynchon, Gravity’s Rainbow, 653. 
456 Ibid., 647. 
457 Ibid. 
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458 Kirby, 48. 
459 Ibid. Also, she importantly asks, “What do we forfeit in claiming Nature’s ‘textuality,’ its 
literacy, as our own?” (48). 
460 Pynchon, Gravity’s Rainbow, 654-5. 
461 I am inclined to imagine The Matrix here, with its towers of humans-as-batteries. 
462 Ibid., 654. 
463 Ibid. 
464 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (1995), trans. Daniel Heller-
Roazen (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 175. 
465 Ibid., 176, 32. Elsewhere Agamben is even clearer in his declaration about the political space 
of modernity itself: “Today it is not the city but rather the camp that is the fundamental 
biopolitical paradigm in the West” (181). 
466 For a more detailed discussion of emergence, see Chapter 4. 
467 Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, 158. 
468 Pynchon, Gravity’s Rainbow, 722. 
469 Ibid., emphasis mine. 
470 Akira Mizuta Lippit’s nuclear critical study, Shadow Optics (2005), is particularly interesting 
for his analysis of the effects nuclear light and radiation had on bodies at Nagasaki and 
Hiroshima, and how Japanese filmic practices have attempted to represent, often by not showing 
or rendering invisible, the (inaccessible) experience of nuclear light and radiation. “The atomic 
radiation that ended the war in Japan unleashed an excess visuality that threatened the material 
and conceptual dimensions of human interiority and exteriority. It assailed the bodies it touched, 
seared and penetrated them, annihilating the limits that established human existence in the world. 
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The destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 exposed the fragility of the human surface, 
the capacity of catastrophic light and lethal radiation to penetrate the human figure at its limit. 
Under the glare of atomic radiation, the human body was exposed: revealed and opened, but also 
displaced, thrust outward into the distant reaches of the visible world. It situated the body 
between not only two worlds but two universes: two separate orders of all things, or even of the 
same things. Visibility and invisibility, exteriority and interiority, the living and the dead” (Akira 
Mizuta Lippit, Atomic Light [Shadow Objects] [Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2005], 4).  
471 Pynchon, Gravity’s Rainbow, 722. I should note here that though I do not comment upon the 
obvious resonances with postcolonial criticism above, I do not think that Pynchon calling non-
Europeans “savages” indicates some kind of colonial myopia in which the humanity of the other 
cannot be perceived by Pynchon. His frequent condemnation of Western imperialism throughout 
his fiction and his constant sensitivity to the preterit, the other, the different, and the perverse 
serve to color this term in the above passage more ironically. At this irony’s most simple level, 
what is more “savage” than a “Kingdom of Death”? 
472 And one might even go so far as to say, the narrator (or at least one of them) of Pynchon’s 
luminous and voluminous fiction. Recall that all of Gravity’s Rainbow may very well be a film, 
and this film’s interruption by a light bulb burning out coincides with the Rocket’s final descent 
(“The film has broken, or a projector bulb has burned out. It was difficult even for us, old fans 
who’ve always been at the movies [haven’t we?] to tell which before the darkness swept in” 
[760]). In other words, has Byron burned out, or is there nothing left to project/write? 
473 See particularly Ernst Bloch, “The Artistic Illusion as the Visible Anticipatory Illumination” 
(1959), in The Utopian Function of Art and Literature: Selected Essays, trans. Jack Zipes and 
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Frank Mecklenburg (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1988), 141-55; and Ernst Bloch, The 
Spirit of Utopia (1918), trans. Anthony A. Nassar (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
2000). 
474 For the mega-text’s limit, in a Borgesian sense, is the world itself, something too big to ever 
be totally experienced. Consequently, I am encouraged to look at the narrative work that such 
massive texts do less as telling a tale, and more as projecting or constructing a world in which 
narrative(s) sometimes occur. 
475 Badiou, 14. 
 
4.0 THE INVERTED NUKE IN THE GARDEN: DAVID FOSTER WALLACE’S 
ARCHIVAL APOCALYPSE, PP. 205-312 
 
476 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921), Revised Ed., trans. D.F. Pears 
& B.F. McGuinness (New York: Routledge, 1974), 87. 
477 Which appears in Girl with Curious Hair (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1989), 231-373. 
478 Larry McCaffery, “An Interview with David Foster Wallace,” The Review of Contemporary 
Fiction 13, no. 2 (Summer 1993), 142. 
479 Perhaps an even better example occurs in the interview with McCaffery when he discusses 
Terminator 2: Judgment Day (dir. James Cameron): “It’s almost like postmodernism is fiction’s 
fall from biblical grace. Fiction became conscious of itself in a way it never had been. Here’s a 
really pretentious bit of pop analysis for you: I think you can see Cameron’s Terminator movies 
as a metaphor for all literary art after Roland Barthes, viz. the movies’ premise is that the 
Cyberdyne NORAD computer becomes conscious of itself as conscious, as having interests and 
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an agenda; the Cyberdyne becomes literally self-referential, and it’s no accident that the result of 
this is nuclear war, Armageddon. . . . Metafiction’s real enemy has always been Armageddon.  
Art’s reflection on itself is terminal, is one big reason why the art world saw [Marcel] Duchamp 
as Antichrist” (McCaffery 134). 
480 Don DeLillo, White Noise: Text and Criticism, ed. Mark Osteen (New York: Penguin, 1998 
[1985]), 325. 
481 Ibid., 326. 
482 See Adam Kelly, “David Foster Wallace and the New Sincerity in American Fiction,” in 
Consider David Foster Wallace: Critical Essays (Los Angeles: Sideshow Media Group, 2010), 
131-46. 
483 On recursivity in Infinite Jest see N. Katherine Hayles, “The Illusion of Autonomy and the 
Fact of Recursivity: Virtual Ecologies, Entertainment, and Infinite Jest,” New Literary History 
30, no. 3, Ecocriticism (Summer 1999): 675-97. 
484 See David Foster Wallace, Infinite Jest (New York: Little, Brown & Co., 1996), 983. 
485 See D.T. Max, “The Unfinished,” The New Yorker (March 9, 2009), http://www.newyorker. 
com/reporting/2009/03/09/090309fa_fact_max. 
486 And it is not lost upon this author that the critical attention Wallace has received since his 
death has ranged from the respectful, careful, and intelligent, to the scavenging and self-serving. 
The simple act of joining the current discussion, so recently begun, puts one in the awkward 
position of canonizer, defender, and advocate. To do so not in terms of one’s own interests at the 
author’s expense, but rather in the service of an author who deserves detached and rigorous 
criticism, must be the goal for such a contemporary intervention. The simple fact that the work of 
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David Foster Wallace requires such a goal, however, may indeed be a testimony to the attention 
his work so richly deserves. 
487 See David Lipsky, Although of Course You End Up Becoming Yourself: A Road Trip with 
David Foster Wallace (New York: Broadway Books, 2010). 
488 George Saunders, Untitled Tribute, Five Dials: Celebrating the Life and Work of David 
Foster Wallace, 1962-2008 10 (2009): 15. 
489 David Carlisle, “Introduction,” in Consider David Foster Wallace: Critical Essays, ed. David 
Hering (Los Angeles, CA: Side Show Media Group Press, 2010), 20. This collection of essays is 
also the first devoted exclusively to Wallace, and one of its primary ambitions is to define a field 
of David Foster Wallace Studies, something I think it gestures toward beginning quite well. 
490 Michael Sheehan, “Editor’s Introduction,” The Sonora Review 55-56 (2009): 4. 
491 David Foster Wallace, Everything and More: A Compact History of ∞ (New York: W.W. 
Norton & CO., 2003), 305. In the previous sentence, the notational “N” was used to mark a 
mathematical descriptor absent from my word-processing program. 
492 Lipsky, 35. Also see Clare Hayes-Brady, “The Book, the Broom and the Ladder: 
Philosophical Groundings in the Work of David Foster Wallace,” in Consider David Foster 
Wallace: Critical Essays (Los Angeles, CA: Sideshow Media Group Press, 2010), 22-36, where 
she also discusses the influence of the philosophy of Paul Ricoeur and Richard Rorty upon 
Wallace’s early work, in particular The Broom of the System. 
493 David Foster Wallace, “Fictional Futures and the Conspicuously Young,” The Review of 
Contemporary Fiction 8, no. 3 (1988): 51. He goes on to add: “Language’s promotion from 
mirror to eye, from organikos to organic, is yesterday’s news (except in those two lonely 
outposts, TV and the Creative Classroom) as the tide of Post-Structuralism, Marxism, Feminism, 
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Freudianism, Deconstruction, Semiotics, Hermeneutics, and attendant –isms and –ics moves 
through the (‘Straight’) U.S. academy and into the consciousness of the conscious American 
adult” (51). 
494 See Less Than Zero (New York: Vintage Contemporaries, 1998 [1985]) and Imperial 
Bedrooms (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2010) for particularly brutal examples of this 
minimalism. 
495 For an excellent general discussion on what poststructuralism’s influence on US culture more 
broadly has looked like, see François Cusset, French Theory: How Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, 
& Co. Transformed the Intellectual Life of the United States (2003), trans. Jeff Fort 
(Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2008). 
496 His father was a philosophy professor at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, and 
his mother was a professor of English and Composition at Parkland College. 
497 Fredric Jameson, “New Literary History and the End of the New,” New Literary History 39, 
no. 3 (Summer 2008): 383. 
498 Ibid., 385. 
499 Zadie Smith, “Brief Interviews with Hideous Men: The Difficult Gifts of David Foster 
Wallace,” in Changing My Mind: Occasional Essays (New York: Penguin, 2009), 237. She later 
writes, on a quite different note: “He was, in the broadest sense, a moralist: what mattered to him 
most was not the end but the quality of our communal human experience before the end, while 
we’re still here. What passes between us in the queue before we die” (264). 
500 Jameson’s two references to Infinite Jest are sparing and somewhat cryptic in the otherwise 
quite incisive “New Literary History After the End of the New.” Like much of what is under 
discussion here, Jameson’s remarks are germane, if for no other reason than he is both relying on 
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and challenging a rhetoric of ends, and specifically such overly-general categorical terms like 
“new.”   
501 Wallace, Infinite Jest, 12. 
502 See Mark Fisher, Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative? (Winchester, UK: Zer0 Books, 
2009) and Michael Schudson, Advertising, The Uneasy Persuasion: Its Dubious Impact on 
American Society (New York: Basic Books, 1984). 
503 David Foster Wallace, “E Unibus Pluram: Television and U.S. Fiction” (1993), in A 
Supposedly Fun Thing I’ll Never Do Again (New York: Back Bay Books, 1997), 41. 
504 Ibid. Wallace goes on to write at more length about what he considers the forebears of this 
televisual-irony: “The erudite, sardonic fictions of the Black Humorists introduced a generation 
of new fiction writers who saw themselves as sort of avant-avant-garde, not only cosmopolitan 
and polyglot but also technologically literate, products of more than just one region, heritage, 
and theory, and citizens of a culture that said its most important stuff about itself via mass media. 
In this regard, one thinks particularly of the Gaddis of The Recognitions, JR, the Barth of The 
End of the Road and The Sot-Weed Factor, and the Pynchon of The Crying of Lot 49. But the 
movement toward treating of the pop as its own reservoir of mythopeia gathered momentum and 
quickly transcended both school and genre” (45). 
505 Ibid., 63. 
506 He also suggests as much in his interview with Larry McCaffery: “There are some interesting 
parallels between postmodern crank-turners and what’s happened since post-structural theory 
took off here in the U.S., why there’s such a big backlash against post-structuralism going on 
now. It’s the crank-turners fault. I think the crank-turner’s replaced the critic as the real angel of 
death as far as literary movements are concerned, now. [. . .] Take a look at some of the critical-
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theory Ph.D. dissertations being written now. They’re like de Man and Foucault in the mouth of 
a dull child. Academia and commercial culture have somehow become these gigantic 
mechanisms of commodification that drain the weight and color out of even the most radical new 
advances. It’s a surreal inversion of the death-by-neglect that used to kill off prescient art. Now 
prescient art suffers death-by-acceptance. We love things to death now, now. Then we retire to 
the Hamptons” (McCaffery 135). Though this is clearly not to suggest that Wallace is the first 
writer to bemoan what William James once called the “PhD octopus.” 
507 Tom LeClair, “The Prodigious Fiction of Richard Powers, William Vollmann, and David 
Foster Wallace,” Critique 38, no. 1 (Fall 1996): 14. 
508 Wallace, Infinite Jest, 63-64. 
509 It should be also noted, as I don’t think it has elsewhere, that Wallace’s intimate knowledge 
of optics is most assuredly due to the three years he spent at the University of Arizona during his 
MFA. The U of A is one of the two leading optics schools in the country (the other is the 
University of Rochester), and, combined with the presence of Raytheon in Tucson, he was in a 
particularly appropriate place to learn about the complexities of optical science. I am also 
indebted to Doctor of Geometrical Optics, Eric C. Fest, for pointing me toward the historical 
importance of geometric optics in constructing the Hydrogen Bomb. More on this below. 
510 Wallace, Infinite Jest, 985, n. 24, fn. a. 
511 I will primarily be using “Incandenza” or “Himself” to designate J.O. Incandenza, though 
“James” or “J.O.,” would also be appropriate. 
512 Which is an acronym for “Year of Dairy Products from the American Heartland.” 
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513 It is not unimportant as well that, with the exception of the citation abnormalities regarding 
the calendar, it would be difficult to recognize this outside of the context of Infinite Jest as a 
fictional citation. 
514 David Letzler has usefully called such extraneous matter “cruft” in “Encyclopedic Novels and 
the Cruft of Fiction: Infinite Jest’s Endnotes,” Studies in the Novel 44, no. 3 (Fall 2012): 267-
283. 
515 John Barth, “The Literature of Exhaustion” (1967), in The Friday Book: Essays and Other 
Nonfiction (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1984), 72. 
516 It should also be noted that there is another level of recursivity here, as Barth’s 2001 novel, 
Coming Soon!!!, can clearly be read as a response to “Westward,” as well as commentary upon 
his youthful first novel, The Floating Opera (1956). 
517 See A.O. Scott, “The Panic of Influence,” The New York Review of Books 47, no. 2 (10 Feb. 
2000), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/232. 
518 See Harold Bloom, The Anxiety of Influence: A Theory of Poetry, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1997 [1973]). 
519 With perhaps a bit of exaggerated self-criticism he says: “In ‘Westward’ I got trapped one 
time just trying to expose the illusions of metafiction the same way metafiction had tried to 
expose the illusions of the pseudo-unmediated realist fiction that came before it. It was a horror 
show. The stuff’s a permanent migraine. [. . .] God, even talking about it makes me want to puke. 
The pretension. Twenty-five-year-olds should be locked away and denied ink and paper. 
Everything I wanted to do came out in the story, but it came out as just what it was: crude and 
naïve and pretentious” (McCaffery 142). 
520 McCaffery, 147. 
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521 Another novel appearing around the same time on par with Infinite Jest’s metacritical 
awareness is Mark Z. Danielewski’s remarkable House of Leaves (New York: Pantheon, 2000), a 
novel surely inspired in part by Infinite Jest. 
522 Note: the “V” is often overlooked by many, and is important with regard to my subsequent 
discussion of archival accumulation. 
523 Michel Foucault, “Preface to Transgression” (1963), in Language, Counter-Memory, 
Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews, trans. Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon, ed. 
Donald F. Bouchard (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977), 49. 
524 This and the following section have been published in a revised and different form as “‘Then 
Out of the Rubble’: The Apocalypse in David Foster Wallace’s Early Fiction,” Studies in the 
Novel 44, no. 3 (Fall 2012): 284-303. 
525 David Foster Wallace, The Broom of the System (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 457. 
526 Ibid., 40, emphasis mine. It also must be noted that the doodle is one of Wittgenstein’s 
famous language games. The drawing is of a duck that, if turned 90°, appears to be a rabbit. The 
lesson of this particular game is that what we call something is dependent upon how we perceive 
an object, in other words, the context of the linguistic situation. And this is also to make his 
point: “An image is not a picture, but a picture can correspond to it” (Ludwig Wittgenstein, The 
Philosophical Investigations [1953], 2nd ed., trans. G.E.M. Anscombe [Malden MA: Blackwell 
Publishers, 1958]), 101e, 301.  
527 Ibid., 73. 
528 Wittgenstein, Investigations, 27e, 55. 
529 David Foster Wallace, “The Empty Plenum: David Markson’s Wittgenstein’s Mistress” The 
Review of Contemporary Fiction 10, no. 2 (Summer 1990): 220. 
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530 Ibid., 221. 
531 Wallace, Broom, 467. 
532 Which is, if you will recall, “Oedipa settled back, to await the crying of lot 49” (Pynchon, The 
Crying of Lot 49, 152). 
533 Wallace, Broom, 90. 
534 Ibid. 
535 Ibid., 54. 
536 See Leo Marx, The Machine in the Garden: Technology and the Pastoral Ideal in America 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1964). Also, for a discussion of Wallace’s construction of 
landscape and Marx, see Graham Foster, “A Blasted Region: David Foster Wallace’s Man-made 
Landscapes,” Consider David Foster Wallace: Critical Essays, ed. David Hering (Los Angeles, 
CA: Sideshow Media Group, 2010), 37-48. 
537 Wallace, Broom, 45. 
538 Hayes-Brady, for one, said: “it seems clear to me that The Broom of the System deserves to be 
considered not as the juvenilia of a potentially talented author, but as the self-assured declaration 
of an artistic and philosophical project that would give rise not just to an impressive career, but 
also to a rebirth of American fiction” (36). 
539 Theodor Adorno, Aesthetic Theory (1970), eds. Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann, trans. 
and ed. Robert Hullot-Kentor (Minneapolis, MN: The University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 
159. 
540 Jacques Derrida, “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences” (1967), 
in Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 
279. It is also of especial note that Derrida uses archē to designate eschaton. 
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541 To play on the term “body without organs” used by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari in Anti-
Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (1972), Vol. 1, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and 
Helen R. Lane (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1983). 
542 Blanchot, The Writing of the Disaster, 41. 
543 John Barth, Lost in the Funhouse (New York: Anchor Books, 1988 [1968]), 97. 
544 Though for Wallace “consumption” might be a more appropriate term here. 
545 This book has also been adapted into a film by director John Krasinski (2009). 
546 David Foster Wallace, “Octet,” in Brief Interviews with Hideous Men (Boston, MA: Back 
Bay Books, 1999), 147. 
547 It should also be noted that “Octet” is constantly performing a kind of self-diagnosing literary 
criticism, furthering the recursive loops between writer, reader, and critic, with Wallace tending 
to not only anticipate the theoretical implications of such meta-criticism, but to anxiously and 
obsessively fret over his own theoretically self-aware position. For example: “You were betting 
that the queer emergent urgency of the organically unified whole of the octet’s two-times-two-
times-two pieces (which you’d envisioned as a Manichean duality raised to the triune power of a 
sort of Hegelian synthesis w/r/t issues which both characters and readers were required to 
“decide”) would attenuate the initial appearance of postclever metaformal hooey and end up (you 
hoped) actually interrogating the reader’s initial inclination to dismiss the piece as ‘shallow 
formal exercises’ simply on the basis of their shared formal features, forcing the reader to see 
that such a dismissal would be based on precisely the same sorts of shallow formalistic concerns 
that she was (at least at first) inclined to accuse the octet of” (Brief Interviews, 151-2). It is also 
germane to my later conversation to mention that Wallace is using “emergent” here in the way 
that Steven Johnson does. 
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548 Wallace, Brief Interviews, 160. 
549 Ibid., 159. 
550 Ibid., 160. 
551 Barth, Lost in the Funhouse, 72. 
552 Though it should be noted that her pregnancy itself is a ruse. 
553 David Foster Wallace, Girl with Curious Hair (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1989), 239. 
554 Ambrose is clearly Barth because he actually wrote a story called “Lost in the Funhouse” in 
the world of “Westward,” which we are given to understand is word for word Barth’s story. This 
is also clearly an allusion to Jorge Luis Borges’ “Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote” (1941), 
Collected Fictions, trans. Andrew Hurley [New York: Penguin Books, 1998]), 88-95, in which 
Pierre Menard achieves that curious accomplishment of writing (not copying) Don Quixote word 
for word hundreds of years later, and this reproduction is pretty much universally regarded as a 
better work. This all of course complicates the map one must draw to trace influence here in a 
similarly recursive fashion, something Barth himself plays upon in his novel Coming Soon!!! 
555 In other words, this is quite far from Gaston Bachelard’s notion of a house as “an instrument 
with which to confront the cosmos” (The Poetics of Space [1958], trans. Maria Jolas [Boston, 
MA: Beacon Press, 1994 (1964)], 46). 
556 Barth, Lost in the Funhouse, 97. 
557 For instance, see Wallace’s review of H.L. Hix’s Morte d’Author: An Autopsy, “Greatly 
Exaggerated” (1992), in A Supposedly Fun Thing I’ll Never Do Again (Boston, MA: Back Bay 
Books, 1997), 138-45, in which he shows a more-than-passing familiarity with the history of the 
intellectual formation of deconstruction: “Hix’s discussion isn’t comprehensive, quite: Heidegger 
and Hegel are scarcely mentioned, Husserl (a major influence of Derrida) is absent, as are such 
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important contemporary figures in the debate as Stanley Cavell. . . Paul de Man, Edward Said, 
Gayatri Spivak” (141, emphasis mine). Recall also that de Man was one of those “aliens” 
Wallace referred to in his “Fictional Futures” essay. 
558 de Man, 211. 
559 I’m choosing to capitalize the term “Empire” here for, though “Westward the Course of 
Empire Takes its Way” appeared over a decade before Hardt and Negri’s Empire, I do not think 
it too much of stretch to understand Wallace as meaning something similar to their use of the 
term “Empire” in his title 
560 Ibid. 
561 Girl with Curious Hair, 310. 
562 It is almost impossible to read this without hearing echoes of Theodor Adorno and Max 
Horkheimer’s critique of aesthetic production within what they call “the culture industry”: “Only 
by subordinating all branches of intellectual production equally to the single purpose of imposing 
on the senses of human beings, from the time they leave the factory in the evening to the time 
they clock on in the morning, the imprint of the work routine which they must sustain throughout 
the day, does this culture mockingly fulfill the notion of a unified culture which the philosophers 
of the individual personality held out against mass culture” (Theodor Adorno and Max 
Horkheimer, The Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments (1944), trans. Edmund 
Jephcott [Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002], 104). 
563 For Wallace’s own take on Barthes’s seminal essay, again see “Greatly Exaggerated.” 
564 de Man, 215. 
565 McCafferey, 142. 
566 Wallace, Girl with Curious Hair, 256, emphases in original. 
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567 Ibid., 257, emphases in original. 
568 Ibid., 340. 
569 Ibid., emphases mine. 
570 I feel that Wallace wants to signal both “Pop,” as in father, and “pop,” as in popular culture at 
this point. In the figure of Steelritter, they are the same thing for his son. Who is of course 
speaking here while dressed as Ronald McDonald. 
571 Ibid., 341, emphases in original. 
572 Apropos The Broom of the System, we might well recall Wittgenstein’s early work in the 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus here: “Death is not an event in life: we do not live to experience 
death. If we take eternity to mean not infinite temporal duration but timelessness, then eternal 
life belongs to those who live in the present. Our life has no end in just the way in which our 
visual field has no limits” (Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 87, 6.4311). 
573 de Man, 222. 
574 Walter Benjamin, “Unpacking my Library” (1931), in Illuminations, 67. 
575 Herman Melville, Moby-Dick (Norton Critical Edition) (1851), 2nd ed., eds. Hershel Parker 
and Harrison Hayford (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2002), 294. 
576 This section has been published in a considerably revised and significantly shorter form as, 
“The Inverted Nuke in the Garden: Archival Emergence and Anti-Eschatology in David Foster 
Wallace’s Infinite Jest,” boundary 2 39, no. 3 (Fall 2012): 125-149. 
577 Note: for ease in documentation, I will refer to the apocalyptically entertaining film at the 
center of the novel’s clandestine machinations as: Infinite Jest (V) and the Entertainment. (It also 
goes by the names: samizdat, Infinite Jest (IV), and Infinite Jest (VI); also, its primary actor, 
Joelle Van Dyne, proposed calling it “The Face of the Deep,” though this title was rejected by its 
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auteur as “too pretentious” [Infinite Jest, 238]). This is also to suggest that the ambiguity of its 
nomenclature should be retained and captured by referring to it as Infinite Jest (V), something 
most other critics eschew by predominantly referring to it only as the Entertainment. 
578 It is perhaps significant here that the US’s apocalyptic problem with waste and garbage is the 
central theme of Don DeLillo’s Underworld (New York: Scribner, 1997), a similarly massive 
novel that appeared one year after Infinite Jest. 
579 Hayles, “The Illusion of Autonomy,” 684. On the form of the novel itself she continues: 
“Imagine a huge novel that has been run through the recursive feedback loops of an intelligent 
agent program and then strung out along the page. Although the words follow in linear sequence, 
the recursive enfolding would dramatically affect the novel’s structure, sequence, and meaning. 
For such a novel any starting point would be to some extent arbitrary, for no matter where one 
starts, everything eventually cycles together with everything else” (684-5). 
580 Though it should be noted that it might also be nuclear fission, or a combination of 
fusion/fission, as the novel remains ambiguous regarding which process is involved. Ultimately 
it does not really matter, for the important aspect of “annular fusion(/fission)” is its annularity, 
which, according to the OED is defined as: “Of or pertaining to a ring or rings; ring-like, ring-
formed, ringed.” The cyclical feedback loop, the recursivity of annular fusion is what Wallace 
clearly wants to emphasize with this imagined technology. 
581 Wallace, Infinite Jest, 572. 
582 “Kertwang” is a neologism of Wallace’s that he uses throughout Infinite Jest, roughly 
meaning: either a joke played on someone, or something that upsets the smooth functioning of 
something else. 
583 Wallace, Infinite Jest, 573. 
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584 Stephen Burn, Infinite Jest: A Reader’s Guide (New York: Continuum, 2003), 65. This is 
indeed the very end of this chapter, and the rest of the short study is devoted to the novel’s 
popular and critical reception. 
585 Marshall Boswell, Understanding David Foster Wallace (Columbia SC: University of South 
Carolina Press, 2003), 130-1. 
586 See Infinite Jest, 787-95, where Molly Notkin, friend of Joelle V.D., is interrogated and is 
clearly lying about some of the content of the film. Boswell, to his credit, attends to the 
unreliability present in the various accounts of the content of the film, but he ultimately says, 
“Although this is all we know about the content of the Entertainment, it is surely enough” 
(Boswell, 127, emphasis mine). His entire reading of the novel is based on this “surely enough,” 
arguing that “in the same way that a coherent reading of The Broom of the System first demands 
familiarity with Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, a cogent interpretation of Infinite 
Jest first entails a brief encounter with Lacanian theory” (128). That this claim rests on the 
ambiguous content of Infinite Jest (V) is shaky ground indeed. 
587 See Elizabeth Freudenthal, “Anti-Interiority: Compulsiveness, Objectification, and Identity in 
Infinite Jest,” New Literary History 41, no. 1 (Winter 2010): 191-211. 
588 Something that, if we recall how desire is formulated in “Westward the Course of Empire 
Takes its Way” as a desire for death, must surely give one pause as to the applicability of relying 
too heavily on a Lacanian reading of Infinite Jest. 
589 See Steven Moore, “The First Draft Version of Infinite Jest,” at The Howling Fantods, http:// 
www.thehowlingfantods.com/ij_first.htm, for an excellent account of the composition and 
editing of Infinite Jest. The Howling Fantods is an immensely useful resource for anyone 
working on Wallace. 
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590 For a chronology of the events in Infinite Jest, see Greg Carlisle, Elegant Complexity: A Study 
of David Foster Wallace’s Infinite Jest (Los Angeles, CA: Side Show Media Group, 2007), 493-
8. Though Carlisle’s book is an excellent companion piece to the novel in terms of outlining 
basic narrative facts, it is woefully inadequate as a “study,” providing only a page-and-a-half of 
“Interpretation” (486-7). 
591 Wallace, Infinite Jest, 177. 
592 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection (1980), trans. Leon S. Roudiez 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 1. Before this, she writes: “There looms, within 
abjection, one of those violent, dark revolts of being, directed against a threat that seems to 
emanate from an exorbitant outside or inside, ejected beyond the scope of the possible, the 
tolerable, the thinkable. It lies there, quite close, but it cannot be assimilated” (1). 
593 And indeed, the central political conflict of the novel revolves around US experialism. The 
Great Concavity, the site of US experialism par excellence, is not only located in New England, 
but its toxic waste is continually spilling into southern Québec. For the most part, Canada is quite 
unhappy about the fact that they’ve been “given” new territory that is horrendously toxic, and 
firmly want to return this territory to the US. The AFR, however, rather than desiring to return 
this territory to the US, want to use it as leverage for seceding from both Canada and ONAN To 
bring about such a scenario, they need to make it more desirable for the Canadian government to 
let Québec go entirely rather than risk a war with the US. Thus, they want to use Infinite Jest (V) 
to facilitate this: “This was the real objective: a Master cartridge. Unlike the F.L.Q. [Fronte de la 
Libération de la Quebec], Les Assassins des Fauteils Rollents had no interest in blackmail or 
cartographic extorting for the Convexity’s [Concavity’s] return. Not in re-Reconfiguration of 
O.N.A.N. or even its charter’s dissolution. The A.F.R. were interested only in dealing the sort of 
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testicular frappe to the underbelly of U.S.A. self-interests that would render Canada itself 
unwilling to face the U.S.A. retaliation for this—if A.F.R. could secure, copy, and disseminate 
the Entertainment, Québec would be not so much allowed as required by Ottawa to secede, to 
face on its own the wrath of a neighbor struck down by its own inability to say ‘Non’ to fatal 
pleasures” (Infinite Jest 722). 
594 Donald Pease’s writing about US national fantasy as a slow transformation of new Others 
being invented in The New American Exceptionalism seems particularly appropriate to mention 
here. 
595 Jacques Derrida, “Force and Signification,” in Writing and Difference (1967), trans. Alan 
Bass (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 5-6. 
596 I’m putting “protagonist” under erasure here, for though Hal is clearly the principal character 
for much of the novel, it is clear that Don Gately is really the novel’s hero (without scare 
quotes), and a much more likely candidate for the term “protagonist.” Hopefully my subsequent 
discussion of Hal will also justify this erasure. 
597 The ambiguity of Hal’s “condition” at the opening of the novel has prompted one of the key 
debates in online Wallace communities. 
598 Wallace, Infinite Jest, 694. “John Wayne” here does not signify the American actor who 
appeared in a slew of westerns, but a tennis-peer of Hal’s. 
599 Wallace, Infinite Jest, 11-13. 
600 Ibid., 14. 
601 Ibid., 17. 
602 As noted above, there are fervent debates about how Hal transformed into this person unable 
to communicate in any way. One theory is that he ingested DMZ (a military grade hallucinogen 
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that Michael Pemulis acquires; the novel “ends” near the point Hal, Pemulis, and others are 
about to take it. That said, it is fairly clear that Hal does not ingest it); another is that the mold he 
ate when he was young finally was metabolized; another is that he watched the Entertainment. At 
the end of the day, however, no explanation is satisfactory or necessary, for to give a “content” to 
this change would upset Wallace’s engagement with Derrida. 
603 On one of the schemas used to construct the novel—the fractal known as the Sierpinski 
Gasket—see David Hering, “Infinite Jest: Triangles, Cycles, Choices and Chases,” in Consider 
David Foster Wallace: Critical Essays, ed. David Hering (Los Angeles, CA: Sideshow Media 
Group, 2010), 89-100. 
604 Derrida, Writing and Difference, 8. 
605 Wallace, Infinite Jest, 788, 1072, n. 326. 
606 Indeed, one with direct ties to the real power behind President Gentle: Rodney R. Tine, who is 
also the head of the combined Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
National Security Agency, and other governmental agencies, all integrated into the catch-all 
Office of Unspecified Services—in this way Wallace very much anticipates something like the 
Office of Homeland Security. 
607 Clearly anticipating this very type of critical engagement from other A.B.D.-Ph.D.’s. . . .  
608 The novel presents the possibility that the master-copy of the film was buried in J.O. 
Incandenza’s head, but not only should we attend to the unreliability of Hal in the opening 
chapter when he gives an account of disinterring his father’s body (“I think of John N. R. Wayne, 
who would have won this year’s WhataBurger, standing watch in a mask as Donald Gately and I 
dig up my father’s head” [16-17]), but also the fact that Himself committed suicide by exploding 
his head in a microwave. In other words, there is no head in which to bury the film. 
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609 Wallace, Infinite Jest, 740. 
610 Derrida, Writing and Difference, 14. 
611 Wallace, Infinite Jest, 381. 
612 Ibid., 391. 
613 “SHORT-HAIRED MEN IN SHINY TRUCKS ARE NOT DISMANTLING MANITOBAN 
THERMS BUT INSTEAD MOVING THEM JUST OVER BORDER INTO TURTLE MTN. 
INDIAN RESERVATION, HORRIFIED N.D. GOV CHARGES—12 point Subheader from 
Demoted Headliner Already in Dutch Down in the Subheader Dept., Now, Too” (Infinite Jest 
392). 
614 Wallace, Infinite Jest, 407. 
615 One piece of evidence that these inverted nukes were not detonated immediately follows this: 
“GENTLE HAS COMPLETELY LOST MIND, CLAIMS CONFIDANT, O.U.S. CHIEF TINE 
AT PRESS CONFERENCE: THREATENS TO DETONATE UPSIDE-DOWN MISSILES IN 
U.S. SILOS, IRRADIATE CANADA W/ AID OF ATHSCME HELL-FANS—Header: 
‘WILLING TO ELIMINATE OWN MAP OUT OF SHEER PIQUE IF CANADA NIXES 
RECONFIGURATIVE TRANSFER OF ‘AESTHETICALLY UNACCEPTABLE’ 
TERRAIN—Pretty Obviously Homemade Subheader” (407). 
616 Ibid., 322. 
617 Ibid., 324, though Wallace goes on to stress the difficulty of deciding who exactly won: 
“though the assignment of point-values for each Combatant’s shirts, towels, shorts, armbands, 
socks, and shoes is statistically icky, plus there are also wildly involved corrections for initial 
megatonnage, population density, Land-Sea-Air delivery distributions, and EM-pulse resistant 
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civil-defense expenditures, so that the official victor takes three hours of EndStat number-
crunching and at least four Motrin for Otis P. Lord to confirm.” 
618 Ibid., 321-2. 
619 Ibid., 1023, n. 120 
620 Ibid., 322. 
621 In anticipation of my discussion of simulation below, it might also be useful here to note that 
Wallace is also pointing to Baudrillard in this passage: “We need to ask what might come after 
the orgy—mourning or melancholia? Doubtless neither, but an interminable clean-up of all the 
vicissitudes of modern history and its processes of liberation (of peoples, sex, dreams, art and the 
unconscious—in short, of all that makes up the orgy of our times), in an atmosphere dominated 
by the apocalyptic presentiment that all this is coming to an end. Rather than pressing forward 
and taking flight into the future, we prefer the retrospective apocalypse, and blanket revisionism. 
Our societies have become revisionistic: they are quietly rethinking everything [. . .]. Museums, 
jubilees, festivals, complete works, the publication of the tiniest unpublished fragments—all this 
shows that we are entering an active age of ressentiment and repentance” (Baudrillard, The 
Illusion of the End, 22). 
622 Wallace, Infinite Jest, 1023, n. 123. 
623 Ibid., 1024-5, n. 123. 
624 Ibid., 1023, n. 123. 
625 Ibid., 327. 
626 Ibid., 329. 
627 Or in other words, they are avoiding nuclear strikes on population centers. 
628 Wallace, Infinite Jest, 330. 
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629 Ibid., 333. 
630 Ibid. 
631 Ibid. 
632 Here, one might do well to think of Brian Massumi’s discussion of soccer in Parables for the 
Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002), 68-88. 
633 Borges, “On Exactitude in Science” (1960), in Collected Fictions, 325. 
634 Jean Baudrillard, “The Precession of Simulacra,” in Simulacra and Simulation, 1. 
635 And indeed, Hal clues us into this fact when “it also occurs to him that he finds the real-
snow/unreal-snow snag in the Eschaton extremely abstract but somehow way more interesting 
than the Eschaton itself, so far” (Infinite Jest, 335). It should also be noted, however, that there is 
an implicit critique of Baudrillard here, because Hal’s fascination with this problem is produced 
by “‘marijuana thinking.’” 
636 Baudrillard also heavily criticizes “using” his notion of simulation in contemporary art works 
in The Conspiracy of Art. 
637 Furthermore, maps function in other metaphorical ways throughout the novel: dying is often 
referred to in the novel as getting “de-mapped,” killing someone is “de-mapping” them, and 
people’s faces are referred to as “maps.” 
638 Infinite Jest, 335. 
639 Ibid., 336. 
640 Ibid. The passage continues: “The dreaded red UGC beanie has been donned by an Eschaton 
game-master only once before, and that was over three years ago, when human input-error on 
EndStat tallies of aggregate SUFDDIR during a three-way SACPOP free-for-all yielded an 
apparent ignition of the earth’s atmosphere” (337). 
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641 Ibid., 341. 
642 Indeed, Pemulis explicitly refers to the events surrounding the Eschaton as “I.-Day’s 
apocalypse” (1068 n. 324). 
643 Kermode, 18. 
644 Wallace, Everything and More, 302, n. 121. 
645 The most clear evidence is the archival collection of words on page 832 and elsewhere that 
Gately, a high school dropout, clearly could not have known. The ghost uses “Gately’s own 
brain-voice” to communicate with him, rather than, say, “speaking” with him, but the presence of 
language in his consciousness that Gately could in no way have been familiar with, and yet 
nevertheless understands, suggests that the appearance of Himself’s ghost “actually” takes place. 
Himself’s knowledge of events transpiring at ETA, that Gately also could not have had 
knowledge of at the time, also suggests this. That said, given the unreliability of so many other 
instances in the novel’s narration, the actuality of Himself projecting into Gately’s consciousness 
remains ambiguous. 
646 Wallace, Infinite Jest, 838-9. 
647 “Year of the Depend Adult Undergarment: InterLace Telentertainment, 932/1864 R.I.S.C 
power-TPs [“teleputers”] w/ or w/o console, Pink2, Post-Primestar D.S.S. dissemination, menus 
and icons, pixel-free Internet Fax, tri- and quad-modems w/ adjustable baud, Dissemination-
Grids, screens so high-def you might as well be there, cost-effective videophonic conferencing, 
internal Froxx CD-ROM, electronic couture, all-in-one consoles, Yushityu nanoprocessors, laser 
chromatography, Virtual-capable media-cards, fiber-optic pulse, digital encoding, killer apps; 
carpal neuralgia, phospenic migraine, gluteal hyperadiposity, lumbar stressae” (Infinite Jest, 60). 
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648 Ibid., 416. The passage continues: “No more Network reluctance to make a program too-
entertaining for fear its commercials would pale in comparison. The more pleasing a given 
cartridge was, the more orders there were for it from viewers; and the more orders for a given 
cartridge, the more InterLace kicked back to whatever production facility they’d acquired it 
from. Simple. Personal pleasure and gross revenue looked at last to lie along the same demand 
curve, at least as far as home entertainment went” (417). This construction of the availability and 
quality of entertainment available to people inhabiting the world of the novel should also clearly 
signal a step beyond the world of “Westward”’s commercial to end all commercials. 
649 See Hering, 89-110. 
650 Galloway, Protocol, 11-12. 
651 Hayles, “The Illusion of Autonomy,” 684-5. 
652 Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics; or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine, 
2nd ed. (Cambridge MA: The MIT Press, 1961 [1948]), 28. 
653 Shaviro, Connected, 243. Here Shaviro is referring to the “Cultural Fugue” as it appears in 
Samuel R. Delany’s Stars in My Pocket Like Grains of Sand (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan 
University Press, 2004 [1984]). From Shaviro quoting Delany: “A world is said to go into 
Cultural Fugue when ‘socioeconomic pressures. . . reach a point of technological recomplication 
and perturbation where the population completely destroys life across the planetary surface.’” 
654 Shaviro Connected, 10. 
655 Elsewhere in the novel we are provided more specific details for many of these films when 
they are watched by Hal or recounted by Joelle. Blood Sister: One Tough Nun is a particularly 
[un]interesting “parody of revenge/recidivism action genre, a formerly delinquent nun’s . . . 
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failure to reform a juvenile delinquent leads to a rampage of recidivism revenge” (Infinite Jest, 
990, n. 24). 
656 Wallace, Infinite Jest, 989-93, n. 24. These films are the captivatingly titled: Various 
Lachrymose U.S. Corporate Middle-Management Figures, The Clever Little Bastard, The Cold 
Majesty of the Numb, Death and the Single Girl, Too Much Fun, The Unfortunate Case of Me, 
and Sorry All Over the Place. This list also does not include the other “unfinished. 
UNRELEASED” versions of Infinite Jest (I-VI). 
657 Ibid., 989, n. 24. These “found dramas” basically came about through random chance—say 
throwing a dart at a page of the phonebook on the wall—and then consisted of imagining what 
that person’s life was like at that very moment. The “conceptual” aspect, of course, was that one 
really couldn’t know, nor could that person’s life be filmed. 
658 Ibid., 397. The passage continues: “which art-film habitués of course thought was a cleverly 
ironic anti-ad joke, and so they’d shell out for little paper theater tickets and file in in their 
sweater vests and tweeds and dirndls and tank up on espresso at the concession stand and find 
seats and sit down and make those little pre-movie leg and posture adjustments, and look around 
with that sort of vacant intensity” (397). 
659 Ibid., 989, n. 24. The “film” was basically a camera turned upon the audience. 
660 Ibid., 991, n. 24. 
661 Umberto Eco, The Infinity of Lists, trans. Alastair McEwen (New York: Rizzoli, 2009), 279. 
662 Ibid., 321, 327. 
663 Wallace, Infinite Jest, 985, n. 24, fn. a. 
664 Ibid., 986, n. 24. 
665 Ibid., 987, n. 24. 
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666 Ibid., 990, n. 24. “Madame Psychosis” is Joelle’s stage name. 
667 Ibid., 993, n. 24. There are also three (fictional) footnotes to this entry detailing the sources of 
the quotations. They are: “d. E. Duquette, ‘Beholden to Vision: Optics and Desire in Four Après 
Garde Films,’ Cartridge Quarterly East, vol. 4 no. 2, Y.W.-Q.M.D., pp. 35-39”; “e. Anonymous, 
‘Seeing v. Believing,’ Cartridge Quarterly East,’ vol. 4 no. 4, Y.W.-Q.M.D., pp. 93-95”; and “f. 
Ibid.” (993, n. 24, fn. d.-f.). 
668 Shaviro, Connected, 60. 
669 Steven Johnson, Emergence: The Connected Lives of Ants, Brains, Cities, and Software (New 
York: Scribner, 2001), 18. 
670 Ibid. 
671 Ibid., 19. 
672 Ibid., 20. 
673 Ibid., 21, emphasis mine. 
674 Ibid., 219-20. 
675 Ibid., 137. 
676 Steven Shaviro, The Cinematic Body (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 
1993), 54-5. 
677 Wallace, Infinite Jest, 126 & 752. 
678 Wallace, Infinite Jest, 981. 
679 Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents (1930), trans. James Strachey (New York: 
W.W. Norton & CO., 1989 [1961]), 10-11. 
680 Melville, Moby-Dick, 427. 
681 F. Scott Fitzgerald, The Great Gatsby (New York: Collier Books, 1991 [1925]), 188-9. 
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682 Nevil Shute, On the Beach (New York: Ballantine Books, 1974 [1957]), 279. It should be 
noted here, however, that Shute was a British writer who wrote On the Beach after he had 
emigrated to Australia. 
683 Infinite Jest, 981. 
684 Fitzgerald, 189. 
685 Whitman, 28, ll. 30-1. 
686 Zadie Smith is an exception to this statement. 
687 Brief Interviews, 125. The citation for the entry continues: “a 600gb DVD3 Product with 
1.6gb of Hyperavailable Hot Text Keyed to 11.2gb of Contextual, Etymological, Historical, 
Usage, and Gender-Specific Connotational Notes, Available Also with Lavish Illustrative 
Support in All 5 Major Sense-Media*, ©2096 by R. Leckie DataFest Unltd. (NYPHDC/US/ 
4Grid). *(compatible hardware required)” (125). 
688 Ibid., 127. 
689 Ibid., 125-6. 
690 Ibid., 127-8. 
 
5.0 CODA: APOCALYPSE NETWORKS: REPRESENTING THE NUCLEAR 
ARCHIVE, PP. 313-337 
 
691 Jorge Luis Borges, “The Book of Sand” (1975), in Collected Fictions, trans. Andrew Hurley 
(New York: Penguin, 1998), 483. 
692 Declan McCullagh, “Senators Propose Granting President Emergency Internet Power,” CNET 
(10 June 2010), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-20007418-38.html. As McCullagh points 
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out, “The idea of an Internet ‘kill switch’ that the president could flip is not new. A draft Senate 
proposal that CNET obtained in August [2009] allowed the White House to ‘declare a 
cybersecurity emergency,’ and another from Sens. Jay Rockefeller (D-W.V.) and Olympia 
Snowe (R-Maine) would have explicitly given the government the power to ‘order the 
disconnection’ of certain networks or Web sites.” The full text of the PCNAA is available at 
http://www.opencongress.org/bill/111-s3480/text.  
This is also to note that this section will appear in a slightly revised form as “Apocalypse 
Networks: Representing the Nuclear Archive,” in The Silence of Fallout: Nuclear Criticism in a 
Post-Cold War World, eds. Michael Blouin, Morgan Shipley, and Jack Taylor (Newcastle upon 
Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, forthcoming 2013), 81-103.  
 And on a further note, I have declined to revise the chapter overmuch, as I wrote it to be 
a fairly self-contained piece. Consequently, the term “coda” fits nicely, for though I repeat 
myself (or fail to repeat myself), hopefully there will not be too many contradictions. I feel that 
this essay further illustrates my points, while pointing new ways forward in my own thinking, 
particularly in terms of my recent interest in the “mega-text.” To alter it significantly would 
change its particular cant. To say something I did not have a chance to say in the dissertation, a 
title I played around with but failed to find a home for: “no apologies, not now.” 
693 See Chloe Albanesius, “Lieberman Backs Away from ‘Internet Kill Switch,’” PcMag.com 
(21 June 2010), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2365393,00.asp. 
694 Jameson, Postmodernism, 38.  
695 Galloway, Protocol, 29. 
696 Ibid., emphases mine. It should be further noted that US nuclear policy itself has adapted to 
the new paradigm of what Galloway calls the distributed network. Jonathan Schell perceptively 
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analyzes this structural and systemic change in policy in The Seventh Decade, noting Donald 
“Rumsfeld’s most famous articulation of this new strategic uncertainty principle was that you 
must plan not only for the ‘known unknowns’ but for the ‘unknown unknowns.’ In the last 
analysis, the target of the nuclear arsenal became history and whatever it might produce—not a 
foe but a tense, the future itself” (Schell 121). 
697 It is also interesting to note that the first particularly American archival theory, articulated in 
T.R. Schellenberg’s Modern Archive: Principles and Techniques (Chicago, IL: Society of 
American Archivists, 1956), emerged in the aftermath of World War II to account for the 
massive number of government documents that were produced during the war. For a brief history 
of archival theory, see John Ridener, From Polders to Postmodernism: A Concise History of 
Archival Theory (Duluth, MN: Litwin Books, 2009). 
698 Derrida, Psyche, 400. 
699 Derrida also gives just such (destructive) agency to archives ten years after the Cornell 
conference on nuclear criticism in Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression (1995), trans. Eric 
Prenowitz (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1996). 
700 Fernando Báez, A Universal History of the Destruction of Books: From Ancient Sumer to 
Modern Iraq (2004), trans. Alfred MacAdam (New York: Atlas & Co., 2008), 6-7. 
701 Derrida, Psyche, 400. 
702 His reading of modernism and Joyce are of particular note, and I think much can be gained 
from continuing his project of reading the pre-Hiroshima nuclear archive. See Paul K. Saint-
Amour, “Bombing and the Symptom: Traumatic Earliness and the Nuclear Uncanny”; “Over 
Assemblage: Ulysses and the Boîte-en-valise From Above,” in Cultural Studies of James Joyce, 
ed. R. Brandon Kershner, European Joyce Studies 15, no. 1 (New York: Rodopoi, 2003), 21-58; 
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and “Air War Prophecy and Interwar Modernism,” Comparative Literature Studies 42, no. 2, 
Comparative Cultural Studies (2005): 130-61. 
703 Walter M. Miller, Jr., A Canticle for Leibowitz (New York: Harper and Row, 1959), 11.  
704 Similar post-nuclear misreadings occur in Russell Hoban’s Riddley Walker (1980) and Will 
Self’s The Book of Dave: A Revelation of the Recent Past and the Distant Future (2006). 
705 For a brief history of the literary representation of the destruction of books and archives, see 
Báez, 188-198. 
706 Carolyn Steedman, Dust: The Archive and Cultural History (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers 
University Press, 2002), 164, emphases in original. 
707 Derrida calls this the “absolute epochē” of the nuclear age (Psyche, 401). 
708 Berger, 5-6, emphases in original. 
709 Ibid., xiii. 
710 This eschatologically anticipatory archival project is not limited to literary fiction. For 
example, in 1989 it was reported that the Internal Revenue Service, an immense archival 
institution, has a plan in place to continue to collect taxes after a thermonuclear war. See 
“Nuclear War Plan By I.R.S.,” The New York Times (28 May 1989), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
1989/03/28/business/nuclear-war-plan-by-irs.html. The US National Gallery also has a “special 
archive” whose goal is the preservation of works in the wake of a national catastrophe. See Ned 
Martel, “Curator Andrew Robison Decides what goes into National Gallery’s Emergency Box,” 
The Washington Post (14 August 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/curator-
andrew-robison-decides-what-goes-into-national-gallerys-emergency-box/2011/08/08/ 
gIQAUTVsFJ_story.html. 
711 Benjamin, Illuminations, 256. 
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712 Derrida, Psyche, 393. 
713 Derrida, Psyche, 400. 
714 It should also be noted that David Mamet has had a much publicized rift with his previously 
held liberal-democratic viewpoints that has caused him to embrace neoconservatism. See David 
Mamet, The Secret Knowledge: On the Dismantling of American Culture (New York: Sentinel, 
2011) and Jordan Michael Smith, “Was David Mamet Ever Really a Liberal Anyway?” The Awl 
(20 June 2011), http://www.theawl.com/2011/06/was-david-mamet-ever-really-a-liberal-anyway. 
715 One might also suggest that the novel does this to an offensive degree, which may account for 
the roundly negative reviews it has received. See John Fortune, “Footnotes and Fancy Free: The 
Question is This: Is David Mamet’s Wilson a Work of Genius or a Vast Pile of . . . ?” The 
Observer (27 Feb. 2000), http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2000/feb/27/fiction.davidmamet. 
716 David Mamet, Wilson: A Consideration of the Sources, Containing the original Notes, 
Errata, Commentary, and the Preface to the Second Edition (Woodstock, NY: The Overlook 
Press, 2000), back cover. 
717 Ibid., xiii. 
718 Ibid., 20-21. 
719 Ibid., xiv. 
720 Neal Stephenson, Anathem (New York: William Morrow, 2008), 60. 
721 Ibid., 15. 
722 Ibid., 712. 
723 Charles Stross, “Palimpsest,” in Wireless (New York: Ace, 2009), 282. 
724 Ibid., 272. 
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725 “Hyperarchive” is a term that I think nicely designates an archive whose goal, whether stated 
or not, can be seen in an attempt to gather together as many documents and texts as it can, 
regardless of content. 
726 Stross, 250. 
727 Ibid., 249. 
728 Ibid., 289. 
729 Ibid., 301. 
730 Ibid., 287. 
731 Derrida, Paper Machine, 15. 
732 Ibid., 17, emphasis in original. 
733 Derrida, Psyche, 400. 
734 On Gordon Bell’s project to document and record his entire life, see Alec Wilkinson, 
“Remember This?” The New Yorker 83, no. 14 (28 May 2007): 38-46, http://www.newyorker. 
com/reporting/2007/05/28/070528fa_fact_wilkinson?currentPage=all.  
735 Galloway and Thacker, 118. 
736 From James Cameron’s 1991 film Terminator 2: Judgment Day, in which NORAD became 
self-aware and began to eradicate humanity, to the disaster spectacles of Roland Emmerich, to 
the revivification of the zombie genre—see in particular Sarah Juliet Lauro and Karen Embry’s 
quite compelling essay, “Zombie Manifesto: The Nonhuman Condition in the Era of Advanced 
Capitalism,” boundary 2 39, no. 1 (Spring 2008): 85-108—to the ecological disasters of Kim 
Stanley Robinson or Margaret Atwood’s Oryx and Crake (2004) and The Year of the Flood 
(2009), there has been no shortage of diverse, multiplicitous, and seemingly ubiquitous disaster 
narratives during the second nuclear age. 
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737 Jameson, The Ideologies of Theory, 573. 
738 See RichardGrossman.com, http://www.richardgrossman.com/breeze_avenue/. 
739 For some interesting beginning efforts to delineate the mega-narrative as a field of study, see 
Pat Harrigan and Noah Wardrip-Fruin eds., Third Person: Authoring and Exploring Vast 
Narratives (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2009). 
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